THE DOWNED PLANE AN INTERVIEW WITH BOBBY R. INMAN WHAT PROBABLY HAPPENED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000500240018-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2000
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 4, 1983
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901
HPTIC LE APPEAR WASHINGTON P O S T
4 September 1983
STATINTL
,Y. ''r?uo ., yvw??, / .?, -.- - ------ ! alrllner pellt:LRtWU 11111-WICIII 161I?7,ur ULRU V- I-' They A: In looking at the pieces of information cisms of the poor performance of their air defense they track. 1 hey know it's not theirs. But they
that have filtered down through the news cover- system fresh in their minds. They make the deci- don't know whose it is.
age-that's the only access I've had-1 pieced it sion, since the Koreans are not responding, to Q: So it. would be very difficult for it to
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up a p
together this way: shoot it down. Instead of using cannons as in '78, occur to them to p
A: 'Chat's right And even if they were to p'ck
at the time the Korean airliner
uess is that
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leaves Anchorage, the program put into the com- up a phone, how? to whom? This does perhtps
tional air traffic. The Soviets are not part of the
stantial error. The aircraft takes off, proceeds I could very well have figured that to was over
along the route, begins to go off its normal course, proper waters, in international airspace, and normal process in handling international aircraft.
cuts into and actually crosses into Soviet airspace so he never knew what hit !tint? And there's a long gap in there between Anch r-
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Q: How did that original computer error get craft. He maybe even understood signals. But Q: Cut a little deeper into the Soviet reoc-
made and not perceived? having the Soviets' go out to fly around com- tion. Why would there not have occurred to
A: Totally by the Koreans. But the data being mercial airlines is not a unique event. They're them the 100 reasons for not -.shooting that
relayed back show that, because of the program , targets of opportunity, to look at, reconnais- would occur to us?
error, the plane's on its normal track. And to the lance, to practice anything. So it may well be A: Because you're thinking as an Americ in,
pilot, it appears that he is on his normal track, and not as a Soviet. To an American, in this
But in reality he's very substantially off course. that the Koreans had previously had aircraft country, human life is the No. I priority. And
That will take some explaining by somebody else come up, look at them, pace and proceed back, property and territorial matters come a very
who knows those systems better. But I don't when they're proceeding in international air- distant second. It is inconceivable to me t at
know any other way this series of events could space. The presence itself of the fighters there- the United States would ever delegate autho ity
have occurred unless that happened. fore would not be -an instant cause for great to engage a civilian airliner in peacetime.
The aircraft actually would be normally alarm. But obviously any signals, any kind of With the Soviets the priority is exactly he
tracked.by. the Soviets, as everything that flies rocking or lights being flashed, does become
' `then the pilot faces the question, why other way around. The lust priority is that t~iey
on the periphery is 24 hours a day. The fact cause. will not tolerate any intrusion into their ir-
that it moved toward the coast would be de- are they trying to divert me'? If he believes lie's space. And if it occurs, they will force the ir-
tected rapidly. '['he Soviet air defense system in international airspace, then he continues to craft down. And if the aircraft tries to esc pe,
goes into alert as they see the prospective and fly, never responding, they'll destroy it,
then real penetration of airspace. We are told Q.- We read in the papers that the Japanese Q: You are suggesting, or you are statin/as
that eight aircraft reacted, which says to me military picked up that the plane was off a fact, that the shoot-down decision was made
four missions of two aircraft each spread out cour:ye, We know that the Korean airline itself by the local people way out in Siberia, even
was aware the plane was late. Why wasn't two
over a substantial period of time. though this event was going un at the dinner
hour in Moscow?
Identification passes have to have identified and two put together? ?
it as a 74'7: it's too distinctive an airplane to be A: '['here's a time factor here. Very likely, A: I believe there is it strong likelihood, Ifol-
misidentified. In the nighttime there may have first, the Korean people didn't know it was late viewed tsir
en ''78 [s iucfddieent, normal hat hey y reviewed
been some difficulty in identifying it as Korean. until it didn't arrive. ]owing ing the
rest hen
The Soviets at that point had. to he discussing Q: Uon't they pick it tip some hundreds of When they're Vs td fun r l So let re ac ion
how to get it to land. What we don't know, of nuA:es ouNot a long way, They don't think to track cized bthe West for poor performance.
commercial flights just for tracking. But it They have a long aversion to any aircraft .
course, is what kind of signals they tried to use g, that
back and forth. In the daytime, clearly, it's would have been picked up at a distance -let's comes in whether it's a small aircraft wandering
much easier with the rocking of wings and the give it 100 to 150 miles out across the Sea of over from Turkey or a military aircraft. doing, pe-
other things that the pilot can clearly see. At Japan. 'That's still well short of where it ripheral reconnaissance or a commercial airliner.
night that becomes a little more complex. ran into its problems. In the '78 incident, an enemy aircraft got too far
But if I'm right in my guess about the bad As for the Japanese radar, the ques- in. They were sluggish in detecting it, they were,
computer program, the Korean pilot and crew, tion is what's the time factor involved very slow in reacting. When they went up try
believing they're over international waters, there. They have no way in all probahil- in fact to fire at it, the guy dove and found i on
aren't about to follow a signal from Soviet air- a lake on which he landed. He didn't know %here
craft to divert and land. And so they proceed. he was. If he had known where he was he'd have
nd instead
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The Soviets are determined not to let an in- gone
trader actually come into their territory and es- Subsequent to that, I believe, the odd are
cape, with memories of '78 [when another Korean very high that the Soviets established a au-
tonomous air defense system. They delegated
authority to intercept and force to land and, if
that did not work, to destroy.
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500240 f61LT~-'1 -V I
An Interview With Bobby R. Inman
The Downed Plane
What Probably Happened
 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R00050024001 e-1.
Now, given the way information flows centrally
in the Soviet Union on everything, information
clearly must have been flowing to Moscow as the
events were occurring. So at least someone in Mos-
cow at an air defense headquarters knew they were
tracking an aircraft, knew that the aircraft was
over land or at least was penetrating Soviet air-
space, knew that they had reacted to this and that
ultimately they intended to destroy it.
So the prospect is clearly there for someone I
in Moscow to override that decision, but I be-
lieve it. is already established with civilian Polit-
boro approval that there will be no penetration
of Soviet airspace, and if an aircraft does, just
shoot it down if it won't land. It doesn't matter
whether it's civilian or military.
Q: So we are dealing with a very grim'
reminder of how that system works but
not necessarily with anew political fact
that has to enter into our calculations on other
dealings with the Soviet Union?
A: Exactly right. It is a grim reminder of
their value system, of their general attitude
about anything that penetrates Soviet territory.
And the ruthlessness with which they will deal
with that without any second thoughts. `
Now, I'm sure at this point in time there are
,a great many people in Moscow who would like
to reverse this event. Not because an airplane.
was shot down with a loss of4ives=but because
of the stark reminder it has for the rest of the
world; it does an awful lot to Clear the air after
this very sophisticated campaign we've watched
over the last two years of their trying to portray
themselves as the peacemakers and the United
States as the great threat to world peace.
Q: If that is their presumed purpose, then
why are they fudging and lying about it?
A: Well, there's no easy answer for them. I
cringed, as I always do, when we began provid-
ing details of events that we've collected from
sensitive intelligence sources and methods, be-
cause of the likelihood that the Soviets will
track back through that process and determine
not only how much we knew but maybe even
how we knew it and will take steps to cut us off.
But with our decision to declassify and to make
a direct statement and not let leaks occur and
do perhaps even more damage, the Soviets were
put at an immediate disadvantage. So much de-
tail is provided that they.are not left with the
easy option to mislead. ..1::.
Let's face it, we have been in the climate in this
country and in much of the West for the last dec-
ade, where what the' U.S. government says is al-
most immediately questioned-are they telling
the truth? What the Soviets, the Nicaraguans,
the Cubans say is almost immediately accepted as
the truth and then later challenged. In this case
the depth of detail is such that the Soviets are at
a very substantial disadvantage.
Q. Why don't they just say, we're sorry but
we do not allow our territory to be penetrated?
A: That would be a much smarter response.
Q: The truth is not in them?
A: Well, the truth in this case is not a likely re-
sponse. But they may come to that. And it would
be a much smarter way to deal with it. Trying to
portray this as a Korean plane doing a spying mis-
sion is just pure nonsense. We certainly wouldn't
have wanted it. We have much better ways of get-
ting the information. If the Koreans had had any-
thing they had wanted to know, they would have
come to ask us for it-not fly a 747 loaded with
passengers when they're trying to build a commer-
cial airline business. It's such a shallow lie that it
makes the Soviet case even worse.
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500240018-1
 STATINTL
Approvsl1r ;I 2001/03/07: CIA-RDP91-0090
WASHINGTON POST
2 September 1983
0
Y Soviets
i r tu
it-ter,
ON PAGE
3y A. D. Horne
Washington Post Foreign Service
A missile fired by ''a Soviet jet-fighter downed a Ko-
rean Air Lines jet, with 269 persons aboard near the So-
viet island of Sakhalin Wednesday, American officials
charged yesterday, calling on Moscow to explain "this
appalling act."
The Boeing 747, whose passengers 'include "Rep,
Lan, McDonald (D-Ga.) among an estimated 30 or more
Americans, apparently plunged into the Sea of Japan;
with no sign of any survivors. The plane went down early
Thursday morning, Tokyo' time, which was Wednesday
afternoon here.
Ssayiet officials, facing mounting international out.
rage, did not acknowledge'downing the 'plane. A brief
statement issued in Moscow by the official Tass news
agency said only that Soviet fighter planes had tried to
guide "an unidentified plane" that twice ."violated the
air space of the U.S.S.R.;" but that "the intruder plane
did not react. to the signals and warnings from the So-
viet fighters and continued its flight in the direction of
the `yea of` Japan."
The Soviets later reported, in a message delivered to
the State Department, that search parties had found
signs of a possible crash in the area of %-Ioneron Island.
crest at' Sakhalin.
The plane. on a flight from New Fork to Seoul with a
retoeling stop in Anchorage, Alaska, apparently wan-
dered far north of its scheduled flight path, which would
have passed south of the Kuril Islands and the northern
Japanese island of Hokkaido.
Secretary of State George P. Shultz said the plane
"strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Pen-
in,ula and over the Sea of Okhotsk and over the Sakha-
lin Hand." Shultz said that. "at least eight fighters" were
scrambled to intercept the airliner, and that the fighter
that =1mt it down "was close enough for a visual inspec-
tion of the aircraft."
Hut Shultz said there was no direct radio contact be-
tweeen the airliner and the Soviet planes: "We can see ,
explanation whatever for shooting down an unarmed
In Santa.Barbara, Calif.. Whitt House spokes
L
man
arry-
Speakes announced that President Reagan was returning
to Washington today, a day earlier than planned, for :a
m
ti
g
ith hi
ee
n
w
s national security advisers;
Late 'yesterday; State 'Department spokesman John
Hughes said Soviet. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromvko
had sent Shultz a message that' was "almost verbatim"
the Tags statement. Hughes-said the 'Soviet Embassy was
told that Grnmyko's message w,as
"totally inadequate" as an explana-
tion.
- Other -nations with citizens aboard
the domed plane expressed outrage._
According to Korean='Air'Lines,'the
majority of ' ;the passengersis were
Stiith'-Koreans, ' bitt there were `also
Japanese, , -Taiwanese, .Filipinos;-
Thais, Canadians and .persons of
other nationalities aboard.
In Tokyo, Japanese Foieigri Mini
ister Shintaro Abe said that if the
airliner had been shot down by So-
viet planes, it. was "very regrettable."
Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Pavlov
was summoned to-the Foreign Min-
istry for an explanation.
In Ottawa, Canadian. Minister of
State Jean-Luc Pepin -said that Soviet
Embassy Charge d'Affaires Alexander.
Novikov cautioned him,. "Planes go
down without being shot down." Last
night, Deputy Prime Minister Allan J.
MacEachen said he was "very. of
by the Soviet. reaction.
In Seoul, South Korean President
Chun Doo Hwan met twice with his
Cabinet during the day. and later
issued a statement accusing the So-
viet Union of "a barbarous act" and
demanding a Soviet apology. South
Korea has no diplomatic relations
with tile. Soviet Union-a strong
su )porter of its rival North Korea:
Approved For Release 2001/03/07: CIA-RDP91-009012AR~. 18-1
 STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/0*67N?iMATWbP91--0090
1 September 1983'.. . ?,,
Soviet Union,.its air defenses, and on international intelligen
happened, how it happened, and what's likely next.
tonight, we'll talk to a broad range of specialists on internati
why it shot down a Korean jetliner with 269 people on board. On
this horrifying act of violence. STATINTL
KOPPEL: Tonight, the United States is still waiting for the So
Press Secretary): (at press conference) Words can scarcely exp
KOPPEL: Good evening. I'm Ted Koppel, and this is Nightline.
KOPPEL: If you were watching this broadcast last night, you pr
with the same impression we did: there had been some kind of a
fighter jets and a Korean Air Line 747, but senior U.S. officia
and we led you to believe, that the plane had landed safely on S..- ---y.
Sadly,
that was not true. 'The U.S. flag over:the White House today,
and
over
all
federal
installations and all official U.S. buildings around the world,
flies
at half'
b
d K
d
Ai
i
i
t
-
Li
'
i
staff.
oar
crewmen a
orean
ne passengers an
x
n
y
Two hundred s
r
ne
s
Fl
ght,
007 are missing and believed dead. The aircraft was shot down by a Soviet
air-to-missile, air-to-air missile. The United States and South Korean have called
for a special meeting of the U.N. Security Council tomorrow. Tomorrow, also, Presidenlt
Reagan cuts short his vacation and returns from :California to Washington- He'll meet
with his top security' advisers and with congressional leaders tomorrow and over the
weekend. From the president to the Congress to the families of those who were on
board the downed jetliner, the reaction today was one of almost sickening shock- Some
found it hard to believe that the Soviets had actually shot down an unarmed plane with
so many passengers on board. Many who spoke of the incident were deeply moved with I
pain and with anger.
KOPPEL: So far, at least, the Soviet government has acknowledged only that an
airliner, an unidentified one, penetrated Soviet air space. They have not admitted
shooting down the plane. Nor have the come close to expressing anything approaching'
regret. Joining us now live is the U.S. undersecretary of state for political
affairs, Lawrence\Eagleburger. Secretary Eagleburger, what do we know? Are we
confident that the Soviet Union shot that plane down? EAGLEBURGER: Well, I think,
Ted, the facts are absolutely clear. There is no doubt whatsoever, on the basis of
evidence from a number of sources, that the Soviet air force shot down that Korean
Airlines airplane. There's no doubt about that whatsoever.
KOPPEL: Give us, if you can, a thumbnail sketch of, of what happened to the best of
the U.S. government's understanding and in what kind of a timeframe. EAGLEBURGER:
Well, the time frame is, without the facts right in front of me is gonna be a little
bit difficult, Ted.
KOPPEL: Roughly. EAGLEBURGER: But in effect, as the secretary said in his statement
today, there-is no question that the Korean Airlines plane was outside of its normal
flight pattern and in fact over-flew Soviet territory. There is also no question
about the fact that that plane was .captured by Soviet radar for about two and a half 1
hours.. There were, at one time or another, eight Soviet aircraft up in the air,
either looking for it or in fact later, unfortunately, finding it. There's no
question at all about the fact that one Soviet aircraft, the one that in fact f7inall
shot the plane, down came to within two kilometers of the Korean aircraft.
COA= D
Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000500240018-1