CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE ISSUES OF THE 80S

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500220002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1980
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

E m e f 0l 6? f PA ?J1: RYV9Fl -60901 R000500220002-0
Intelligence Requirements
AS WE MOVE INTO THE DECADE of the 1980s, it is
certain that the intelligence community will be
called upon increasingly to provide vital support to our
national security decision-making processes. In this
regard, I am reminded of a perceptive statement made Bobby R.
by a senior intelligence official in 1977 in specific refer- Vice Admiral, USN
ence to the changing intelligence environment. This of- Director
,?I'icial noted that two things stand out most clearly: National Security Agency
"
? There are more things about which we need in-
telligence data.
There is the prospect that intelligence may be
harder to obtain."
Our intelligence efforts have historically been heavi-
ly oriented toward the military aspects of world events
and remain largely so today. But while military consid-
erations remain vitally important, our need for eco-
nomic and political intelligence has an increasing im-
pact on our national security as well. This is a central
feature of the contemporary environment: the emer-
gence of new or enlarged intelligence requirements
which are in addition to, rather than instead of, more
traditional categories of intelligence.
Looking at some recent events, it seems to me that
an extremely useful outcome of the SALT II debate
within the Congress was a generally increased aware-
ness of the capabilities of intelligence to contribute to
our national security not only in respect to SALT but
also across the. entire range of our security interests.
In addition to the obvious need to maintain our in-
telligence focus on coverage having long-range strate-
gic importance, I believe it is clear that our need for
political/economic/military intelligence on other func-
tional and geographic areas will continue to grow. Re-
Improving Our Analytical and
Dissemination Capabilities
HE 1980s WILL BE a dynamic and challenging peri-
I. od for people in the intelligence business.
Throughout the decade, the potential for international
instability and turmoil will be very high. In this diffi-
cult setting, the intelligence community must continue
to identify and, indeed, anticipate the changes in the
foreign political, military and economic environment.
One of the greatest challenges faced by intelligence
professionals may well be the development of im-
proved ways of analyzing and disseminating in-
telligence information. Developing, procuring and em-
ploying the most cost-effective and mission-effective
collection systems will, of course, continue to be vital
tasks. Our technical capability to collect intelligence
should keep pace with needs though, and collection in
the 1980s will likely be characterized by the generation
of a large variety and heavy volume of timely, but
"raw," data, especially in times of crisis. To ensure
cent events in Iran and Afghanistan underscore this)
need. I believe that we must have a sizeable increased)
investment in both intelligence collection and analyticli
resources during the next decade if we are to serve the'I
nation's vital interests and take maximum advantage,
of the opportunities available to us to produce in-
telligence of great value to this country.
It is my personal conviction that a prudent invest-
ment now in our overall intelligence posture will pay
back huge dividends as we move further into the,
1980s. The challenge facing those of us in the InD
telligence Community is to plan wisely and be able to
articulate. our programs well in order to build the nec
essary levels of understanding and support in the deci-
sion-making levels of both the Executive Branch and
the Congress. The debate must be focused on what wet
as a nation need in the way of first class intelligence,
not on what we can do without. An integral part. of this
process will necessarily involve a more detailed educa-
tion of the public (to the maximum extent possible'
within sensible classification bounds) of the vital role;
of intelligence in relation to the national security of thee
United States.
John B. Marks
Major Genera!, USAF
Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence,
Headquarters USAF
the data is used effectively, our analytical and dissemi-l
nation capabilities must be equal to the technical po-
tential of collection systems. This will require progress,
in several areas.
First, to separate and correlate the key bits of infor-
mation in a large volume of data, better analytical tools
will be required. Many of the approaches to answering
this problem undoubtedly can be found in the data au-1
tomation field. Computer-assisted analysis capabilities)
will be essential.
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Marine Corps Reconnaissance,
Surveillance and Target Acquisition in
the 80s
U NDER THE BEST OF CONDITIONS, the requirement
to "find and fix" the enemy's movers, shooters
and emitters is a challenge to any organization's recon-
naissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA)
capability. Looking forward. to the 1980s, this chal-
lenge to the Marine Corps is even more imposing.
While rapid deployment in response to worldwide
contingencies has long been a demonstrated capability
of the Marine Corps, the advent of the Maritime Pre-
positioning Ships (MPS) concept introduces new com-
plications for the Marine Corps in the 1980s. In addi-
tion to maintaining our traditional role of forceable en-
try in amphibious operations, we must be prepared to
move rapidly by air, marry up with our forward de-
ployed equipment prepositioned aboard specially con-
figured commercial ships in the objective area and then
carry out any one of a myriad of operational missions
assigned.
This complex activity must be executed in a manner
which ensures that the Marine commander has contin-
uous and responsive intelligence support throughout
the entire process, from the airlift phase to the poten-
tial "movement to contact" phase. Yet, the very na-
ture of MPS deployment suggests that the commander
will frequently be separated from his normal in-
telligence and RSTA assets. During such periods, the
commander must rely on theater or national in-
telligence assets to keep abreast of a potentially vola-
tile and changing situation. This, in turn, places heavy
reliance on his accompanying communications, both
while airborne and upon reaching the objective area.
Upon arrival in the area, he may find Marine forces
deployed with Navy, Army and Air Force units, each
having unique organic RSTA assets. Service system
interoperability now becomes a factor as assets such
as Air Force RF-4C's, Navy EP-3C's and Army
SOTAS systems commence operations and provide
products of high potential value.
The Marine Corps must be prepared to employ its
RSTA assets in threat environments ranging from high
Clyde R. Dean
Brigadier General, USMC
Director of Intelligence, `
Headquarters USMC
intensity against modern, sophisticated opposition, to
low intensity against insurgents, terrorists or similar
groups with varying degrees of combat capability. The
weapon systems and emitters we must "find and fix"
may be Communist-produced or may be of United
States or Allied origin.
As the state-of-the-art technology is incorporated in-
to the weapon systems of the 80s, the need for real-
time and near-real-time systems to detect and engage
the opposition becomes essential. We look forward to
a Marine Corps tactical intelligence system in the mid-
80s which comprises automated SIGINT collection,
processing and dissemination, including airborne col-
lection and direction finding capabilities; enhanced ca-
pabilities in ground sensors, including a capability for
remote emplacement; and the fully-fielded Marine Air-
Ground Intelligence System with its capability to in-
tegrate products of theater and national systems to
provide timely, responsive intelligence support to Ma-
rine commanders.
The challenge of the 80s is clear: a tactical RSTA
system which will provide tailored and timely in-
telligence; the flexibility to operate under varying and
demanding conditions; interoperable with other Serv-
ice theater and national systems; as mobile as the unit
it supports; capable of rapid deployment; and support-
ed by communications which will ensure that the prod-
ucts get to the commander in time for decisive actions.
The Marine Corps acknowledges the contributions
of the AFCEA community toward meeting this chal-
lenge, and looks forward to.your continued assistance.
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