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March 27, 1980
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STATI NTL Approved For Release ?PLCUINS7CI:iglIciTp9A1)-00901R00 27 March 1980 n world, examdirector say. ? Former Central Intelligence Agency Director William Colby - said yesterday at Muhlenberg College that he believes the CIA is "the best in the world" despite its decline in credibility and respect in the eyes of the public.. , In fact, Colby said during his visit under, the sponsorship of the student cultural affairs organization Free University that a weakened CIA over the past 20 years might well have resulted in the loss to cOmmunism af several Western European countries. Further, he .opined that the effectiveness of the agency probably has prevented the outbreak of World War III -- a devastating nuclear tragedy. Nowa private lawyer in Washington, Colby defended the concept of an effective intelligence network in a free society. But he did confess to some abuses in the past. The CIA director from 1973 to 1976 said the agency repeatedly tried to have Cuban Premier Fidel Castro killed, even enlisting the aid of 'Walla types" to help. "It was one of the more , stupid things that we ever did," Colby told an audience of about 500 people at Memorial Hall last night. He-addedthat one of the directives he issued upon becoming director, in 1973 was "no assassinations." - ? , The former Foreign Service officer assigned to Stockholm, Rome. and Saigon said the CIA was active in Chile prior to the overthrow of the late President Salvador Allende, but he denied the agency actually had anything to do with the coup that led to Allende 's death, as has been publicised. Colby also denied in a question-and-answer session that the agency spied on Dr. Martin Luther King. "To the best of my knowledge- this was never done, the former intelligence chief said- - . Asked about America's anticipation or lack thereof of 1 the embassy invasion that led to the capture of 50 American if hostages in Tehran, Iran, Colby said the intelligence agency did I underestimate the Shah's vulnerability among his people. But he noted intelligence is not a crystal ball., In Afghanistan, he observed, agents reported Soviet, ac- tivities long before the invasion of that country, and he pointed out if agents hadn't been alert the U.S. would never have learned about the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba in 1962. ? "I don't think I'would go back to the CIA,- said the former , National Labor Relations Board attorney: "J don't think its good , to go back to anything:: ? He would, not, however, rule out :accepting a political ;.appointment.,, , Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 STATI NTL tit ;ARTrcE,E, Eofflit4,For Releme 419,141,3/97m; cIA-RDP91-00901R0005000 ? :7,1 PAGE / 27 MARCH 1930 ,1 As a result, the proposed charter j for intelligence agencies has become the center of ?a fierce controversy be- tween those?including ? President _ Carter?who. wish to give intelligence - agencies greater freedom to combat threats to national security, and those l? who fear that greater freedom for in- ? telligence agents will mean erosion of ? civil- liberties for Americans general-. . - . ;131:-Tli.;;;:'e-':. riubi:. of' , the'-'2.on'"...V'e:rsy..:.".:21s-l' A ?"----. .: .wh ether Americans'.should be treated- _. ..] , i differently when it:comes to gather-' .;?? :?E? ,'WASHINGTON-14f an ?American :citizen who happens to be a close as- . sociate ? of the- Ayatollah Ruhollah ..Khomeini has a meeting with the Ira- ' nianrevolutionary leader, should U.S. 'intelligence agents be allowed - to :pa vesdrop? ?And what about the propriety. of placing a Jewish American under -1.surveillance if ? he lunches privately- i_with the Israeli ambassador and later .7lobbies his congressman on behalf of Israel? Or should it be legal to keep Jabs on an Irish American who meets :-yrit..11. leaders of the Irish Republican ?:".Army-in Dublin, then makes pro-IRA ? :speeches in Boston? ?.? ? In all three:of:these: hypothetical cases,???the :American:. citizerts,, are innocent- of criminal ?wrongdoing.. Legally, they could. not be.. subjected to electronic surveillance -.Or other intrusions on ? their. privacy? by. U.S:. enforcement ': agencies ' conducting criminal investigations. . - . Yet whereintelligerice agencies are :'concerned, the ? situation may be far- .,:different. Under. current ?rules and., --under a proposed-new- charter being I :?onsidered, by-Congress, intelligence agents . sometimes can encroach -on the privacy :of :apparently innocent Americans in . ways never, permitted. for law enforcements agents. . By R-DirilIT C. TOTH Tirrnw. 3 te44 Wri t-9.r . . , itigAntelligerice information than they:. fiithe? field- of -.1aF_*?enforcement: put another. way, the.':.charter raises'. the question of whether the "criminal:: standard!' that inustte inet to justify,. any breach of, a- citizen's privacy by police'Should.- be- lowered 'for intel- ligence agents. ? . ' ' Lacking evidence of criminal acti-. vity? should agents be able to eaves- drop, on the American who meets with Khomeini because he might; have 'essential information- about the' U.S. hostages in Tehran? Should the -1 Jewish American and the Irish Amer--..i lean - be spiect?- on, becau,se . the - chance that they might be engaged in,i 'clandestine intelligence ? (Or terror,' activities" even ?though they might actually be doing nothing inore. !than- exercising-, their constitutional rights? ? ' - ? .; FBI Director William IL. Webster, former CIA chief William. Colby and ' even- some 'liberals in Congress and the: Carter- Administration -believe ? that the answer is yes, that there-- 'should be a lower threshhold for in-' .vestigation in- intelligence cases- than criminal. cases.. :???-?f ??.i!,`Few intelligence easeS.ever gO to' .Webster told the Senate Intel-.;-'t ligen c Comm it te e- c tly.------"Tar; gets" are:usually -followed to-learn. their' ,hontacts' ancl.'...intentions;-: and steps' are- then tak en to neutralize Or misinform theni and their employers without going to court, he explained..,-- ? --..".This _distinguished them.. -from . a.. CONTINUED Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 STATI NTL tricAppApyglifm Release10M/0271iF9IA-RDP91-00901R0005 ON PAGE -77 25 MARCH 1980 'Colbyipo'ilbts Value of Any Law F&Prioi-Natice of CLA Moyes 13rCI-IARiES MOHR e ? Spe?c141 Ca Tre. New YoUr? , ? , WASHINGTON, March 24 A former Director of Central Intelligence said today that it would probably make little ..practical difference whether a new law gave Congressional intelligence commit- tees the legal right to have prior notifica- tion of covert intelligence operations. William E. Colby, who was the chief of the- Central Intelligence Agency from 1973 to 1976, told the Senate Select IntelIi- ,Igence Committee that such covert opera- ' tion.s usually took time to be fully put into reffect and that most operations in which ' he had been involved "could have been 'turned off" even if Congress learned of 'and objected to them only after they had been initiated. ? - ? - ? ? -? r The issue of "prior notification' has divided the Carter Administration, which 'opposes the requirement of giving such :notification, and the authors of so-called ? 'echarter" legislation, meant to regulate the intelligence services. .' Mr. Colby testified that he 'found prior 'notification to be "a rather small issue." q-le remarked that Con,p--slonal com m it- --rtece did not have veto power over covert -operations or the power to approve them, but he seemed to believe that Congress vmold have considerable influence on any ? operations of which it had knowledge. Effect of Objections . "The realities of these kinds of opera- ;tions are that a Presidential decision to '.-edopt them generally is followed by a ;.series of activities to implement the pro- ;gram. over a period of time," he said. 'Whether the committees have 'prior n tice' or not, substantial objection to an ac- tivity,will certainly influence the Presi .dent to whether it should be fully_car- Mr.Colby endomed the concept of cone. . - prehensive "intelligence charter" legis- lation, calling it a"sensible middle posi- tion" between an era when intelligence was conducted outside the "normal con- stitutional and legal system" and the clamor in the 70's for ."total exposure" and rejection of intelligence operations. The former director indiCated that pas- sage of such leedslation, which is opposed by many in Congress, would make the in- telligence. community stronger in the long run than attempting to give it unfet- tered freedom. He asserted that the char- ter would avoid the danger of another emotional backlash by an aroused public in future years "because resPonsibility and accountability will clearly lie with- our constitutional authorities." -'? . Senator Lowell P. Welcker Jr., Repub- lican of Connecticut, who is not a member of the intelligence committee, said in testimony that pending charter legisla- tion had gone too far in an attempt to "ac- commodate" the White House and the C.I.A. .1 . Urging the co. iminitee to "hang tough," Senator Welcker shid, "Those accommoe deems have led to the invention of a new, lopsided wheel which sacrifices many of the basic rights of the American people in a misguided attempt to smooth the path ofehe C.I.A." ? Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 A0441Wease 20?P0WW61391-00901 Colby Urges Other U.S. Ageneist To Provide Cover for CIA Agents Associated Press Former CIA director William Colby testified yesterday that the proposed new U S. intelligence charter should requirf some federal agencies to give U.S. i telligence agents cover over seas. "Theo present situation," Colby told the Senate Intelligence Committee, "is ridiculous and dangerous in the in- clination of a number of government - agencies to bar the use of their cover for intelligence operations approved by the Congress." Colby said he believes the charter should provide some way for intelli- gence agents to act as employes of non-intelligence agencies abroad when necessary to cover their true intelli- gence activities.. - Colby said the requirement should be attached to a 'provision already in the proposed neve charter that would . permit American reporters, clergy and professors to do work for U.S. in- telligence agencies abroad. Sen. Lowell - Weicker (R-Conn.) sparked a flurry when he testified that some of the articles in leading American newspapers about congres- sional intelligence hearings in 1973 were written by reporters who "had been on the payroll of the CIA or were on the payroll of the CIA." But later, Weicker told reporters he did not know of any reporters who were on the CIA payroll at the time that they wrote the articles about the congressional hearings. The Senate committee and the House Intelligence Committee are conducting hearings on a proposed new charter that would spell out what U.S. intelligence agencies can and cannot do in the future. STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 STATI NTL LL:,IAppro ff ( 7 9 ????? =?? ?r: n- .71 rn- rn C:OWC i'eliirtn4-r?r? n " -9 0917 7 i2.71 1"7717: 7 7 -7 .5:1.-.::: ^ 4:2? 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Wq! r n trtz: 1,7"r: 2F--PP:1-SI ;TMSIR_; MI'; 7STITOMPTS R! r0 Colsy PRIIPOSr.D criF 1.i.FINRTS IN -HF: FRT-I ;HT SR 7 i:nnnil 7 i;,"71,7711 n 791 - r?- ^!nrrOniln:1 OnO cft44 Ljnrurt.m: it flilfe.n::i ..s.t1ii .. .. 7 . : 2 7211, pJh my Pi4ARTF79 , COLBY TOLD THF SFNATF CONNTUFF THF rTiNTRY HRPJ RP:n Pn?iTiPrs RY HE ?c f;. o: rn4 AW.UCTNOa irtr4ArpletirOrlpgcruPnuc nkP4c;RpDpP-9r14c 790r1pn?; m To" Tn -r.8 i?9 ;-7" r- ourcril v f 1 P? p. r R300500080023- 1 'rig: rf I nrcnrir111 Enrpi.117:-;ricrr. 7 f ! r I 7= ir 2'4 1.. 2 2.4 1.4 2 STATI NTL Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500 THE VILLAGE VOICE 24 March 1980 .. Th',...-Slifie.pp decisionsuggets that the governmenthos-i:if_4-4ts,:. too. :One not to be:constantly::h0 on how harassed ? . ? : saving-.the,Republtc. . , . Eliot' Fremont-Smith. Despite the giggles in The Brethren one must assume that the Supreme Court knows, .in a general sense, what it's Imean,? it isn't really the nine stooges up .ihere..Thugs maybe, but not totalrnurds.. It can tell right from wrong; So ? it is: ineOtreCt, I would arinie;_to ?think.that in. United States v. Snepp. the. ort majority merely :sought :vengeance; Efor-.a., and insurance that: "..;.zievEir? again Would law clerks tell tales..., or it. merely Wanted to ? contribute 'ipatriotic:.bit;.to,pe never-ending- struggle- ? , eagainst. Worldwide Coin niunisai: and help, president";re-UnleashLthe C1A.J.Thesel iia: have heen.factors, ofcthirs__the: only' not the: whole' cfsioiy;f. ;not...the "'Main .-Purpose cision the- mainPurPose of: the Supreme , '.:Court was to correct--or- begin to cOrrect- Ye:major flaw in our Constitution, that part f the First-Amendnient that can beicon-- ? ? - " .:strued as ? ;guaranteeing -.."freedom a speech' to just about anybody,. ineltiding.. the press, While it true that in. Pre-' , . -.decisions :.earlier Supreme ' Court.S thave.talloWecl:_ Certain -constraints ,With pect; say; to military Informationand, the:: like!Jn time of .war" or `,`clearand`present_ f'dariger'',-(nOt to,Mentiori tin ongoing Sensi-.; :-..tivitrtuie-onflicts with the Sixth AMend:- 4n.ent: and the vicissitudes of obscenity)"Ifi is; also true that over the Years thecourt - '.11-as?.; fen d etri'?o ?;!-tilt'.'-etoward `Treeci-Orn'?:iif. :-speeehe,!.:,:even implying '(in,. the Terite,d94:: Piiir'case) at: this-extends iinpOr: .?i-?xit7gOverrirrient documents of paskpolicf' -"aid public en icism thereof?.. i;:-..s-,7 .But I& the Present court, this liabitual::- ..tilthig-.:'ObViously-...seemi- Nnfair:.=-Y,`Sirict. ,pon stru c ti on is ra";., taken too far; if Yon/ ent,7 Servairts;iof. .the.'people: %though, have.sOme.rights,.tOo..:. .ozieof them' is not to:,be'cOnstantlY. I:harassed ,:On .hovV.P, and:.why,it. is savini_th.e:i ';;Rep ub I ie7E-a n d_ certainly Or to begin .5yith), by former employee-S'of the servant. of i:the:.peOPle whOse.:papPective;99.mhaess: roper to discicAgAilt5ifithil:ftf-dF(*te itwarpect by ez.opin , ? - ? h - ? ? . p4V. ? But I kirn leaping ahead: ACtUalli, tli-e. Suprema Court hoped to deal with the : First Amendment suddenly and cleanly.-1 The date: :last Summer.. The case: the ! enjoinment of The Progressive from pub-j lishing an article about the H-bomb. The; article, apparently, was based on publiCly.; available information, but . the writer,- a ; lay-scientist, had put two and two togeth- er and 'came up on his oivn with a synthesis; -of how the bomb worked that was too close: -1 for comfort to Edward Teller's' description , in The Encyclope.dio Ainericana and could; aid .- God knows - what-. Asian or Africa6i country-in building the bomb....Th Could Certain ideas haying to do With what; -America is all about be (as the lower court-I. -judge prOclairned).classified at birth'', r..i ...-g .:,:ifyelll But fate intervened before the -Supreme :Court could -establish the isloc,-., .. trine Another Another scientiSt; reasoning on the ...slY; came-up with the same H-bomb `.'se:e ..Crets'?_. in aletter to the public. press, which:' Was -published before anyone in authority: could do anything,- so the case against Tae Progressive had To be dropped?.(hnporttint. Constitutional decisions 'cannot be -ren detedeffectively in circumstances Ithe.:. 1 PubliCi. is likely to-per.ceive. as silly) 4. -sha.hi-e7i.".iiii.4 ? it , was ?:.-telskingle-..?-Lirg?6'...0- ..... ? :-- --.. , - ? .. ? ? ..... . ? i:.:porturtity---2.`cut deeply, cut swiftly, "the : old Toet said?arid now. the court would have to operate on the First Amendment n "a Piecemeal. fashion. 'Yet *The Progres- . :. not a total loss:-in terms of time, it set a new record for prior restraint. se 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 Then; in December, the court let stand' lower court decision- awarding a. libel -judgment against ti Work -of fiction. .1 will; ?return to this; suffice to note here-that; :part of the -proof Of malice'-' wast how a Character in the novel did not red Sernble the supposed, real-life ,snmably,..,the court wished to concentrate. ? .orOhe ?upcoming. Snepp :and Kissiny,er; :cases, - since these dealt With national terests?,:end:t.whatnot;iwhile ...73indrim- v. Mitchel/ and Doubleday fOciised merely.' sliterarY=imaginative':.,free-.; . _ doin..;13ut a victory by declination, even! thOugh it sets.zio binding legal precedents,1 is' still a victory: In a democracy, one miist! sometimes: count on sheer' intiMidation,1 ? especially when?as the pregent chief jus- tice has been -wOnt to note?the Suprerne'S calendar is tiS'crOwded as it is these days; there's hardly time tO hear the basic -,argurnents in- a .case?and;:: indeed; with .Snepp - the &lona broke new ground in its . . .qu'est for-efficiency by Wasting nOta.Single -minute.iththe.deferise briefs. Why both] er when there are more-important things to do; like establishing new lawin fOotnotes? , . - , . rnajority decision in United States i nepp :ren ered- February- ,19,?1980,; ? ? - ?? ? the main text;- very siiirole."Upon his emplbthent.. *ith.the,CIA; -and' againl upon his resignation;- Prank Snepi:. had' -signed contract: agreeing i-neve'r to dis- ,clos information ?---Or :anything to do with intelligence operations; :witholit . prior clearancethe CIA ...By 'r:publi.shing..,.. an:Account of ---.,Ameripa's! :withdwa ral from South Vietnam,', Decent tintero'al! (Ran d om ',Rot] s e, 1977);. ,without ii..iliinitting..-'.theria-ritiscript, for -Clearance,. SnePpihad :violated this -con,.1 : matterthat the government' had' ? e cifi ca lly7d e din d to cl ai ro th a t Sneppi _ . _ classified:. inforinati on p-what:" was Cen s orabl e was not SnePli:s! decision to--make Nor did the First1 -:Ainerid erit-?;;apPly:'::(S epfirRandOm' House,' the: .of AmericanPub-i lishers;'' American- Civil Liberties .itlnion;had. all: aigiled ? in 'tfie_.lower courts' tie high Cou' 'Contra t p and simple..?;.::::1 STATI NTL A?0A-A1etTIFor Release 2001/03/07: CIA-RDP91- :1RTICLEPP:A' fi ON PAGE STATI NTL FORTUNE 211- MARCH 1980 st.te.; - ? - by LOUIS KRAAR Over the past decade, American corpo- rations have been discovering one suppos- edly rich foreign market after another ?only to have their hopes dashed or diminished by unexpected political chang- es or upheavals. But it remained for the rev- olution in Iran, which exposed U.S. companies to .potential losses totaling $1 billion, to drive home the lesson in global survival. Now even the most seasoned multinationals are looking for better means to assess?and manage?their po- litical risks. As Stephen Blank, a political scientist with the Conference Board (the leading nonprofit research group for busi- ness), says: "Many ctaief executives got clobbered by winging into Iran without ad- equately understanding the country, and they've gont! into China the sarne way. Now a lot of them want to .improve their grasp of the world." Like the U.S. government, the nation's businessmen confront greater turbulence abroad and wield less power than. in the past. The once-favored stratagems to shape or even topple a foreign regime?An the brash tradition of United Fruit in Central America?are no longer acceptable corpo rate practices. In lands where payoffs to gain leverage or win contracts are custom, ary, Americans are bound?or at least in- hibited?by the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. As one executive remarks, "The time has passed when we could buy or rent governments." -srcolizr,rifr,,:at-,--.,?,,..7,...?-- .. , . ,:. ?---,..77?,,-,,,?.,;, 11-0,:vcr,,v1A-orp,....rri6a.xiik 'rctp , m -----4,--___ , 1 ::.,..,:?.........?,Let,!.:,....:071.?,.,:f...,.. az:: t,m?.? ,Y4'1 :i,A.t$111FP-Ar; STI.T.rt-onTt'Ne3.-cenros-v IMMIX ON PAG' For Release WILLIAM E. COLBY STATI NTL Q7 ? CIA-RDP91-009 198o A New C iarter or the C.I.A. In his State of ,the Union speech, Presi- dent Carter called .for "quick passage of a new charter to define.clearly the legal au- thority and accountability of our intelli- gence agencies." He said it must guaran- tee that 'abuses not recur but also. must remove unwarranted restrictions on intel- ligence and tighten controls on intelli- gence information. He said that "an ef- fective intelligence capability is vital to our nation's security." In response to the President's call, a bill has been introduced into the Senate en- titled "The National Intelligence Act of 1980," This bill was not produced in the short time between the President's speech and its introduction, but rather is the re- sult of a several-year debate and discus- sion over a new charter for American in- telligence. This debate had been marked by a series of draft proposals and substan- tial criticism of them, from all sides. The debate produeed a stalemate between those who would ."unleash" the Central Intelligence Ageney and go back to the old days of intelligence, and those who would festoon it with restraints andcontrols, en- suring that no abuse ever recurred but also s ensuring that it could not do an effective job. The President's initiative now breaks this stalemate but puts the debate into the public and Congressional arena rather than . continuing it behind -closed doors. Other proposals have been made to cut through the epistemological discussion of a whole new charter to remove several spe- cific burdens on intelligence. H. R. 5615, Proposed by the entire membership of the House Committee on Intelligence, would establish criminal sanctions for the revela- tion of names of intelligence officers, agents and informants. S. 2216, intro- duced by Senator Daniel P. Moynihan (D., N.Y.), would add to the House pro- posal a repeal of a 1974 requirement that the C.I.A. brief eight committees of the Congress about anything it does abroad other than pure intelligence gathering. This requirement makes secrecy almost impossible in such operations. The bill would also free intelligence from the workings of the Freedom of Information Act, except with respect to individuals asking about their own records. This sudden flurry of movement in the Congress with respect to intelligence is ob- viously the result of developments in Iran and Afghanistan. These events brought to the Washington level the growing senti- ment in the nation that the 1975 exposures of intelligence went too far. The .sensa- tional and even hysterical manner in which those were conducted had exagger- ated the actual record, had given grist to the mill of America's enemies and certain- ly exerted ,a depressing effect on the C.I.A.'s morale and ability to carry out its missions. Iran and Afghanistan dramatize the fact that the United States needs an in- telligence service in the turbulent world ...around us. But the fact that the pendulum swung too far in 1975 does not mean that it should swing back entirely to its original position. It is plain that the "old days" of intelligence cannot be repeated. In the United States, intelligence is no longer the traditional spy service answerable only to the monarch. It is instead, a great center of information, scholarship and technology. Even more important, the 1975 explosion revealed the fundamental contradiction between such a traditional spy service and the U.S. Constitution's separation of powers. America changed the intelligence discipline fundamentally and has also ended its traditional exemption from nor- mal constitutional practice. The new intelligence charter will resolve the traditional contradiction. It seeks a reasonable position between the extremes of total 'secrecy and destructive disclosure. The wild pendulum swing must be re- placed by a steady center position, pro- viding intelligence the tools it truly needs in order to operate and the American pub- lic the assurance that it will not become a "rogue elephant." If the lack of precision in the 1947 charter reflected a national consensus .at that time that intelligence should not. be discussed openly, the 1980 charter will reflect a new consensus over procedures to ensure both accountability and the tools that are truly necessary to its Mission._ Both Presidents Ford and Carter (and the agency itself) issued regulations limiting its -activities and _requiring ac- countability, but ,these were executive ac- tions alone. :Its COngressional debate and final votingsifie necessary issues could be joined, alternatives clarified and compro- rnises'sritade so that a . final charter will reflect-a new national consensus about in- telligence. The draft charter reflects many com- promises between the executive branch and the Congress. The earlier versions produced by the Congress over the past several years were substantially different from this one. The present version reflects the gradual growth of undssstanding by the congressicinal sponsors of the neces- sity.of some of its provisions, higher con- fidence in their own role of control and in- creased public concern over undue restric- tions on intelligence. But the fess items of disagreement be- tween the executive branch and the Con-. gress will not he the dominant issues raised in the charter debate. These more basic questions will include whether constitu- tional rights must be absolute, or whether some carefully controlled exceptions may be essential to allow intelligence to per- form its function to protect the Constitu- tion. The charter bars the use of covert in- ONT I NUED Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 2 App oved For Release 2001/03/07: CIA-RDP91-00901.R000500080023-3 telligence against an American citizen out- side the United States except in counter- intelligence or counterterrorism cases when he is a suspect, or in "extraordinary cases" approved by the President after National Security Council review. Another issue will be the degree to which intelligence officers should have a free hand, be subject to control and ac- countability for individual operational de- cisions or be restricted absolutely from some activities. For example, the charter flatly bars the use of American media, academic or religious cover for intelli- gence operations but establishes a specific system of accountabilty and approval for covert political and paramilitary opera- tions. A third major issue will be the degree of protection of intelligence secrets against those who would reveal them. The charter reflects a compromise that would punish anyone with official knowledge of the identities of our intelligence officers, agents and sources, who reveals them as the former agent Philip Agee did. The Moynihan and House bills would extend the punishment to anyone who reveals them with specific intent to impair or im- pede U.S. intelligence activities, striking at a cottage industry doing just that in Washington. A still unresolved issue is whether the executive?branch has the ultimate author- ity to decide what should be released to Congress. This has not yet been compro- mised in the charter draft. It does reduce the committees to be briefed from eight to two, but it provides that Congress has a right to all information about intelligence and can decide what should be released to the public. This provision will undoubted- ly be compromised in the final text, as it was in previous Congress-executive con- frontations, by a sensible provision that leaves the ultimate question specifically unanswered, but establishes procedures of consultation that make .it unlikely that such a naked confrontation will occui. The charter does permit the exemption of intelligence material from the normal workings of the Freedom of Information Act, ending the absurd situation in which our nation's intelligence services were re- quired by law to respond tO requests from Eastern Europe about their secrets. It will have to respond with respect to individual citizens asking about records with their own names upon them. A fine point of distinction has been drawn as to whether Congress will be in- formed prior to certain intelligence opera- tions or whether they will be informed in a "timely manner," immediately after the decision to initiate them. This is hardly a major issue as the practicalities are that the "timely" provision will ensure that the Congress will be aware soon enough to ef- fect or even to reverse a decision to launch an intelligence action. The requirement of prior warning could either delay action or force consultation and generate opposi- tion in Congress before the President has even made up his own mind whether or not to proceed. Each of these provisions, whether com- ,promised between the executive branch and Congress or whether still the subject of different positions, will be debated by the contrasting interest groups affected or concerned by them. This raises the danger that the public debate can become bogged down between extreme positions, as the debate between Congress and executive has been for the paSt several years.. In this situation, the choice can become no char- ter and a continuation of the present un- satisfactory situation, or a quick turn to the Moynihan proposals. These are trans- parently necessary, however incomplete they are, but their chief drawback is that they suggest a mere return to the "old days" of intelligence operations. The op- portunity to form a new national consen- sus can thus be lost because of the intran- sigence of individual interest groups. This could later produce another swing of the pendulum against intelligence, left with- out clear guidance and in confusion in the interim. Now is the lime to make the com- promises to form a new national consen- sus, giving the intelligence community its marching orders under our constitutional system, and let it get back to work. ((William E. Colby was director of the central Intelligence Agency from 1973 to 1976.? Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 STATINTL Approved ForRelease2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS NEWS SERVICE STATINTL DISTRIBUTION II Date. 12 March 1980 Item No. 2 Ref. No. R A .CICEEVZYV A0584 STATINTL UM-COLeY1140 iCOLBY DENIES CIA INVOLVED IN IRANIAN TORTURE VANCOUVER5 BRITISH COLUMBIA (RP) - WIL1 COPY SAYS THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WORKED WITH SAVA6 THE IRANIAN SECRET POLICES IN COVERT OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION5 Iht INVOLVED IN TORTURE IN IRAN. COLBY5 WHO SERVED AS CIA DIRECTOR FR,A i TO 1YbDgNI7D IRANIAN ACCUSATIONS THAT THE AGENCY WAS INVOLVED WITH SAVRK IN PRACTICING TORTURE TECHNIQUES DURING THE REIGN OF OFPriSFD .DHAH NNIAMMHD PAHLAVI. SPEAKING TUESDAY ON A RADIO TALK SHOW) COLBY SAID THE CIA REcElvED HELP FROM SAVAK IN MONITORING SOVIET MILITARY MOV;'MENTc. '4AS FOR THE TORTURE AND THAT SORT OF THING, CM SURE THAT THE 7 I ORGANIZATION) IN PART5 Oln SOME OF THIS," COLEY SAID. IM NOT SURE HOW MUCH5 QUITE FRANKLY AND THE ONE THING I AM APSOLUTELY SURE OF IS THAT THE LIM HAD NnTHING TO DO WITH IT NOT-U. I KNOW THAT FOR A FACT. "SURE, WE WORKED WITH THE SAVAK IN ORDER TO HAVE r THP POSTS THAT ZAVE US A UNIQUE COVERAGP OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONc." AP-NY-02-12 0812ST LISTENING SOVIPT Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080023-3 1 AP,Tricr_,:7:T; o PAG Approved For ReleasViolifigb/07 : CIA-RDP91-0090 D THE GEORGETOWN VOIC (GEORGETOWN UNIVERS 11 March 1980 By Philipp Borinski - Georgetown University?s special posi- tion within the political establishment of this country is not any hot news. Nixon kept referring to Kissinger and his political circle as the '"Georgetown-set", and. in .these days it has almost become a corn- , _ _ _ monplace to speak -of ...the SFS?faculty ,and the GU-run "Center for Strategic and International Studies" (CSIS), sprinkled as they are with former high government- officials, as a (republican)" government in exile". What strikes, however, is the "special relationship" GU seems to enjoy? with a particular part of the political es- tablishment?the CIA, or, more accurately, the "pre-Carter-CIA". ? "Unholy alliance"- or "Entente cordiale"? These terms appear to charac- terize the respective viewpoints of the two ? camps in which the GU-community is split ( over the issue and who all too Often fail to discuss it seriously. This article is meant to shift the debate somewhat from, emo- tional or self-righteous mutual accusations, based on moral _and political principles; to a more objective approach toward the matter, based on the availalbe, for a Voice-reporter naturally limited informa- _ To the student-observer, the mentioned "special relationship" presents itself mainly in the form 'of personal bonds, on the aca: . ? demic level, between the CIA. and CIA-1-e- lated private organizations :On the one side. , and GU: on the other.:Beyond :that, how= ever,..these "CIA-academicians" do:engage 'in 'oppp activities;chiefly- in the context -of the current- efforts to beef up a supposedly -impotent ,CIA- arid -of the Bush- campaigit Finally,?.:-:the';i:CIA.: qua. CIA operated and presumably still operates. on :Campus7both ovettly. -and covertly: It iS those three -:points7-academic relations"; political activities and- CIA4verations on ..Campus =that "are?worth?illuminating:1n, trs The Hilltop Conn& The list of former high CIA-officers no, associated to GU/CSIS impre sive. It even includes two retired Direct() of Central Intelligence, James Schlesinge now senior adviser and chairman of study-group with the CMS,. and Willia Colby, a "friend, of the School of Foreii ,Service". In the "Second rank" one fin, .names of CIA-career-officers who he ' crucial positions during their time of acti duty: Cord Meyer, formerly station chi in London, now senior research associa at the SFS; Jack Maury, formerly statif chief in Athens till shortly after the. co of the colonels in April 1967, then leg lative counselor to the CIA, now memb of the MSFS-faculty; Ray Cline, forme] deputy director for intelligence, now e; ciitive director of the CSIS; George Cary formerly station chief in Saigon and W? Germany, now senior fellow at the CS. -And Allan Goodman, professor of inter- national politics at - the SFS, is also an active CIA-officer, serving_ on Turner's 'presidential briefing staff. -To-be sure, there remained a gray-Zone between the politically oriented research- interests of retired .CIA-officers and the lithits GU could possibly go to in offering these individuals facilities for teaching and publishing, without compromising its repu- tation for 'academic freedom and practiced ,Catholic ideals. This gray-zone was filled Out 'by the National Intelligence Study Center, founded and organized by Ray Cline, and the Consortium for, the Study of ? Intelligence,. with Cline as a prominent .member and Roy. Godson,, professor of governinent :at GU, as chief-coordinator. Comprised of former CIA-people, other re- tired government-officials and scholars of 'some . of the country's top-universities, these organizations, according to. Cline, "serve the' purpose of encouraging serious study and,. writing on the role of intelli- . uarver uiu iio IGUILUIC LUC FIJSNIVIlity that some colleagues of his "may privately engage in classified research". But who else except some "good old friends" being still on the government-payroll can turn up the necessary sources? In the eyes of Father McSorley, well- known on Campus for his pacifist opinions, all these facts are simply a "disgrace".I According to McSorley it is "harmful for GU to have persons on Campus who repre- sent an organization guilty of severe viO-1 lations of law, morality arid human digni- ty". Only if they disassociate themselves I from the values embodied by the CIA, he said, may they teach here. One may well 1 assume that Father McSorley does not stand aloof with this :view on our Campus. In defending their presence at GU the persons- in question themselves usually cite its high academic calibre- and advan- tageous _location as reasons for their de- cision to join it. "Most retired CIA-people want to stay in-D.C., because they cannot do without- their. daily fix of interesting infrornation' and" political action", _Cline says ,,"When I started to look about for a place with the right atmosphere, adrn nis- trative supPortand good research facilities, -I -discovered- thav-Georgetown,.initS kind pf curricidum;-_facul4' and students, ,carne =oth -senisant!-aY Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901ROCOO 1ha natural_aff ei.i4stitu- .ty; .especially --between :,.the and - the intelliizence-communitv'".,-;