INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL BOBBY R. INMAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500240017-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 6, 1983
• Content Type: TRANS

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4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068
STATINTL
PROGRAM CBS Morning News
September 6, 1983 8:08 AM
STATION W D V M- T V
CBS Network
Washington, DC
SUBJECT Interview With Admiral Bobby R. Inman
DIANE SAWYER: The Soviets have intimated a number of
possible excuses for what happened with that Korean plane; one,
that it was a spy plane, and also that they mistook it for a
spy plane, all adding to the confusion over the events of last
week.
To help try to clear up some of that confusion, we
asked Admiral Bobby Ray Inman to join us this morning. Many
people consider him the ultimate intelligence professional. He
is former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, former
Director of the National Security Agency, and he joins us from
Austin.
Admiral Inman, thank you so much for coming in this
morning.
ADMIRAL, BOBBY RAY INMAN: My pleasure.
SAWYER: Let's start with what the Soviets have said
in the past. Do any other countries use passenger planes for
spying purposes? Is it possible that that's what this one was
doing?
ADMIRAL INMAN: On rare occasions, some countries may
well have used passenger planes. In this case, I'm very
confident that the Koreans were not doing it.
First, it was nighttime. The equipment to do night-
time reconnaissance, infra red, or side-looking radar, is
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very expensive. Very few countries'manufacture it. They would
have had to have gotten it from this country. So, I discount
any potential that that 747 was equipped for nighttime photo
reconnaissance over land.
SAWYER: Do you think from the pattern of events
there's any possibility that the Soviets mistook it for a spy
plane?
ADMIRAL INMAN: Well, they're clearly going to work
hard trying to -- to let the rest of the world believe they
mistook it. In addition to tracking every aircraft that flies
anywhere near their periphery, they also monitor what goes on.
Commercial airplanes retain contact with the International
Flight Control Center -- Anchorage and Tokyo for the 747.
Military reconnaissance aircraft, as a safety measure, because
of our high priority for human life, stay in regular communica-
tion with communications facilities. There's no question that
the Soviets distinguish them on every occasion.
If both airplanes had left Anchorage within two or
three'minutes of one another, they might have been confused for
as long as ten minutes. Well before the point that there was
an intrusion over land space, they would certainly have sorted
out the difference between identity of the aircraft.
SAWYER: Again, from your observations of the past of
the pattern of events in the Soviet Union, do you have a theory
about how high up the decision was made? Do you think it was
made in Moscow?
ADMIRAL INMAN: Diane, I really don't know. My
speculation probably differs from that of some of the others.
I believe in the wake of the '78 incident where the Soviets
were so determined not to have another situation in which their
air defense appear to perform so poorly, and that they set up
not only a lot more investment in their air defense system, but
more rigid controls.
If you're not going to let an aircraft escape, where
events move very rapidly, then the odds are high that the rules
of engagement would permit a decision to destroy it out in the
forward area. But one should never forget in this case that
that Soviet air defense system flows a steady (sic) volume of
traffic back to Moscow.
There's little doubt that officials in Moscow moni-
tored it all the way along, and if they'd wanted to issue an
order to prevent the activity they would have had time to do
it.
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SAWYER: Little doubt that in Moscow they monitored
ADMIRAL INMAN: No doubt that they monitored it. But
there was a steady flow of what was going on.
SAWYER: One final question. A lot of people have
been wondering if there were U.S. reconnaissance planes in the
area, if indeed they crossed the path of the flight at one
point, could they not have seen -- should they not have seen
that i,t was being trailed by Soviet fighters and it was in
trouble?
ADMIRAL INMAN: As I understand the time -- the time
sequence, the crossover was much before reconnaissance aircraft
-- the fighters came up to look at the airliner. If they were
in the very immediate vicinity, 10, 20 miles away, they would
have seen the activity. Even a hundred away, it's doubtful.
SAWYER: Admiral Bob Inman. Again, our thanks to you
so much. Some of the questions addressed this morning.
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