CASEY PICKS AMATEUR FOR MOST SENSITIVE CIA JOB
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150042-4
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 20, 2005
Sequence Number:
42
Case Number:
Publication Date:
May 15, 1981
Content Type:
NSPR
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP91-00901R000500150042-4.pdf | 125.61 KB |
Body:
STAT
Approved For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0005001
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A 5
Fick Amateur f 0
asey-r
ost_. ensitive .: . - Job : .-U,
In some'of its ct oice for'senior'
positions in its foreig =policy estab-
lishment, the waysoi'rhe Reagan ad-
ministration are wondrous to be-
hold. dust as State- Department
officers were beginning=?o-recover
from the appointzaen :7f a Reagan
confidant without an foreign ex-
perience as deputysecretary of state,
the CIA was stunned?this-week, by.
the selection of a rank amateur to
head its most sensitive-directorate.
Reaching outside the professional
cadre of trained andexperienced in-
telligence officers,.CIA Director Wil-
liam Casey has- rejected tbe...unan
imous advice. of 'old intelligence
hands by appointing a New. Hamp-
shire businessman and Reagan po-
litical operative, Ma-x`Hugel, as dep-
uty director for operations (DDO).
This government. job was once
described by columnist Stewart Al
sop with only slight exaggeration-
as-"the most difficultanddda) erous af-
ter the president's:"The mman in-this.-
position has the-responsibility for di-
1
recting all the agency's--secret oven:
seas operations from., recruiting ,
spies inside Russia, to secretly.pen-.
etrating the international-tersor-ist
networks, to conducting.-covert p0-
litical activities. Allen=Dutties,1itch
and Helms and.. William Colby all
held this job before-Sub sequentlybe
coning- CIA-:- directors 'ort' . they
earned their pro tiort-by= many: i
years in intelligence.asiig nts. '
The DDO's masformidable-oppo
nent and main:ocoznpetitor:-on.the;
world stage is-the head:of-the?-KGB7.s
First Chief Directorate, who con
trols in Russian embassies a corps of
m
es
KGB processional officers four ti
the size of the CIA's.-overseas pres-,
ence.
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
15 May 1981
CORD :AEYE i ..
Incredible to KGB
The, KGB chiefs in Moscow will
find it incredible that the Americans
should entrust the DDO responsibil-
ity to someone with virtually no pre- -
vious .experience, and they are un-.
doubtedly searching their files for
evidence of Mr. Hugel's role as 'a
longtime undercover agent. They
will find nothing of the sort. " .
It is no reflection on Hugel's bus!-.
ness acumen in amassing a small for-
tune from the construction of a sew-
ing machine company to point out
that his only prior experience with
intelligence was a brief stint at the:
end of World War II with military, in-
telligence. As one Pentagon..gener.al
commented, "The DDO office is no
place for on-the-job training.." ;
There is perhaps no position in
the U.S. government where the accu-
mulated memory of past successes
and failures and deep familiarity
with the individual strengths and
weaknesses of hundreds of staff of-
ficers are so essential. The DDO has
to be both leader and manager, and
his ability to inspire confidence
among his troops depends on his re-
cord of achievement in intelligence.
A Dicey Business
If President Reagan follows
through on his intention to build up
the covert political action and para-
military resources of the CIA, this
appointment is all the more surpris-
ing. As other presidents have
learned, covert intervention in for-
eign.countries can be a.dicey busi-
The decision to intervene de-
ness.
pends in the. first instance on the
DDO's judgment on whether the
..-,gains_outweigh the risks.., ; ..'
In the only other case where a CIA
director reached so far outside the
ranks of the operations directorate,
Allen Dulles selected a bright econ-
omist, Richard Bissell, to be DDO. In-
tellectually brilliant but lacking in
operational experience, Bissell be-
came the unfortunate architect of
the Bay of Pigs-
In the staffs of the Senate and
House intelligence committees and-
among friendly European intelli-
gence services, there is concern that
this appointment may further politi-
cize the CIA. Hugel first came to
Casey's attention during' the presi-
dential campaign as the result of his
success in organizing ethnic groups
behind Reagan's canadacy. Casey is
convincing in his denial that the ap-
pointment. is a political payoff, but
the Democrats would find it hard to
resist the temptation' to replace
Hugel-with a political choice of their
own the next time around. Step by
step, the apolitical objectivity on
which the agency used to pride itself
is being undermined. '
When confronted with these
fears, Casey explains that after re- I
viewing the qualifications of all se-
nior operational officers he conclud-
ed that only Hugel had the required
drive and ability.. Casey may have a
been influenced by his experience
in World War II when Wild Bill
Donovan collected a-group of talent-
ed amateurs to run U.S. intelligence.
But that was 40,years ago and the
Soviets now present a more formida- .!
ble challenge. Casey may yet prove
to be right in choosing an able ama-
for the, agency's toughest job.
teur
But it's a breathtaking. gamble for
which the country will have to pay
heavily if Casey has guessed wrong. jl
Approved -For Release 2006/01/12 : CIA-RDP91 00901 R000500150042-4
i