FOREWORD TO INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS ISSUE OF SIGNAL MAGAZINE OCTOBER 1981 BY ADMIRAL B.R. INMAN, U. S. NAVY DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91-00901R000500220001-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 8, 2000
Sequence Number:
1
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 1, 1981
Content Type:
MAGAZINE
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Body:
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FOREWORD
TO
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS ISSUE
OF
SIGNAL MAGAZINE
OCTOBER 1981
BY
ADMIRAL B. R. INMAN
U. S. NAVY
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
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Throughout this nation's history, we have understood the need for first
class intelligence in periods of tension or danger. Now is such a time. in
the 1980s, U.S. intelligence will be needed more than ever to provide vital
support to our national security processes. The challenges to this nation
and to U.S. intelligence will be large ones.
Intelligence is important because, in a very real sense, it acts as the
senses of our nation's government--our eyes, ears, etc. Intelligence can
sharpen our vision, increase our understanding, and aid in making wise decisions.
To allow this, however, intelligence must be timely and accurate. There are few
jobs more important to our country than to recognize the earliest indications
of future international problems and to alert our national leaders quickly. And
there are few tasks more important than to find and explain the details of potential
foreign conflict, challenges to our economy, or, thankfully, the fact of continued
peace. The importance of this work transcends politics, and professional intel-
ligence officers are non-partisan servants of our society. Their calling is as
noble as that of the professor, businessman, or diplomat.
The major challenges to U.S. intelligence in the 1980s will continue to
be those that developed since the catastrophic start of World War IT:
-- The increasing diversity of the world, including the steady emergence
of the USSR as a powerful and hostile force.
-- The technological revolution in Western society and in the intelligence
profession as well.
? -- The recognition that intelligence can help more areas of government
? than just diplomatic and military issues.
-- The realization, as a result of the above points, that there are more
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-- The glut in data, with the result that important information is not
only harder to find blit also harder to sort.
The need for support structures, including communications, that
span the earth when and where we need them.
In addition to these challenges, U.S. intelligence has had to cope with
increasingly persistent attention by the news media and has had to learn how
to interact with Congress, both as a user of finished intelligence and as an
overseer of our performance.
At the same time we deal with these on-going challenges, we have lesser ones_
to face as well. Although less critical, they are vexing nonetheless because
many of them are the historic foundations of intelligence as a profession. One
example is finding and retaining the highest caliber people, while at the same
time developing and maintaining our professional skills, such as foreign languages.
Another example is the protection of our intelligence sources and methods against
penetration by the intelligence services of foreign. governments. And a third is
the judicious maintenance and protection of the great trust that this nation
places in our use of secrecy within a democracy of laws and personal freedom.
After a decade of directed searching for, and finding, intelligence cLoa-
bilities which we ostensibly could do without, we now have an intelligence Com-
munity too lean in many ways. We face pacing questions--what do we need today,
and what will we need in the latter half of the-decade? .These are not easy
questions. As we struggle with them, we will have to recognize that all of the
ibasic arenas of U.S. intelligence need attention and strengthening?collection,
production, counterintelligence, covert action, and support. Strengthening U.S
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intelligence, or rebuilding where necessary, will not occur in just a few weeks;
but if we hope to be better in the 1980s, then we must start today. As we addressl
these questions, knowing that we will be competing for resources against other
important programs in the government, we need to plan wisely and to articulate
our programs well. As we do so, we will create and maintain the non-partisan
support for high quality intelligence that the Executive Rranch, the Congress,
and the American people need and deserve.
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