(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500160003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: June 7, 1972
• Content Type: SPEECH

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JUN 1972
GENTLEMEN:
Executive Rau .strv
IT IS ALWAYS A PRIVILEGE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY SEMINAR, I PARTICULARLY WELCOME
THE OPPORTUNITY, WHICH THIS OCCASION AFFORDS, TO
STEP BACK AND LOOK AFRESH, AT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS.
THERE ARE TIMES WHEN HISTORY IS MADE RAPIDLY
AND WHEN THE EVENTS WHICH MAKE IT ARE DISPLAYED.
FOR ALL THE WORLD TO SEE. THIS HAPPENS, FOR EX-:
AMPLE., WHEN GREAT WARS BEGIN OR END, OR WHEN GREAT
REVOLUTIONS OCCUR. BUT THERE'ARE.OTHER TIMES WHEN
HISTORY IS MADE SLOWLY AND WITH LESS FANFARE. IN
!
SUCH TIMES, DEVELOPMENTS HAVE MORE SIGNIFICANCE
IN THE AGGREGATE THAN THEY DO AS SINGLE EVENTS.
BELIEVE THAT THE PAST DECADE HAS BEEN SUCH A
PERIOD. IN TIMES SUCH AS THESE, IT IS IMPORTANT
TO EXAMINE THE AGGREGATE AS WELL AS THE INDIVIDUAL '
EVENT, AND I SUGGEST THAT SUCH AN EXAMINATION PRO-
VIDES A USEFUL PERSPECTIVE ON CURRENT PROBLEMS AND
TENSIONS;
ONE OF THE TRENDS OF THE PAST DECADE WHICH
HAS STRUCK ME AS ESPECIALLY MEANINGFUL IS THE CARE
WHICH THE GREAT POWERS HAVE TAKEN TO AVOID DANGEROUS
ARMY WAR COLTEM
CARLISLE BARRACKS
PENNSYLVANIA
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CONFRONTATIONS WITH EACH OTHER. IN THE PERSPEC-7
TIVEOF A DECADE, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS OF 1962
APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A KIND OF WATERSHED. THEN,
FACED WITH THE MOMENT OF TRUTH, THE SOVIET LEADERS
CHOSE PEACE. THEIR BEHAVIOR SINCE 1962 STRONGLY
SUGGESTS THAT THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WAS NOT AN
EXPERIENCE THEY WOULD LIKE TO REPEAT,
4! THE YEARS SINCE THEN THEY HAVE SHOWN A
STRONG RELUCTANCE TO ENGAGE IN MILITARY ACTION AND
A HEALTHY APPRECIATION Of THE ADVANTAGES OF NON-
CONFRONTATION. WE HAVE. SEEN THIS, FOR EXAMPLE,
IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT OF 1967, IN THE JOR-
DAN CRISIS OF 1970, IN THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR LAST
YEAR, AND MOST RECENTLY DURING THE EVENTS OF THE
PAST FEW WEEKS IN VIETNAM.
OF COURSE, THE PRINCIPAL FACT CONTRIBUTING
TO NON-CONFRONTATION POLITICS IS THE NUCLEAR CAPA-
BILITY OF THE GREAT POWERS. THE NUCLEAR POWERS
SIMPLY CANNOT AFFORD TO CONFRONT EACH OTHER IN
PARTICULAR CONFLICT SITUATIONS UNLESS THEY ARE
PREPARED FOR TOTAL NUCLEAR STRUGGLE. THIS IS NOT
TO SAY THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS CAN NOT OR DO NOT
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PURSUE THEIR OWN INTERESTS. INDEED, THE, FACT OF
MUTUAL DETERRENCE ENCOURAGES LIMITED AND GRADUALIST
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL INTEREST. BUT IT ALSO IMPOSES
CAUTION ON BLATANT EXPANSIONISM, AND LT DISCOURAGES
CHALLENGES TO POSITIONS WHICH HAVE ALREADY BEEN
.STAKED OUT.
Now, ALL THESE FACTORS CREATE A CERTAIN STA-
BILITY. THE USSR CANNOT MOVE MILITARILY AGAINST
WESTERN EUROPE. WE CANNOT MOVE MILITARILY IN EAST-
ERN EUROPE. CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION CHECKMATE
EACH OTHER IN NORTH ASIA. NEITHER WE NOR THE CHI-
NESE CAN ESTABLISH HEGEMONY IN EAST ASIA AND THE
WEST PACIFIC. AND BOTH THE CHINESE AND THE SOVIETS
SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THIS AS WE DO.
IN RECENT YEARS, OF COURSE, THE USSR HAS BE-
COME A GLOBAL POWER, AND IT IS PURSUING A GLOBAL
POLICY. THIS. POLICYIS GLOBAL NOT ONLY IN THE SENSE
THAT IT IS BACKED UP BY INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC
MISSILES. THE USSR ALSO HAS A GROWING NAVY AND AIR
TRANSPORT FLEET, MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE USSk
CONSIDERS ITSELF A GLOBAL POWER. SOVIET FOREIGN
MINISTER GROMYKO RECENTLY REMARKED THAT THERE WAS
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NO MAJOR QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THAT
COULD BE RESOLVED WITHOUT THE SOVIET UNION OR AGAINST
ITS WILL. BUT EVEN AS THE USSR PLAYS THE WORLD
POWER ROLE, IT QUITE CLEARLY DOES SO WITH A GENUINE
PREFERENCE FOR A CAUTIOUS AND GRADUALIST APPROACH.
As LONG AS THEY THINK THAT THEIR INTERESTS ARE BEING
ADVANCED--EVEN IF SLOWLY--THE SOVIETS PREFER TO AVOID
RISKS
How, THEN, SHOULD WE DESCRIBE THE PRINCIPLES
OF STATECRAFT WHICH ARE EMERGING AND GUIDING THE
RELATIONS OF THE GREAT POWERS? THESE NEW PRINCIPLES
I WOULD DESCRIBE AS UMMUNICATION AND ADJUSTMENT,
IN TODAY'S ENVIRONMENT THERE ARE .THINGS THAT NO RE-
SPONSIBLE NATION CAN DO. AND IF THERE IS SOMETHING
YOU CANNOT DO ANYTHING ABOUT, YOU HAVE TO .ADJUST TO
' IT,
THIS IS NOT THE SAME THING AS ACCEPTANCE. FOR-
EIGN AND STRATEGIC POLICIES ARE STILL DESIGNED TO
PROTECT AND PROMOTE NATIONAL INTEREST. BUT TO PRO-
MOTE NATIONAL INTEREST ONE MUST RECOGNIZE WHAT NA-
TIONAL'POWER CAN DO AND WHAT IT CANNOT DO. ONE MUST
KNOW THE RANGE OF THE POSSIBLE: AND ONE MUST MAKE
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CALCULATIONS OF RISK, To DO THIS, WE AS.A NATION
MUST UNDERSTAND BOTH THE RELATIONS OF POWER AND THE
MEANING OF POLITICAL EVENTS TAKING PLACE THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD. THE BASIC PURPOSE .OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY IS TO HELP WITH THIS UNDERSTANDING.
BUT NOT ONLY MUST WE' UNDERSTAND, SO MUST OTHER
NATIONS, THAT IS THE PATH TOWARD RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THEM, AS WELL AS FOR OURSELVES. WE CANNOT BE
SURE THAT OTHER NATIONS WILL ALWAYS ACT RESPONSIBLY,
BUT THEY ARE MOST LIKELY' TO DO SO TO THE DEGREE THAT
THEY UNDERSTAND WITH WHOM THEY ARE DEALING AND WHAT
THE RELATIONS OF POWER ARE. THE GREATER THE EXTENT
-
TO WHICH COMPETING NATIONS OPERATE FROM A COMMON
DATA BASE, THE BETTER THE CHANCE THAT THEY CAN AND
WILL WORK TOWARD POINTS OF ADJUSTMENT WITH EACH OTHER.
. THAT, I THINK, IS WHAT IS SO IMPORTANT ABOUT
THE KIND OF DIPLOMACY WHICH HAS DEVELOPED OVER THE
PAST YEAR OR TWO. CHIEFS OF GOVERNMENT HAVE NEVER
TALKED TO EACH OTHER SO MUCH. HEATH AND POMPIDOU
HAVE MET, AS HAVE POMPIDOU AND BRANDT, BRANDT AND
BREZHNEV, BREZHNEV AND POMPIDOU, AND PRESIDENT
NIXON WITH A WIDE RANGE OF INTERLOCUTORS, INCLUDING
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THE COMMUNIST LEADERS IN PEKING AND MOSCOW. WHAT
IS HAPPENING IS THAT CARDS ARE BEING LAID ON THE
TABLE. LEADERS ARE. TELLING' EACH OTHER WHAT THEIR
OWN PROBLEMS AND INTERESTS ARE,
? IN RECENT MONTHS WE AS A PEOPLE HAVE GOTTEN TO
KNOW BETTER WHAT CHINA IS LIKE, AND HOPEFULLY THE
CHINESE PEOPLE HAVE GOTTEN TO KNOW BETTER WHAT
AMERICANS ARE LIKE. PERHAPS THE MOST INTERESTING
EXERCISE OF ALL HAS BEEN THE SALT TALKS. THESE HAVE
BEEN LONG AND TEDIOUS, AND IT HAS BEEN CLEAR TO BOTH
SIDES THAT THE PROBLEMS. INVOLVED ARE VERY COMPLEX.
THE TALKS HAVE SHOWN THAT WE AND THE SOVIETS KNOW
QUITE WELL WHAT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE
WEAPONS THE OTHER POSSESSES, WE DON'T KNOW, OF
COURSE, EVERYTHING WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, PARTICU-
LARLY ABOUT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, BUT WE DO
PRETTY WELL, IN THE GIVE AND TAKE OF THESE SALT
TALKS, 'IT BECAME CLEAR TO EACH SIDE THAT THE OTHER
WAS PREPARED TO MAKE SOME ADJUSTMENTS. SOME OF
THESE ADJUSTMENTS HAVE NOW BEEN INCORPORATED INTO
AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, AND THE TALKS WILL GO ON IN
THE SEARCH FOR MORE COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENTS, BUT
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THE ACHIEVEMENT OF SETTLEMENTS MAY NOT BE SO IMPOR-
TANT AS THE PROCESS ITSELF. IT IS IN THE PROCESS
THAT COMMUNICATION IS TAKING PLACE AND ADJUSTMENT
IS BEGINNING.
' THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE MILITARY
POWER NOW PLAYS--AND WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY--AN IM-
PORTANT ROLE IN THEPROCESS OF COMMUNICATION AND
ADJUSTMENT, THE SIZE, STRUCTURE, DOCTRINE, AND -
TACTICAL CONCEPTS ON WHICH A NATIONAL MILITARY FORCE
OPERATES ARE PART OF THE DATA WHICH AN ADVERSARY
EXAMINES WHEN HE TRIES TO JUDGE INTENTIONS. THE
CHARACTER AND MAGNITUDE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE 'SYS-
TEMS, AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFEN-
SIVE SYSTEMS, PROVIDE CLUES ABOUT A NATION'S READI-
NESS TO ACCEPT MUTUAL DETERRENCE OR TO GO FOR SOME-
THING MORE DECISIVE, THE BALANCE BETWEEN NUCLEAR
AND NON-NUCLEAR COMPONENTS, AND THE BALANCE BETWEEN
LAND-BOUND AND FAR-RANGING FORCES, TELL SOMETHING
ABOUT THE DEGREE OF FLEXIBILITY WHICH. A NATION HAS
PROVIDED FOR ITSELF. AND THE EXTENT AND CHARACTER
OF THE ARMS CONTROL PROGRAMS TO WHICH A NATION IS
WILLING TO COMMIT ITSELF TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT
ITS WILLINGNESS TO MAKE ADJUSTMENTS.'
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MOST OF THE WORLD'S LEADERS SEEM TO HAVE COME
INTELLECTUALLY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY MUST COMMU-
NICATE AND ADJUST. OUR PRESIDENT HAS TAKEN A STRONG
LEAD, AND SOVIET AND CHINESE LEADERS HAVE INDICATED
THAT THIS IS THE COURSE THAT THEY, TOO, ARE WILLING
TO PURSUE. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW QUITE OPENLY SIG-
NALED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PUT BRAKES ON THE ARMS
RACE, AND THE CHINESE HAVE GIVEN AT LEAST *PRELIMINARY
INDICATIONS T THAT THEY ARE DISPOSED TO LIVE AND LET
-LIVE IN EAST ASIA AND TH1 WEST PACIFIC.
WHAT KIND OF A WORLD WILL THIS PROCESS OF COM-
MUNICATION AND ADJUSTMENT LEAD TO? ONE THING THAT
IS ma LIKELY TO HAPPEN IS A GENERAL WORLD SETTLE-
MENT WHERE EVERYONE IS HAPPY ABOUT EVERYTHING.. AT
THE END OF WORLD WAR II THERE WERE WIDESPREAD HOPES
THAT THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL SETTLEMENT SUPPLEMENTED
?BY A WORKABLE WORLD GOVERNMENT WHICH COULD ENFORCE
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND JUSTICE. BUT WE SHOULD HAVE
KNOWN BETTER. A STABLE WORLD IN WHICH NOTHING .
-CHANGES EXCEPT BY CONSENT IS SIMPLY NOT COMPATIBLE
WITH THE'DYNAMICS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT. I SUPPOSE
THERE WILL ALWAYS BE THOSE WHO WISH TO DOMINATE
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OTHERS, THAT THERE WILL ALWAYS BE THOSE. WHO WANT
TO EXPORT THEIR IDEOLOGY OR WAY OF LIFE, THAT THERE
WILL ALWAYS BE THOSE WHOSE iNTERESTS, RELIGIOUS BE-
LIEFS, OR TRIBAL EGOTISM WILL LEAD THEM INTO CON-
FLICT WITH OTHERS. THAT IS. ONE OF THE COSTS OF A
PLURALISTIC WORLD. IT CAUSES CONTESTS AND TENSIONS.
THESE TENSIONS WILL NO DOUBT RISE FROM TIME TO
TIME, AS THEY HAVE IN THE PAST MONTH OR TWO. SOCIAL
SYSTEMS WILL BE IN CONFLICT AND STATE-TO-STATE RE-
LATIONS WILL BE MARKED BY HOSTILITY, BUT THE CHANCES
ARE GOOD THAT IT WILL BE A CONTROLLED HOSTILITY.
.WHAT THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL,ENVIRONMENTJCES
IS TO SET CERTAIN LIMITS UPON TENSIONS AND HOSTILITY;
WHILE COMMUNICATION PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH
ADJUSTMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT. THIS PROCESS OF AD-
JUSTMENT WILL BE A CONTINUING ONE. As ONE OBSTACLE
OR PROBLEM IS ALLEVIATED, ANOTHER WILL ARISE. THUS,
NON-CONFRONTATION POLITICS LEADS NEITHER TO STABILIZA-
TION OR TO A GENERAL SETTLEMENT. BUT IF COMMUNICA-
TION IS. KEPT UP, IF THE DATA BASE IS .SHARED, IF POWER
IS'REGARDED AS A FORM OF COMMUNICATION AND NOT MERELY
AS A MEANS OF IMPOSING ONE'S WILL, THEN GLOBAL NON-
CONFRONTATION POLITICS WILL AVOID NUCLEAR DISASTER.
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THE POLITICS OF COMMUNICATION AND ADJUSTMENT
HAVE ALREADY PRODUCED SOME MOVEMENT TOWARD A NEW
ORDER IN EUROPE AND ASIA. THE WEST GERMANS UNDER
BRANDT HAVE RECOGNIZED THE REALITY OF AN EAST GERMAN
STATE, AND THEY HAVE ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THERE- IS NO
LONGER ANY POINT IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE AND TO DEAL
WITH THE EAST EUROPEAN STATES WHICH THE REST OF THE.
WORLD HAS RECOGNIZED FOR MANY YEARS. PRESIDENT
POMPIDOU OF FRANCE, MEANWHILE, HAS UNBLOCKED BRITISH
MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THUS- TAKEN
AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD A NEW EUROPE,
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, ANDt,
SOME OF THE POLICIES IT WILL ADOPT AS TIME GOES ON,
WILL INVOLVE SOME LESSENING OF CROSS-ATLANTIC TIES
WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND SOME STRAINS BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EVOLVING WEST EUROPEAN POWER
STRUCTURE, MEANWHILE, THE.USSR IS FOLLOWING A WEST-
POLITIK DESIGNED TO ENCOURAGE THIS SEPARATION OF THE
UNITED STATES FROM WESTERN EUROPE, THE SOVIET LEADERS
HAVE SOUGHT TO GIVE WEST EUROPEANS A 'GREATER SENSE
OF'SECURITY, NOT ONLY BY RESPONDING TO WEST GERMAN
AND FRENCH INITIATIVES, BUT ALSO BY REDUCING TENSIONS
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WITH THE US. THIS POLICY IS LARGELY ASSOCIATED.WITH
CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV, AND WE CANNOT BE CERTAIN ABOUT
HOW GENUINE AND PERSISTENT AT WILL BE. FOR THIS
REASON., THE PROCESS OF ADJUSTMENT IN EUROPE WILL BE
A?SLOW AND DELICATE ONE. WHATEVER MISGIVINGS 'THERE
MAY BE ABOUT US POLICY Ig EUROPE, NO WEST EUROPEAN
NATION IS ABOUT TO GIVE UP THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE AND
TO CAST ITSELF UPON THE MERCY OF THE SOVIETS, AND
THE SOVIETS ARE NOT ABOUT TO RETRACT THEIR POWER FROM
EAST EUROPE AND LEAVE THEIR RELUCTANT ALLIES EXPOSED
TO WESTERN INFLUENCE.- BUT IF ADJUSTMENT PROCEEDS
FROM .ONE STAGE TO ANOTHER IN A MANNER NOT THREATENING
TO THE SECURITY OF ESTABLISHED POSITIONS, PERHAPS A
MORE OPEN AND RELAXED. EUROPE WILL ARISE.
THE PROBLEM IN ASIA IS MORE DELICATE STILL. WHAT
HAS HAPPENED SO FAR IS A BEGINNING WHICH MAY NOT
MOVE MUCH FARTHER FOR SOME'TIME TO COME. -SOUTHEAST
ASIA IS STILL IN A CRITICAL CONDITION. THE WAR ON
THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT HAS CLOSED THE BOOK UPON ONE
HISTORICAL PHASE IN THAT TRAGIC AREA WITHOUT PROVID-
ING A CLEAR TEXT FOR THE NEXT. I WISH I COULD TELL
YOU WHAT IS IN STORE FOR SOUTHERN ASIA, BUT I CANNOT.
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THE ENTIRE AREA FROM BALUCHISTAN TO THE MEKONG DELTA
IS REPLETE WITH ECONOMIC AND ETHNIC STRAINS, COMPET-
ING POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, AND PATTERNS OF POWER AND
DISORDER THAT DEFY RATIONAL SOLUTION, IT WILL BE
MANY YEARS BEFORE A NEW ORDER EVOLVES THERE.
IN THE LARGER AREA OP EAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN
PACIFIC, THE WORLD ADMITTED CHINA TO THE COMITY OF
NATIONS EVEN BEFORE THE PREIDENT'S VISIT, AND THE
TRIP ITSELF MARKED THE OPENING OF A US-CHINESE DIA-
LOGUE. PARTLY IN RESPONSE TO THAT TRIP, THE JAPANESE
AND THE SOVIETS HAVE BEGUN TO CONSIDER WAYS' OF RE-.
SOLVING THEIR DIFFERENCES WITH EACH OTHER AND ARE,
LOOKING FOR WAYS OF COOPERATING IN THE EXPLOITATION
OF SIBERIA'S VAST RESOURCES, JAPANESE AND CHINESE
CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES WILL NO DOUBT INCREASE. THUS,
A NEW QUADRILATERAL RELATIONSHIP--AMONG CHINA, JAPAN,
THE USSR, AND THE UNITED STATES--IS BEGINNING TO
EVOLVE. I CANNOT TELL YOU WHAT ITS FINAL FORM WILL
BE. BUT, AS IN EUROPE, IT WILL EVOLVE SLOWLY. EACH
OF THE FOUR POWERS INVOLVED WILL TAKE CAREFUL SCRUTINY
OF THE OTHER, AND OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHERN ASIA,
BEFORE IT UNDERTAKES NEW INITIATIVES OR RESPONDS TO
THEM.
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BY CONTRAST TO THE GREAT EVENTS TAKING PLACE IN
EUROPE AND ASIA, ONE IS OFTEN PRONE TO *THINK OF THE
ARAB-ISRAELI QUARREL AS A SIDESHOW, OR TO THINK OF
A LATIN AMERICAN CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT AS A NEIGHBOR-
HOOD FRACAS. PERHAPS THAT IS RIGHT, BUT I THINK IT
IS ALSO HELPFUL TO RECOGNIZE THAT, WHILE THESE AREAS
ARE PERIPHERAL TO THE MAIN EVENTS, THEY ARE UNDER-
GOING 'IMPORTANT ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGES WHICH
.WILL AFFECT THEIR POLITICAL EVOLUTION. THE ARAB
WORLD IS A FAR DIFFERENT PLACE FROM WHAT IT WAS 25
YEARS AGO, ALL THE ARAB STATES ARE NOW FREE OF .
COLONIAL CONTROL, AND MANY ARE OIL-RICH. MANY'ARE
BECOMING RAPIDLY WESTERNIZED AND INDUSTRIALIZED.
SOME?EGYPT, IRAQ, AND SYRIA--HAVE DEVELOPED CLOSE
RELATIONS WITH THE USSR. OTHERS--NOTABLY THE SUDAN,
LIBYA, AND ALGERIA HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS
OF THE SOVIETS, SOME HAVE-LOST INTEREST IN THE IS-
RAELI PROBLEM, BUT OTHERS FEEL THERE IS NO ALTERNA-
TIVE TO CONTINUED HOSTILITY. ISRAEL ITSELF IS UNDER-
GOING PROFOUND CHANGES AS A NEW GENERATION APPROACHES
POLITICAL POWER, I DO NOT KNOW WHETHER OR WHEN THESE
CHANGES WILL PRODUCE A RESOLUTION OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
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AFFAIR, BUT THEY ARE CERTAINLY CREATING NEW CIRCUM-
STANCES WHICH WILL AFFECT THE DEVELOPMENT OF THAT
STRUGGLE AND WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL ONE DAY RENDER IT
OBSOLETE, IF NOT SOLUBLE,
IN LATIN. AMERICA, NATIONALISM HAS TAKEN ON
A NEW CHARACTER, AND ITS PACE HAS QUICKENED. Po-
LITICAL REVOLUTIONS THERE, MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, ARE
;
NOW MOVEMENTS FOR MAJOR SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE
RATHER THAN THE DISPLACEMENT OF ONE CLIQUE BY ANOTHER,
IN MOST OF LATIN AMERICA, THESE WEARS TO BE A
CONSENSUS THAT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE
ARE NECESSARY AND THAT THESE CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY
BY A REGIME WHICH ASSERTS ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM
FOREIGN CONTROL. THE DEGREE OF RADICALISM IN THIS
NEW NATIONALISM VARIES WIDELY--FROM AVOWED MARXISM
IN CUBA AND CHILE TO ECONOMIC PRAGMATISM IS BRAZIL .
AND MEXICO, IN NEARLY EVERY' CASE, BUT ESPECIALLY
IN THE MORE RADICAL REGIMES, THIS DRIVE FOR SELF-
ASSERTION HAS INVOLVED AN ATTACK UPON US ECONOMIC
INTERESTS AND AN ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE TRADE AND AID
FROM OTHER FOREIGN POWERS, THIS PRESENTS THE ComA
MUNIST NATIONS WITH AN OPPORTUNITY, AND THEIR IN-
FLUENCE SEEMS LIKELY TO GROW. ON THE OTHER HAND,
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THE COMMUNIST POWERS ARE LIKELY TO BE UNDER SUSPICION
AS POTENTIAL FOREIGN DOMINATORS, AS HAS BEEN THE
UNITED STATES, THIS WILL PLACE LIMITS UPON HOW
MUCH INFLUENCE THEY CAN GAIN, THEIR RECOGNITION
OF THIS WILL CAUSE RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF THE
COMMUNIST POWERS TO BECOME TOO DEEPLY INVOLVED IN
EXPENSIVE COMMITMENTS IN COUNTRIES WHERE THEY RE-
ALIZE THEY CANNOT ACHIEVE REAL CONTROL..
THUS, JHERE ARE MANY SMALLER NATIONS--OUTSIDE
THE PRINCIPAL ARENA OrTENSION AND ADJUSTMENT AMONG
THE GREAT POWERS--WHICH ARE TRYING TO FIND THEM-
SELVES, TO ESTABLISH THEIR OWN NATIONAL IDENTITJES,
AND TO MOLD THEIR OWN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL SYSTEMS
IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD, THERE IS A STRONG
CURRENT OF ECLECTICISM IN THEIR APPROACH, AND THIS.--
COUPLED WITH THEIR INTENSIFYING NATIONALISM?IS ALSO
.ONE OF THE HOPEFUL SIGNS OF THE TIMES, THIS WORLD
OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS WILL NO DOUBT BE MESSY
AND SOMETIMES CHAOTIC, IT WILL FACE TERRIFYING
PROBLEMS OF POPULATION EXPANSION AND URBANIZATION,
AND IN MANY CASES, A SHORTAGE .OF RESOURCES, DE-
VELOPMENTS IN THESE AREAS WILL IMPINGE UPON RUA-
' TIONSHIPS AMONG THE GREAT POWERS AND. CREATE OR
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EXACERBATE TENSIONS AMONG THEM, To THE EXTENT
THAT THEY DO, THEY WILL COMPLICATE, AS THE ARAB-
ISRAELI AND INDO-CHINA PROBLEMS NOW DO, THE PROC-
ESS OF ADJUSTMENT IN GREAT POWER RELATIONSHIPS,
ANOTHER FACTOR IN WORLD RELATIONSHIPS WHICH
IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY DECISIVE IS ECONOMICS.
MODERN ECONOMIES, EVEN IN THE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,
MUST BE FINELY TUNED TO FUNCTION PROPERLY. BUT.
WHAT IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPARENT IS THAT THE
FINE TUNING NOW INVOLVES THE RELATIONSHIPS OF NA-
TIONAL ECONOMIES WITH EACH OTHER, ALMOST INEXORABLY
THE WORLD IS BECOMING A SINGLE ECONOMIC UNIT. 'WORLD
TRADE CONTINUES TO EXPAND, TECHNOLOGY IS EXPORTED,
AND THE RAW MATERIALS MARKET IS BECOMING A WORLD
MARKET. INFLATION AND HIGH INTEREST RATES IN ONE
MAJOR TRADING NATION AFFECT EMPLOYMENT AND PRICES
IN ANOTHER, IMPRUDENT ECONOMIC POLICY IN ONE CAN
CAUSE ECONOMIC STRESS IN ANOTHER. EVEN POLICIES
OF A NON-ECONOMIC CHARACTER HAVE ECONOMIC REPER-
CUSSIONS. AN UNSETTLED POLITICAL SITUATION IN A
MAJOR TRADING NATION CASTS DOUBT UPON ITS CURRENCY
OR UPON THE SECURITY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS.
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SO--UNLESS A NATION WISHES TO CUT ITSELF OFF
FROM INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS--THESE
RELATIONSHIPS ARE BECOMING A CURB UPON NATIONAL
SOVERE.IGNTY. No NATION I KNOW ABOUT SEEMS DISPOSED
TO CUT ITSELF OFF. INDEED, EVEN THE COMMUNIST
COUNTRIES APPEAR EAGER. TO BROADEN THEIR ECONOMIC
CONTACTS AND TO. TAP THE TECHNOLOGY AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD, THIS DESIRE,
IN TURN, IS ONE OF THE IMPERATIVES ENCOURAGING
THEM IN THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT.
THERE ARE TIMES, WHEN I READ THE NEWSPAPERS,
THAT I BEGIN TO WONDER WHETHER THOSE OF US WHO ,ARE
CONCERNED WITH NATIONAL SECURITY AND WORLD POLITICS
HAVE ACHIEVED A PROPER BALANCE AMONG THE .VARIOUS
TARGETS OF OUR CONCERN. WE MUST, OF COURSE, CONTINUE
TO BE CONCERNED WITH THE MILITARY THREAT POSED BY
THE COMMUNIST POWERS, DESPITE THEIR INCREASING APPRE-
CIATION OF THE VIRTUES OF NON-CONFRONTATION POLITICS.
BUT THE WIDENING IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONSHIPS UPON OUR LIVES AND FORTUNES MUST BE
RECOGNIZED, AND SO MUST BE THE DRIVING FORCE OF
NATIONAL SELF-REALIZATION FOR MANY PEOPLES AROUND
THE WORLD.
.-17-
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PERHAPS MORE IMPORTANT YET, THE WORLD SYSTEM
AS A WHOLE SEEMS TO BE ENCOUNTERING NEW PRESSURES.
SOME SCHOLARS NOW SUGGEST THAT THE WORLD SYSTEM IS
FACING RISING FORCES WHICH CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY
THE HISTORICAL SOLUTIONS OF MIGRATION, TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. THROUGH ITS GROW-
ING POPULATION, ITS RISING LIVING STANDARDS', AND
ITS TECHNOLOGICAL ACHIEVEMENTS, THE WORLD IS CREAT-
ING A LOAD ON ITS NATURAL RESOURCES THAT MAY BE TOO
GREAT, THE EARTH, ITS ATMOSPHERE, ITS LAND, ITS
FRESH WATERS, AND ITS MINERALS ARE FINITE. IT WOULD
INDEED BE IRONIC IF WE FRITTERED AWAY OUR TIME:10,UR
INTELLECTUAL ENERGY, AND OUR CAPACITY FOR COMMITMENT
ON ASSORTED MATTERS OF WORLD POLITICS WHILE OUR
NATURAL ECO-SYSTEMS WERE DEGENERATING AT A FATAL
PACE,
I DO NOT KNOW THAT THIS. IS THE CASE, BUT ONE
CANNOT BRUSH OFF THE WARNINGS ISSUED BY RESPECTED
AND DEDICATED STUDENTS OF THE SUBJECT. PERHAPS WE
-OUGHT TO WIDEN OUR DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY,
PERHAPS WE OUGHT TO WIDEN THAT DEFINITION A GREAT
DEAL. IF THERE IS NOW REAL HOPE THAT WE CAN AVOID
-18--
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NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, THE QUESTION IS STILL OPEN
WHETHER WE ARE COURTING ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE. IF
EVEN SOME OF THE NEW WARNINGS NOW BEING ADDRESSED
TO US ARE VALID, THAT IS REASON ENOUGH FOR THE GREAT
POWERS TO ADJUST THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH EACH OTHER
AND MOVE ON TO A NEW ERA OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION.
-19-
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Appr
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
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2
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Remarks:
I see no reason why this could not be
declassified with the possible exception
of the sentence on page 14 beginning
with, "In nearly every case..." and
ending with "... other foreign powers."
VAW v w
. . . . . . - - - - - ? -"*"'
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Lt Gen V. A. Walters,
ed For
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9 June
: GiceblifiliA1400201FO00501016001)3-
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Remarks:
This is the Director's speech given at
Carlisle Barracks. Newsmen in the audience
have requested it on a background (or even
public) basis.
The Director wants the reaction of you
gentlemen as to whether he should ask Herb
Klein to okay its release. Will you kindly
pass your thoughts to me.
1,
4:1
AMT
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Angus MacLean Thuermer
1 F 04, 6 6
- i i wv . m . I
6 8
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FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions
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