EX-CIA DIRECTOR TELLS HIS VIEWS BUT NOT SECRETS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500080025-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 27, 1980
• Content Type: NSPR

STATINTL ORLANDO SENTINEL-STAR
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?HOWEY-IN-THE-HILLS By his own admission,
William Colby istnondescript. `
Sitting in the lounge at Mission Inn Golf and Tennis j
Resort, quietly sipping a gin and tonic and listening to I
the house duo play "Spanish-Eyes;",.Colby looks like a
successful accountant unwinding;after a tough day at
the office:. '.,.: _.
Colby spoke, Friday night to a Lake, County Execu-
tive` Club meeting at the, Leesburg
Community Center. Colby was stay-
ing at the Mission Inn Friday night'
after his address. i
A short wiry man with graying
correct acute nearsightedness,
He,doesn't look like a spy, let
William Colby alone the former head;of the Central
Intelligence Agency who from, September 1973 until.
January_ 1976 held more secrets in. his: head than
anyone.
"Of course as each year goes bythire are fewer and
fewer. ? But I still have some," he said tapping his
temple.
Colby, 60, a career officer for the, CIA who was ap-
pointed director of the agency by President Nixon to
replace James Schlesinger, was in, turn-replaced . in
1976 by'George Bush.
Colby was director of the agency during a turbulent
period of more than three years, which saw charges of.
CIA activity behind Watergate, foreign assassination:
attempts on Castro and other Communist leaders, and-
charges of illegal involvement in domestic affairs.
He spent much of his energy as director testifying in
front of any number; of pongressional?.committees in
vestigating the CIA at the time. And Colby said it was
his willingnessto explain the CIA's role. that finally
cost him his job.. - .
"Anyone else 'night have tried to stonewall it like
they had always done in the past," he said." But I saw
the need to explain what we were doing to the Ameri-
can people.
"At the time the CIA was fighting for its. survival."
In the 25 years he served in the CIA, Colby said
there had been three revolutionary changes in intelli-
gence gathering; the centralization of intelligence in
the.early 1950s, the growth of sophisticated technol-
ogy in the. 1960s, and the realization in,the middle-
1970s that the CIA had to follow certain legal,
boundaries.
The furor that surrounded the sensational CIA rev-
elations while Colby was director has begun to die
down, he said, predicting that. President Carter's
promise of a new charter for the CIA signals an accept
tance of intelligence operations.
"The pendulum is swinging back-again, it will never
be where it was before, but then it shouldn't," he said.
Colby said he thought the biggest threat .in the fu-
ture will come from Central. America. Other "flash
points" will be South Africa and the Middle East dur-
ing the 1980s, he predicted.
"'Great power., has been a monopoly of. great na-
tions," he said. "But great power, thanks-to science
h I now comes in small packages."
and tec no ogy,
In answer to a question from the audience, Colby-
said he thought Carter would continue a gradual esca-
lation of pressure on Iran in order to gain the release
of the 50 American hostages in that country.. He said,
he thought the Iranians would let the hostages go, but
are "just looking for a face-saver."
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470'1 WAIIL.L.ARD AVENUE, C:I iEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068
STATINTL
January 27, 1980 10:30 PM CITY Washington, DC
William Colby Interviewed
NICHOLAS VON HOFFMAN: Welcome, Bill Colby.
William Colby is, I think, known to almost all Ameri-
cans as the former head of the CIA, a man who has spent most of
his life dealing with foreign policy and defense matters.
And it's a del ight to have you here, even though I
don't agree with anything you're going to say.
W I LL I AM COLBY: It's a pleasure to be here.
VICTOR LASKY: He's typically open-minded. You know
that, Mr. Colby.
COLBY: Right.
LASKY: Well, let's get down to what seems to be the
emerging pattern, as far as the congressional attitude towards
CIA. It's a new attitude. It's an attitude which takes into
consideration the feeling that there's a necessity for the CIA,
there's a necessity for operations which up to now had to be
cleared with about -- how many? How many congressional...
COLBY: Eight committees.
LASKY: Eight committees. That's several hundred peo-
ple. Arid that's absurd.
LASKY: Because every time the CIA would venture forth
with a so-callbd secret or covert operation, it would appear in
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the pages of The Washington Post the next day, or at least two
days.
COLBY: Every one that we briefed them on in 1975
LASKY: It did blow on the pages of the press. Well,
YOU know, you can't run an operation that way.
.A1hat is your feeling about the President's new policy?
COLBY: Well, I think it's long overdue, quite frankly.
For a couple of centuries we didn't think we needed any intelli-
gence. Then we adopted the foreign concept of intelligence,
which was total secrecy. And then we got surprised at that and
horrified at i t, and then we said, "Let's have total exposure."
And now we're discovering that that doesn't work either. And so
we're going back to a sensible middle course, with the consti-
tutional controls on intelligence, but not total exposure.
LASKY: We I I , I et's say -- what i f we had gone back to
that a year ago. What would be different in the world?
COLBY: WeII, I think that CIA can do various things
in various countries fairly well. It's done some good jobs.
You've heard a Iot about the failures or the abuses, but you
haven't heard about the successful ones. There were successes
in the Congo in the early '60s. There were successes in Laos.
There were successes in Western Europe in 19:50. There were suc-
cesses in the Philippines. There've been a lot of successes.
LASKY: The trouble is that what might have been suc-
cesses in years past later on might take the coloration of being
non-successes in the eyes -- at least as far as public opinion
is concerned. I would suggest to you that, without getting into
the Iranian matter, where I assume a CIA operation took effect
in 1953 and the Shah was returned to the Peacock Throne -- that
was considered a great success at one time. And now, I would
venture to say, there's a good segment of opinion that would
suggest that it was not that much of a success.
COLBY: Well, I think on a scale of history, 25 years
of good relations, 25 years of a good government, which increased
the literacy rate from 15 to 50 percent, the life expectancy of
the average Iranian from 44 to 53 years, which created a whole
middle class there which hadn't existed, which compare -- you
compare Iran and the two neighboring states of Pakistan and Iraq,
and ask which one of those three seemed to make the best progress
over these years.
Now, I'm not going to say nothing wrong ever happened.
Don't get me wrong. But I'd say 25 years of that kind of pro-
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gross, as against the turmoil that threatened in 1953 and is
there today, was a pretty good. 25 years.
VON HOFFMAN: Wel 1, let's -- just for the sake of
argument, I'll accept that with some reservations. But let me
ask you...
LASKY: I'll accept it...
VON HOFFMAN: I know you' l l accept it.
But look, what about the last year, the last two years?
What could the CIA have done, if it had been, quote, unchained,
unfettered, in 1978?
COLBY: V'ell, let's talk about when it was fettered,
which was in 1974.
VON HOFFMAN: Right. Four years of fettering, and alI
those years of unfettering.
COLBY: Well, the point is -- I'm not sure -- I'm not
going to say that just one I ittle fI ick of the wrist and every-
thing would have been all right. Don't get me wrong. But I do
say that the CIA has certainly been discouraged, to put it mildly,
from any kind of operations of this nature around the world in
the last seven years, since '73-74.
LASKY: And we're talking about, I think...
COLBY: Well, yeah, since Chile. And the gross misre-
presentation of what actually happened there. Because if you' II
look at the history, you'll find the CIA had nothing to do with
the overthrow of Mr. Allende or his death. I mean most people
say, "That's a CIA coup." It wasn't. CIA involved in an effort
to bring about a coup in 1970 for the Iong period of s ix weeks.
And then it went back to its basic strategy of building up the
decent, moderate center people, Christian Democrats, the national-
ists in Chile; not the right wing, not the military.
VON HOFFMAN: Okay. In that case, look -- all right.
I don't want to get off on Chile. But I think the question
again and again comes back to: If you were unfettered, could
you -- would you have kept the Shah on the throne? Would that
have been the pol icy? And would you have been able to do it?
COLBY: Well, the President of the United States, a
year or so ago, said that we support the Shah, but we won't in-
terfere. Now; to me that's a contradiction in terms.
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VON HOFFF'1AN: I must admit, when I heard him say that,
I said, "Well, what does that mean?"
COLBY: '.^/e l I , it means nothing.
VON H0FFi,1AN: Right.
COLBY: Because you can't do both. You've got to choose
one or the other.
[Confusion of voices]
COLBY. I have no problems about helping our friends
in other countries meet the kind of challenges from our enemies
in those countries and their supporters from the Soviet Union
and elsewhere.
VON HOFFMAN: Well, do you -- are you also sitting here
and telling me, sir, that you believe that an unfettered CIA
wou l d have been able to prevent the Ayatollah and his compa --
or his colleagues from taking power?
COLBY: To me, the r e a l l y c r i t i c a l absence i n the Iran-
ian s i t u a t i o n was that the Shah d i d not bu i l d an active po l i t i ca l
base underneath all these good things that he did. They were
practical things to be contributed. They were matched by some
things that he did were wrong: corruption, human rights abuses,
things like that. No question about it. But he did not build
the kind of active political base, for example, that Charles De
Gaule I had under h im when he faced a revolution in 1968. And he
turned a couple of political switches, and 200,000 people marched
down the Champs Elysees and said, "Stop this nonsense. We want
him." Now, that didn't happen with the Shah.
LASKY: Let me ask -- may I ask, perhaps, an embarras-
sing question. Wh i l e you were Director of the CIA, which was,
what, 173 to '76?
COLBY: Right.
LASKY: Three or four years. And you had a great deal
of knowledge of our conduct of covert activities, if they were
covert, in Iran. Did we cooperate with the SAVAK, the Iranian
secret po I i ce, to the extent where we engaged or helped them
engage in torture and all that sort of thing that we hear critics
so often manifest themselves?
COLBY: We certainly cooperated with SAVAK. For one
thing, we had those very valuable intelligence monitoring posts
on the mountains up in Northern Iran telling us what kinds of
weapons the Soviets were developing, what kind of nuclear mis-
siles, and so forth.
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So, did we cooperate with SAVAK? Yes. Did we help
thorn on torture? Absolutely not. CIA has never helped anybody
on torture. It hasn't provided the equipment. It hasn't pro-
vided the training.
LASKY: Well, I'm glad to hear that.
COLBY: The best evidence of that was Philip Agee,
no friend of CIA. And he said that at one point when he workd
for CIA he was sending some Latin American security people up
to Washington so they'd get some CIA training so they no longer
would use the kind of torture they had.
LASKY: Well, thank you, Mr. Colby. I'm going to the
audience. And I think the first question is with this gentleman.
What is your name, sir?
MAN: Dean Palevi (?).
LASKY: All right, Mr. Palevi.
DEAN PALEVI: I wanted to ask a question concerning
the po I i cy of containment . I t seems to me that the American
policy of containment has not at ways taken into consideration
democracy, and the United States has often supported regimes
that aren't necessarily very democratic.
Now, considering the fall of Vietnam and the fall of
the Shah, wou Id you say our po I i cy of containment has been suc-
cessful?
COLBY: Wet I , I' d say that a po I icy of containment
avoided a third world war for about 30 years. Now, that's not
bad for a policy. And that's exactly what it was designed to
do. It was designed to prevent a thrust by the Soviets into
the areas around them, and not put us to the position where we
had to use our military force to hold them. Now, our policy
of containment worked in that respect.
As for supporting r i g h t - w i n g and so forth. I f you' i l
look around the world, you'll find that anytime we had a choice
in a situation, we supported democratic, responsible, moderate
leaders. And if you look at the Philippines, if you look at
Japan, you look at Southeast Asia -- Diem versus who? Versus
the French puppet, versus the Communists.
We were seeking the k i nd of decent I eadersh i p -- and
it was decent leadership for a long time -- that gave us a better
hope.
Now; there are some places we never had that choice.
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I n some places there wasn't any of that kind of leadership.
And at that point the question was whether you wanted that
country to become a Communist country, failing any containment,
or whether you would be willing to support that leadership.
LASKY: Any other -- anyone else? Yes, sir?
N1AN: I'd like to ask you, Mr. Colby. I understand
from what you've said that you support -- you say you have no
problem with helping our friends in ways which you have des-
cribed. For example, that we have, as you say, helped SAVAK.
We did help them.
My question...
COLBY: Not in torture, I hasten to add.
MAN: You said that, and that was my -- that's what
I was coming to. Jesse Leaf, who used to be the CIA's Iran Desk
officer, in charge of Iranian intelligence collection, has written
in The New York Times that, in fact, the CIA was training SAVAK
in methods of torture which derived from the SS in Nazi Germany.
LASKY: Well, you know, we can get -- we can get the
COLBY: Well, you know, that's just nonsense. I can
assure you that it's flat nonsense. It may be his words, but
it's nonsense.
I know what kind of training we've given other intel -
Iigence services around the world, and I know very well that we
never taught anybody torture.
VON HOFFMAN: But you do admit you have a credibility
problem as an institution.
COLBY: Oh, sure. I don't have any problem. But I
say the best answer to your question is: Ask the Senate Com-
mittee on Intelligence. Ask the House Committee on Intelligence.
Ask them to look into it. Because they can get the individual
officers up there under oath, and they'll find out whether we
taught torture or not. And I can assure you they'll come out
and say we didn't.
Do you honestly think that after the enormous investi-
gations about CIA by the Congress, that if we had taught torture
it wouldn't have come out by now?
MAN: I think that the burning question is not that.
The burning -- because the CIA has been able to cover up so many
of its operations, and the Church Committee only uncovered some
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of t hem. There are many more that still will come out.
COLBY: The Church Committee got anything they asked
for, in terms of the operations. They didn't get the names of
the people, because we insisted that they not get the names of
the people we dealt with. But in terms of operations, they got
a fu l I exposure. And they made a fu I I investigation of the 25
years of CIA's history.
MAN: Most of the Church report is still classified,
COLBY: It may be classified. But I guaranty you,
you ask any of the congressmen and senators whether there's any
classified chapter that talks about torture. And I can assure
you there isn't.
VON HOFFMAN: We've got to break away....
[End of interview]
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16 January 1980
Defusing Future Teas
irector
e
e
IA a6P
By DAN CUPPER
Staff Writer
ANNVILLE -An emerging role
for intelligence-gathering agencies,
that ,M defusing tensions between
superpowers dnd third-world coun-
tries, is envisioned by the former
director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
' . William 'E. 'Colby, addressing
about 700 persons Tuesday at the
second-semester chapel convocation
of Lebanon Valley College, said the
"hope of the 1980s" is that intelli-
gence can be used to "spread prob-
lems out on the negotiating table."
Such problems, he said, are like-
ly to be born of a widening econom-
ic? gap between affluent and poor
nations, a gap which he considers
the most serious threat to national
security. Fueled..' by poverty and
overpopulation, he said, "enormous
pressures are building up in the
Third World.
``Until now, the great power has
been held by the: great nations.
Now, `small packages of that great
power, in .chemical, biological and
nuclear form,- are being held ' by
smaller nations?
? ',-"The gap; between poverty. and
affluence, produces' thoughts. of
envy, .and'poornations are looking
for tools to: balance the distribution
o??''tivealth. They can do this by eco-
nomic means through cartels, by po-
litical means through demagoguery
and, by violent means through tur-
nnVISIOUS
cerraaaker'
moil such as in Iran, or turmoil nar-
rowly targeted as terrorism.
"With knowledge (gathered
through intelligence), we can identi-
fy and counter policies and weapons
by showing that we're prepared. In
this way, the world is able to solve
the problems that these countries
are having."
Necessarily, he said, this in-
volves agencies such- as the CIA
lending support to, sympathetic fac-
tions. In Iran, he said, the CIA "gave
some support to the shah
(Mohammed Reza Pahlavi) to return
to power in 1953 and we've had 25
years of good diplomatic relations.
We didn't), make a garden out of
Iran, but itiwas better than the tur-
moil going on there now."
Responding to challenges and
threats requires "some alternative
between simply (issuing) a diplo-
matic protest on the one hand, and
sending in the Marines and a,.carrier
task force,orl the other," he said.
In an earlier news conference,
Colby, who headed the CIA between
1973 and 1976, said that the loss of
intelligence-gathering stations in
Iran following the rise to power of
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini will
have a minimal effect on , U.S. ef-
forts to monitor Soviet arms prolif-
eration.
It-will, take just a "short time"
before new monitoring stations are
established elsewhere, just as the
United States replaced sites lost ear-
Tier in Turkey. And "even if they
(the Russians) cheat" on arms treat-
ies, he said, "we'll be able to catch
them because it will be not too long
a time before new stations can be
established."
Despite dimming chances for its
ratification in the U.S. Senate. be.
cause of the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, Colby said he favors
the Strategic Arms Limitation Trea-
ty because it would "limit the
growth of these terrible weapons."
He also said he doesn't expect ;
the expulsion of American reporters
from Iran to have much effect.
"Information doesn't succeed in
being bottled up," he said, noting
that other news services would con-
tinue to operate. Besides, he said,
developments in Iran would be re- .
ported "through normal diplomatic
workings of communication and
transportation" and "by courageous
people."
He pointed out that when Viet-
nam came under Communist con-
trol, predictions that all news from
that country would cease proved
false. He cited the boat people, who
after their escape told the "real
facts" about Communist domina-
tion. 11111
Colby praised President Jimmy
Carter's handling of the hostage sit-
nation in Iran, calling it "resnonsi-1
ble." ' He said he approved of!
Carter's method of "gradually in-
creasing pressure through the rally-1
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ing of world opinion.
"The American people deserve
enormous credit for supporting this
kind of treatment rather than de-
manding immediate military_
'action."
He said he was "not surprised"
by the invasion of Afghanistan be-
cause of indications that he'd seen
earlier, not in intelligence reports
but in the press.. These included re-
ports of an increase in the number
of Soviet advisers in the country; of
an internal power struggle; and of a
massive buildup of Soviet troops on
the Afghanistan-U.S.S.R. border.
"When they moved, they moved
;ast, but! was not surprised;" Colby
said...,
By contrast, he said, he was
surprised by the overthrow of the
shah in Iran.
"The factual 'information was
there, but the likelihood that Kho-
meini meini would be the spark to set it
off? Nobody knew that," he said.
William E.. Colby'-.
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I
, r?
w .i* ._ I
~ ? I \ I r'``
r)Af= January 14, 1980 7:51 AM crlY Washington, U.C.
The Hughes-Ryan Bill
JIM BOHANAN: We're 30 seconds away from a look at
the situation with our intelligence gathering agencies, and
maybe a breakthrough for them. Stay tuned.
BOHANAN: Sometime back Congress decided to tighten
control of our intelligence gathering. Now WRC's Richard Day
says the pendulum is swinging back.
RICHARD DAY: At the start of the 170s it began,
evidence, stories that clouded the reputation of the once
pristine CIA. Links with the mob, attempted assassinations
of world leaders. It was tawdry stuff indeed, and politicans
were drawn to it like a magnet. The Central Intelligence Agency
was too arcane, too autonomous and even arrogant.
To slap it down, Congress passed the Hughes-Ryan
Bill in 1973, sharply curtailing the purview of the agency, if
not, in the opinion of some, emasculating it.
That bill required any planned covert missions to
be put before no fewer than eight Capitol Hill committees.
As critics of the bill said, almost a guarantee of failure.
Spread out before 150 or so legislators and their staffs,
all it needed was one leak to the media and the operation
was no longer covert.
Now, former CIA Director WI I I iari Colby is pleased
to hear that President Carter wants Congress to repeat that
act.
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ABC News Cl osOup SWIM WJLA TV
ABC Network
January 1-5, 1980 7:00 F'M CITY Washington, DC
Segment of Escape from Justice
TIM 01DRIEN: This report concerns allegations that
there are more than 200 Nazi war criminals now living in America,
and that collectively they are responsible for the deaths of as
-nany as two million people. This report will also explore how
these Nazis and Nazi collaborators came to this country and how
they have managed to stay. And it will present evidence which
indicates that some of them have been recruited, protected, and
even employed by the United States Government.
O' FBRI EN: But beyond those who lied their way into the
country, others were actually brought in. Nazis were ardent
anti-Communists, and many of them had important military or sci-
entific knowledge. Thus they were considered valuable in the
new fight against the Soviets.
SIMON WIESENTHAL: I am sure that during the Cold War
was some plan to bring such people and to use them.
O'BRIEN: Documents only recently available prove there
was such a plan.
Here at the U.S. National Archives and at government
agencies throughout Washington are stored hundreds of thousands
of documents concerning the atrocities committed before and during
World War, II. Many of these documents grew out of U.S. efforts
to prosecute Flazis. But some tell of efforts to actually recruit
them. -
ABC News has learned of one high-level intelligence
program that not only allowed war criminals into this country,
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WASHINGTON STAR (GrZE]-i I,ItTE)
10 JAiiUALY 1930
TV a_
eign Service, which is intended to
raise questions like these, questions
of diplomatic processes, diplomatic
mechanics, rather than those in the
policy area. But as the discussion
proceeded, the policy questions were
unavo-idable. And, as it is almost.
everywhere these day3, the Iranian
spectre was present.
The panelists discussing the issue
provide a fair index to the level of
participants in the symposium. They
included former CIA Director Wil-
#r~ liamColby; ormer rim assn arlits
Ex-CLX head William Colby, wort _tunker; former Ambassador
to the United Nations Charles Yost;
Thomas L. Hughes, president of the
Ily Boris Weintraub Carnegie Endowment and a former
washingtonstarStaff Wri er diplomat; and John Wills Tuthill,
former ambassador to, among other
It's one of those questions that places, Brazil. (Henry Kissinger
confront all diplomats at some time,
-and-bolts question that none-
a nuts
theless spills over into the policy
field - particularly at a time when
the shadow of Iran looms so large. ,
The question is this: When you are
a diplomat, do you maintain contact
with the opposition to the estab-
lished government in the country?
Simple, perhaps. But then the another designed to show that this is
questions start to multiply, and take easier said than done, and that, even
unusual twists and turns, and start if good contacts are established, it
doubling back on each other, and may not mean a thing to the execu-
pretty soon, it becomes a very, very Lion of American foreign policy.
delicate matter:
"
How do you decide what is legiti-
When I was serving in France in were I950s," said Yost, 'a' career di lo- sition were stirred a over the
mate opposition and what is a kooky p subject of Iran_w ere even former
fringe? At what level should any mat, some of us saw the probability fringe? Rcfiard Helms a care zr
contact be made? What do you do if that the government would fall and intelligence of IEIa ,hat as conceded
you are serving in an authoritarian that Charles de Gaulle would come that the U.S. was the victim of an
country that considers such contacts to power. We did our best to culti- ha-t ti~ence failure.
round for rave displeasure? How vate those around him. But the prob- - ~- -
g g helms, in an article written for an-'
do you make such contacts so as to lem was a rift between the United
. get the proper information you need States and de Gaulle going back be-
without making it seem that you are fore World War IL That created a re-_
encouraging the opposition to ex- sentment in the general's mind
pest U.S. support? which plagued us later."'
So when a covey of diplomatic Hughes harkened back to his days
practitioners who made up a very as deputy chief of mission in London
substantial segment of the U.S.. during 1969 and 1970, when a flap de-
foreign-policy establishment for the veloped over whether, the U.S. !
last three decades, as well as at least should close its consulate in South-
half a dozen foreign envoys to Wash- ern Rhodesia to protest the refusal
ington, got together yesterday at of Rhodesian whites to share power
'Georgetown University in a sea of with blacks.
gray-flannel pinstripes to discuss the As he described it, the American
They w iOWgi11 Ft tN1
' under the auspices of the relatively
issue, it seemed not very simple at . ambassador to London, Walter
put his appearance totally off the
record.)
Almost everyone agreed that
4TIIUED
asef20?4ih (i0 einCaAyJRDFi9i1 00901 R000500080025-1
meant that dealing with the Labor
American diplomats abroad should
maintain some sort of contact with
the opposition. But that was merely a
starting point.. Almost everyone pro-
vided horror stories of one sort of
the Conservatives. lklaanwhila, tile
Conservative opposition of.Ed,.vard
Heath, which was about to depose
the Labor government, was est+b-
lishing its own secret contacts with
Kissinger and his staff in the Ni:_on
White House, which, in contrast to
the policy of the State Department,
was tilting in favor of the Ian Smith
regime and "practicing benign ne-
glect" toward black Africa.
In that jumbled context, said
Hughes, who was the opposition?
Over and over again, the panelists
and members of the audience, which
included a large number of former
high-ranking ambassadors and State
Department officials past and
present, complained that they knew
of opposition to established regimes
that were gaining strength in their
countries and eventually took
power. Again and again, they told of
reporting this to Washington, but
being ignored by policy-makers here
for one frustrating reason or
another.
"The problem may be that at
home, at the highest levels, there is
a predisposition to see the situation
in a certain way, and a reluctance to
move away from a particular
policy," said Yost in quiet di-
plomatese.
Certainly, the most fervent argu-
:anew Institute for the Study of Dip1o government of Harold Wilson fell to
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 RO
ARTIC;L : PPr R~?D THE WASHINGTON POST
ON PAGE PARADE MAGAZINE
6 January 1980
Q. Is it a fact that Richard Helms and William Col.
by, both former directors of the Central Intelligence
Agency, hate each other so much that neither will
appear in the same room with the other? What is the
source of their enmity?-1.L., Arlington, Va.
A. Colby does not hate Helms, but Helms was.
found guilty of perjured testimony before a Senate
committee and reportedly holds Colby responsible
for releasing the "family jewels'--those CIA in-
house secrets thatsubsequently brought him down.
As director oithe CIA, Helms believed he was work-
ing for the President of the U.S.; Colby believed he
was working for the people. The difference in phi.
Iosophies is responsible for the enmity-more pro-
nounced on Helms's side than Colby's.
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080025-1
 STATINTL
Aprproved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-0
PRESS RELEASE
The United States and William E. Colby, former Director of
Central intelligence, have reached agreement on the settlement of a
dispute arising from Mr. Colby's publication, prior to CIA security
review and of a book containing information concerning
intelligence activities. Agency review of the book was required
because, as a former CIA employee, Mr. Colby is bound under secrecy
agreements to obtain o i;aere before dissemination any material
relating to CIA intelligence activities.
in August of 1977, Mr. Colby submitted a copy of the manuscript
of the book, eventually published as Honorable Men: My Life in the
CIA,'simultaneously to his publisher and to the CIA for its
pre-publication approval. In the Agency's view, these
circumstances constituted a breach of Mr. Colby's obligations.
Although the publisher received the manuscript with the
understanding that final approval for publication was subject to
CIA review, further dissemination of the manuscript occurred before
Agency approval.
The CIA had referred the matter to the Department of Justice
asking that litigation against Mr. Colby be considered. Such
litigation was averted by the agreement reached today.
In the settlement, Mr. Colby has agreed to pay $10,000 to the
United States. He also has promised to submit all materials
containing uncleared intelligence information for CIA
pre--publication review prior to release to any unauthorized person.
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500080025-1
 roved-For-Release _a0Q1103/07. CIA-R.DP91-O09Q L O.050.OO&002~ 1:-.
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
fuLL.. and complete.. settleme.nt.__oE from the,
publication of a manuscript containing intelligence information
prior to Central Intelligence Agency pre-publication review and
clearance, William E. Colby and the United States agree as follows:
1. As a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency
("the CIA" or "the Agency"), William E. Colby continues to be bound
by two secrecy agreements which he signed on July 26, 1950 and
October 1, 1958 as a condition of his employment with the CIA.
Pursuant to the terms of the 1958 agreement, he agreed, inter alia:
(i) not to publish or participate in the publication of any
information or material relating to the Agency, its activities or
intelligence activities generally, either during or after the term
of his employment, without specific prior approval by the Agency;
and (ii) not to discuss with or disclose to any person not
authorized to hear-it, classified information relating
Central Intelligence Agency, its activities or to
materials,-under --_ the control. of the: Agency.
intelligence
2, In August 1977, Mr. Colby mailed to his publisher, Simon
and Schuster, a manuscript containing a description of his career
with the Agency which was eventually published under the title
Honorable Men: My Life In The CTA. The manuscript was forwarded
to the publisher with the understanding that the author's final
approval for publication was subject to any changes that the CIA
might require after its review. Simultaneously, Mr. Colby
submitted the manuscript to the Agency for pre-publication
approval. Simon and Schuster at a later time further disseminated
the original manuscript to a French publisher. It was under these
circumstances that the obligation under the secrecy agreements was
b.L'eflchedd through the dtssemination of the manuscript before
CIA clearance.
App tsved Far :F ]case -200 _03TO7.; CIA-RDP 1-00 01.F 00 ? Q1480 2$
 fin
3. In consideration of the above, William Colby agrees:
a. ..:To.~s