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December 19, 2016
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December 20, 2005
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March 26, 1982
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STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R ARTICLE APPEARED ON PACT: L Niiclear Reaction: U.S. Tests Response To an Atomic Attack Recent Top-Secret Exercise Fitst or Kind, Since Flying in Doomsday Plane. -By Joeue-J-Flauca , i ? ;.;:e ,Siaff Reporter of Trim WAti,?S?ntevr JouitNAL:. -??WASHINGTON-It was on the fourth day i:of the nuclear crisis when hundreds of So- viet missiles-hit their targets in the U.S.? ? es. The President died where he was sitting, ?in the cramped. "Situation Room" beneath ;the White House. Instantaneously, command .over the nation's remaining civilian and mil- :Rely resources shifted to his successor as a !nuclear strike was called to retaliate. Mean- :while, critical functions of the federal gov- ernment - continued..,operating- - from :,hundreds of locations scattered throughout 'the U.S. ? ? - -ell ? ? ? - -.? --ee. ?s. , This was the scene in a huge, world-wide 'inuclear war game that was. secretly - di- i .rected from the White House during the first live days of March. As described by- high -government officials,.. the. game - code' named "Ivy. League"-was the first coin- iplete exercise of the military and civilian command- structures and communications systems to be used in -all-out- nuclear.:war since 1956. ..? essees 'see, es s. en ye ?The "war" was 'directed from- the-White House by former Secretary -of State William 4P..RogerS, Who actedsas- the .S?President,- ;Richard Helms,.-former director of theCen- Aral -Intelligence Agency and arr,bassadorto. l,Iran, played the Vice President-se-2 ..i.? t ".:i.:11 # '?7?,-,-,, ,,... .4presideut -ts.:!iftiaskfreite.,:;2:.;,,,.,,,,44.- ?1 .., Althongfilhe game pneducesomeee se, scOnfUsed . moments 'ire the Situation. Rooth, , .4 reportedly, convincedpresidenf Reegait and ethe galaxy : Of: hiS?',t6ii;national-secUrityAifft=- tcials Who watChedit thaf.the,nadon lel the plans and the capability to maintaincontnit-, !ityof government during aimclear strike.-' i "We did a lo'rbetterthan-we thought, we 'would," says one player. He. explains: that ithe:ekercise evas.devised to act: on the 'phi-f, dosophy. of President. Reagan and other- top. I ? ? ia.drninistration, officials: that 7 tprotectton ;of/. ikey -government functions during a crisis. is as. much et Sat deterrent to; nuclear swar ,.,ai `.,building new.strategicehuclear weapons.\sysL- items." ? .. '.', -????-e:74.-----?? '-':* ? ' :::::--,:?"-''' ?:-? ' The officials. whredescribe the game, and wholequesta:nonyrnity say one.objectivein `idiscussingethe gamesis -no make sure:that i the ?tiler side is a.waree that, we have. the capability., They.say.the game involved the i movement of over 1,000 civilian 'and military: 1 players throughput, the world, inclucting,twee unidentified ? Reagan Caftlevf;figetieffiettn who. are- indine. to- succeed ident.Reagan ? ould ?he. the ;lean; attacks; eseiseesleetretete" THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 26 March 1982 number of deputy and under secre- taries of cabinet agencies acted as members ;of the National Security Council, while Pres- ident Reagan, Vice President George Bush. f ; Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr., ;Secretary of Defense Caspar W:-Weinber- ger, the President's national security ad- viser, William P. Clark Jr., and other secu- ' rity-council members looked on..,, _ ?`bTo -Fault" ? Procedure .' ? l'?-???1 : Mr- Rogers, a New York lawyer., and Mr. 'Helms, currently the head of a:Washington Iconsulting firm, Saffeer Co.. were picked by !President Reagan and Vice president Bush for the roles of the President and Vice Pres: ? i ident, The'garne was designed to create a, :e "no fault,: atmosphere, where mistakes ? could be made and lessons learned without necessarily telegraphing whet a U.S. official . might do In stich a crisis. During the last week in February, Mr. ' Rogers; Mr. Helms and the officials of the game's mock National Security Council were told that situation had deteri- orated. The response of both the Soviet and .! U.S. governments- to the deepening crisis f had been to order. mobilization for war. Af- ter attacks on U.S. forces in Europe, South Korea and in Southwest Asia; war had been ; declared. ' ; ? The. players in the Situation Room were then .told that Soviet tactical nuclear wears: ons had been uted against a U.S. ship in the !: North Atlantic and that chemical munitions . had been fired at: some U.S. troop units overseas, resulting in a large number of 1: casualties. . , k ? -The "President," after studying options provided?by the office of. the:Joint Chiefs, decided to use tactical nuclear weapons in response tie the: 'chemical ? attack -and later 'ibegan: giving permission for, the release of tactical warheads elsewhere-on--a case-byt case 'basis as' the tempo- ofethe enemy at-: racks, accelerated. ? s 0" One. enajor.debate arnong.participanfs in the room involved the 'question 1 disperse -.Potential: successors:, to. the presi-; d encY:' Another involved the...timing of-,the ; release of US.. military units to- help state ! and local governments managetheir evacus .1 attn. and other clyil-defense roles. ? 6, As one-major player describes it, the de- cisions ' :everes Made ?swiftly ,.` although I. the 'choices were .disturbinge,'you're right uP-. against Something that has never, happened: beforePlie- says. 'e - I (Mr...Rogers?says of the gaMe..-'.!I not ? -In a position to talk about IL" Mr. Helms. pays he is under similar, strictures. The sources say that no NATO commands were used during the game, aIthough'some Cana; than Military headquarters, ,participated in parts of it.) ? ? "IvseLeague" players simulated the use ;of the ?hotline," the teletypedinkeWith So- viet.leaders, repeatedly using it to explain let.S. moves-and intentions in-an- attempt to ,alleviate the deepening crisis.' ee ? .The eeseiee? ieelu si e e@MraWl!.1 jill?VATOO- ylayers eithulated the procedures needed to .filLegaps hie: the 11.S- systeni .bY launching eme ?4,eneee e _ e.esseseeseeee 00500150035-2 ? The .ultirriate moment occurred late -1-re the fourth day, when the mock North Ameri- can Air Defense Command. reported a major incoming Soviet missile attack. At that point, technicians began switching off major pieces of the U.S.-military and civilian com- munications systems used by the Pentagon and the Federal Emergency Management .Agency to simulate the destruction. :.*.? "Ivy League". posited a "worst case" So- viet nuclear strike. some 5,000 megatons raining down on the; nation.. (The first at- omic bomb, the one That incinerated Him- - shima, Japan,-had a strength of about '20,000. tons of TNT, or one-fiftieth of a megaton.) - -"1 .. The genie also assumed that Soviet tar- getere would attempt-what is called by mili- tary planners a "decapitation strike," an ef- fort to destroy Washington and the entire. . federal command structure. . 'At that point in the game, with the Presi- dent "dead,": control over the "war" shifted first to Mr: Helms, who as the pretend Vice President, spent part of the time aloft in the National Emergency Airborne Command Post: a specially equipped Boeing 747 that has been described in the press as the .`Doomsday Plane." e Later, control shifted to each of two Cabi- net officers, one in a secret federal facility in Massachusetts and the other at a similar facility in Texas. There, the two men, ac-1 companieci by "core teams" of officials from key government agencies, took corn- 1' - mand of the nation's remaining civilian and military resources. ? - A fourth "miniature White Hotise" was established in a U.S. embassy in Europe to simulate what would happen if a successor to the President, such as the Secretary of State, was consulting with U.S. allies when a nuclear war broke out. ? ?????? The ground-rules- of the- game called for- the President and his successors to use what Is called the Single Integrated Operations Plan, the pian for a major nuclear strike in retaliation against a Soviet ICBM attack on the U.S: The pretend- security-council Mem hers involved in the game were top-level of- ficials.? They included Thomas Reed, a fort mer Secretary of the Air?Force who now Is al consultant to Mr. Clark, the President's nae; Hong. -4ecurity adviser ; ? Maker. Stoesse1,1 - deputy secretary of state;_ Fred Ikle, under 'secretary "of- defense, and Air Force .Gen.: James E. Dalton, staff director of the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ? - ? ? On March 5, when' the genie ended, PreS- ident Reagan'placed a conference call to all the command centers used during_the exel?- cise, 'telling the players: e ? .`:". "While we pray to God that we Will never have- to use the procedures you have tested She past week,' the nation is better. oft: foe what has been done." ? . 7 ? President; Reagan -added that "the exerts Zise will not only .improve our ability to reH 'spond. ;to such a critical emergency-but. more -importantly, the lessons learned wil; 1ROONOtt 341.1 Prove,: that our adver- g to. gam, by such &vett h Approverd,Forr,Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00050015 AoRijpifc--'7.17R;j1), THE BOSTON GLOBE 24 March 1982 s???? ean mesa ? ?1, . ,. ..,,,? .., , ?,..A-4- ,-:'`4 - ::-..? - 1 ,::: .- ., -.4' , ? ? ';? 'Earlier...this month ,The,Globe:published. a .,,, s in-country team .tc.,, -,1i create a coup section of Henry KiiSinger's memoirs centering 4-7.? climate by propaganda, , misinformation and On.the'.disingenuous7Claim ' that :',":"otir govern-4.3 terrorist activities; (2) collect intelligence on . , riient- had nothing to 'do with,plaiming [Salva- N :Coup-minded .'? Officers;1, and '(3)- inform- those doi-,Allendes];Overthrow- and no tT involvement .. ,,..coup-minded 'officers that the US government *.ithjhe- plotters',';`, who carried ;;Ont 'the1973: -:will give them ' full- support ,in a coup short 6 ? , Military putsch fri..Ohile. 011 the day there direct US. military intervention 1.:,:-'-:-.Z`i''' ',.-: : ?-' : 1- were reports, 'iriJhe Globe -"a:iiebther major' r;::;...i;,,j1.9,;44'-'i..-0-Fi:a. ci,'..-..11-4;:;; kir] e-n.dq'S'i _ . Arr.-ler-few-1:: newsf]aperS', clegcribirig the' iieagan : s.was ratified and; allowed -to, take office? :The .Administration 7s plans for covertaction to :'de- , ..: ,?:.;,-,CIA's? Karamessines --,- told ,--,:a.:::,' 'congressional stabilize the leftist government Of Nicaragua , Comrnmittee, that ',',Track .'2 never really ended, ,?-'..There are-of course--; Significant "differences2 What we were told to do in effect was well Al:: between, Nicaragua today and Chile In 1973 In .-- ? lende IS now president ,:-:.'.- but Continue our ef- NiCaragua thereisno'protofascist'grouP of up- ?.; --forts." Kararnessines,:::the Ultimate insider, per-level, military:officers trained by American - : said; "The seeds that ;were _laid in 1970 had ' Instructors and imbued with the strategic 'and ' . ? c:4V? - politi; doctrines,t of their,. instructors. T h their Impact in 1973 e ? ? . --?=7":: 41; ? , N.icii-aguan..ariny-:16 a, Sandinise.arini, and 'so': The Church Corninittees-!report on "Covert -7.-Action in Chile' was even more spec ;fie. in HS anyAmericanattemptto overthrow the regime '.7finding that; by January', 1972; the CIA's San- paramilitaryMust-pass through the risky stage of forming tiago station "had successfully Penetrated" the- bands to iabotage,power stations andblow..upbridges:-,q:::..;,,i,;:..??..f!;:group;?that. would make the .,1973 couP and contact through ' an = intermsediary with , Two bridges Were blown up thiS was in nthonities, ?, its leader.." The report said that -the CIA re-- drastic reaction of the. S.andinik ceived, intelligence reports orithe' coup who declared a..ZitatiZtif Ternergeri6k. and ' plan- : - pended demberatiei.iighti, takes into aceount of July, 'Au- the the months the haunting precedent of American complicity gust and September 1973." The report added Allende. ? that the agency's efforts :..."went :_ - the, overthrow of ? This means Ws- beyond the mere collection of information citicifitirigpsSingee&rather:.desultdiSr 'effdit. at: disinformation i:'-,5:::There is no point getting..angrYae.'Kissingeit .4. '..??::for.--.trying?tp:Over up these old crimes He is: :In mtd-September 1970 after Aflende was merely.' doing; what - expected of him. One elected president of Chile butbefore his election Month -after Chile succumbed to the'barbarbUs' had been ratified by th ,--,-:;?,e):ChIleanz,Congress;-::::k Richard -Nixon .KISsinger,.;johnMitchell and reign of a Military dictatorship; William Colby, ,forineri,c1A.direetOr:...RichardHeliffs''seCin rno-,10.1eP*director:-.Of the , CIA,told...acongresSional tJor kSe;Cret-pladtti get.'ilcyo-f.Allende:?.,:',-,7-,f',!::;:-:::g.;Corpmittee:-:.`,,Zfhp:presumptiOn- tinder, vvhich, W;'-HeIrn has e iNixbrOriStrueted conduct.thi'S..type,of operation is that itis a co". hPy-f-iti:vplay operation and that the United 5tates'., hand' tarytcoUp d'eta.t in Chile to preVent,Allendes Is not ito show.' ? accession to the presidency.",7;:ghiS.praii wasi?e6:.',5,,,.Kissinger'S perfunctory rewrite of iiistor.;/, if: cleriarned -.Track,,24KiSsinger:blinself- has; Said,?..:L"-.taken seriously. would Merely 'Make it More dif-, Ttabk 2. Meant ,,,-`en'cOOraging' a. Mciredirect role. .:ficult to -understand ;on temporary ''events in for thiCLA Kissinger:?. himself :a '16Yal: rnep, tOig:Inycihog p10.1.bqr of-the ?andinistas', ruling directorate,' singerMelrnS,arid'tbe CIA:S deputy-director Of ;.!.!..,.-Vyk.i.riay:be7:giii-e:that gloved hand in the sh6inhiiik, Of tiVO.Nica. . to ,.the-CIA-w!StatiOri,z-fif4SantiagO:?':'6idering the r raguan bridges a..R.Ye ?..A214.1;AV; Approved For Release 2006/01/12: CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150035-2 ARTICLE yctor Release 2006/0M yg* 2 -FORM-00901R000500150 22 MARCH 1982 ON PAGE ::::kczee# I WASHINGTON TALK 335-2 STAT ??? 77- --, A Helms Encounter 2 (00 firm treet scene: Richard Helms, the career spy, is. strolling down K Street, watching the world with - a carefree gaze., ,? , - "Hi, Dick," a passing acquaintance --says. The former Director of Central '-Intelligence appears off on some pas- toral fantasy; he does not quite regis- : ter recognition. But then he smiles ;And silently returns the greeting with ' f- a casual and, in his case,,suddenly ',7-1nost suggestive gesture. He uses his. -hand as though pointing and shooting :an imaginary gun at the man vaho greeted him. The friendpasses by ; the tableau is terminated without treme prejudice, `, ? ? tz.?;; ???? : Fr2lIcts XI Clines:- " Viarti.-..11Weaverjri- Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150035-2 Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 40.14?' VFW YORK TIMES 4- MARCH 1982 '000500150035-2 BO-Nil INVESTIGATES ;vjieuslicinghearrwFtioenhdaecdi to n discredit s c r member eirlirDi j the Nazi Party. Mr. Langemann was quoted as saying -SECURITY OFFICE that he met with Richard Helms, the former-head of the C.I.A., in Washing- ton on Feb. 2,1%8, to tell him of the con- . 1 cern felt in Bonn about the documents. According to the account, Mr. Helms directed Mr. Langemann to a man whose name was given as Mr. Hart, a C.I.A. employe described as a Nazi ex- Magazine Says He Persuaded C.I.A. to Have Nazi Papers in the U.S. Suppressed .? By JOHN VINOCUR - Special toTheNewYorlerlmes BONN, March 3 ? The chief federal prosecutor today ordered an investiga- tion of a West German security officer described by a magazine as having ar- ranged with the Central Intelligence Agency to suppress documents in the United States about the Nazi connec- tions of former Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger. ? The official was also said by the magazine to have disclosed that the West German intelligence agency sought to recruit an "agent of influ- ence" to lead President Nixon to think favorably about West Germany. The investigation was ordered into Hans- Langemann, a department chief in the Bavarian Interior Ministry. A ? spokesman for the ministry said Mr. Langemann, who worked for the intelli- gence agency from 1957 to 1970, was sus- pended frorn his post on Tuesday. The federal prosecutor, Kurt Reis.' mann, also announced that an inquiry was being conducted to determine if the author of the magazine article, J?rgen Saupe, had disclosed state secrets. . Leftist Magazine Konkret , The. article, appearing in the leftist magazine Konkret, involves eight cases ? in which Mr. Langemann was said to be' involved. The magazine said it had eight hours of tape recordings contain-, ing Mr: Langernarip's disclosures. The ? suspended- official's lawyer insisted,' ? however, that parts Of the recordings did not originate with Mr. Langemann. ? The magazine said it was told by Mr. Langemann in 1968 that the intelligence , "Destroying the documents was out of the question," the magazine said. "So another way cut was found. If the documents could not be destroyed, find- ing them in the giant microfilm ar- chives could be made extremely diffi- cult, practically impossible. ? "To do so, it was necessary to take the 'Guide to films of captured documents' out of circulation.It wasclene.n ? Langemann was quoted as saying that Mr. Bart turned over 58 volumes of the so-called guide to German authori- ties. The magazine printed a copy of what it said was a telex from the West German intelligence agency's resident in Washington reporting this to Mr. Langemann and suggesting that a spe- cial note of thanks be sent to Mr. Hart. The magazine said the agency also arranged to get an "agent of influence" close to Mr. Nixon. ? German Points of View It quoted Mr. Langemann as saying: "We wanted to get close to Nixon. Not to get information out of him. Rather we wanted -- that was the sense of the whole operation ? to reach Nixon with German points of view from a friend' with deep ties and financial relations." Later, the magazine said, informa- tion was also sought from the so-called agent, who was described as an influen- tial San Francisco Republican. 'Mr. Langemann, who headed a sec- tion of the Bavarian Interior Ministry with a staff of 220, was said by his law- yer as having sought to stop publication of the account. The photocopies of pur- ported documents appearing with the report did not come from Mr. Lange- mann, his lawyer said, and the maga- zine declined to disclose how they had been obtained. 2 I ? . agency sought to stop what it thought would be a series of possible disclosures by journalists of documents from the National Archives in Washington that ? .? Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150035-2