CIA: CRITICISM, INQUIRY, ANTAGONISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500180007-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 29, 2000
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 5, 1973
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/03
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WASIIINGTON?Since the Day of
Pigs, when the 'United States lost its
gamble under the Kennedy administra-
tion to overthrow Fidel Castro, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency has suffered in
many areas of public opinion.
It has also. suffered internally, going
thru a succession of directors and los-
ing. other hey people under three Presi-
dents [starting with Kennedy] who did
not totally believe what the CIA reports
were saying.
The CIA was created in 1945 by the
late President Truman las the Central
Intelligence Group] from the skeleton
of the wartime Office of Strategic Stud-
ies. It was formed in an effort to col-
lect information [or spy] on other na-
tions as rimeli as they did en us. From
the start, it was an ageincy cloaked in
semi-secrecy noted for generating de-
bate
An early director, Adm, Roscoe H.
'Hillenhoetter, had warned the Truinan
administration of the then impending
Communist invasion of Siouth Korea?
and apparently was replaced for his
accurate prediction by Gen. Walter Bo..
dell Smith.
Smith then grabbed headlines 1clurin7.
the Sen. Joseph H. :\leCariny periodl
by statirG; in public there was a "moiiai
certainty" that ComronniA stie: iii'id
peneina:cd every securi:y aLi.ency in
Washimiton.
Smith did not lost long at the CIA
.after that and was replaced by the
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pipe-smoking Allen W. Dulles, brother
of John Foster Dulles, President Eisen-
hewer's secretary of state. Dulles put
McCarthy down after the senator
charged there were double agents oper-
ating within the CIA.
.the first civilian chief of the
CIA, came off as sort cif a super-spy
because of his exploits in the 055 dur-
ing World War 11. After staving off
:\IcCarthy, he continued to build the
CIA froth a small iiilency [starting with
1,500 agents] to a ?.7orldwide network
that began to do more than make esti-
mates of what foreign powers might
do.
Still, the Hoover commission looked
do the operations of the agency and
up with a report saying it was
lacking in collecting "inteliigence data
from behind Ulu Iron Curtain." ..\lcan-
while, die CIA squabbled with the
arias el' the
three military soi vices. In one cciie it
had cron.i.ih cleat to E;et the Army's
chief of intellinomie C- i!.1 fired.
By 1103 the CIA was speriding
a scar ;now it is shC!Iniid
;-ibout. 3 billion]. A year lalur it v,ai;
warnini:.!; that there was an intcm,n,ic
Oiimmuni:t drive UiefiViiV in latu
America. And than ii if bei-ian to
fall in en lia,! enciy after its
waiii shot down
ne incident causal even 11
di:. iii and the ciincellatien ei
summit meetini,,
STATI NTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RD
with a public trial of pilot Francis C.
The pablie clamor really began, (ho,
after the attempted lava ion of Cuba
ordered bv laic President Kerinedi.,,,
The Into lIobert F. Kennedy per.sonally
ran an investiiation of the ni:-,ency us
lit mime for the fiasco begin to fall on
the CIA for furnishing faulty-data. All-
ti' a shoi't period of grace, Dulles left
as director to be replaced by John A,
7:IcCone, a business executive..
Adm. William F. [fled] Raborn
in the Johnson administration,
biggest early flap v,-as a charge
the CIA got involved in an incleosian
government upheaval. Put the _involve-
ment also spread to the Congo, Viet
Nam, and apparently to some domestic.
ir,telligence activities. The deputy diree-
liom then was Richard Helms, a career
inanaement expel L.
Helms moved up to director during
the Johnson era of 111K, a ssu trig Con-
gress that the CIA did not c,-ante for-
eign policy. Helms eentiiiued to feel
public .heat because of the CIA financ-
ing of foundation.; a.nd situient activi-
ties. IIc was defended by Sen. Kennedy
at the. time.
When 'Mr: Ni7,:on became Prerident,
one of his first naoves \vas to install a
truAed associate of lom.i standrig--Ma-
ririe Gen. iloic.irt Cushinan?rr; deptity
director of the CIA. After, getting his
own reading on the ai,tiney, Vic Presi-
dent promoted Cushman to comman-
dant of the corps--anti is rimd;:e
Helms to I r:11
row we will repiirt on the new dircic?-,
THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURBAL OF
INTERN.ATIONAL LAW & POLITICS
ApprOved For Release 200V3V071a4-RIDV1914-130901R0
TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE
STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN*
-
t ?
I. INTRODUCTION
\, Eveiy few years the C.I.A. is rediscovered. The inspiration is
rarely the same: Guatemala in 1954; the 1.1-2 incident in 1960; the
Bay of Pigs in 1961; support for the National Students Association
in 1967. This year it is mainly Laos.
? How far the Nixon Administration has been forced to come in
the past year in acknowledging the C.I.A.'s role in Laos may be
seen by a comparison of two official reports. In March, 1970, in
.response to increasingly detailed newspaper reports and rising pres-
sures from Congress, President Nixon issued a 3,000 word statement
on Laos, including a nine point description of "the precise nature
of our aid to Laos."' There was no mention of the Central intelli-
gence Agency. On August 3, 1971 he Senate Foreign Relations
Committeereleased a staff report on the situation in Laos, cleared
for publication by the Administration after 5 weeks of negotiation
with the Committee staff. The published report reflects numerous
deletions insisted on by the Administration but includes the now
officially conceded revelation that "the most effective [friendly]
?military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the... irregu-
lar forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to
a great extent, organized by the C.I.A."2
There have been revelations about C.I.A.. foreign operations
before and official or semi-official confirmations of them. What is
unusual about the official confirmations of C.I.A. operations in
Laos is that they have been forced. out of the Administration while
the activities are still in progresi. The revelations come also at a
time when the Congress is heavily engaged in an effort to legislate
limits to the President's discretion in foreign affairs.
These events have led to the introduction in the present Con-
gress of several bills which comprise the first proposed legislation
intended to bring the C.I.A.'s foreign operations under substantive
legislative restraints. It is not that past years were without con-
gressional flurries over the C.I.A. Over the years some 132 bills had
been introduced either to establish standing committees to oversee
the C.I.A.'s activities or to authorize special investigations of the!
C.I.A.'s role. Not one passed, and only two ever reached the floor
..of even one House, where both Were decisively defeated by better
, than two-thirds majorities.3 The remarkable thing is that the activity
was all confined, to jurisdictional battles within the Congress. The
traditional issue has been which small group of Senators and Rep-
resentatives would be privy to the doings of the C.I.A.
Not until 1967 was the first bill introduced to limit what the
C.I.A. could do with its funds: Rep. Ryan's measure to prohibit the
C.I.A. from contributing funds to domestic organizations.4 The
Johnson Administration avoided what surely would have been con-
siderable pressure for such legislation only by. announcing that all
? existing covert financial assistance to the nation's 'educational and
private organizations would be terminated by about the end of the
year.5 More recently, Congress has compelled the Nixon Administra-
tion to terminate covert C.I.A. funding of Radio Free Europe and
Radio. Liberty and forced it to seek legislation to pre-vide open gov-
? Approved Fromdieleialteg20OV/080#17.6: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500180007-0