CIA 'BEST IN WORLD,' EX-DIRECTOR SAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: March 27, 1980
• Content Type: NSPR

STATI NTL
Approved For Release ?PLCUINS7CI:iglIciTp9A1)-00901R00
27 March 1980
n world, examdirector say.
? Former Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby -
said yesterday at Muhlenberg College that he believes the CIA is
"the best in the world" despite its decline in credibility and
respect in the eyes of the public..
, In fact, Colby said during his visit under, the sponsorship of
the student cultural affairs organization Free University that a
weakened CIA over the past 20 years might well have resulted in
the loss to cOmmunism af several Western European countries.
Further, he .opined that the effectiveness of the agency
probably has prevented the outbreak of World War III -- a
devastating nuclear tragedy.
Nowa private lawyer in Washington, Colby defended the
concept of an effective intelligence network in a free society. But
he did confess to some abuses in the past.
The CIA director from 1973 to 1976 said the agency
repeatedly tried to have Cuban Premier Fidel Castro killed, even
enlisting the aid of 'Walla types" to help. "It was one of the more ,
stupid things that we ever did," Colby told an audience of about
500 people at Memorial Hall last night.
He-addedthat one of the directives he issued upon becoming
director, in 1973 was "no assassinations." - ? ,
The former Foreign Service officer assigned to Stockholm,
Rome. and Saigon said the CIA was active in Chile prior to the
overthrow of the late President Salvador Allende, but he denied
the agency actually had anything to do with the coup that led to
Allende 's death, as has been publicised.
Colby also denied in a question-and-answer session that the
agency spied on Dr. Martin Luther King. "To the best of my
knowledge- this was never done, the former intelligence chief
said- - .
Asked about America's anticipation or lack thereof of 1
the embassy invasion that led to the capture of 50 American if
hostages in Tehran, Iran, Colby said the intelligence agency did I
underestimate the Shah's vulnerability among his people.
But he noted intelligence is not a crystal ball.,
In Afghanistan, he observed, agents reported Soviet, ac-
tivities long before the invasion of that country, and he pointed
out if agents hadn't been alert the U.S. would never have learned
about the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962. ?
"I don't think I'would go back to the CIA,- said the former
, National Labor Relations Board attorney: "J don't think its good
, to go back to anything:: ?
He would, not, however, rule out :accepting a political
;.appointment.,, ,
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STATI NTL
tit ;ARTrcE,E, Eofflit4,For Releme 419,141,3/97m; cIA-RDP91-00901R0005000
?
:7,1 PAGE / 27 MARCH 1930
,1 As a result, the proposed charter
j for intelligence agencies has become
the center of ?a fierce controversy be-
tween those?including ? President
_ Carter?who. wish to give intelligence
- agencies greater freedom to combat
threats to national security, and those
l? who fear that greater freedom for in- ?
telligence agents will mean erosion of
? civil- liberties for Americans general-.
. - . ;131:-Tli.;;;:'e-':. riubi:. of' , the'-'2.on't.ro"...V'e:rsy..:.".:21s-l'
A
?"----. .: .wh ether Americans'.should be treated-
_. ..]
, i
differently when it:comes to gather-'
.;??
:?E? ,'WASHINGTON-14f an ?American
:citizen who happens to be a close as-
. sociate ? of the- Ayatollah Ruhollah
..Khomeini has a meeting with the Ira-
' nianrevolutionary leader, should U.S.
'intelligence agents be allowed - to
:pa vesdrop?
?And what about the propriety. of
placing a Jewish American under
-1.surveillance if ? he lunches privately-
i_with the Israeli ambassador and later
.7lobbies his congressman on behalf of
Israel? Or should it be legal to keep
Jabs on an Irish American who meets
:-yrit..11. leaders of the Irish Republican
?:".Army-in Dublin, then makes pro-IRA
? :speeches in Boston? ?.? ?
In all three:of:these: hypothetical
cases,???the :American:. citizerts,, are
innocent- of criminal
?wrongdoing.. Legally, they could. not
be.. subjected to electronic surveillance
-.Or other intrusions on ? their. privacy?
by. U.S:. enforcement ': agencies
' conducting criminal investigations.
. - .
Yet whereintelligerice agencies are
:'concerned, the ? situation may be far-
.,:different. Under. current ?rules and.,
--under a proposed-new- charter being I
:?onsidered, by-Congress, intelligence
agents . sometimes can encroach -on
the privacy :of :apparently innocent
Americans in . ways never, permitted.
for law enforcements agents.
. By R-DirilIT C. TOTH
Tirrnw. 3 te44 Wri t-9.r
. .
,
itigAntelligerice information than they:.
fiithe? field- of -.1aF_*?enforcement:
put another. way, the.':.charter raises'.
the question of whether the "criminal::
standard!' that inustte inet to justify,.
any breach of, a- citizen's privacy by
police'Should.- be- lowered 'for intel-
ligence agents.
? . ' '
Lacking evidence of criminal acti-.
vity? should agents be able to eaves-
drop, on the American who meets
with Khomeini because he might;
have 'essential information- about the'
U.S. hostages in Tehran? Should the -1
Jewish American and the Irish Amer--..i
lean - be spiect?- on, becau,se . the
-
chance that they might be engaged in,i
'clandestine intelligence ? (Or terror,'
activities" even ?though they
might actually be doing nothing inore.
!than- exercising-, their constitutional
rights? ? ' - ? .;
FBI Director William IL. Webster,
former CIA chief William. Colby and '
even- some 'liberals in Congress and
the: Carter- Administration -believe
? that the answer is yes, that there--
'should be a lower threshhold for in-'
.vestigation in- intelligence cases- than
criminal. cases.. :???-?f
??.i!,`Few intelligence easeS.ever gO to'
.Webster told the Senate Intel-.;-'t
ligen c Comm it te e- c tly.------"Tar;
gets" are:usually -followed to-learn.
their' ,hontacts' ancl.'...intentions;-: and
steps' are- then tak en to neutralize Or
misinform theni and their employers
without going to court, he explained..,--
? --..".This _distinguished them.. -from . a..
CONTINUED
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tricAppApyglifm Release10M/0271iF9IA-RDP91-00901R0005
ON PAGE -77 25 MARCH 1980
'Colbyipo'ilbts Value of Any Law
F&Prioi-Natice of CLA Moyes
13rCI-IARiES MOHR e ?
Spe?c141 Ca Tre. New YoUr? , ? ,
WASHINGTON, March 24 A former
Director of Central Intelligence said
today that it would probably make little
..practical difference whether a new law
gave Congressional intelligence commit-
tees the legal right to have prior notifica-
tion of covert intelligence operations.
William E. Colby, who was the chief of
the- Central Intelligence Agency from
1973 to 1976, told the Senate Select IntelIi-
,Igence Committee that such covert opera-
' tion.s usually took time to be fully put into
reffect and that most operations in which
' he had been involved "could have been
'turned off" even if Congress learned of
'and objected to them only after they had
been initiated. ? - ? - ? ? -?
r The issue of "prior notification' has
divided the Carter Administration, which
'opposes the requirement of giving such
:notification, and the authors of so-called
? 'echarter" legislation, meant to regulate
the intelligence services. .'
Mr. Colby testified that he 'found prior
'notification to be "a rather small issue."
q-le remarked that Con,p--slonal com m it-
--rtece did not have veto power over covert
-operations or the power to approve them,
but he seemed to believe that Congress
vmold have considerable influence on any
? operations of which it had knowledge.
Effect of Objections
. "The realities of these kinds of opera-
;tions are that a Presidential decision to
'.-edopt them generally is followed by a
;.series of activities to implement the pro-
;gram. over a period of time," he said.
'Whether the committees have 'prior n
tice' or not, substantial objection to an ac-
tivity,will certainly influence the Presi
.dent to whether it should be fully_car-
Mr.Colby endomed the concept of cone.
. -
prehensive "intelligence charter" legis-
lation, calling it a"sensible middle posi-
tion" between an era when intelligence
was conducted outside the "normal con-
stitutional and legal system" and the
clamor in the 70's for ."total exposure"
and rejection of intelligence operations.
The former director indiCated that pas-
sage of such leedslation, which is opposed
by many in Congress, would make the in-
telligence. community stronger in the
long run than attempting to give it unfet-
tered freedom. He asserted that the char-
ter would avoid the danger of another
emotional backlash by an aroused public
in future years "because resPonsibility
and accountability will clearly lie with-
our constitutional authorities." -'? .
Senator Lowell P. Welcker Jr., Repub-
lican of Connecticut, who is not a member
of the intelligence committee, said in
testimony that pending charter legisla-
tion had gone too far in an attempt to "ac-
commodate" the White House and the
C.I.A. .1 .
Urging the co. iminitee to "hang tough,"
Senator Welcker shid, "Those accommoe
deems have led to the invention of a new,
lopsided wheel which sacrifices many of
the basic rights of the American people in
a misguided attempt to smooth the path
ofehe C.I.A." ?
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A0441Wease 20?P0WW61391-00901
Colby Urges Other U.S. Ageneist
To Provide Cover for CIA Agents
Associated Press
Former CIA director William Colby
testified yesterday that the proposed
new U S. intelligence charter should
requirf some federal agencies to give
U.S. i telligence agents cover over
seas.
"Theo present situation," Colby told
the Senate Intelligence Committee,
"is ridiculous and dangerous in the in-
clination of a number of government -
agencies to bar the use of their cover
for intelligence operations approved
by the Congress."
Colby said he believes the charter
should provide some way for intelli-
gence agents to act as employes of
non-intelligence agencies abroad when
necessary to cover their true intelli-
gence activities.. -
Colby said the requirement should
be attached to a 'provision already in
the proposed neve charter that would .
permit American reporters, clergy
and professors to do work for U.S. in-
telligence agencies abroad.
Sen. Lowell - Weicker (R-Conn.)
sparked a flurry when he testified
that some of the articles in leading
American newspapers about congres-
sional intelligence hearings in 1973
were written by reporters who "had
been on the payroll of the CIA or
were on the payroll of the CIA."
But later, Weicker told reporters he
did not know of any reporters who
were on the CIA payroll at the time
that they wrote the articles about the
congressional hearings.
The Senate committee and the
House Intelligence Committee are
conducting hearings on a proposed
new charter that would spell out what
U.S. intelligence agencies can and
cannot do in the future.
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STATI NTL
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THE VILLAGE VOICE
24 March 1980
..
Th',...-Slifie.pp decisionsuggets that
the governmenthos-i:if_4-4ts,:. too. :One
not to be:constantly::h0 on how
harassed ?
. ? :
saving-.the,Republtc.
. ,
.
Eliot' Fremont-Smith.
Despite the giggles in The Brethren
one must assume that the Supreme Court
knows, .in a general sense, what it's do.ing.:.
Imean,? it isn't really the nine stooges up
.ihere..Thugs maybe, but not totalrnurds..
It can tell right from wrong;
So ? it is: ineOtreCt, I would arinie;_to
?think.that in. United States v. Snepp. the.
ort majority merely :sought :vengeance;
Efor-.a.,s.a-urrilous-.book. and insurance that:
"..;.zievEir? again Would law clerks tell tales..., or
it. merely Wanted to ? contribute
'ipatriotic:.bit;.to,pe never-ending- struggle-
? ,
eagainst. Worldwide Coin niunisai: and help,
president";re-UnleashLthe C1A.J.Thesel
iia: have heen.factors, ofcthirs__the:
only' not the: whole'
cfsioiy;f. ;not...the "'Main .-Purpose
cision
the- mainPurPose of: the Supreme
,
'.:Court was to correct--or- begin to cOrrect-
Ye:major flaw in our Constitution, that part
f the First-Amendnient that can beicon--
? ? - "
.:strued as ? ;guaranteeing -.."freedom a
speech' to just about anybody,. ineltiding..
the press, While it true that in. Pre-'
, .
-.decisions :.earlier Supreme ' Court.S
thave.talloWecl:_ Certain -constraints ,With
pect; say; to military Informationand, the::
like!Jn time of .war" or `,`clearand`present_
f'dariger'',-(nOt to,Mentiori tin ongoing Sensi-.;
:-..tivitrtuie-onflicts with the Sixth AMend:-
4n.ent: and the vicissitudes of obscenity)"Ifi
is; also true that over the Years thecourt
-
'.11-as?.; fen d etri'?o ?;!-tilt'.'-etoward `Treeci-Orn'?:iif.
:-speeehe,!.:,:even implying '(in,. the Terite,d94::
Piiir'case) at: this-extends iinpOr:
.?i-?xit7gOverrirrient documents of paskpolicf'
-"aid public en icism thereof?..
i;:-..s-,7 .But I& the Present court, this liabitual::-
..tilthig-.:'ObViously-...seemi- Nnfair:.=-Y,`Sirict.
,pon stru c ti on is ra";., taken too far; if Yon/
ent,7 Servairts;iof. .the.'people:
%though, have.sOme.rights,.tOo..:.
.ozieof them' is not to:,be'cOnstantlY.
I:harassed ,:On .hovV.P, and:.why,it. is savini_th.e:i
';;Rep ub I ie7E-a n d_ certainly Or to begin .5yith),
1...hot. by former employee-S'of the servant. of
i:the:.peOPle whOse.:papPective;99.mhaess:
roper to discicAgAilt5ifithil:ftf-dF(*te
itwarpect by ez.opin
,
? - ? h - ? ? .
p4V. ?
But I kirn leaping ahead: ACtUalli, tli-e.
Suprema Court hoped to deal with the :
First Amendment suddenly and cleanly.-1
The date: :last Summer.. The case: the !
enjoinment of The Progressive from pub-j
lishing an article about the H-bomb. The;
article, apparently, was based on publiCly.;
available information, but . the writer,- a ;
lay-scientist, had put two and two togeth-
er and 'came up on his oivn with a synthesis;
-of how the bomb worked that was too close:
-1
for comfort to Edward Teller's' description ,
in The Encyclope.dio Ainericana and could;
aid .- God knows - what-. Asian or Africa6i
country-in building the bomb....Th
Could Certain ideas haying to do With what;
-America is all about be (as the lower court-I.
-judge prOclairned).classified at birth'', r..i
...-g .:,:ifyelll But fate intervened before the
-Supreme :Court could -establish the isloc,-.,
.. trine Another Another scientiSt; reasoning on the
...slY; came-up with the same H-bomb `.'se:e
..Crets'?_. in aletter to the public. press, which:'
Was -published before anyone in authority:
could do anything,- so the case against Tae
Progressive had To be dropped?.(hnporttint.
Constitutional decisions 'cannot be -ren
detedeffectively in circumstances Ithe.:.
1
PubliCi. is likely to-per.ceive. as silly) 4.
-sha.hi-e7i.".iiii.4 ? it , was ?:.-telskingle-..?-Lirg?6'...0-
..... ? :-- --.. , - ? .. ? ? ..... . ?
i:.:porturtity---2.`cut deeply, cut swiftly, "the
: old Toet said?arid now. the court would
have to operate on the First Amendment
n "a Piecemeal. fashion. 'Yet *The Progres-
. :.
..f.swe.case.was not a total loss:-in terms of
time, it set a new record for prior restraint.
se 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901
Then; in December, the court let stand'
lower court decision- awarding a. libel
-judgment against ti Work -of fiction. .1 will;
?return to this; suffice to note here-that;
:part of the -proof Of malice'-' wast
how a Character in the novel did not red
Sernble the supposed, real-life libelee..P.re:?1
,snmably,..,the court wished to concentrate. ?
.orOhe ?upcoming. Snepp :and Kissiny,er;
:cases, - since these dealt With national
terests?,:end:t.whatnot;iwhile ...73indrim- v.
Mitchel/ and Doubleday fOciised merely.'
sliterarY=imaginative':.,free-.;
. _
doin..;13ut a victory by declination, even!
thOugh it sets.zio binding legal precedents,1
is' still a victory: In a democracy, one miist!
sometimes: count on sheer' intiMidation,1
?
especially when?as the pregent chief jus-
tice has been -wOnt to note?the Suprerne'S
calendar is tiS'crOwded as it is these days;
there's hardly time tO hear the basic
-,argurnents in- a .case?and;:: indeed; with
.Snepp - the &lona broke new ground in its
. .
.qu'est for-efficiency by Wasting nOta.Single
-minute.iththe.deferise briefs. Why both]
er when there are more-important things to
do; like establishing new lawin fOotnotes?
, . - , .
rnajority
decision in United States i
nepp :ren ered- February- ,19,?1980,;
? ? - ?? ?
the main text;- very siiirole."Upon
his emplbthent.. *ith.the,CIA; -and' againl
upon his resignation;- Prank Snepi:. had'
-signed contract: agreeing i-neve'r to
dis-
,clos information ?---Or
:anything to do with intelligence operations;
:witholit . prior clearancethe CIA ...By
'r:publi.shing..,.. an:Account of ---.,Ameripa's!
:withdwa
ral from South Vietnam,', Decent
tintero'al! (Ran d om ',Rot] s e, 1977);. ,without
ii..iliinitting..-'.theria-ritiscript, for
-Clearance,. SnePpihad :violated this -con,.1
:
matterthat the government' had'
?
e cifi ca lly7d e din d to cl ai ro th a t Sneppi
_ . _
classified:. inforinati on
p-what:" was Cen s orabl e was not SnePli:s!
decision to--make Nor did the First1
-:Ainerid erit-?;;apPly:'::(S epfirRandOm'
House,' the: .of AmericanPub-i
lishers;'' American- Civil Liberties
.itlnion;had. all: aigiled ? in 'tfie_.lower courts'
tie high Cou'itiCWas...ai
'Contra t p and simple..?;.::::1
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FORTUNE
211- MARCH 1980
st.te.;
- ? -
by LOUIS KRAAR
Over the past decade, American corpo-
rations have been discovering one suppos-
edly rich foreign market after another
?only to have their hopes dashed or
diminished by unexpected political chang-
es or upheavals. But it remained for the rev-
olution in Iran, which exposed U.S.
companies to .potential losses totaling $1
billion, to drive home the lesson in global
survival. Now even the most seasoned
multinationals are looking for better
means to assess?and manage?their po-
litical risks. As Stephen Blank, a political
scientist with the Conference Board (the
leading nonprofit research group for busi-
ness), says: "Many ctaief executives got
clobbered by winging into Iran without ad-
equately understanding the country, and
they've gont! into China the sarne way.
Now a lot of them want to .improve their
grasp of the world."
Like the U.S. government, the nation's
businessmen confront greater turbulence
abroad and wield less power than. in the
past. The once-favored stratagems to shape
or even topple a foreign regime?An the
brash tradition of United Fruit in Central
America?are no longer acceptable corpo
rate practices. In lands where payoffs to
gain leverage or win contracts are custom,
ary, Americans are bound?or at least in-
hibited?by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. As one executive remarks,
"The time has passed when we could
buy or rent governments."
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IMMIX
ON PAG'
For Release
WILLIAM E. COLBY
STATI NTL
Q7 ? CIA-RDP91-009
198o
A New C iarter
or the C.I.A.
In his State of ,the Union speech, Presi-
dent Carter called .for "quick passage of a
new charter to define.clearly the legal au-
thority and accountability of our intelli-
gence agencies." He said it must guaran-
tee that 'abuses not recur but also. must
remove unwarranted restrictions on intel-
ligence and tighten controls on intelli-
gence information. He said that "an ef-
fective intelligence capability is vital to our
nation's security."
In response to the President's call, a bill
has been introduced into the Senate en-
titled "The National Intelligence Act of
1980," This bill was not produced in the
short time between the President's speech
and its introduction, but rather is the re-
sult of a several-year debate and discus-
sion over a new charter for American in-
telligence. This debate had been marked
by a series of draft proposals and substan-
tial criticism of them, from all sides. The
debate produeed a stalemate between
those who would ."unleash" the Central
Intelligence Ageney and go back to the old
days of intelligence, and those who would
festoon it with restraints andcontrols, en-
suring that no abuse ever recurred but also s
ensuring that it could not do an effective
job. The President's initiative now breaks
this stalemate but puts the debate into the
public and Congressional arena rather
than . continuing it behind -closed
doors.
Other proposals have been made to cut
through the epistemological discussion of
a whole new charter to remove several spe-
cific burdens on intelligence. H. R. 5615,
Proposed by the entire membership of the
House Committee on Intelligence, would
establish criminal sanctions for the revela-
tion of names of intelligence officers,
agents and informants. S. 2216, intro-
duced by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan
(D., N.Y.), would add to the House pro-
posal a repeal of a 1974 requirement that
the C.I.A. brief eight committees of the
Congress about anything it does abroad
other than pure intelligence gathering.
This requirement makes secrecy almost
impossible in such operations. The bill
would also free intelligence from the
workings of the Freedom of Information
Act, except with respect to individuals
asking about their own records.
This sudden flurry of movement in the
Congress with respect to intelligence is ob-
viously the result of developments in Iran
and Afghanistan. These events brought to
the Washington level the growing senti-
ment in the nation that the 1975 exposures
of intelligence went too far. The .sensa-
tional and even hysterical manner in
which those were conducted had exagger-
ated the actual record, had given grist to
the mill of America's enemies and certain-
ly exerted ,a depressing effect on the
C.I.A.'s morale and ability to carry out its
missions. Iran and Afghanistan dramatize
the fact that the United States needs an in-
telligence service in the turbulent world
...around us.
But the fact that the pendulum swung
too far in 1975 does not mean that it
should swing back entirely to its original
position. It is plain that the "old days" of
intelligence cannot be repeated. In the
United States, intelligence is no longer the
traditional spy service answerable only to
the monarch. It is instead, a great center of
information, scholarship and technology.
Even more important, the 1975 explosion
revealed the fundamental contradiction
between such a traditional spy service and
the U.S. Constitution's separation of
powers. America changed the intelligence
discipline fundamentally and has also
ended its traditional exemption from nor-
mal constitutional practice.
The new intelligence charter will resolve
the traditional contradiction. It seeks a
reasonable position between the extremes
of total 'secrecy and destructive disclosure.
The wild pendulum swing must be re-
placed by a steady center position, pro-
viding intelligence the tools it truly needs
in order to operate and the American pub-
lic the assurance that it will not become a
"rogue elephant." If the lack of precision
in the 1947 charter reflected a national
consensus .at that time that intelligence
should not. be discussed openly, the 1980
charter will reflect a new consensus over
procedures to ensure both accountability
and the tools that are truly necessary to its
Mission._ Both Presidents Ford and Carter
(and the agency itself) issued regulations
limiting its -activities and _requiring ac-
countability, but ,these were executive ac-
tions alone. :Its COngressional debate and
final votingsifie necessary issues could be
joined, alternatives clarified and compro-
rnises'sritade so that a . final charter will
reflect-a new national consensus about in-
telligence.
The draft charter reflects many com-
promises between the executive branch
and the Congress. The earlier versions
produced by the Congress over the past
several years were substantially different
from this one. The present version reflects
the gradual growth of undssstanding by
the congressicinal sponsors of the neces-
sity.of some of its provisions, higher con-
fidence in their own role of control and in-
creased public concern over undue restric-
tions on intelligence.
But the fess items of disagreement be-
tween the executive branch and the Con-.
gress will not he the dominant issues raised
in the charter debate. These more basic
questions will include whether constitu-
tional rights must be absolute, or whether
some carefully controlled exceptions may
be essential to allow intelligence to per-
form its function to protect the Constitu-
tion. The charter bars the use of covert in-
ONT I NUED
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telligence against an American citizen out-
side the United States except in counter-
intelligence or counterterrorism cases
when he is a suspect, or in "extraordinary
cases" approved by the President after
National Security Council review.
Another issue will be the degree to
which intelligence officers should have a
free hand, be subject to control and ac-
countability for individual operational de-
cisions or be restricted absolutely from
some activities. For example, the charter
flatly bars the use of American media,
academic or religious cover for intelli-
gence operations but establishes a specific
system of accountabilty and approval for
covert political and paramilitary opera-
tions.
A third major issue will be the degree of
protection of intelligence secrets against
those who would reveal them. The charter
reflects a compromise that would punish
anyone with official knowledge of the
identities of our intelligence officers,
agents and sources, who reveals them as
the former agent Philip Agee did. The
Moynihan and House bills would extend
the punishment to anyone who reveals
them with specific intent to impair or im-
pede U.S. intelligence activities, striking
at a cottage industry doing just that in
Washington.
A still unresolved issue is whether the
executive?branch has the ultimate author-
ity to decide what should be released to
Congress. This has not yet been compro-
mised in the charter draft. It does reduce
the committees to be briefed from eight to
two, but it provides that Congress has a
right to all information about intelligence
and can decide what should be released to
the public. This provision will undoubted-
ly be compromised in the final text, as it
was in previous Congress-executive con-
frontations, by a sensible provision that
leaves the ultimate question specifically
unanswered, but establishes procedures of
consultation that make .it unlikely that
such a naked confrontation will occui.
The charter does permit the exemption
of intelligence material from the normal
workings of the Freedom of Information
Act, ending the absurd situation in which
our nation's intelligence services were re-
quired by law to respond tO requests from
Eastern Europe about their secrets. It will
have to respond with respect to individual
citizens asking about records with their
own names upon them.
A fine point of distinction has been
drawn as to whether Congress will be in-
formed prior to certain intelligence opera-
tions or whether they will be informed in a
"timely manner," immediately after the
decision to initiate them. This is hardly a
major issue as the practicalities are that
the "timely" provision will ensure that the
Congress will be aware soon enough to ef-
fect or even to reverse a decision to launch
an intelligence action. The requirement of
prior warning could either delay action or
force consultation and generate opposi-
tion in Congress before the President has
even made up his own mind whether or
not to proceed.
Each of these provisions, whether com-
,promised between the executive branch
and Congress or whether still the subject
of different positions, will be debated by
the contrasting interest groups affected or
concerned by them. This raises the danger
that the public debate can become bogged
down between extreme positions, as the
debate between Congress and executive
has been for the paSt several years.. In this
situation, the choice can become no char-
ter and a continuation of the present un-
satisfactory situation, or a quick turn to
the Moynihan proposals. These are trans-
parently necessary, however incomplete
they are, but their chief drawback is that
they suggest a mere return to the "old
days" of intelligence operations. The op-
portunity to form a new national consen-
sus can thus be lost because of the intran-
sigence of individual interest groups. This
could later produce another swing of the
pendulum against intelligence, left with-
out clear guidance and in confusion in the
interim. Now is the lime to make the com-
promises to form a new national consen-
sus, giving the intelligence community its
marching orders under our constitutional
system, and let it get back to work.
((William E. Colby was director of the
central Intelligence Agency from 1973 to
1976.?
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STATINTL
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OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS
NEWS SERVICE
STATINTL
DISTRIBUTION II
Date. 12 March 1980
Item No. 2
Ref. No.
R A .CICEEVZYV A0584 STATINTL
UM-COLeY1140
iCOLBY DENIES CIA INVOLVED IN IRANIAN TORTURE
VANCOUVER5 BRITISH COLUMBIA (RP) - WIL1 COPY SAYS THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKED WITH SAVA6 THE IRANIAN SECRET POLICES IN
COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION5 Iht
INVOLVED IN TORTURE IN IRAN.
COLBY5 WHO SERVED AS CIA DIRECTOR FR,A i TO 1YbDgNI7D IRANIAN
ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AGENCY WAS INVOLVED WITH SAVRK IN PRACTICING
TORTURE TECHNIQUES DURING THE REIGN OF OFPriSFD .DHAH NNIAMMHD
PAHLAVI.
SPEAKING TUESDAY ON A RADIO TALK SHOW) COLBY SAID THE CIA REcElvED
HELP FROM SAVAK IN MONITORING SOVIET MILITARY MOV;'MENTc.
'4AS FOR THE TORTURE AND THAT SORT OF THING, CM SURE THAT THE
7 I
ORGANIZATION) IN PART5 Oln SOME OF THIS," COLEY SAID. IM NOT SURE
HOW MUCH5 QUITE FRANKLY AND THE ONE THING I AM APSOLUTELY SURE OF IS
THAT THE LIM HAD NnTHING TO DO WITH IT NOT-U.
I KNOW THAT FOR A FACT.
"SURE, WE WORKED WITH THE SAVAK IN ORDER TO HAVE r THP
POSTS THAT ZAVE US A UNIQUE COVERAGP OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONc."
AP-NY-02-12 0812ST
LISTENING
SOVIPT
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1
AP,Tricr_,:7:T;
o PAG
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D
THE GEORGETOWN VOIC
(GEORGETOWN UNIVERS
11 March 1980
By Philipp Borinski -
Georgetown University?s special posi-
tion within the political establishment of
this country is not any hot news. Nixon
kept referring to Kissinger and his political
circle as the '"Georgetown-set", and. in
.these days it has almost become a corn-
, _ _ _
monplace to speak -of ...the SFS?faculty
,and the GU-run "Center for Strategic and
International Studies" (CSIS), sprinkled as
they are with former high government-
officials, as a (republican)" government in
exile". What strikes, however, is the
"special relationship" GU seems to enjoy?
with a particular part of the political es-
tablishment?the CIA, or, more accurately,
the "pre-Carter-CIA".
? "Unholy alliance"- or "Entente
cordiale"? These terms appear to charac-
terize the respective viewpoints of the two
? camps in which the GU-community is split
( over the issue and who all too Often fail
to discuss it seriously. This article is meant
to shift the debate somewhat from, emo-
tional or self-righteous mutual accusations,
based on moral _and political principles;
to a more objective approach toward the
matter, based on the availalbe, for a
Voice-reporter naturally limited informa-
_
To the student-observer, the mentioned
"special relationship" presents itself mainly
in the form 'of personal bonds, on the aca:
. ?
demic level, between the CIA. and CIA-1-e-
lated private organizations :On the one side.
, and GU: on the other.:Beyond :that, how=
ever,..these "CIA-academicians" do:engage
'in 'oppp activities;chiefly- in the
context -of the current- efforts to beef up a
supposedly -impotent ,CIA- arid -of the Bush-
campaigit Finally,?.:-:the';i:CIA.: qua. CIA
operated and presumably still operates. on
:Campus7both ovettly. -and covertly: It iS
those three -:points7-academic relations";
political activities and- CIA4verations on
..Campus =that "are?worth?illuminating:1n,
trs
The Hilltop Conn&
The list of former high CIA-officers no,
associated to GU/CSIS impre
sive. It even includes two retired Direct()
of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinge
now senior adviser and chairman of
study-group with the CMS,. and Willia
Colby, a "friend, of the School of Foreii
,Service". In the "Second rank" one fin,
.names of CIA-career-officers who he
' crucial positions during their time of acti
duty: Cord Meyer, formerly station chi
in London, now senior research associa
at the SFS; Jack Maury, formerly statif
chief in Athens till shortly after the. co
of the colonels in April 1967, then leg
lative counselor to the CIA, now memb
of the MSFS-faculty; Ray Cline, forme]
deputy director for intelligence, now e;
ciitive director of the CSIS; George Cary
formerly station chief in Saigon and W?
Germany, now senior fellow at the CS.
-And Allan Goodman, professor of inter-
national politics at - the SFS, is also an
active CIA-officer, serving_ on Turner's
'presidential briefing staff.
-To-be sure, there remained a gray-Zone
between the politically oriented research-
interests of retired .CIA-officers and the
lithits GU could possibly go to in offering
these individuals facilities for teaching and
publishing, without compromising its repu-
tation for 'academic freedom and practiced
,Catholic ideals. This gray-zone was filled
Out 'by the National Intelligence Study
Center, founded and organized by Ray
Cline, and the Consortium for, the Study of
?
Intelligence,. with Cline as a prominent
.member and Roy. Godson,, professor of
governinent :at GU, as chief-coordinator.
Comprised of former CIA-people, other re-
tired government-officials and scholars of
'some . of the country's top-universities,
these organizations, according to. Cline,
"serve the' purpose of encouraging serious
study and,. writing on the role of intelli-
.
uarver uiu iio IGUILUIC LUC FIJSNIVIlity
that some colleagues of his "may privately
engage in classified research". But who
else except some "good old friends" being
still on the government-payroll can turn up
the necessary sources?
In the eyes of Father McSorley, well-
known on Campus for his pacifist opinions,
all these facts are simply a "disgrace".I
According to McSorley it is "harmful for
GU to have persons on Campus who repre-
sent an organization guilty of severe viO-1
lations of law, morality arid human digni-
ty". Only if they disassociate themselves I
from the values embodied by the CIA,
he said, may they teach here. One may well
1
assume that Father McSorley does not
stand aloof with this :view on our Campus.
In defending their presence at GU the
persons- in question themselves usually
cite its high academic calibre- and advan-
tageous _location as reasons for their de-
cision to join it. "Most retired CIA-people
want to stay in-D.C., because they cannot
do without- their. daily fix of interesting
infrornation' and" political action", _Cline
says ,,"When I started to look about for a
place with the right atmosphere, adrn nis-
trative supPortand good research facilities,
-I -discovered- thav-Georgetown,.initS kind
pf curricidum;-_facul4' and students, ,carne
=oth
-senisant!-aY
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ei.i4stitu-
.ty; .especially --between :,.the and - the
intelliizence-communitv'".,-;