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December 31, 1982
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Approved For Release 2006/01/12: CIA-RDP91-00901R00 ASSOCIATED PRESS 31 December 1982 WASHINGTON KISSINGER BELIEVES SOVIETS BEHIND ATTEMPT ON POPE' LIFE Accounts that have emerged so far on the assassination attempt on the pope lead "almost to no other conclusion" than that the Soviet secret service was behind it, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said Friday. "Here is a Turkish terrorist, who suddenly shows up in Bulgaria, which is not the normal thing for a Turk to do, lives in the best hotel in Bulgaria, emerges with $50,000 and a weapon, travels all over Europe. It cannot happen without the Bulgarian secret police," Kissinger said in a Cable News Network interview. The interview was taped Wednesday for broadcast Friday and Sunday. "It's nonsense to say, as I read somewhere, that maybe something got away from the higher levels. That does not happen in Bulgaria. Then it had to be the Soviets. The Bulgarians have no interest in coming after the pope." Kissinger continued, "... they must have concluded that they had to crush Solidarity. At that time in 1981, they must have thought that the possibility existed that the Red Army would have to go in. "In that case if there were a Polish Pope who did what he was alleged to have threatened, go to Poland and oppose them, that would be a formidable psychological problem." Kissinger said he had been told by Richard Helms, former head of the CIA, that "it had all the earmarks to them,of a KGB operation." "If you try to square the Known facts, it really leads almost to no other conclusion." Yrui Andropov, the new Soviet leader, was head of the KGB at the time. Asked what the implications of that were, Kissinger said: "I take it we will never know more than we know. We don't negotiate with the Soviets because we like them. ... The Soviets will ruthlessly pursue their own interests. Our problem is whether in a nuclear world the Soviets pursuing their own interest and we pursuing our interest can ease the potential conflicts and reduce the danger of confrontation." On the two sets of negotiations now under way with the Soviets, the strategic and the intermediate-range nuclear missile talks in Geneva, Switzerland, Kissinger said, "the difference between the two sides is not so irreconcilable." Kissinger was the primary negotiator of the SALT I treaty and the unratified SALT II treaty limiting strategic nucler weapons. Noting pressure for A nuclear freeze from some sectors of U.S. public opinion, he said, "I do not think it is useful and I do not think it is communist manipulated." STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500150027-1 )Red For Release 20061 ?&IAS91-00901 R 27 DECKER 1982 WASHINGTON - On Nov. 9, the day before l.eaaid Brezhnev died, Ital. ian Interior Minister Virginio Rognoni received a visit from the C.I.A.'s vice chief of station in Rome and a staffer from the U.S. ' Senate Intelligence Committee. The Americans wanted to know about the Bulgarian connection to the shooting of the Pope. Mr. Rognoak explained that All Agca, the Turkish gunman, had been informed a few months before that Italy could not afford the cost of keep- ing him in solitary confinement much.` . longer. To Mr. Agca, that meant he would be transferred to an ordinary prison and would promptly be mur- dered. That induced him to talk about the Bulgarian Government officials who hired him to kill the Pope. "what proof do you have?" asked the C.I.A. man. The man in charge of Italy's inter- nal security laid out the facts: that the., gunman was a cold-blooded killer for hire, and not a fanatic or ideologue; that be was able to pass into Bulgaria easily on an Indian passpart-and take up residence in a first-class hotel, which requires secret service knowl- edge; that he entered penniless and came out with $50,000 trom what is hardly a land of opportunity; that be was able to describe accurately the living quarters of the Bulgarian of5- caals who pvere his controls and con- tacts; and that a flurry of electronic commumicatioa came out of the Bul- garian Embassy lust before the. at- tack on the Pope, similar to the ac- tivity that took place before an Ameri- c an general was abducted. The C.I.A. man waved that all aside. "You have no proof," be said, and did .his best to convey to the Ital- ian Government a high degree of skep- ticism from the American Govern- ment. "what proof do you want?" asked Mr. Rognoai. The circumstantial evi- dence already presented, along with some more that the gunman -was ea- . petted to reveal. was the best that ESSAY `You Have No Proof By William Sa ire could be garnered on a covert- opera-tion. Nobody would came forward with a fingerprint of Yuri Andropov on the gun, but it was certain that no such mission could be undertaken without the permission of the, K.G.B., then headed by Mr. Andr opov. According to one report of the meet. ing, the C.I.A. representative c ontin- ued to anew with distaste the condu- sions being reached by the Italian in- vestigators. Meanwhile, in other capi- tals - and in Washington - middle- level C.I.A. men with journalistic con- tacts have been pooh-poohing the story. In Rome, U.S. foreign service officers have been telling Italian dip- lomats that the investigation is an in- temational embarrassment Thus, the Italian Government farad itself pursuing a case that caused it to strain relations with a Communist neighbor and profoundly offend the new Soviet leadeer without the moral support of the government of the United States. The lackadaisical atti- tude of most of the US. press on this subject throughout the early winter - especially after the man who had to have at least guilty knowledge of the plot was elevated to the top post in the Kremlin - was seen by Italians as further evidence that the U.S. wanted the investigation shut down. Why do we require tongs to touch this story? why are we setting our-STAT selves standards of proof that the Soviet bloc will make impossible to meet? . One reason is humanly institution- al: most spooks, after the C_I.A.'s flat rock: was flipped over in the post- Watergate era, don't want anybody to think that assassination is part of any nation's "dirty tricks," and so they come to the defense of the K.G.B. in grand le Cam fashion, hinting that the evidence is part of an anti-Andro- pov plot. (An exception is former Di. rector of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, who was pointing a finger at this "classic intelligence operation" from the start) Another reason has to do with the workings of the American press: where does a story of such magnitude come off being broken in the Readers' Digest, and developed in detail by NBC, a mere television Detwork? Such a story needs establishes le- gitimacy; only a major newspaper can properly provide that. Then there is the bogglemeat fat. tar: the story. of the spymaster who gave the order to kill the Pope and thereby saved Poland from Solidarity and rose to the top in the Kremlin - that's a large lump of information to digest. Evil so audacious is mbehev- able. The central reason for the shameful reluctance to urge the lt:alians on is political: we have to deal with this an Andropov, say our doves, and If the chain of circumstance is drawn too tight we might not be able to trust the Soviets an arms control. That fear of not being able to bring back detente motivates mast of those who wish this awful trail of circum- stance would vanish. We know enough; they do not want to know any more. That is wiry, after facts are pre- seated which compel common sense to lay the crime at the Kremlin door, we will bear the faceless. officials complain, "you have no proof." Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150027-1 1IC:: 1- ._:;k ed For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-0090 0.ll P`.C --' THE CHEISTIAR SCIENCE MONITOR 22 DECD ..,ER 1082 Readers write Response from Mr. Helms Since the Monitor has a reputation with me for accuracy in reporting, I would like to bring to your attention the item that appears on page two of the Nov. 24 edition in which you report that I "lied about the (Chilean) plot in Senate hearings." The fact is that I was -never charged with lying. I pleaded nolo contendere to not having testified "fully and completely" before a Sen- ate committee in 1973. My testimony took place at a time when ongoing secret oper- ations would have been exposed by a "full and complete" statement on my part. Richard Helms [Ed. note: The statement that Mr. Helms lied about a plot to assassinate President Allende ,of Chile was cited in a brief wire ser- vice report and attributed to an Atlantic Monthly article drawn from Seymour Hersh's book. "The Price of Power: Kissinger in Nix? on's White House." In fairness it should have been stated that the a ticle does not explicitly use the word "lie," but leaves such an im- plication.] Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500150027-1 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 Ota^Fx WASHINGTON POST 13 DECEMBER 1982 Sir,rou It ded Chaptc' o d BEM M ar } urrey er Washington Post Staff Writer A heavily shrouded chapter of Cold War history has been reopened with new insights and controversy arising from recently declassified testimony of CIA chief Allen W. Dulles on spy plane operations against the Soviet Union in the 1950s and early 1960s. Members of the U.S. intelligence community from the Dulles era were dismayed a week ago by news ac- counts about an allegedly undis- olosed "CIA spy plane" shot down over the Soviet Union before the sensational U2 overflight of Francis Gary Powers May 1, 1960. ? Dulles' testimony was given be- hind closed. doors to the Senate For- eign Relations Committee May 31, 1960, during the international up- zoar about the U2 high-altitude re- Connaissance jet plane and the col- aapse of the Paris summit conference in. mid-May that year when Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev vented his outrage over the flight by the captured American pilot. News reports last week based on Dulles' testimony said he disclosed that the United States lost "eight or nine" Central Intelligence Agency operatives on an earlier "spy plane" farted down in the Soviet Union. '.State Department officials, after eainsulting with the CIA, told ques- tioners that the reports were incor- rect and that Dulles evidently was referring., to the widely publicized loss of a U.S. Air Force plane and crew over the Turkish Soviet border iri 1958 `.Many colleagues of Dulles simi lakly said he only was citing a known incident in 1958-a second one in which a plane was forced down across that frontier. There were two problems with the However, from information now available, it appears that in the tense. U2 inquiry, Dulles , deliberately scrambled his testimony to shield the identity of the then-supersecret National Security Agency, or unwit- tingly mixed up the two incidents. Possibly he did both. As one associate recalled, a Dulles technique in maintaining an aura of certainty in his testimony was to "give quick answers to deflect ques- admi anyth missi( virtue inadv inc.cid( Be etrati flying U.S. BLII\ tions and never appear hesitant or in sions, known as "ferrets", operated doubt." around the vast periphery of the So- One encounter involved an Air viet Union to pick up emissions of Force C118 on a CIA courier mission radar, ground communications and with nine men aboard-three for- microwave signals. mally assigned to the CIA-and Sometimes-accidentally or de- forced down about 100 miles inside liberately-they penetrated Soviet Soviet Armenia in June, 1958. Five territory during what were called of the nine Air Force officers aboard risky "fox and hounds" forays to se: descended by parachute, and four off Soviet air defense radar and in landed with the aircraft. All were these instances American aircraft released after 10 days of questioning. often were fired upon. In September, 1958, a second, Allen Dulles, in his 1960 testimo- deadlier incident occurred in the ny, evidently overlapped both inci- same. region. An Air Force C130 with dents. He said, "You may recall 17 military personnel aboard, on as- there have been several instances of signment to the National Security planes that have strayed over Soviet Agency, and packed with electronic territory which have been shot down. eavesdropping gear for gathering in- You recall the two incidents in Ar- telligence, was shot down and menia and the Caucasus a few years crashed in Armenia. ago, and there have been instances Six bodies were returned by the off the tip of Japan and some near Soviet Union, but 11 were never re- Alaska." covered. In 1962, after stormy dis- He went on to say, "In one case pute at the highest levels of the U.S. we are still endeavoring to get `back, and Soviet governments, the 11 you know-they haven't told us missing were officially "presumed , what happened to, I think, eight or dead," although efforts to recover nine of the crew of one of the planes the bodies were still being made in that ramp down in the area of Cau- casus." That episode is recounted in a "This was a. civilian plane," Dulles" revealing.. book on "they NSA;--"The said. "It was manned by employ of Puzzle Palace" by James Bamford. it the Central Intelligence Agency, not --reprints- an'-extraordinary-transcript by military personnel. They were in of monitored conversations by Soviet civilian clothes. It was an entirely fighter pilots during the attack on' civilian intelligence operation, and I the C130. The transcript made pub- was prepared to take the responsi- lie in 1959 by Secretary of State bi]ity and document that responsi- Bxplanations, however. The two John Foster Dulles, Allen's brother, bilit ." - groups were talking alAptpdtf ehFor Rdreme' O b'k1?12t: G1 eRE)R91-00901 R000900150027-1 episodes, and neither fully meshed Kremlin to account for the missing crew members. c~.c ,~ With Dulles' testimony. No one will- STAT Approved For Release 2006/0.111.2.:. CIA-RDP9tO0901ROO,050 FeiCr,' l ON ATLANTIC MONTHLY MAGAZINE December 1982 THE PRICE OF - Po Kissinger, Nixon, and Chi BY SEYMOUR M. HERSH YEOMAN CHARLES E. RADFORD DID NOT WANT TO BE reassigned to Washington, but it was the fall of 1970 and he was in the Navy and his country was at war. Radford, twenty-seven years old, had been hand- picked by Rear Admiral Rembrandt C. Robinson to serve as his confidential aide and secretary on the National Secu- rity Council staff in the White House. The bright and am- bitious Radford was an obvious choice for the sensitive job: he was married and had young children; he was a devout Mormon who did not drink and would never consider using drugs; and he was fierce in his determination to earn a commission and become a Navy officer. Radford reported for duty on September 18, replacing a civilian secretary who was being transferred. There was obvious tension in the office, and Admiral Robinson, in one of their first meetings, demonstrated why, Radford recalls: "He made it clear that my loyalty was to him, and that he expected my loyalty, and that I wasn't to speak outside of the office about what I Oid in the office." Admiral Robinson was the liaison officer between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council, and his office was a sensitive one: the White House's most highly classified documents, including intelligence materi- als, routinely flowed through it. By mid-1970, Henry A. Kissinger, President Richard Nixon's national security a- viser, had developed complete confidence in Robinso 's discretion and loyalty. It was not surprising, therefore, that Robinson was deeply involved in the secret Kissinger and Nixon oper- ations against Salvador Allende Gossens, of Chile, who had astounded the Central Intelligence Agency and the White House by winning the September 4 popular election for the Chilean presidency, although Allende received only 36.6 percent of the vote in a three-way race. Radford, who arrived at his new post a few weeks after the Chilean elec- tion, vividly recalls the sense of crisis: "This wz .n't sup- posed to happen. It was a real blow. All of a sudden, the pudding blew up on the stove." Admiral Robinson and his superiors were "wringing their hands" over Chile, Radford says, "almost as if they [the Chileans] were errant chil- dren." Over the next few weeks, Radford says, he saw This is the secandA(*vp lfr }ea 2OO6/U*/4 T}GaIA-R .9 @GO t 5OOd$QUZptions papers, as the bu- Price of Power: Kissinger in Nixon's White House, which will be pub- reaucracy sought to prevent Allende from assuming office. lished next spring by Summit Books. . Among the options was a proposal to assassinate Allende.