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December 9, 2016
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November 14, 2000
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June 26, 1983
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o~;rQe~1 For Release 200~~b TILE TREAT Inside the Soviet Military Machine. By Andrew Cockburn. 338 pp. New York: Random House. $16.95.- HE debate over America's defense policy and budget is all too often conducted in hyperbole. The Kennedy "missile gap" and the Reagan "window of vulnerability":frightened Americans into believing that the Soviet Union had leaped ahead of the United States in military power. In both these cases, as in Others, more sober investigation revealed the facts to be considerably less threatening;-but only after full political advantage .had beentaken--of_the. public's fears. The propersoleof intelligence sw glvean&ccurate picture of potential adversariesmeithererated nor minimized. iBut since the'easiest things to - cotmt are tangible forces and weapons andthe hardest am military readiness, effectiveness, .discipline and will ,to fight, the .tendency is to rely more -on the former -than the latter. In addition, the role of intelligence is generally as- sumed to be to assess only the adversary, rather than to compare his capabilities against our own. That function, called "net assessment," has.had a very hard time finding a hospitable home in American in- telligence. The National Security Council did the job for a short time in the early Nixon years ; then the Pen- tagon took it over. Had net assessment evaluations been entrusted to an independent body, the official view of the balance of power might have differed from the Defense Department's recitation of the "hard `facts"-of Soviet weaponryand forces and the counter- forces and counterweapons required byoour-side. "The Threat" by Andrew Cockburn is a major contribution to net assessment. ? In the United States, any major strategic:question must be discussed and settled in public. The debates over the B-1 bomber, the MX missile, additional car- rier task forces - all are examples-of Congress's par. ticipation in basic strategic decisions. Thus net as- sessment must be a public process that balances what we know about our adversaries against our knowledge of our own forces. Mr. Cockburn, a journalist specializing inmilitary affairs. adds greatly to public understanding of Soviet strength by going beyond mere numerical evaluation to the human factors behind the numbers. He has in- terviewed former members of the Soviet military now in the West and collected other information about the performance of Soviet forces and weaponry. And he ? concludes that the Soviet armed forces are far less of a menace than usually pictured. He reminds us that Murphy's I.aw_can apply to the Russians as well as to ourselves. "The Threat" cites the abominable discipline and widespread drunkenness of Soviet ground forces and the lack of any substantial noncommissioned officer class to provide battlefield leadership at the small unit level. Instead, Soviet officers are expected to perform many of the duties that Western armies, with great ef- ficiency, delegate to sergeants. 'Moreover, deficien- cies are covered up throughout Soviet ranks to prevent word of weakness from rea ing the top, Mr. Cockburn dissects the for- midable total figure for the Soviet armed forces, some 5.8 million, to demonstrate that it is not directly comparable to our smaller number. Nearly a mil- lion members of the Russian armed forces are construction and railroad personnel, jobs that are not included in our de- fense . establishment. Many other pgsitions,. in categories like .air defense, internal se- I -curtty.and border controldoaot appear in any -number 2n bur dor+ces:~ltareover; the`Russlans" PPtly Tequire''far greater .numbers of people than we do to accomplish the sametasks.'For -example, there are 250,000 men and women serving in theSoviet Ministry of Defense, compared to about 60,000 at our Washing- ton headquarters level. By Mr. Cockburn's calculations, about two million men would actually fight on each side in case of war. Mr. Cockburn points to sub- stantial weaknesses in the com- bat effectiveness of Soviet tanks, aircraft and ships. He analyzes the Soviet Union's poor maintenance and its emphasis on parade-ground-ready equip- ':ment .at -the - expense of -opera- tional readiness; aircraft and tanks are parked when they might be used for training, and ships spend much time at an- chor. - WHILE Mr. Cockburn sometimes overstates the tendency of the military establishments on both sides to paint a frightening Pia ture of each other and so insure continued appropAations and perquisites for themselves, his analysis is a healthy antidote to the usual hyperbole of our politi- cal debate, which portrays the Soviet Union as all powerful and the United States as relatively weak. This book can help move us toward a more consistent and sensitive process of net assess- ment that will provide a more realistic evaluation of the readi- ness, effectiveness, discipline, -will and training of the two .sides. But that s_ssessment must -also. include- nclude an awareness, missing from --"Tree --Threat,"' - that the weaknesses Mr. Cock- burn finds an-the Soviet forces were there ,during their bloody campaigns against Hitler, whose brilliant officers, spenn_ did noncommissioned officers and perfect-discipline could not in the end withstand the raw power of the Soviet onslaught. Debunking the Pentagon's more extreme assessments of the Soviet threat does not remove the need to meet real strength - but -with the right weapons, not carbon copies of the enemy's arms and armor. ^ _ William E. Colby was Director of the Central Intelli- gence Agency from 1973 to 1976. Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500070011-7 Approved For Release 2001/03/IJI~` STATINTL :Colby and the freeze You don't have to." .cooing white dove to be against nuclear madness. William E. Colby pro- claims himself "an unreconstructed cold warrior." And Colby advocates a bilateral nuclear freeze. Colby was director of thakfrom 1973 to 1975. "At the CIA," he told The New York Times, "it became obvious to me that the real function of intelligence is not to win battles but to help with the peace, to avoid the kind of destabilizing sure that can occur. . _ "It is clear to me," Colby said, "that the arms race has us on the verge of another one of these terrible destabilizing steps that is moving us toward a hair-trigger world with all this talk of launch under attack. My God, we're talking about the fate of the world." To Colby, nuclear war is not a political issue; it is a practical matter of staying alive. He has not aligned himself with organizations that promote the freeze, although he assisted U.S. Catholic bishops in drafting their freeze endorsement. Instead, Colby conducts his own speaking tours and writes news- paper columns on the -subject. At the same time, he supports the Reagan administration's stand in El .Salvador and staunchly defends the propriety of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It. is not the first time that Colby has strayed from the party line to support a principle. In 1975, Colby went to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and exposed "the family jewels," the CIA's supersecret domestic spying operations. He also turned over to the committee evidence that former CIA director Richard Helms had lied to Congress about the extent of CIA involvement in the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Al- lende. As a result of those actions, Congress tightened the reins on the CIA's heretofore independent oper- ations. Helms was prosecuted for his lies. He pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor charge of false testimony and slipped silently from public life. Colby has made numerous Washington enemies as he battles for personal principles, but he retains their respect. Unlike too many people in govern- ment, one never has to doubt.Colby's sincerity in what he says. "I think it's time for people to take this (nuclear) matter away from the (government) priesthood that has gotten us into this mess," Colby told a Georgetown University audience recently, "and to simply insist that we, stop building these things." Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500070011-7 For Release 2001W8/0fGRr 'AP91-519d14 bb 14 June 19S - Ex-C.LA.. Head Now Works fo a Nuclear Freeze By PHIL GAILEY Spe aitoTDeNewYorkT1mea WASHINGTON, June 13 - Eight years ago, while this city was under- going its post-Watergate cleansing, William E. Colby did something un- usual for a director of Central InteW- gence. He disclosed the agency's "family jewels," as its dark secrets and illegal activities were called by insiders, be- fore a Senate committee. At the same time he turned over to the Justice De- partment the findings of an internal inquiry that led to the prosecution of Richard Helms, one of his predeces- sors, for lying to Congress about C.I.A. activities in Chile. - The agency's old guard reacted with harsh accusations and innuendoes. Some, including James J. Angleton, who had been ousted as head of coun- terintelligence by Mr.. Colby, sug- gested at the time that he might be a Soviet mole; others accused Mr. Colby of paralyzing the agency's abil- ity to conduct covert operations by kneeling before the Senate Select Committee on intelligence as if it were, in the words of one former G.I.A. director, "a mourner's bench." President Ford asked for Mr. Colby's resignation in late 1975. These days Mr. Colby, who prac- tices international law here, is again playing a surprising role for a former director of Central Intelligence. He has joined the public debate on nu- clear arms control on the side of the Catholic bishops and the nuclear freeze movement, and this has brought a new round of criticism of Mr. Colby by some of his old C:I.A. colleagues who never forgave him for opening the agency's black bag to the world. After he ;%,n ated C.I.A. Di- can occur. It is clear to me that the rector in 19tiwar groups tacked arms race has us on the verge of -an- up posters in Washington labeling Mr. other one of these terrible destabiliz- Colby a "murderer" and war criminal ing steps that is moving us toward a for his role in directing operation hair-trigger world with all this talk of Phoenix, an effort to identify and re- launch under attack. My God, we're cruit or imprison leaders of the Viet- talking about the fate of the world." cong,in South Vietnam. Some 20,000 If Mr. Colby's former colleagues in Vietcong "suspects" were killed dur- ' the intelligence community are per ing the .operation. Mr. Colby told a plexed by the latest public role of this House-committee that there had been man who calls himself "an unrecon- some "excesses" despite his rules .against illegal killings, but he insisted that the program had, on the whole, been successful. : Still, Mr: Colby was shaken by sug- gestions that he had condoned politi- cal assassinations. "How does it feel to be married to a war criminal?" he asked his wife when the posters went up. - ,$is public tribulations were matched by his personal grief. In 1971 his eldest daughter died in Washing- ton after a long illness, and friends say Mr. Colby, who was stationed in Viet- nam during the years her health was deteriorating, felt a sense of guilt for not having spent more time with her. Practical and Moral Aspects Mr. Colby, whose poker player's face rarely betrays his emotions or private thoughts, nodded slightly as a reporter repeated this speculation about why he went from the cold to the freeze. "If I were taking the other side, no- body would bat an eyebrow about it," he said. "I felt this way long before the bishops' letter came out and, in fact, I helped to some degree in ex- plaining the issue to Catholic groups. I figure the priests can take care of the moral aspects and I'll talk about the practical aspects." Mr. Colby, who is waging his per- sonal freeze campaign on the speak- ing circuit and in newspaper columns, contends that 'his antinuclear activi- ties are "a logical extention of what I was doing in the intelligence busi- ness." He goes on: "At the C.I.A. it be- came obvious to me that the real func- tion of intelligence is not to win battles but to help with the peace, to avoid the kind of destabilizing surprises that structed cold warrior," so are some liberals who-have welcomed him into the ranks of the nuclear freeze move- ment despite his support for the Rea- gan Administration's policies in El Salvador and his unwavering defense of American involvement in Vietnam. James R. Schlesinger, a former G.I.A. director, said that the freeze movement, "if anything but a political gesture, could be detrimental to the overall military balance." He said he did not doubt his former colleague's sincerity, but, like .some other mem- bers of the national security com- munity, said he felt that Mr. Colby's words were taking a turn toward stri- dency. Mr. Schlesinger, Secretary of De- fense in the Nixon and Ford Adminis- trations, said he read with dismay Mr. Colby's recent remarks to an antinu- - clear group at Georgetown Universi- ty. Mr. Colby told that audience: "I think it's time for people to take this matter away from the priesthood that has gotten us into this mess and to simply insist that we stop building these things." In an interview, Mr. Schlesinger said: "I get restless, and I. suspect others do too, over firebrand com- ments about . a supposed nuclear priesthood. Bill knows better than that. Discussions regarding nuclear - strategv have been ouite open, more . meat to his Roman Catholic faith and a sense of guilt from some of the most . paintul periods of his life. Known as a'Soldier-Priest' "My position is a little incongruous for a former C.I.A. man, and I under- stand that," he said, adding that, con- trary to what some are saying, neither religion nor guilt brought him' to his present view. Still, friends and critics alike, -in- cluding two former directors of Cen- tral Intelligence, suggest privately that Mr. Colby, known around the C.I.A. as the "soldier-priest," may be motivated in part by his deep commit- Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500070011-7 STATINTL ApprpEQrV001 /03/06: CIA-RDP91-00901 UIi PLC B -- WASHINGTON POST - This President Wants Silence By Cthsors . ... officials for .life. ''By Frank Snepp TVt THEN THE SUPREME Court ruled against me' in t 7M1980 and upheld the enforceability of government secrecy agreements, my father - who is a conservative superior court judge - predicted that "one of these days some patriot in'the White House will realize the power the Brethren have given him," and saddle us with a system of censorship such as we've never seen in this country. My father has been proven right. President Reagan, cit- ing Snepp u. U.S., has decreed that every bureaucrat "with authorized access to classified information shall be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement.....- . ? This order will obligate some bureaucrats to submit all work-related writings for government censorship for the rest of their lives. And the Supreme Court made clear in _?my case that these government workers won't given have Ito sign secrecy agreement to become censorship candi- dates. All they have to do is get assigned to an official "position of trust" with "conceded access to confidential sources and materials."From that point on, .they're Vim- plicitly obligated not to publish anything, classified or not, about their work, without official approval. Forever; In a "fact sheet" attached to the Reagan order, the Jus- tice Department reminds all bureaucrats of this implicit "fiduciary duty." This clears'the way for a censorship sys tem that is virtually open-ended. Steven Garfinkel, the official responsible for monitoring governmentwide security programs, has conceded to`Con. . gress that though he can't say for sure how many buiresu- crats traffic in classified information, at least 65=official departments and agencies do. The mind boggles at the potential number of gag victims this estimate implies. The 11 agencies that make up the U.S. intelligence communi- ty, by themselves, are 200,000-strong. In practical terms, if the Reagan order is enforced, many of the turnstile bureaucrats who come and.go with Will thel look favors former reps partment c the State U :Would- ti atGeorgeto, brace such r Patrick or R Would th t" V- rronn the STATINTL Heritage Foundation who've served the Rea- gaii Vhite House be happy about being cen- sored.;by the liberal constituents of a Mon- da'1e, Tenn or Cranston!administration' .;Xoudon't need a :definitive answers to these-questions to view the Reagan order as. ill-conceived and dangerous. .3c -;Predictably, the administration has had a problem selling its scheme. Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard Willard, principal author of the Reagan directive, initially claimed that the secrecy agreements were needed to stem a flood tide of leaks which "has, .increased in severity over the past dec- ade.,.But then Garfinkel, the government's designated auditor of leaks, conceded to a congressional subcommittee that only a half- dozen. leaks had been reported to his office in the,-past three years. --,Willard tried to recoup. In a TV interview, he said it wasn't the quantity or severity of leaks that necessitated the gag rule. Rather, it was the worries of our allies - their "lack of confidence in our government's ability to keep secret important information...." .,;Since most of our allies (witness the Brit- ish) have far more stringent secrecy regula- tions than we do - and far more serious se- curity problems - Willard's attempt to jus-. tify:the Reagan directive is a token of how desperate his case has become. And no won- der..Numerous authoritative voices have been raised against its assumptions. . 'Writing in Foreign Policy last fall, former CIA .;Director Stansfield Turner ? declared: "Fortunately, while several leaks about actual espionage in the past six or seven years have involved serious breaches of security, very lit- tle-information harmful to U.S. intelligence interests has been revealed. In short, the im- pression that intelligence agencies cannot keep secrets is highly exaggerated." . -Former Deputy CIA Director Bobby Inman has also cast doubt on the wisdom of the administration crackdown. Last winter he told .U.S. News & World Report that the Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500070011-7 ARTICLE ON PAGE d For Release 2001 _ ='10901 RO STATINTL. Angelo Codevilla is a professional staff member with the Senate Intelligence Committee. Previously, he was a foreign service officer and a fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. Dr. Codevilla has written widely on European politics and in the field of intelligence and military policy. STATINTL States expects of its intelligence services or what they are to t accomplish in order to meet the STATINTL By focusing so exclusively on rules and standards of operations, the intelligence debate of the mid-1970s did no answer the fundamental question of what the United challenges of the 1980s. STATINTL The Substance and the Rules Since the early 1970s, this country's intel- ligence agencies have been asking, "What does the country expect of us?" That ques. tion had not arisen in the postwar period be- cause the American political system had left the agencies to the total discretion of those appointed to lead them. In the early 1970s, factional conflict among those leaders spilled over into a national debate about what America's practitioners of intelligence ought to have foremost in, mind. That debate con- tinues. Recently, Admiral Stansfield Turner, President Carter's Director of Central Intelli- gence, and his former special assistant, George Thibault, published an attempt both to answer that question and to indict the Rea- gan administration's handling of intelli- gence. The author's answer seems to be that the American people expect their intelligence agencies to be as innocuous as possible. They charge that the Reagan administration is undermining the agencies by loosening too many restrictions. The authors thus contend that for our civil liberties' sake, and for the sake of the agencies' own standing in the country, the agencies ought to concentrate on formulating for themselves the right kinds of rules and restrictions. However, tine would not suspect from Turner and Thibault's arti- cle,that the rules by which intelligence offi- cers live ought to flow from the intelligence profession's substantive requirements. Nevertheless, in intelligence as in other areas of government, the American people rightly want their employees to accomplish the functions for which they are paid. This author will argue that Stansfield Turner is Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000?6