CASEY PICKS AMATEUR FOR MOST SENSITIVE CIA JOB

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150042-4
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
December 20, 2005
Sequence Number: 
42
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 15, 1981
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150042-4.pdf125.61 KB
Body: 
STAT Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0005001 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE A 5 Fick Amateur f 0 asey-r ost_. ensitive .: . - Job : .-U, In some'of its ct oice for'senior' positions in its foreig =policy estab- lishment, the waysoi'rhe Reagan ad- ministration are wondrous to be- hold. dust as State- Department officers were beginning=?o-recover from the appointzaen :7f a Reagan confidant without an foreign ex- perience as deputysecretary of state, the CIA was stunned?this-week, by. the selection of a rank amateur to head its most sensitive-directorate. Reaching outside the professional cadre of trained andexperienced in- telligence officers,.CIA Director Wil- liam Casey has- rejected tbe...unan imous advice. of 'old intelligence hands by appointing a New. Hamp- shire businessman and Reagan po- litical operative, Ma-x`Hugel, as dep- uty director for operations (DDO). This government. job was once described by columnist Stewart Al sop with only slight exaggeration- as-"the most difficultanddda) erous af- ter the president's:"The mman in-this.- position has the-responsibility for di- 1 recting all the agency's--secret oven: seas operations from., recruiting , spies inside Russia, to secretly.pen-. etrating the international-tersor-ist networks, to conducting.-covert p0- litical activities. Allen=Dutties,1itch and Helms and.. William Colby all held this job before-Sub sequentlybe coning- CIA-:- directors 'ort' . they earned their pro tiort-by= many: i years in intelligence.asiig nts. ' The DDO's masformidable-oppo nent and main:ocoznpetitor:-on.the; world stage is-the head:of-the?-KGB7.s First Chief Directorate, who con trols in Russian embassies a corps of m es KGB processional officers four ti the size of the CIA's.-overseas pres-, ence. THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE) 15 May 1981 CORD :AEYE i .. Incredible to KGB The, KGB chiefs in Moscow will find it incredible that the Americans should entrust the DDO responsibil- ity to someone with virtually no pre- - vious .experience, and they are un-. doubtedly searching their files for evidence of Mr. Hugel's role as 'a longtime undercover agent. They will find nothing of the sort. " . It is no reflection on Hugel's bus!-. ness acumen in amassing a small for- tune from the construction of a sew- ing machine company to point out that his only prior experience with intelligence was a brief stint at the: end of World War II with military, in- telligence. As one Pentagon..gener.al commented, "The DDO office is no place for on-the-job training.." ; There is perhaps no position in the U.S. government where the accu- mulated memory of past successes and failures and deep familiarity with the individual strengths and weaknesses of hundreds of staff of- ficers are so essential. The DDO has to be both leader and manager, and his ability to inspire confidence among his troops depends on his re- cord of achievement in intelligence. A Dicey Business If President Reagan follows through on his intention to build up the covert political action and para- military resources of the CIA, this appointment is all the more surpris- ing. As other presidents have learned, covert intervention in for- eign.countries can be a.dicey busi- The decision to intervene de- ness. pends in the. first instance on the DDO's judgment on whether the ..-,gains_outweigh the risks.., ; ..' In the only other case where a CIA director reached so far outside the ranks of the operations directorate, Allen Dulles selected a bright econ- omist, Richard Bissell, to be DDO. In- tellectually brilliant but lacking in operational experience, Bissell be- came the unfortunate architect of the Bay of Pigs- In the staffs of the Senate and House intelligence committees and- among friendly European intelli- gence services, there is concern that this appointment may further politi- cize the CIA. Hugel first came to Casey's attention during' the presi- dential campaign as the result of his success in organizing ethnic groups behind Reagan's canadacy. Casey is convincing in his denial that the ap- pointment. is a political payoff, but the Democrats would find it hard to resist the temptation' to replace Hugel-with a political choice of their own the next time around. Step by step, the apolitical objectivity on which the agency used to pride itself is being undermined. ' When confronted with these fears, Casey explains that after re- I viewing the qualifications of all se- nior operational officers he conclud- ed that only Hugel had the required drive and ability.. Casey may have a been influenced by his experience in World War II when Wild Bill Donovan collected a-group of talent- ed amateurs to run U.S. intelligence. But that was 40,years ago and the Soviets now present a more formida- .! ble challenge. Casey may yet prove to be right in choosing an able ama- for the, agency's toughest job. teur But it's a breathtaking. gamble for which the country will have to pay heavily if Casey has guessed wrong. jl Approved -For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91 00901 R000500150042-4 i