ADDRESS TO THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS WASHINGTON, D.C. BY THE HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500160006-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2000
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 14, 1971
• Content Type: SPEECH

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ADDRESS TO THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
BY
THE HONORABLE RICHARD HELMS
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
APRIL 14, 1971
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GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
Gentlemen:
I welcome this opportunity to speak to you today about the place of an
intelligence service in a democratic government.
In doing so, I recognize that there is a paradox which I hope can be dis-
pelled:
On the one hand, I can assure you that the quality of foreign intelligence
available to the United States Government in 1971 is better than it has
ever been before.
On the other hand, at a time when it seems to me to be self-evident that
our government must be kept fully informed on foreign developments,
there is a persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the
need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelli-
gence Agency.
I am not'referring to the occasional criticism of CIA's performance-the
question of whether we gave advance warning of this coup or that revolt,
or how accurately we forecast the outcome of an election or a military
operation. By necessity, intelligence organizations do not publish the extent
of their knowledge, and we neither confirm nor deny challenges of this
nature. We answer to those we serve in the government.
What I am referring to are the assertions that the Central Intelligence
Agency is an "invisible government,"-a law unto itself, engaged in pro-
vocative covert activities repugnant to a democratic society, and subject to
no controls.
This is an outgrowth, I suppose, of an inherent American distaste for the
peacetime gathering of intelligence. Our mission, in the eyes of many
thoughtful Americans, may appear to be in conflict with some of the tradi-
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tions and ideals of our free society. It is difficult for me to agree with this
view, but I respect it. It is quite another matter when some of our critics-
taking advantage of the traditional silence of those engaged in intelligencc-
say things that are either vicious, or just plain silly.
't'here is the arrant nonsense, for example, that the Central Intelligence
Agency is somehow involved in the world drug traffic. We are not. As
fathers, we are as concerned about the lives of our children and grand-
children as are all of you. As an Agency, in fact, we are heavily engaged
in tracing the foreign roots of the drug traffic for the Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs. We hope we are helping with a solution; we know
we are not contributing to the problem.
As a general rule we are silent, because we must maintain the security
of our intelligence operations, but we also recognize that the people of
the United States have a legitimate interest in every arm of their govern-
inent. There is, fortunately, enough fact in the open record, and in the
pertinent legislation, to meet that public interest.
I propose, therefore, to discuss with you the legislative charter of the
CIA, the unique functions of a central intelligence organization, and. fi-
nally-in order to reconcile our security requirements with the democratic
society we serve--the role of intelligence in policy formulation, and the
controls, checks, and balances under which we operate.
American intelligence did not begin with the National Security Act
of 1947, which established the CIA. George Washington personally di-
rected his espionage networks during the Revolutionary War. President Polk
had a showdown with the Congress in 1846 about accounting for the
funds he used "to employ individuals for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation." In the Civil War, the North hired the Pinkerton Agency to expand
its intelligence services. The Department of State and our armed forces
all have had long experience in the collection of information.
Why, then, a Central Intelligence Agency? The proximate cause cited
by President Truman and the 80th Congress in 1947 was the experience
of Pearl Harbor, when, in the words of President Truman:
11. if there had been something like coordination of information
in the government, it would have been more difficult, if not impossi-
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ble, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack. . . . In those
days, the military did not know everything the State Department knew,
and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy
knew. The Army and Navy, in fact, had only a very informal arrange-
ment to keep each other informed as to their plans."
The Central Intelligence Agency, therefore, was created not to replace,
but to coordinate the existing intelligence elements of the United States
Government.
Our charter, the National Security Act of 1947, provides that in the in-
terest of national security the Central Intelligence Agency will advise the
National Security Council on intelligence activities of the government,
make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordina-
tion of such activities, correlate and evaluate foreign intelligence, perform
additional services of common concern, and "such other functions and
duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the Na-
tional Security Council may from time to time direct."
This latter language was designed to enable us to conduct such foreign
activities as the national government may find it convenient to assign to
what can best be described as a "secret service." These activities have al-
ways been secondary to the production of intelligence, and under direct
control by the Executive Branch. Obviously I can not go into any detail
with you on such matters, and I do not intend to.
And may I emphasize at this point that the statute specifically forbids
the Central Intelligence Agency to have any police, subpoena, or law-
enforcement powers, or any domestic security functions. I can assure you
that except for the normal responsibilities for protecting the physical se-
curity of our own personnel, our facilities, and our classified information,
we do not have any such powers and functions; we have never sought any;
we do not exercise any. In short, we do not target on American citizens.
In matters directly affecting the security of the United States, the Presi-
dent and his National Security Council want what we call "national" in-
telligence-evaluations which reflect the considered and agreed judgment
of all of the intelligence components of the United States Government. The
production and dissemination of this national intelligence is the responsi-
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bility and the primary function of the Central Intelligence Agency. We
can produce these agreed evaluations, of course, only by consulting and
coordinating the views of the entire intelligence community.
There is nothin< arcane or mysterious about this term, "the intelligence
community." It is simply a name for all of the intelligence assets at the
disposal of the United States-the CLA, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
the intelligence components of the various armed services, the National
,Security Agency, the intelligence elements of the Department of State,
:uid-when appropriate-those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the Atomic th,ncrgy Commission. They are all represented on the
United States Intelligence Board. This board is chaired by the Director
of Central Intelligence, not as the head of CIA, but as the principal in-
telligence adviser to the President and the National Security Council.
The United States Intelligence Board coordinates the assets of the United
States for foreign intelligence collection, and sees to it that there are
neither gaps nor unnecessary duplication in filling the information require-
ments of the nation's policymakers.
Just what are these national requirements for foreign intelligence?
There are the obvious ones, of course, in the era of thermonuclear de-
terrence: What is the scope of the strategic threat to U.S. security? What
are current Soviet intentions? How soon will Communist China have an
intercontinental ballistic missile?
America's intelligence assets, however, do not exist solely because of the
Soviet and Chini se threat, or against the contingency of a new global
conflict. The United States, as a world power, either is involved or may
with little warniiu. find itself involved in a wide range and variety of prob-
lems which require a broad and detailed base of foreign intelligence for
the policymakers.
What, for -instance, caused the fighting between Honduras and El Salvador,
and what can be done to ease the situation?
What are the implications of impending British withdrawal from the
Persian Gulf for the world's petroleum supplies?
Where are the pitfalls for the United States in the confrontation between
black African nationalism and so-called White Southern Africa?
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Or, for that matter, to give you an extreme example, how deep is the water
alongside the docks in Djibouti? This question is not as farfetched as it
may sound. If France should one day grant independence to French Somali-
land-now formally the Territory of the Afars and Issas-the area would
almost certainly he a source of contention between Ethiopia, which looks
to the United States for support, and Somalia, which is highly dependent
on the Soviet Union. What ships could be used to land a UN peace-keeping
force-or unload relief shipments? Thus information on Djibouti could
suddenly become necessary to the United States Government in an effort
to prevent a new international crisis.
A mass of detailed knowledge is required, of course, for the planning
of military operations, but I would like to stress that accurate intelligence
is equally essential to the planning and implementation of actions taken to
forestall conflict.
President Nixon put it this way in March 1969, when he visited CIA Head-
quarters:
"I look upon this organization . . . as one of the great instruments
of our government for the preservation of peace, for the avoidance
of war, and for the development of a society in which this kind of
activity would not be as necessary, if necessary at all."
The ancient Romans said: "If you wish. peace, prepare for war"-or, for
that matter, "forewarned, forearmed." Certainly a potential aggressor is de-
terred if he finds that timely intelligence has enabled his prospective victim
to take countermeasures. And when it comes to waging peace, it would be
unthinkable to conclude a Strategic Arms Limitation agreement with the
Soviet Union without the means for monitoring compliance.
The potential benefits of an arms limitation agreement are self-evident in
terms of reduced threat, eased tension, and economy-but only if they
can be achieved without endangering national security. That, in turn, re-
quires that the agreement should be honored by each side, and the Soviets
have traditionally rejected international on-site inspection. The United
States, then, can safely undertake such an agreement, however desirable,
only if it has adequate intelligence assets to assure itself that the Soviets
are living up to their part.
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If the two countries should agree that no new types of intercontinental
missiles will he deployed, it would be incumbent on U.S. intelligence to verify
that the Soviet 1 Tnion is abiding by the bargain. If it should be agreed
that there will be no further expansion of defenses against ballistic missiles,
we must have the means of detecting new developments which might
convert one of the regular Soviet air defense missile systems into an ABM
network. We can be sure, of course, that if the Russians should decide to
exceed agreed limitations, they will make that attempt with the greatest
possible secrecy and concealment. U.S. intelligence, therefore, will have a
major and vital role in any international agreement to limit strategic arms.
Every year at midget time, there is a debate over what portion of our
national wealth we must assign to defense and survival--what weapons
must we buy, and how many?
The United States and the Soviet Union both have a wide variety of
choices among svAems to be developed, and these choices interact. The
key to choice is knowledge--knowledge of the accuracy, reliability, and
numbers of Soviet ICBMs, knowledge of Soviet progress in advanced radars
for ABMs, knowledge, if you will, of Soviet knowledge of our own
(progress.
Whatever the semantics of first strike, mutual deterrence, assured de-
struction capability, or equivalent megatonnage, the answers must come
From an accurate measurement of Soviet offense against our defense, Soviet
defense against our offensive capabilities.
If good intelligence can narrow down the choices, it can save the U.S.
taxpayers many limes its cost. But this prospect-however desirable--is
secondary to enabling the policymakcr to arrive at informed decisions on
the defense budget-or the instructions to the U.S. delegation at the SALT
talks.
Intelligence collection, then, is essential to the maintenance of our de-
lenses, but let me repeat once more my conviction that intelligence at the
same,time makes a major contribution to the much more attractive proposi-
tion of living in peace.
I have tried to give you some idea of the subject matter of intelligence
requirements, but I must attach equal importance to the nature of the
intelligence provided to the government.
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I have already said that it must be a comprehensive appreciation of the
situation, based on all available information, reflecting the coordinated end-
product of the entire intelligence community.
It must also be rigorous in analysis, concentrated in depth, and above all,
as objective as we can make it.
It is precisely in these respects that the Central Intelligence Agency makes
its unique contribution.
First, all of the Departments of Government which have components
in the U.S. intelligence community have responsibilities for the formulation
of policy; CIA has none.
And second, CIA is the only one whose primary mission is to collect,
evaluate, and produce foreign intelligence.
Objectivity puts me on familiar ground as an old wire service hand, but
it is even more important to an intelligence organization serving the policy-
maker. Without objectivity, there is no credibility, and an intelligence or-
ganization without credibility is of little use to those it serves.
We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we can not and must not
take sides. The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to pro-
viding facts-the agreed facts-and the whole known range of facts-
relevant to the problem under consideration. Our role extends to the esti-
mative function-the projection of likely developments from the facts-
but not to advocacy, or recommendations for one course of action or another.
As the President's principal intelligence officer, I am an adviser to the
National Security Council, not a member, and when there is debate over
alternative policy options, I do not and must not line up with either side.
If I should take sides and recommend one solution, the other side is
going to suspect--if not believe-that the intelligence presentation has
been stacked to support my position, and the credibility of CIA goes out
the window.
Another unique attribute of the Central Intelligence Agency is the depth
of professional expertise it can bring to bear on the finished intelligence
product.
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The London Economist a few years ago commented:
"Modern intelligence has to do with the painstaking collection and
analysis of fact, the exercise of judgment, and clear and quick presen-
tation. It is not simply what serious journalists would always pro-
duce if they had time; it is something more rigorous, continuous, and
above all operational-that is to say, related to something that some-
body wants to do or may be forced to do."
This is a good statement of the kindred aims of the intelligence services
and the information media, but in a sense we are the reverse of a news-
paper. The newspaper uses a relatively few collectors and analysts to
serve a mass audience; we use a great many to handcraft a special kind
of report for a very few.
Even in this cay of the Information Explosion, we read everything
that comes into Washington-Department of State cables, Department of
I )el case traffic, our own reports, and the American and foreign infor-
mation media. Then we bring to bear on that information every last bit of
expert analysis at the service of the United States Government.
From the time this Agency was created, we have had to deal with
the fact that some of our most important intelligence targets lie in totali-
tarian countries where collection is impeded by the security defenses of
a police state-for example, Communist China.
In the face of such limitations, the analytical process can often ex-
tract meaningful conclusions from a volume of fragmentary information.
To do so requires ingenious minds and much painstaking work. On Com-
uiunist China, for instance, we have assembled a pane[ of experts in a
broad field of specialties to devote full time to study, analysis and r-,-
porting.
On this analytical team the economist does not concern himself with
Brazilian inflation one day and the Gross National Product of Nigeria
the next, but concentrates on the Chinese economy-just as the nuclear
physicist concentrates on the progress China is making in nuclear weapons.
With their support, the Old China Hand on the panel need not spread
himself thin to master economics and weaponry, but can focus on what
the Chinese--being Chinese-may do next.
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The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 affords a good example of how this
across-the-board analysis-comprehensive in its scope and intensive in its
concentration-serves the policymaker.
In the early Sixties, thousands of Cubans fled their country: Many
brought valuable information. Many, in good faith, brought misinforma-
tion. Some purposefully told stories intended to provoke U.S. action against
Castro. And a few were Castro's agents, planted to mislead us.
It was obvious at the time-from shipping intelligence alone-that
the Soviets were engaged in a substantial military aid program in Cuba,
but the crucial question was whether there were any strategic offensive
weapons on the island that threatened the continental United States.
The intelligence community established a joint interrogation center
in Florida to sift and winnow and evaluate these thousands of reports
centrally. It was a mammoth undertaking, but where possible we checked
every weapon report against U-2 photography of Cuba, and against other
intelligence sources.
One report, for example, claimed there were underground submarine
pens at Matanzas. Our analysts had the facts to disprove this, given the
geological structure of the shoreline and the crucial inshore depths in the
bay.
Another report alleged that light bombers were being stored in a
particular cave. We have a comprehensive speleological survey of Cuba,
which showed that this particular cave curved sharply a few yards in-
side its entrance--too sharply to admit a vehicle, let alone an air-
craft. We also had the photography to show that there had been no
work to alter the shape of that cave.
A merchant seaman gave us a detailed description of what he thought
might be a rounded concrete dome covering missiles-complete with
range and bearing from the pier where his ship had docked. A map of
Havana and a recent city directory established that it was a relatively
new movie theater.
The watch for missiles, however, was complicated by the fact that
there were defensive surface-to-air missiles in Cuba, and to the un-
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grained observer, one missile looks pretty much like another. In fact, some
of these "missile reports" we checked turned out to be torpedoes, fuel
tanks, and even industrial pipe and mooring buoys.
Our intelligence files in Washington, however-thanks to U-2 photog-
raphy of the Sovact Union and to a number of well-placed and courageous
Russians who helped us-included a wealth of information on Soviet
missile systems. We had descriptions or photographs of the missiles, their
transporters and other associated equipment, and characteristic sites in
the Soviet Union, We knew what to look for.
Guided by this background, the interrogators were able to sort out
From the flood of reports the ones which established the arrival of MRBM
and IRBM equipment in Cuba. We were then able to locate the sites
under construction by reconnaissance, and tell President Kennedy the
exact scope of the threat.
't'here remained the question-for the policymakers--of what to do.
11-his required a determination-among other essentials--of whether the
Soviets would be able to strike at the United States with their weapons
in Cuba in the event of a U.S. ultimatum.
Again thanks to all our collection sources, and to the central analytical
process, we were able to inform the President precisely how long it would
take to make the missile sites in Cuba operational. The rest of the Cuban
anissile crisis is history.
The intclligencr analysts who participate in reaching these conclusions,
of course, run the gamut from some who have just begun an intelligence
career to others who have devoted a lifetime of study to their specialty.
To strike a more ? ypical mean, one of the experts who enabled us to give
President Johnson a correct appreciation of the Middle Eastern situation
in May, 1967-jur,t before the start of the June War-held a doctorate in
Near Eastern studies, had lived for several years in Arab villages, and
at the time had spent 12 years with CIA.
I do not wish to imply that we require a Ph.D. of everybody we
hire. but in general we recruit our principal substantive analysts from the
,raduate schools or in the field, with some years of area study or
overseas background already under their belts.
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About half of our substantive analysts have graduate degrees. Al-
most one in three has his doctorate. We have capabilities in 113 foreign
languages and dialects. We can call on the expertise of anthropologists, chem-
ists, metallurgists, medical doctors, psychiatrists, botanists, geologists, en-
gineers of every variety, statisticians, mathematicians, archaeologists, and
foresters. Our people have academic degrees in 298 major fields of spe-
cialization from accounting to zoology.
And as catholic and competent as our "in-house" capability may be, we
do not stop there. We make copious use of consultants, from the estab-
lished "think-tanks" to selected individuals outside government whose help
we seek on specific problems. To the extent that security considerations
permit, in fact, we encourage our substantive analysts to participate-
identifed as CIA employees--in prof essional conferences, and to write for
publication, so that they will remain in touch with the great centers of
study and knowledge in this country, and benefits thereby.
Ironically, our efforts to obtain foreign intelligence in this country have
generated some of the more virulent criticism of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It is a fact that we have, as I said, no domestic security role,
but if there is a chance that a private American citizen traveling abroad
has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policy-
maker, we are certainly going to try to interview him. If there is a compe-
tent young graduate student who is interested in working for the United
States Government, we may well try to hire him.
The trouble is that to those who insist on seeing us as a pernicious
and pervasive secret government, our words, "interview" and "hire" trans-
late into suborn, subvert, and seduce, or something worse. We use no
compulsion. If a possible source of information does not want to talk to
us, we go away quietly. If some student groups object to our recruiting
on campus, we fall back to the nearest Federal Office Building. Simi-
larly, we welcome the opportunity to place research contracts with the
universities, but again, these are strictly voluntary.
And so I come to the fundamental question of reconciling the security
needs of an intelligence service with the basic principles of our demo-
cratic society. At the root of the problem is secrecy, because it is axio-
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matic that an intelligence service-whatever type of government it serves-
must wrap itself in as much secrecy as possible in order to operate
effectively.
George Washington on July 26, 1777, wrote to Colonel Elias Dayton,
his intelligence chief for New Jersey:
"The necessity of procuring good intelligence is apparent and need
not be further urged-all that remains for me to add is that you keep
the whole matter as secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success de-
pends in most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they are
generally defreated, however well planned and promising."
Nations have % ital secrets they are determined to keep secret. They
surround them with the greatest possible security, and they play rough
in preserving those, defenses. Accordingly, the intelligence service which
is assigned to obtain this information must begin by looking to its own
security.
If, at the outset of our operation, the opposition can identify the agents
involved, or the means we propose to use, the enterprise is doomed from
the start.
If, at the conclusion, we disclose how much we know, the opposition is
handed on a platter highly damaging indications of how and where we
obtained the information, in what way his security is vulnerable, and who
may have helped us. He can seal off the breach in his defenses, roll up the
agents, and shut off the flow of information.
If any significant portion of our secret organization is exposed, it
gives the opposition a starting point to work against us. That is why we
seek to preserve a secrecy which, I should note, is honored without question
in many thoroughly democratic countries.
In Great Britain and other European nations it would be unheard of
for the head of the intelligence services to talk to a non-governmental
group as I am tall,: ing to you today. In London, in fact, the location of the
intelligence service headquarters and the identity of its chief have long
been respected as state secrets by the British public, press, and officialdom.
In contrast, here in the United States the area of intelligence over which
we can maintain the traditional secrecy has been steadily reduced.
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We have made it our practice not to answer criticism. Former Senator
Saltonstall summed it up pretty well when he said that in an open society
like ours, it is impossible to inform the public without informing our
enemies.
I cannot, then, give you an easy answer to the objections raised by
those who consider intelligence work incompatible with democratic prin-
ciples. The nation must to a degree take it on faith that we too are
honorable men devoted to her service. [ can assure you that we are, but I
am precluded from demonstrating it to the public.
I can assure you that what I have asked you to take on faith, the
elected officials of the United States Government watch over extensively,
intensively, and continuously.
Starting with the Executive Branch, the Central Intelligence Agency
operates under the constant supervision and direction of the National
Security Council. No significant foreign program of any kind is undertaken
without the prior approval of an NSC subcommittee which includes repre-
sentatives of the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Defense.
In addition, we report periodically and in detail on the whole range
of foreign intelligence activities to the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board, a group of men who have distinguished themselves in gov-
ernment, industry, education, and the professions. This board, originally
created in 1956 under the chairmanship of Dr. James Killian of M.I.T.,
has been headed by General John E. Hull, Mr. Clark Clifford, General
Maxwell D. Taylor, and currently by retired Admiral George W. Anderson.
Our budget is gone over line for line by the Office of Management
and Budget-and by the appropriate committees of the Congress as well.
There are, in fact, four committees of the Congress to which we have
reported regularly--not just on our foreign intelligence product but
on our operations, our plans, and our organization-ever since CIA was
created in 1947. Periodic calls for a "Congressional watchdog committee"
may have suggested to you that no such mechanism exists. On the contrary,
there are elements of the Appropriations and Armed Services committees
in both the Senate and the House which-like the President's Board-are
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told more about our activities and our operations than is known to most
of the personnel in our highly compartmented Agency. But whether we
are to be supervised by these committees or under :ome other arrange-
ment is for Congress itself to decide.
In short, the Central Intelligence Agency is not and can not be its own
inaster. It is the servant of the United States Government, undertaking
what that government asks it to do.. under the directives and controls the
government has established. We make no foreign po:'.icy.
All in all, I: think, President Truman and the 80th Congress recognized
that the CIA was to be both an important implement of the government,
and a legitimate object of public concern. They sought to recognize the
inherent contradiction between intelligence methods and democratic prin-
ciples by establishing elaborate controls.
The same objectivity which makes us useful to our government and our
country leaves us uncomfortably aware of our ambiguous place in it. We
may chafe under the criticism we do not answer, but we understand as
well as anyone the difficulties and the contradictions of conducting foreign
intelligence operations on behalf of a free society.
We are, after all, a part of this democracy, and we believe in it. We
would not want to see our work distort its values and its principles. We
propose to adapt intelligence to American society, not vice versa.
We believe, and I say this solemnly, that our work is necessary to permit
this country to grow on in a fearsome world and to find its way into a
better and more peaceful one.
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I
GLOBAL
INTELLIGENCE
AND THE
DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY
A TE S Of
N
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