HELPING HAND

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CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1
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K
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44
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December 9, 2016
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December 12, 2000
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8
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May 28, 1982
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NSPR
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STATINTL Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 250008-1 WILMINGTON EVENING NEWS JOURNAL (DE) 28 MAY 1982 Helping Hand Old friend surfaces as famous I wonder if you could tell me if Hobby Ray Inman. the CIA officer that has been in the news lately, ever served aboard the U.S.S. Mullinix? I was on that destroyer in the summer of 1961 and the CIC officer aboard was LCDR Robert Inman. He was intelligent (a Fulbright scholar), personable and from the South. I would like to know if this is the same man. ? DAL, Wilmington One and the same. Admiral Inman, who just recently resigned his num- ber two post at the Central Intelligence Agency, served aboard the Mullinix from April 1960 to September 1961. He was made Lieutenant Cnnunander in July 1961. Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASH LNGTON POST STATINTL ONAlpi1OEwpg3For Releask24A1IpX97 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 'Deputy Director of CIA:' - ; ? By IVlic.tiael et1eri WaahIngton Post Start ' ft,.: ? ? - - The, Senate -Intelligence Committee unanimously welcomed and approved the ;nomination of John ,N -McMahon ;uty director 4, ne nspd I ?"' riniikeii still ?11'-cOnfide-- ; 4..4; .in CIA Director; William J. :Casey :.ein4 ;thud were relying especially on the .deputy "to be straight with us.',., At the same time,--McMahon sought to iiissUre the committee that new'presiden;7, orders governing CIA operations did ,e- triOt Mean that the agency would be ii !---Volied in so-calle4 9ntrilsi.veVaiii4160/;,? in this country involving US c' 't? , Asked by Sen. Waiter 4.HuddlestOn '.(D-Ky.) whether the panel would be . formed whenever such techniques 'Ere - ,being used against Americans at home;":, McMahon said: ' "I don't think the CIA will ever be 'in- ? 1J0112i N. McMAIION volved in intrusive techniques against mm 1kMeliCallS- here s the United Statei.' , m44..1.4144 immit4,44?1? . ? .? ." Should there be such a requirementftlie';';,?-best intelligence bfficerl have known;" a fields.. McMahon also is area ;FBI viould do thatIand'ProbablY compliment echoed by inanniriabeiri.; ; CIA insiders' Si being th-E.mt "-r court svarrant4t--A -- But &den carried the point much fur- to any form of outside, man. -McMahon's and-Wei:'s'eenied7lo4 Ainong-,---hum' -other:SEW;he`."". intelligence.7' ? - - yond a prepared -opening- statement to pointed out, the admiral "had .a heck of a In his alinement McMah the committee in which he said:- relationship with this icommittee.' - allegiance to the benefits of 6- "I would like to emphasize for the',? But ".... . Some of Us at least," Biden oversight of secret ,CIA act . . . record that the activities of the intern- - continued, '"don't always leap to embrace under questioning; promisec :gence community. involving Americans '; the utterances of Mr. Casey as being th4. the committee. if he learned are, and must.' continue to be, limited,- whole story, That my be a little unfair, - tant information had been w 'subject to strict standards . of raccounta- and let's assume it mi.." But the fact re-.... the , panel had been ,rnisler bthty and far removed from any abridge:: mains, Biden added, that We s&ne- forme&;1;1.1 ricient of cherished Constitutional rights;" times wonder'vliether were getting the He 'also said the CIA inJtt Huddleston and others have charged whole truth" from Casey 'or whether it's- plete anew study, ordered It ; that the language Of the 'executive order ? - .7 House, to assess US. counte :signed by President Reagan last Decent,. - Biden said that he 'ana .others capabilities' -for sleeting %vitt "-ber does widen CIA -authority to operate always count on Inman for the full story; '...,.posed by foreign 'agents. ;In the -United States rather than strictly: and he and Goldwater' joked that McMa In a related development, '..+53-ierseas. The intrusive techniques re 'hon ought to learn how to pull -up hs tee's former chairman, Dem .ferred -to usually mean' such things as Socks or slide back his chair at the wit: ? Church of Idaho, warned ye? wiretapping, mail' Opening and searched ness.. table, as Inman 'reportedly did on "there is every evidence:" the' without a warrant. ? ? hearing other witnesses say .things that States is losing sight (4 earlit McMahon, 52, was praised by all corn- troubled him. ? ' ? ? and the general proposition mittee members for? expertise and pro- Allegations about Casey's "politicizing" ? operations "should be a rare ; fessionalism during a 31-year CIA career.. of intelligence arenot new. Yet, paradox--- "If we are not careful,' he But several senators eipressed the view, ically, Inman iS known' to be :one of :conference Sponsored here t diet McMahon faced an especially- Casey's strongest defenders in terms of paign for Political Rights, 'w "heavy burden," as 'Joseph R. Bide n Jr. the director's rejection of any attempts to ? to past practice in which c (D-Del.) put it, -as successor to retiring manipulate intelligenm -information. ' tions become a routine progr, Adm. Bobby R.. Inman. ? ; .? ? Unlike Inman, widely regarded as an literally hundreds of projects Inman's surprise decision to resign, "idea man" with a good grasp of global dozens of countries. revealed last pitptAggegoalt.asAtqlow4 boltoi% poLittiga rticcbn.,,,, ft-iriniraircogmait? Committee irnUffi"Thr Nt.fo VriftlAVIWKI!fihon 4,4 fr% AMY vilr5360MKPae (R-Ariz.) yesterday called Inman "the - mainly in management and technical powerful and adverse ,--,:mseq 4414 t. e t ,t413 1,4,iii'tant ,ulatt, 4i' of a - tgreks4onil it,,ee end, to it? orm afield 4r if or rnisiD- : will mid- tt.e bite ntellige4oPe t,ht- Ti-reat ;al* era' that 1.2'tlited ? iin cf. wart a -ei .ar lex; ilea t e turn :era - ving PIZ!' Vttar, tri Lt At he -et, haie Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-009ORR.00500250008-1 IINIL NEW YORK NEWS?WORLD 26 May 1982 Inman's warning should be heeded Adm- . Bobby Inman, the retiring deputy dire6tor of thecii4,vo lliwas a well-deserved reputation on Ca Hill as a shrewd intelligence analyst and a man not given to alarmist rhetoric. Accordingly, we can hope that Adm. Inman's grim warning the other day about the threat posed by the Soviet Union's relentless military build-up will be heeded, most especially by those in Con- gress who imagine that tens of billions of dollars can be slashed from the defense budget without further eroding the nation's security. Adm. Inman was plain spoken: "I believe the Soviet build-up over the last 17 years? has brought us, to a perilous state." Perilous is an unambiguous word. Its use by the nation's second-ranking intelli- gence official means that, in his carefully measured judgment, the United States is in danger. ? Those in Congress who tend to dep- xsorwthat danger and to seek excuses for _ cutting deeply into the Reagan admin- istration's rearmament program cannot easily dismiss Bobby Inman's expertise, or his access to the most highly classified and sensitive intelligence. Nor can they make light of his observa- tion that" future Soviet leaders may be "less cautious" than the septuagenarians who now hold power in Moscow. Given the Soviet Union's recent adventures in places like Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Southeast Asia, any informed judgment that the next generation of leaders may be bolder is chilling stuff. The combination of Soviet military power that can even now reach anywhere in the world plus a more aggressive post- Brezhnev leadership would present the United States with unprecedented threats to its security and vital interests. The logical inference from Adm. Inman's wise counsel is that the best way to buy trouble tomorrow is to cut the defense budget _ today _ _ Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 STATI NTL AltoptoyedifteduRdileale260111Tht/br: CkgRD P91-00901R000500250008-1 ON PAGE_Al__ 20 May 1982 dmiralinman to Inspect Sea Cade By Henry E. MO0bCTry EDITOR More than 400 U.S. Naval Sea Cadets from 11 east .coast divisions will participate in the Second Annual Mid-Atlantic Naval Sea Cadet Personnel Inspection and Pass in Review at the historic Washington Navy Yard on Saturday, 29 May 1982. Admiral Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, will be the Senior? Inspecting Officer. The U.S. Navy Ceremonial Marching Band and the 'U.S. Navy Ceremonial Guard Drill Team will highlight the ceremonies which will begin at 1 p.m. at Admiral Leutze Park at the Navy Yard. DAHLGREN Division, USNSCC, which is head- quartered at the Navy Yard, is once again host for the ceremony along with its sponsor, the District of Columbia Council of the Navy League of the United States. A native of Rhonesboro, TX, ADM Inman became Deputy Director a the CIA on 12 February 1982. In this position he is principal deputy to the Director of the CIA. ADM Inman graduated from the University of -Texas at Austin (B.A., 1950). He entered the Nava/ Reserve the following year and was commissioned as an Ensign in March 1952. His initial assignment was to the aircraft carrier USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), which participated in operations during the Korean hostilities. His subsequent early career included a variety of assignments in Naval in- telligence, including tours as the Chief of Naval Operation's Intelligence Briefer, and Assistant Naval Attache, Stockholm, Sweden, as well ? as operational assignments afloat. ADM Inman has served in a number of positions of high responsibility. He was Fleet Intelligence Of- ficer for the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, 1969-71, during the Vietnam conflict. He graduated from the National War College in 1972. He was Ex- ecutive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, 1972-72. lie served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, 1973-74; as Director of Naval Intelligence, 1974-76; and as Vice Director, Plans, Operations and Support of the Defense In- telligence Agency, 1976-77. He was appointed Direc- tor of the National Security Agency in July 1977, where he served until March 1981. Coincident e ith his assignment as the Deputy Director of the ( IA, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral, the I rst Naval Intelligence Specialist to attain that rani. ADM Inman's many service decorations incl tde the National Security Medal, the Navy Distingu sh- ed Service Medal, the Defense Superior Ser. ice Medal, and the Legion of Merit in addition to. several awards for service during the Korean ,,nct Vietnam conflicts. ADM Inman's permanent residence is Anahe n. CA. He and his wife Nancy (nee Russo, of Washington,. DC) have two sons, Thomas ; William. Sea Cadet Divisions participating in this ye s ceremonies are: ANNAPOLIS Division, Annape.is, MD; BICENTENNIAL Division, Cumberland, IV ); COMPTON Division, Perth Amboy, ; DAHLGREN Division, Washington, D. FRANKLIN/HOLLAT Division, Huntington, LEHIGH VALLEY Division, Lehigh Valley, I sn MAINE Division, Reading, PA; NEW JERSi :Y Division, Bridgewater, NJ; WILLIAM E. TAYLi Division, Wilmington, DE; TECUMSEH Divisi n. Baltimore, MD, and TOP HATTERS Squadr n, ' NAS Norfolk, VA, The Naval Sea Cadet Corps consists of nearly :)0 Divisions and comprises nearly 7,500 young n en] and women and 800 officers. Naval Sea Cadets L re ages 14 through 17 and Navy League Cadets ages 11 to 14. All personnel are volunteers. Tae Naval Sea Cadet Corps is the youth program of Navy League of the United States. It is aimed at educating and training American youth in citizt ship and Naval/maritime matters, Naval hist( .y and tradition, the importance of our maritime ad Naval forces to our nation and world freedom, t le opportunities available in Naval/maritime servi e careers, and at guiding young men and women toward being more patriotic, knowledgeable and responsible citizens. Participation is voluntary a; 'd there is no obligation on the part of the young rm ii and women to join the a:Tned forces. The ceremonies are f:ee, for information c; 202-678-2870. The Navy Yard is located at 8th and 4 Streets, Southeast. CONTINUED Approved For Release 2001/03/07.: CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 More than 400 U.S. Naval Sea Cadets from 11 east coast divons will participate on Saturday, 29 May in the Second Annual Mid-Atlantic Naval Sea Cadet Personnel In- spection and Pass in Review at Admiral Leutze Park at the historic Washington Navy Yard. Pictured am some of the 300 Cadets who participated in the 1981 Inspection. Ad- WO, r?Ndeablf* re?meaffm.4 mire! Bobby R. Inman, USN, Deputy Director of the Centr Intelligence Agency, will be the Senior Inspecting Office DAHLGREN Division, which is headquartered at th Washington Navy Yard, and is host Division, is seen fro+ and left, with components of eight other Divisions. (Phot by PH2 R.G. Ambroseno, USN) Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 2 IMMEDIATE RELEASE NEWS RELEASE OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS) WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301 PLEASE NOTE DATE May 18, 1982 STATI NTL No. 213-82 OXford 75131 (Info' OXford 73189 (Copies) FLAG OFFICER ANNOUNCEMENT Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger announced today that the President has nominated Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, U.S. Navy, to be placed on the retired list in his current grade. Admiral Inman is scheduled to retire on July 1, 1982, after completion of more than thirty years of active service. He has served as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence since February 12, 1981. Admiral Inman was born on April 4, 1931, in Rhonesboro, Texas. -END- Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 Approved For Release 200#150111?AW-IREINTW111100 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 'Disservice' to 4!i Ifaig On Friday, April 30, The. Post pub- lished a front-page story by Loren Jen- kins that claimed that stories told by , Miskito Indian refugees. provide "the basis of Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig's charges . . . that .Nicaragua was pursuing. a 'genocidal' policy. against its unfortunate Miskito Indian minority." ' That statement is misleading. The _ government', has providaL., abundant photographic evidence of thENYSternatic - destruction of the, Miskit6lindian vil- ? !ages by the Sandinista reginvi. This was done in in extraordinary public presen- tation by CIA Deputy Director Adm.. Bobby Inman, and the--.photographs -have siriee been released to ell interested, parties. An- account of AdM. Inman's briefing was carried by The Post. It does . the secretary of state a disservice to Sug- gest he based his charges only on the inevitably- conflicting accounts of Mis- kito refugees in Hondures..;,?1.-': MICHAEL A. LEDEEN Special Adviser to the Secretary-of State Washington --- ? ;10 ? Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 2001/0311X7 LkalAERDP91-00901R0 ON PAGE 7) part,IE 13 tea.y 1982 ovie s in the Pa STAT I NTL Falklands Crisis Gives Them a Solid Foothold in Argentina, - By ROBERT & LEMEN . . - ? The Falklands caitsis has turned into a bo- t to become the Soviet Union's leading trad-. nomic relationship into a strategic-nailitary nanza for Moscow by allowing it to further a e . tog partner in the developing world. Mos-t, one. A new fishing; agreement now lets, longstanding sate objective: a anititary ; : C.OW and Havana consistently block discus- ; ? Soviet "scientific" vessels operate out of relatior.iship with Argentina. - nett; tette.: att ea, sion of Argentina's human-rights violations strategic Ushuaia. off the Beagle :Channel. . Until recently.: the 'main- Soviet leverage ' in international forums, even as they orche- '7.: The Soviet Union has been hawking militae:' with the Argentine temta was-RS 'growing .. strate ostracism of Chile, Argentina's rival ry equipment to the itrgentine generals for I dependence on ti Russian grain and meat , for jurisdiction over the -Beagle Channel. years. Last fall, the jpnta contemplated, the , naarket. Now the Soviet Union,...viith..,the ".:-f,When the two countries mobiliz' ed for war ?.. : purchase of Soviet 4tvarplanes. Inside the i help of the affluent 65,000-member Argeneee over the channel in 1978, the Ruseians pub- 't: anti-communist Argentine. officer corps are 1 tine Com-monist PartYithe largest in Latin. ? licly sided with Argentina. The Argentine;: those who listen to !Sweet. blandishments ' America after Cuba's), is utilizing the Falk:, e :. junta tolerates the -local. slavishly pre-, with sympathy. Sorne have studied at the land Island crisis to-supply a hitherto miss.; Soviet, Communist Party while brinally re-- , Leningrad military c011ege and participated! tog link in its Argentine strategy: mass serpee ...pressing, other leftist organizations. The ...in now-- commonplace military exchange] port for closer relation.e with Moscow. .. ? ' et party' reciprocates with "critical support" missions with their Sbviet counterparts. To - Since its abstention from the U.N. Securie . and inventive apologias for the "progres- reinforce these ties. !the Soviets carefully from the Falkiands., Moscow has lined up , -. ?.- .The SOuthern Cane of South America has era, exporters and fin4nciets. - - . - -:-- ty Council's call for Argentina to withdraw - sive" and "democratic" military regime. . - cultivated relations With Argentine grow,./ behind Buenos Aires. The Soviet press to- appreciated in strategic value as aircraft - Th Argentine? elite has so far resisted ! cuses attention ? on 1Britain's Pright wi ' . Soviet efforts to forge a militarer link. They] stressed their loyalty to what a senicr U.S.; ? official called our "hared values," ? when testifying on behalf pf reeumption. of U.S.; military sales to Argentina last May. British i and US, reaction to the invasion of the I Falklands may allow the Soviets- to hurdle' t -tar tbs . carriers and supertankers have outg,rown government, which. it accuses Of violating . the Panama and Suez canals, and maiitirne international law, while remaining silent on .. traffic in the South Atlantic has multiplied the character of Argentina's and its rupture ? Mounting interest in offshore petroleum, in of international law. Communist Party ban- the seabed, in fishing and in Antarctica, ners and slogans have been conspicuous h) .together with the appearance of Soviet na- rallies around Argentina. The Soviet World* val deployments in West Africa, have -ate soccer teara touring Argentina has also -1 further enhanced the region's strategic sit. - been pressed into service. Russian I e, ey alte now reportedly aupiun--:i rush to embrace Argentine goal-scorers, , More than one-third of all Argentine ex- . monitoring equipmeat from their base in I . . eneen ... i ? . . . : ete , ? r.. ...? plying surveillance 'data and submarine, and . when - the/Russian players are an-e'. . pnrts are sold to the Soviet Union. The same :? Cuba. notmg-itd. they receive prolonged Standing 1. proportion used to go to Great Britain a . driettenin d?outv direel . ovations fro ra therArgen tine specta GM'S. : . half-century ago?before Argentina a t..21.eriate subcemmittee eart_lier 1 e -..' Moscow has been wooingthe countries Of worked free of its hated colonial depen- . igneettetee___L_ei _et the growiree relationip bear South Arnerica'S:- stiategic. Southern Cone ? .!, deuce. For the five decades before the junta ;_., tween Ar enteegno ._(.tOtt_r_t, for more than a clequie.. The main recipient came fo power:Argentina sought to build up . -"mwor cause for neeteuen Sld Argentina of Soviet attentions ha's been Argentina . its industrial sector and to diversify its mar- he humiliated, its Sbviet sympathizers; now... After a decade of steadily expanding corn- -, kets by selling light ma.nufactured goods to-with popular backing, will argue that the .rnerceeArgentina_thie year empatesed.Indiat Latin...America. and Western Europe. The - United States has proved its unreliability, :junta reversed this policy, favoring the agritertel that only Soviet military assistance will .1 . ctilturat. cseports of the oligarchy and prosett protect Argentina from its enemies and ena-:1 ..'tratingthe industrial sector Argentine crit-te ;.ble it to regain its national honor:: te-.14.-enetetrI Z.ICS. 7.of ...thi: junta claim .that- its policy': has.. ,tee' An Moseeei.-we'ted; ,'turned back the development clockncreat-. e. make an ironic footnote to the Reagan Ad:4 king ;:itikictuial .dependente?ontthe Soviet,te ministratiOn'S-Policy of "drawing the line'," traarket and facilitating Soifeepenetrationttnet; in Central America. Thenthe Administrae) linThird World countries like India, liare':-.:1ion 'enlisted the junta in its Central Arneri-:v and tt Cuban: Moscow, - has ?i 'used : economicte: can e anti- communist -crusade; it tasewneni f? blieliniaitnto- ',Wrest' "further,' concessienit 7 .. that.. the generals' indispentability , in entre , ..? I Even before the.: Falklands'', Crisise., the backyard would be proof tigainst fallout; Soviets Were slowing dawn 'their payments ,-. ' from. an adventure in the FalklandseNavr! ...for: Argentine goads and Urging Argentina this bastion of Western value; is the hottest! I. to reduce the huge imbalance in Soviet- ' new candiate for Soviet military assistance:l tArgeetine trade by buying Rtessian. Moscow . The Argentine expel-tence clenionstra tes; :' now -supplies Argentina with turbines and ', again that anti-communism does not neces- generators -for several critical power ' sarity Make for anti-SavietiSin. - .- . --t ? ? ttt ;? clear : prn)ecte, and ie providing the Argentine nu- ? - ' .- ....? , ? e ? ': .- it -; e'.? ',-, :-.-:. ...14:31 . -44 -.Approved. For Ap6 ,ReleVae tirtrOmpo*3R15129nents sul'Ich"as.,9-:%-vleti"Ge419-LatinCg14P.AmericaTiAtr.Pioje7r47::- at_ Gciorg?rthele-1 . ..,i . - fr'desire to build this Pert-,7? r.0..-......?--- -* .,- -- .enriched trra:ninra and heavy water - t.--;?.? University's Center for St '-titMoscove clearlyratede.ami ARTICLE AP ON P NEW YORK TIMES 'Release 20011033W :263A-RDP9J -0_090_1 ROO STAIINIL Crisis Called Likely to Spur Soviet-Argentine By CLYDE H. FARNSWORTH SpecialtoTheNewYorkThow . t WASHINGTON, May 1.2 Adm. Bobby R. Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, says that one out- come of the Falkland crisis may be to turn-the Soviet Union into an arms sup- plier of Argentina in return for Argen- tine wheat and beef. . He described the possibiity as a "major cause for worry" in the United -States, adding that "I think you Will find the Soviets eager. to- sell at bargain prices.?-The obstacle to such a develop- . ment in the past. he said?was Amend- ra e na's lack of interest. . Until its seizure of the Falklands April 2,, Argentina had depended on Western Europe, Israel and the United States for arms supplies, but these sources have now been cut off. Admi;a1 Inman, making one a his rare. .Congressional appearances.. in open session; testified Tuesdaybefore a Senate investigations subcommittee on the implications for Soviet military power of the acquisition by Moscow of Western and Japanese technology. Ad- -miral Innian announced his resignation last month, but he is not expected to leave hie post until around July 1. ? He said the failure to stop theoutflow of this technology had placed the United States in a ."perilous'!-position in deal- ing with expected Soviet challenges in the 1980's. . ?4' ?-".f American officials have -already re- sported.that .Argentina was looking for alternative sources for .suchi arms as the French-built air-to-surface missile that wrecked the British destroyer t. Sheffield. Admiral Inman was the first official to suggest openly that Moscow's need for hard currency to, buy food could be . .. . . linked to Argentina's need for arms. , Admiral Inman said that rather than. , r. embark on any new research and devel- opment programs, the Soviet Union had undertaken a "very thorough vacuum- cleaning" of Western ., and Japanese technology ? to improve-its fighting ...power at greater speed and lower cost.., - "' ' 1.-:i c.: ? 'Very Substantial Efforts' . . ....., ... ... ? Be disclosed that; a.. recent defector ."documented very substantial efforts" by the Soviet Union in Japan. Admiral Inman described Soviet intelligence ac-- tivities in the United States and West- ern Europe as "intense" and called for substantially better;.ceordination be- tween.intelligence - and:Other _Federal agencies to deal with the problem in the United States.? ..---.?-....... - . .. ,.. - ....: ... He,said he would_give a' "very high- priority" to stopping the. .export export of high-'.. .. teclmology products from the United States that specifically help Moscow. _build2ophisticated.weapens.. ...? ,, . ?The C.I.A.: has reported that 70 Per- cent - of the acquisitions of. militariV. ., useful technology, beim . been accom- i plished by the Soviet and Eastern Euro-, ' pean intelligence services, using clan.; . destine, technical and overt collection ' means. The remaining 20.to 30 percent .; camel. through: legal , purchases and'. open-source publications or from other Soviet organizations, such as the Minis-. . try of Trade. Only .a small portion came from direct technical exchanges , con, : ducted by scientists and students.... -:- ' _Admiral Inman told the hearing tha [the new generation. of.-Soviet. leaders "may not be as cautious as the old gen- erationoli3Olsheviks:"" 441'...`-' '..` - - - i Asked by Senator Saiii'Nunn; Demo- -era of Georgia, about iinplications of' financial pressure on.MoScow, Admira Inman . predicted that:try-10 years the Russians would still have economic and agricultural probleniklitit.that..!`they will continue .to:protect their. invesv,. meat in the military sector,Therefore; we :must pay more: attention to ever. more sophisticated weapons systems:" - Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 CLIM.REP SP ? CI 111111111111111111111111 STATI NTL 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 FOR PROGRAM DATE SUBJECT PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF The Today Show May 12, 1982 7:30 A.M. STMKN WRC-TV NBC Network Washington, D. Admiral Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis CHRIS WALLACE: Here in Washington, CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman told a Senate subcommittee there is concern that the Falklands crisis may push Argentina toward the Soviet camp. ADMIRAL BOBBY INMAN: You have fingered a very major worry I have, that the outcome of this crisis will be a decisiol on the part of an Argentine government to embark on a substantill program of acquiring new military hardware in a broad way from the Soviet Union. OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES matApargyersi TRILtft lag VA P.11.93147. 1;urd&F,P,M9.,929111Q99?993199,28.-.1 5 ARTICLE AFFEARED ON PAGE?Alaroved For Re1q0eY ay fp2Ti1"81A-RDP91-00901R00 STATI NTL Media'aisbelief rapped. ., outgoing CIA biggie :an intelligence briefing last March on the Soviet and Cuban-backed military .,.ts..ttitti buildup in Nicaragua. _ ?Washington New Bureau)?Adm. ' , John Hughes of the Defense Intellk Bobby, R. Inman,. re-' - ' -,!;:tzsil - ' - gence Agency conducted the briefing, tiring: deputy 17.41re- -showing reporters photographs taken - cror of the CIA, said from spy satellites of Soviet-type mint- ' yesterday that it .is ary garrison arrangements, lengthened. difficult to'convince ,A,:i . airport runways to _ accommodate the- r public of . the .?iil _Soviet-made Mig fighter-bombers, and peril:: of ? a-- , Soviet. :deployed Soviet T-55 tanks.,. -,4 4-) military buildup be- :,--- Inman, who said he regards Hughes cause the press will as the best photo interpreter around, not believe United said he was surprised to see the news- States intelligence paper accounts of the briefing next day reports, even when '- , ? use a word like "alleged" in discussing they Include spy t.,, Adm. Bobby f,. the intelligence findings. ? \ -' satellite pictures. . , - Inman- : ''' Inman, testifying before the Senate "If one doesn't ? , "L, , Permanent Investigations Subcommit- want to believe there Is a Soviet build- tee, said the public will not be con- up, then one can find other kinds of vinced of an increase in Soviet questions to divert attention," said In- ' strength "if there is no willingness (by man, who added that he had been reporters) to accept the honesty of the particularly irked at press coverage of professional." is , ., , By JOSEPH VOLZ Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 A RT'r CT- LP:FS:13ED fipproy4erFor Release gap? fiSRE51%.9(1ACRAffIR mrei ay 2 ? 'ADM. BOBBY R. INMAN sees cause for worry" about weapons ; 4,10 dist .2no.., ? ., ? Soviet- rgentme Ties Called a Possibility ,.. , ' The United States is concerned that' in the: wake of the Falklands crisis, Argentina may ern? bark on a "subatantial program" of obtaining new weapons from the Soviet Union, the CIA's deputy. director-said yesterday. ' "';' ' - ,.,'';,.' 1, \*; \ '' Adm. Bobby R. fnman told a Senate Subcom- mittee thai such a possibility "is a major cause for worry in the Months ahead." , Irunan's remarks appeared to go further than Reagan administration officials have previously in , public statements,: in pointing specifically to the 'prospect Of,Soviet-Argentine military ties growing ? out of Argentina's confrontation with Britain. ,Inman said that if such an arms supply rela- . tionship,develoPV along with it would come in- ' , creasing, Argentine dependence on Soviet military . advisers and spare parts; ' ','::?c",1$ '31.' '''' t 'Inman, Who Will; retire' froM the CIA July '1.-,'' ; appeared .before the Senate governmental affairs.. investigations 'subcommittee primarily to testify'' about .problemsi. in :controlling leaks of, sensitive: U.S. technology to the Soviet bloc. A governinent study now being carried out on ' the technology ?transfer problem, Inman said, is : likely, to lead to recommendatio9s for a "very sub-.., 1 stantial., input?. of Manpower" to ,help bolster the FBI's. counterintelligence force '''''' ' ''''' '''' ' ? - '' Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 1/4.) I !A I UM I L STATI NTL D r ae r -00901 R RA 0, INC 4701 LLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20015 656-4068 FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM Morning Edition DATE STATION WAMU-FM NPR Network May 12, 1982 6:15 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C. SUBJECT Inman Comments on the Falkland Crisis BOB EDWARDS: Yesterday the Deputy Director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman, told a Senate subcommittee that Argentina may turn to the Soviet Union for weapons as a result of the Falklands conflict. Argentina's previous suppliers, the United States, Europe and Israel, have refused to sign new contracts since the invasion of the Falklands. And Inman said, "I think you will find the Soviets anxious to sell at a bargain price." With news that Soviet reconnaissance planes have spotted part of the task force, we have a report on Argentine-Soviet relations from Chris Hedges in Buenos Aires. CHRIS HEDGES: Since the invasion, one of the strongest defenders of the move to retake the Falklands outside of this country has been the Soviet Union. The Soviet news agency Tass has issued a stream of reports that brands the British as colonial aggressors; and during Secretary of State Alexander Haig's negotiations portrayed the American diplomat as manipulating the situation in favor of Britain. It is suspected by many observers here that the Argentines are receiving practical help from the Soviets during the crisis and can turn to the Soviets if they need to buy arms. While this regime claims to be anti-communist and killed 20,000 of its own people in an avowed war on Marxism, Argentina sells most of its grain to the Soviets. And when this crisis began, there were 20 Soviet ships in the port loading grain and another 20 off the coast waiting to receive shipment. OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES mate,id Appromedraimairaeleasek2004143107.6.GIA-IRDP94,4090.1.R00050026090841ted Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 2 Soon after the islands were taken, the Soviet Union and Argentina signed an aureement to exoloid the protein-rich krill around the Falklands. The Argentirs have used their relationship to the Soviets as a threat, always painting the picture of an abandoned Argentina forced hy their cruel friend, the United States, into the arms of the Russims. Many government officials here are quite Fond of quoting Winston Churchill's line about making alliances with the devil if need he to save their country. Inc ties with the Soviets have been growing and will continue to grow afte,- this crisis. During a recent soccer match between the Soviets and Argentina, the Russian team was given an enthuisastic standing ovation. Anti-communim in Latin America is always a rhetorical convenience used to justify the silencing of any opposition, rather than an ideoloflical stance. And the Argentines are one of the prime examples. Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 ART 024 OLE API' ,'ABED PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER ) r Release 2001t0M71:9(ZIA-RDP91-00 ov CIA official fears Argentines STATINT will try to buy Soviet weapons , i Inman said if such an arms rela- From illqUiref Vitro Service) " Thatcher, said Monday that the "ma;,,' WASHINGTON ?The United States tionship develops between Moscow chismo of women" is playing a rolefi is concerned that. Argentina_ will 1 and Buenos Aires, Argentina would 1! in the "silly war" over the Falklands respond to the Falkland Islands crisis I experience increasing dependence i ? Prince Philip the outspoken . by moving .to buy new weapons from on Soviet military advisers and spare '; husband of Queen Elizabeth II and a the Soviet Union, the cIA's deputy parts. .. l:. *4 keen conservationist; Said yesterday ( director said yesterday: ' 1:-?,1,-4,-,, ,.. = . ?.-,Press accounts of Soviet Argentine ; that the British fleet off the Falkland Adm. Bobby R. Inman, told a"Senate '?. military cooperation. have included i Islands may be mistaking whale subcommittee that such a possibility : reports that the Soviets are sharing echoes for Argentine r submarine is a, major' cause for worry- in the; ' intelligence data ? gathered by sat- signals and, as a resultonany whales months ahead." Inman, who will re:, ellites, ,reconnaissance aircraft and , may have been killed tire July I, made the comments be- electronic eavesdropping ships ? on ? Three British journalists jailed fore the Senate governmental affairs- the movements of the British fleet, ,..1./ .. by the 'Argentine -government on investigations subcommittee': '''.- !I .4..7 In other developments yesterday: j...; spying charges completed a month Inman 's remarks appeared to ' gci_e.,. ' ? The Pentagon refused to discuss behind bars yesterday with little further than Reagan administration details of possible materiel aid to ,. hope for immediate release. Simon officials previously have in pointing. , Britain ..c. in - the crisis. Pentagon Winchester, a reporter for the Sun specifically to the prospect of Soviet- ?. spokesman Henry Catto said he could day Times; Anthony Prime, photogra-4 Argentine military ties growing out neither confirm nor deny whether pher for the Observer, and Ian Mathl of the confrontation with Britain, decisions have been made to provide: er, a reporter for the Observer, have over the South Atlantic islands. . the materiel support for British =. been kept virtually incommunicado "I think they will find the Soviets 'forces ' that Haig had announcedin ,. _ l.recent days. very eager to sell ? and at a bargain , would be forthcoming. price ? particularly if that can lower. ' 'In Paris, Deputy Secretary of the amount of hard currency they State Walter Stoessel said the United have to spend to get access to Argen- States would assist Britain short 4of. tine wheat and beef," Inman said '.; _sending American troops. 1-1e, saict. After the United States announced -Arierica-bicking of Britain "in this on April 30 that it was backing Brit- ? difficult and deplorable problem" am n in the Falklands crisis, Secretary. , had hurt ALS. relations with Latin of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. noted , America, but Washington believed that "communist adversaries seek there would be understanding , positions of influence on the main- among Latin American countries of land of the Americas." ,!',,,' , ,: ,, lz:, the principles involved ? especially Inman, in response to questioning' the principle "not to recognize ag- ? by Sen. Lawton Chiles (D., Fla.), not. gression." . - , , ? - ed that the Argentines have bought ? Pope-John Paul II will cancel his most of their modern weapons from planned visit to Britain if hostilities Western Europe and "have not previ-' with Argentina have not ceased by ously indicated any interest in pro- the middle of next week; Cardinal curingSoviet hardware, even though ' Basil Hume said yesterday. Hume, Peru was acquiring a great deal of ..Roman Catholic primate of England it ''-.) ...-a '-.$114A', '14 i':i4, , . ''', t ! t , ? ,,?4, tand Wales said the visit?scheduled ' But you, have fingered a very: to last' six days, beginning May 28 ? , major worry I have ? that the out-, .;"would be difficult for the Holy See , come of this crisis will be the deci- '... in sad circumstances." ' sion on the part of an Argentine :, ? U.S. ambassador-at-large Vernon government to embark on a substan-, 'Walters, in an indirect reference to tial program ol acquiring new mill-. British Prime Minister- Margaret tary hardware, in a broad way, from' . the Soviet Union," Inman told Chiles, ,. I Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 RA We RE PGRTRS -poptg0005oo 4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEW CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 656-4068 FOR I.P140101...rolk9sesem???? PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF PROGRAM Eyewitness News DATE SUBJECT STATI NTL 1110.101,11.1.1901f.01.6.16..4.114.1.0..lorsmno.--.......04*.0?11 STATION WDVM TV May 11, 1982 6:00 PM aw Washington, DC Admiral Inman Comments MAUREEN BUNYAN: The outgoing Deputy Director of the CIA today warned the Senate that the United States is in a perilous position because of a massive buildup of Soviet military power. Admiral Bobby Inman's comments came before a hearing on the flow of advanced military technology to the Soviet Union. Inman said future Soviet leaders may be less cautious than current officials in challenging the U.S. He warned that such a lack of caution could lead the Soviets to underestimate the strength of the U.S., causing a crisis in the years ahead. OFFICES IN. WASHINGTON DC G NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES ,,,,?,APTS9,\TO,FackrtsROPASei,,,t,,:7,..,:::,,pi,-,61;:e,,;:.,-,..?..,. ,:s.,,-_t,?-,24,1,,,vpr-Y- , -:?,?.001...pie,,,:,,'-',42_a-,:',4'...,,_... :41;F?Si-,,,,,T. --:-.,.f12-?:;7-..,--. Y..2?;:j?it....a.v.ti .-wit?7:f....41-4.,.4"i,t-4.474-12,0.1'vi,trg",t...?="t',,..,-.:,4:i,?:;:tiqz-?V,?:-A,,i, ,,,,.4.1-!,?z, ,,,,, ...t?tpir.".k-.14?41,,,s- -e.:ti,ieff,?4? tt- . . - '"'? -? r'4,-1"ei,-;.'-''' ,-.4.4\54Y1/4. t:s4-4?41-1,-, .--^,-- -41, ,.?i., -, J. T.,,- -?,..--,z1,12.',,,)1.7 ''"elr.7.,,,,Y.S ''.-7'..- N't?-:K; -. ? '''-11q?i;e--4'17 -.c.. td,...,. ....:? .PI:F"'"3:5 - . ':-...-.W4?77:,!?171,-;"ii t't .414.4"tas, . . , V. . 4 I. ?????-:':44:- -;???"4;7"---:.77f-, -.7 -.1 p v. ? f ^.7.. :401..0014.641.0.14aePPOOWN;114UVVila".1 -t ? 140 Approved Fop( ,9(91i /19 citp(710:ticipop!tplri9,99A 1.9Roe500250008-1 shadowy genius (V. cia? a spook so shrewd that no one's sure if.- he's sinister or sincere article 017 ROBERT SAM ANS ILLUSTRATION BY GARY RUDDELL ARLY ONE MORNING not long ago, a group of the nation's defense and in lead- ers rose from their beds, kissed their wives and families and, jaws set, went out to fight World War Three. In simulation, that is. Out over the treacherous terrain of U.S. 95 they trekked, until at last, some distance from NVashington, they attained their objective: the U. S. Naval War Gil- lege. While the sun peeked over the trees and security. men watched net VOUsly, they manned their computer consoles and braced for action. On the Blue Team, representing the United States, were arra; cd some of -the best brains in the strategic business. There were generals and admirals, CIA men and a Secretary of Defense, ascii- table Who's Who of the military estab- lishment. Their Red Team opponents, representing the nuclear might of the Soviet Union, were a less prepossessing lot. Especially their leader. He was a tall, slender man, almost gawky. Ile wore horn-rinuned glasses and had a large, high forehead of the kind that freckles in summer. He did not appear dangerous. Indeed, were it not for the admiral's uniform he was wearing?an ill-fitting garb from which it seemed the hanger had not been re- moved--he might have been taken for a schoolteacher (which, in fact, he had been before he joined the Navy). Com- pared with the company around him, glittery in its gold braid and determi- nation, he was an improbable figure, and his smile, which flashed frequently, was most imp ?balite of all. It was big and toothy and there was a gap between the leading incisors. Altogether, it made him look not so much like a schoolteacher and even less than an admiral; stand- ing there, amidst all that brass, he seemed like nothing so much as Huckleberry Finn. Ills muse w;is Bobby Ray Inman. The game commenced. Back and forth the simulated superpowers battled, sending their computerized scenarios this way and that. Missiles flew, bombers bombed, ships sailed, armies marched, whole countries disappeared. The ten- sion in the .room was electric. Hunched Li over one console, a member of the Joint Chiefs turned suddenly ashen. Out of nowhere, the nukes were on their way. On it went, hour after harrowing hour, and when it was over, when the world lay in pseudo cinders, there was egg of the most highly classified nature on the face of the United States. Said one awed participant, a former Secre- tary of Defense, of the man who had put it there, the admiral with the Huck Finn grin: "I'm just glad that guy's on our side." You hear that a lot, in Washington about Bobby Inman. "The right mats in the right job at the right time," Barry Goldwater, the chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, calls him. James Schlesinger, the former Sec- retary of Defense, terms him "a national asset." To Senator Joe Biden, the liberal Democrat from Delaware, he is "the most quality guy in the Federal Govern- ment." Former CIA director Richard Helms commends him for his "bril- liance"; a Helms successor, William Colby, for his "integrity." Major General George J. Keegan, Jr., the fire-breathing former chief of Air Force Intelligence, likes him for his "guts"; BirchBayls, for Isis "brains"; Walter Mondale, for Isis "wisdom." And then there are those, like a former deputy director of the National Security Council, who say, quite simply, "Bobby Inman is the smartest man in uniform." And who, after a thoughtful pause, add, "laybe out of uniform, too." All this about an improbable man few people outside Washington have ever heard of. In Inman's profession, the ano- nymity is welcome. Bobby Ray Inman, you see, is a spy. ? His official title is deputy director, Central Intelligence. What he does is everything. It is Inman who runs the agency's day-to-day operations; Inman who coordinates the activities of the "in- telligence community"; Inman who pre- pares the critical "national intelligence estimates"; Inman who evaluates the data flowing in from spy satellites; In- man who protects CIA from flak on Capitol Hill; Inman who has the next-to- last word on every GIA undertaking, Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-0090410=0008-1 t P1,-Apprbvdd Istir Retkisq1001 /03f07e:?011ft=1REIP91160901iM0051)02500aijilm" made of a Ilkolgy a a %kei e: nniter shippIng titter strugg over C 's new execti- his ce ings deviously plain. According ,? ? alms to the Alghan rebels. Ile is, in the %try deepest sense, the man who keeps the sect et:. One Of those secrets is who Inman is. [lie places he has worked?CIA, NSA, DIA, ONE the whole alphabet soup that is American intelligence?will say noth- ing. and none with more eloquence than CIA. ''The admiral is keeping a low pro- file,' an agency spokesman says. "We ;11ent going to help y-on with anything.- CIA, however, does provide an official biography. It consists of exactly one un- revealing paragraph. It states that he was born, 50 -years ago, in Rhonesboro, Texas?a town that, according to South- western Bell, does not exist. The biography also says he attended the University of Texas, graduating in 1950 with a liberal-arts degree. A check with the university's alumni computer reveals no such person. Nor, unsurprisingly, is there any listing in any Washington, D.C., area telephone book for a Bobby Ray, or B., or B. R., or, for that matter. any Inman. James Jesus Angleton. the fabled former head of CIA counterin- telligence. id listed. Yes? Angleton whis- pers, he knows Bobby in Then the line goes dead. Inman has no hobbies or outside in- terests. He does not go to baseball games or cocktail parties. Ile rarely, in fact, goes anywhere, except to the office. The principal exception is when he is called to Capitol Hill to testily before one or another of the intelligence-oversight committees, .whose hearings arc con- ducted in secret. Around Washington, he has few close associates CIE someone as lowly as a three-star admiral wants to see him," says one, himself a loin-star, "it had better be damned important") and even fewer friends, "Bobby," as one spook puts it, "is not the kind. of guy you talk over your bowling scores with." Of the handful ol people who claim to know him well, most could not say whether he smykes, or drinks (negative, in both instances), even whether he is married (he is, happily) or has children (he has, two: .both boys). indeed, out of 50 interviews with people who has worked with him over the years, rang- ing from former CIA directors to his superiors in the Navy, only one knew the name of his wile. It is Nancy, and, like her -husband, she is said to be very quiet- It has been anything but quiet., how- ever, since Inman came to CIA. There have been behind-the-secnes battles, exposi's in the press, questions about the agency's links to Libyan-backed assassins, continued conflicts with Congress and calls for director William Casey'sresigna- iion. One way or another, they haye all involved Bobby Ray Inman. A prime? ti?e order, an engagement that, before it was through, would shake the agency, threaten the Bill of Rights and nearly cost Inman his job. It Al began in early 1981, a few weeks a I tet Inman's eolith mat ion hearings. The hearings themselves had been a love leas:, With one Senator after another con- ml dating Inman on his extraordinary fitvess for his new job. The only note- wi.rthy moment came toward the end of the session, when,Inman was asked to Ionunent about reports dna CIA and the White House- would soon seek to undo restrictions the; Carter Administration had placed on the agency with regard to domestic 'spying. Inman's answer was direct; he was against the Administration move. As 'Inman put it: "I would not elect to carelessly walk away from the safeguards we have so carefully crafted together. These rules arc to protect U. S. cif iiens, tant anyone else, and I believe that we need to continue to protect them." But even as Inman WaS speaking, plans Were a root to undo those safeguards. They surfaced, finally, in March, with die leak of the draft of a proposed ex- ecutive order, which, once Ronald Reagan signed it, would allow -CIA not only to engage in domestic spying but to infiltrate domestic dissident organiza- tions, carry out dlandestine wire taps and conduct "Warrantless searches" ("black bag jobs," in agency parlanc.)? in sum, all the Operation Chaos ca- pers that had gotten CIA into trouble with Congress in the first place. Inman, who'd had a hand in drawing up the Carter protections before going to CIA, was livid. Almost immediately, he was back bei ((ICCongress, denouncing the new plan as a "third-level working staff paper" and pledging anew that?CIA's job is abroad." Lest anyone miss Isis point, lie then invited reporters to CIA's headquarters and, in a rare, on-the-rec- ord briefing, vowed. to resign if altera- tions were made to CIA's charter that he found "personally repugnant." The dralt was withdrawn and, shortly there- alter. its author, CIA general counsel Daniel Silver, kit the agency. But that wasn't the cud of it. Three months later, another proposal, this one in more protective of civil liberties, was floated and just as quickly shot down, apparently because it was too protective. 1 hen. last fall, a third and final draft made its appearance. Less Draconian than the first, more hard-line than the second, it still offered possi- bilities for domestic spying. Civil liber- tarians and not a few Senators were alarmed, and Inman shared their con- cern. At one point, during a secret Sen- ate briefing with CIA counsel Stanley to a Senator who was present, when Sporkin discussed provisions_ of lie, order . ? that would allow domestic sp ing, Iii- man flashed a "thumhs-down" sign; when the Sena tors bored in on Spork in, Imnan winked and beckoned with his hand, -More, more." "Bobby is the conscience of the agency," one Senator said al terward. "Without him, the deluge." General Keegan, was blunte.: Bobby Inman, he said, with admiring relish, "knows how to keep the whores at bay." ? It was an extraordinary performance,. but then, nothing about Bobby Inman Juts ever been ordinary. He is an ad. -4 mit-al who grew up on die plains of East Texas. He is a regular career officer who did not attend Annapolis He is a technician who never studied engineer- ing. He is an intelligence specialist in a -- Service where, by regulation. ()illy "blue water admirals" can hold the mist senior commands. He is, in fact, one 01 the very rare non-Annapolis, non-blue-water, full, four-star admirals in U. S. naval history, and undoubtedly the only one any-where who can discuss the rhythms of Thack- cray and Swinbtnne as knowleegeably as he can the exact disposition of the Soviet Baltic fleet. The only thing about him dist is ordinary is his name. It is not Robert but, in the manner of tailback,. for East Central Oklahoma State, plain Bobby, simple and folksy, He lives like a Bobby: strictly no ft-ills. According to he finan- cial statement filed with Congress at the time of his CIA appoint lent, his only income, apart from his N.ovy salary and interest from a credit union and a handful of U. S. Savings Bonds, derives from the rental of a modest four-bed- room house, on which the bank holds a mortgage of less than 5100,000. Inman himself resides in typical military ac- commodations in suliurban The only thing that separates dni from his middle-class neighbors is tht presence of Navy-supplied stewards. The stewards, who are a perquisite of his 1-.111c, assist in the preparation of Inman's sole known passion: the ritual of elaborate, multicourse breakfasts. He barely- has time to eat them. Most mornings he is up at four to begin por- ing through the remains of tin work he has lugged home the night before. By seven, he is at his functionall,- Spartan office at CIA's McLean, Virginia, head- quarters, having read the overnight cable traffic during the chauffeured ride to work. Unless there is a cal ti the Hill (where he is liked) or-the White House (where he is not), he will remain there, without interruption, until well ? after dark. At which point he returns home Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250Whymy Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 to begin the process all over again. beat. "Mr. P-R-E-M-A-D-A-S-A is the of Henry Kissinger's, worked within the Fiin?? laughs an old hrend. "Bobby prime minister," he shot back, allowing White Ilouse and, without Presidential ! Inman has no fun." himself a small, self-satisfied smile, "and knowledge, spied on die Gosernment Upon first meeting, Inman can seem Mr. J-A-Y-E-W-A-R-D-E-N-E is the presi- itself. Just who they were spyina for w.? . aloof, dmost cold. Ile is much warmer dent." always difficult to say. For v, nite- Lea with friends?likable. engaging, con. 1 he Navy. fortunately, values such task force was a Navy operatimi, it was siderate of sensibilities?but even then, recall. and Inman's climb up the career heavily infiltrated by CIA. -1 lie Navy ? there is a distance, a sort of enforced ladder was in-c-t-e-o-r-i-c. After a war- yeoman, for instance, was a CIA. man; remoteness. aS it he's constantly calcu- tune tour of sea duty aboard the air-? like the other members of Tgsk Force kiting who around him can be told what. craft carrier Valley Forge, Inman held 157, he officially did not exist. So se- It can be unsettling. A man who has a series of increasingly important assign- cret was the task force, so sensitive was known him lor years and, like so many assistant naval attach?U.S. Ern- its mission, that, until a group of its others, still claims not to know him bassy, Stockholm; executive. assistant, former agents brought suit against the , well, admits: You know as much about Vice-Chief . of Naval Operations; chief Government demanding pension rights,' Bobby Inman as Bobby Inman wants intelligence briefer, C1NG-PAC; director, the Navy refused to acknowledge that - you to know, and that is damned little." Naval Intelligence; vice-director, De- there had ever been such a thing Intelligence accounts for some of. the tense Intelligence; director, National The task force was real enough, ?- isolation. Inman has spent most of his Security Agiency. His superiors groomed though, and so was the now ,nfamous ;Rink lifetime keeping people from and fussed ?over him like a prize pupil CIA man Wilson, who was then running ? knowing things. But it is the other in- who, because of his oddity, threatened one of the task force's fronts, an equally telligence, the one spelled with a small none of their careers. And so, almost real civilian corporation called Around I, that keeps him truly separate. his invisibly, he continued to rise. World Shipping and Forwarding. Around ? brain is an intimidating. storehouse, The turning point came in 1973,_ dur- 'World's legal business was freight han- crammed with every imaginable' fact, ing the Yom Kippur war. The outbreak dling, and among the items it shipped.; and, according to every recollection, it of the war, which initially sent the quite illegally, were 20 tons of ida?stique always has been. Back in Texas, they 1sraelis reeling back from the Suez Canal, explosive to Libya. But dan. wasn't still remember that Bobby Inman was one caught U. S. intelligence flat-footed, and, Wilson's only enterprise; he boasted of of the renowned radio "Quiz Kids." di- as the battling continued, there was a holding controlling interest ?,n more zling adults every week with intellectual mad scramble to come up with hard than 100 corporations. The companies pyrotechnics. Give him an impossible information. At issue was not only the laundered spy money for the Navy, equation and, whir, he'd solve it. Ask disposition. of the Arab armies but also secured sophisticated electrontcs gear, after a fact and, zingo. he'd give it to the intentions of the Soviet Union. In- entertained Congressmen, monitored yon. The capital of Mongolia? The man, then intelligence briefer to the Soviet nuclearlionth shipments and,' date of the Council of Trent? The Vice-Chief of Nasal Operations, sup- according. to published reports. _helped ? coefficient of the square root of nine plied the critical piece of the puzzle. destabilize the left-wing government of over pi? Bobby knew them all? What the piece was remains, even now, Australian prime minister Gough Whit- and a lot more besides. He seemed to secret, but a good guess is that it in- lam. There was very little, in rim that - read everything in sight, which was not volved Soviet plans to dispatch, two Task Force 157 did not do. Ai cording unusual for a bright boy in a small town combat divisions to Syria at the height to subservient investigations by The where. after feeding the hop after sup- of the conflict. "Everyone else in the Washington Post and the Winnington per, there IV:IS not much else to do. What community was calling it one way," re- News Journal,. Task Force 157 was in- was unusual was that he never seemed calls one admiral. "Bobby was the only volved in almost every majm intelli- to forget any of it. Ile could repeat, one calling it the other. Bobby was the gence operation from 19G8 until 1975, --serbatim, whole passages of obscure one who was right.- from overthrowing Salvador Allende in tomes he had digested years before. It The Soviets, after threats by Richard Chile to helping Kissinger fiy secretly was as if his mind were an IBM 360 on Nixon, abandoned their plans, and the to Peking in 1971. which the terminals never closed, and correctness of Inman's analysis eventual- Inman put an end to it. 'Lie chain watching it work, all clickety-clack, like ly helped win him appointment as three- of events began in 1975, *shortly after some giant parlor trick run amuck, got tor of Naval Intelligence. It was there finnan's appointment as director of. I') be a little frightening. that he encountered. the redoubtable Naval Intelligence. Early thit year, He must have had few playmates. Edwin Wilson, CIA man, shipper of Inman appeared before Sen at John While visions of playing football for arms, recruiter of assassins. McClellan's Defense Apprcyriations 1tK7A1 danced in the other boys' heads, ? Subcommittee and, afterward, a senior young Bobby was off at the library'. He Military intelligence, and Naval. Intel- committee staffer invited him to lunch., iv as skinny and four-eyed and awkward ligence in particular, is a formidable Inman accepted and at the restaurant and along the way, a lot of sand proba- undertaking, involving the tracking not they were joined by Wilson. who bly got kicked in his fare. But it paid off. only of potential enemies but of actual announced, "I work for you, Admiral." Because when he got to he an ;1(11111, allies as well. In the Navy, much of the Inman was surprised. but not nearly so the 1)1hcr boys weren't frightened, they latter task fell to a shadowy operation much as when 'Wilson went oti to tell, were awed. "I'd tell you he has a photo- dubbed Task Force 157. hint that he would have an easier time a ph ie memory." says one of them. a Created in the late Sixties, at the securing money on the Hill if 1n7steered. senior \Vhite noose aide, -but it's better height of the antiwar movement, Task contracts to Wilson's companies. than that. A photograph takes time to Force 157 was perhaps the most clandes- There were never any contracts. When - develop. Inman's like a Polaroid. In tine of all military intelligence's opera- he went back to his office that afternoon, smut." They still wanted to test him, Lions. Its members wore no uniforms and Inman ordered an investigation of Wile, though, just as they' had on the radio were outside the regular Navy chain of son instead. it took a year to untangle every week: Spell the name of the command. Their cover took various all of Wilson's Various connections and,.: prime minister of Sri Lanka, Daniel forms. Some operators ran dummy civil- even then, whom he was working for Patrick Moynihan challenged during a ian companies. Others, such as a yeoman and _precisely what he was doing were Senate heApprtoverd ROI Releaset200,11/103107NDtC4A-ROP914Q901R00050025EUMvuEry Approved For Release gooifio3/97 : cIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 Ear _from c ear. What was obvious was ce argei. t san that of CIA?? train of impedimenta trailec behind that Wilson was, in hunan's words. "a petty grafter . . . a 'five percenter.' " With that pronouncement, Inman fired him. Inman disbanded Task Force 157 ahogether when he discovered a lew months later that. Wikon had been - using it to recruit assassins on behalf of Libya. "I closed it down.". bonan said of the task force, "because it was out of control and because its continued operation was a di'ahl, on Navy resources." . The explanation was vintage Inman, a hit_ of idealisin--''out of control"? laden with a heaping helping of pragma- tism: "drain on Navy resources." It was ? the same combination he used to rational- ize his opposition to CIA's domestic spy- ing. 1-fe feared for civil liberties?"rules , ? to protect Americans"?yes, and he was worried about efficiency, too. Keeping track of protesters was expensive. It took one's eye off the Worst of all, the press invafiably fotind out, and that, as Inman ruefullyi put it, "keeps us from doing the job we were meant to do." You had to trim like that if you were a spook, or you wouldn't stay a spook for very long. It was all right to come j off like an A.C.L.U. member in private, 1 an unseen third party to all the phone to silently signal Senators that, what they calls made by Jane Fonda, Dr. Spock and H were hearing from Reagan's boys was 1678 other Americans nn the agenc'y., crazy. The important thing was not be-1' "watch list." NSA also read all overseas ing too out-front publicly. You had telegrams and thoughtfully distributed be a member of "the team," as ['lei copies of the most interesting to other faceless men of the agency called them- honesty he d recruit GOvernment agencies -flat selves, and, there were rules by whichl the team played. It was a dicey business sometimes, sorting out who you were. from what you believed, and for Bobby Inman, going to NSA was the diciest! business of all. ?ii The National Security Agency is onei of those agencies your Government:' would prefer that you not know about.' The joke in Washington is that its initials stand for Never Say Anything, and, in practice, NSA doesn't say much. It is listed in no Government handbook. It is uniquely exempt from the provi- sions Of the Freedom of Information Act. What it does, how many people it employs, the amount of dollars it spends are all classified. Even the executivel (7. order Harry Truman signed 30 years I ago bringing it into existence rernains an official secret. ll won it; by accepted standards, he ? modern, three-story building lb' miles The average military officer who went outside Washington on the grounds of' up to the Hill, you see, was a practiced Fort Meade, Maryland. To discourage, imlitician. Ile played the angles. Helc the casually curious, two chain-link, TV-4 backslapped. He drank bourbon ancr' monitored fences, each topped by six branch water with the bulls in their strands of electrified barbed wire, sur-1' bideawa-y offices. 'When he testified, round it. 'The people who pass through which was something to be avoided, a: its portals (some 20,000 men and worn-1 backed by another 100,000 military per-; him. There were squadrons junior sonnet at 2000 "listening posts" through. colonels whispering off mike in his ear; . out die world) are, a tight-lipped group. briefcases bulging with every possible They are forbidden to discuss their work, contingency; set-piece formulas for Just.' even with their spouses. To ensure that the Right Answer. To get it, a Congress- , they don't, they are subject to regular man had to ask Just the Rieht Ques-', poly,graph examinations that ask them to don, and even then, of course. lie didn't list the names and addresses of people get ""irfi' Wfi'le careers were made no with whom they have had sex, as weld the fine art of evasion. That was the : as whether or not they are acquainted' established norm. with the meaning of the word fellatio. But Inman WA.,,n't normal, lie didn't " What NSA does is snoop. "They've' drink and he didn't backslap. He did t got a huge vacuum cleaner turned on," go into the hideaway offices, hut it wasn't, to chat about what the Redskins had says one authority on the agency, "suck.' jug in information around the world.: Whatever goes out over the airwaves? rub the bridge of his nose in weariness'. from a Soviet radar pulse over Novo-. and talk geopolitics. He'd discuss where sibirsk, to an AI ab diplomat calling the world was going the next '!0 years, ; home to Riyadh about the price of oil, and where it ought to be going. He'd to a Panamanian infantry captain radio- talk about the Russians, dispassionately, ing his company to switch position? gets sucked up in, the vacuum cleaner." alialYticjillY, trying to put hiluself in their shoes. And he'd talk abont ? And that, as it turned out, was the gence?NSA's and that of the other , trouble. For among the billions of bits.' agencies. There wouldn't be Janes Bond of information NSA routinely \ collected; were the .private conversations of ordi-' stories, but the nuts and bolts of the nary Americans?and Some not so ordi- craft: how. more linguistics experts; needed to be recruited: how CIA's : Tlary ones, as well. For years, NSA was 'generation gap,' as he called it needed to be closed; how the "data product" ! could be improved. He could be star-'. tlingly honest?"That's pretty dumb," he said of one operation, "but 'we're going to do it anyway".:7-and, i hk n converts tohis side. program, code-named Operation Sham- particular 11 he had a political ideology, it was a . ., rock, went on for 18 years. mystery to the men who questioned him.: It all came to an end (hiring the ?Goldwater liked him, and so did John Watergate investigations. When the Nix-. f ower, which was to be expected Inman was, after all, a man of arms. 11:fiar was i on tapes were played. three initials' kept clone the previous weekend. Instead, he'd stretch out his long legs, h an back,? sopping up: NSA. From the way Nixon Ind hi; friends talked about it?twice . i not expected, what was truly astoLinding, was how the liberals, the -Senatirs hke : as much, by one count, as CIA?NSA Joe Buten and Daniel K: Inoi.ye and : seemed capable of almost anything. The Birch Bayli, who munched ' on CIA di- ' more the Congressmen listened, the rectors like cornflakes, not only liked ' closer that seemed to the truth. Around him but adored him. Their regard for Capitol Hill and in the press, there' him was almost embarrassing. and in ' was growing pressure to bring NSA. certain quarters in Washington. it was to heel. Enter the fixer, Bobby Inman, said that all the adulation actua;ly hurt Inman's touch with Congress was al-. Inman. When, Biden heard that be of. ready well known. The Navy thought so fere(' to call Inman "a no-good, son-of-a- mich of his skills it had already given bitch horse's ass" if it would help his ins a medal?the Distinguished Service. career, but Inman didn't seem worried, rectal, its highest noncombatant deeorto About Congress there was no reason to on---simply for tlse quality of his Con- . , ' worry during those years he was minning ,, .ssiona testimony. It was odd about ' . that medal, and odd about the way In- ma ' The agency is headquartered in ? al, did almost everything wrong. NSA, because Inman had a scs.ret. A friend, a former CIA director, told what it was: "Bobby," he said, "undei stands information. He knows it is power. He knows how to use it." It was hypnotic to. watch. There he would be on a hearing day, utter]) alone. No aides whispering conversations, no briefing books at his side, the greeo baize of the witness table stretching out before him s like an empty ocean. Thi t gavel would bang and the distinguished Sen.! Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0005002166M-Wrira' Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 ator from somewhere would ask a ques- tion. And then it would happen: A smile would conic over Inman's face as if, cartoonlike, a light bulb had been turned on in his head. "Well, yes, sir," he would begin, and two tight para- ,graphs later, the Senator would have what he had been after, with maybe a lesson in Russian history or English literature in the bargain. If the question had been less than wise, as questions in Congress tended to be, the Senator would never know it. This was not Scans Turner, who belittled them, or Dick Helms, who condescended to them; this was goodol' Bobby Inman, who simply informed them. It seemed so effortless, no one ever guessed at the pressure; only his left leg, crossed casually over the right, gave him away. When he was bored, it had a habit of swinging from side to side. The press was entranced. It was hard not to be when, as was his wont at NSA. he was lunching with them in their offices, taking them home to breakfast and, ever so nicely, asking them not to write this story or that. NSA directors had never done that 'before; no spook ever had. And they had suffered for it. Inman was different. When Inman talked, reporters listened. There lsre r c certain rules, of course; You never named him; you never attributed the tidbits he gave you; you never, in fact, did anything he didn't want you, to do. OE the invitations to breakfast stopped coming. That was a capital game, and Innian pla),ed it with consummate skill. During his time at NSA, exposes of the agency all but disappeared. Inman's ability to play the pi ess ?vas on display?along with his slashing wit-- at the 1977 Gridiron Dinner. The annu- al black-tie, off-the-record soiree is an important event on the Washington social calendar, a once-a-year opportuni- ty for pols and press to put aside the " adversary re:1w flinch ip that supposedly exists between them. -the topic of the I 1977 dinner was intelligence, and Inman, then director of NSA, was in top form. Cazing out over the Washington Hilton balfronm,.where were collected sonle of the senior powers of America o jour- nalism. he noted that, according to recent press reports, sonic of those in attendance had been picking up pin poney as operatives for the CIA. -That was a shame. Inman said. SI IICC (IA was such a ham-handed, stingy employer. -1-hen, smile broadening, he continued: "We in the Pentagon want to make it Il[) to you. join us and you can be in the hig money. We've got 120 d011ars a year to spend. They skimped on ex- penses. With us, you'll have um-ouch- 6 rti 'turn's. timthle-dtPPing and lots of : It was against this backdrop t at word fringe benerds? Dnekininting triPs- PX began to circulate in late 1980 that ' privileges. (heap booze at officers clubs. Inman was being pushed as he next ! Free iJcoho1 treatment ;It VA hmsPitals? director of Central Intelligente. Doing I ..Ancl )(tut: dishonorable discharge up- the pushing was Barry Goldw;,ter. and, gr:Ided. If your editor won't pay for the the incoming Reaganites were rot at all assignment, well give you a free ride -with happy. They had their candidate?I Lockheed. If you have to get there Reagan campaign director \Villiam la-4, we have a few B-1 prototypes. Not Casey. a 68-year-old former CSS man to mention Trident submarine rides for the kiddies." The reporters, who were to write while Casey suffered from cei tain few critical stories about NS:\ thereafter, mitted defects?lapses in men.ory, in- I lapped it up. CIA director Stansfield ability to organize and, as tirrw would I demonstrate, a studied cavalier' ess with other people's money?he was at least I not Inman. Inman they despised He was , a Carter appointee. He was poprlar with Congress and the press. He hat; even? and this raised hackles most of a11- 1110WC(l a fag to stay at NSA. This last charge was indisputaely true. In mid-1980. as the :\ [oral vfajority was beginning its in cam- paign, a routine security check IL ci found a middle-level NSA employee to be a homosexual. 1Vithin the int-Iligence for the Central Intelligence Agency. CIA had suffered at Inman's hands, community, that had alwa sben,- cause both difYing his tenure at Naval, Intel- ligence and later while he was at NSA, it blackmail. That was the recommenda- for instant dismissal, the ratiornile being that homosexuals were \mine; able to where he had become embroiled in a tion in this case, but Inman overrode it.-1 bureaucratic cat fight with Turner over I 's independence. Turner, . ,t)1,1ei crantaind'sf foarm,i,l,v1-:1-,r and, the agency 1 whose arrogance was exceeded only -by misc., the enot.ne(t, was oiloweuIC tsta,, ! his ambition, had lvaned to bring NSA: (n) Ivith no diniiininion 01 his securitoi directly under his command, and Inman, eiear;nue. 1-he ci A ?old O\ I) were7 after months of battling, had successfully beside themselves. ;Ind. by the lime he . thwarted him. The incident was notable, took office. so, reportedly. was It.eagan's if only because it WaS one of the few then national-security advisor, 1th hard times Inman had ever been seen to lose. v Allen. Allen had hig plans for the his temper. Whether by calculation or, agency. i word wurd Of the da, ir was not, during his fight with Turner, he; going to be "unleashed," and du loosen- had done so several times. Tables were ing or its bonds and the alterana pounded, faces turned red, angry words mstics dierein would rexinire tough. were exchanged; and, as a result, Turner, minded, hardcharging men. TI e worry an immensely proud man, had never ens that ltiman was soft. forgiven Inman. ? There remained, though, the ,u-ohlern Matters were not improved when NSA --- Goldwater, who was lobbying, iast and intercepts later picked up word of Billy inrionsjv lot- Inman's appointme it. Also, Carter's financial dealings with the Lib- someone had to backstop Cam y, espe- yans. Rather than take the information daily On the Hill. The yip solw on was to Turner, Inman, as provided by stat; to offer Inman the n umber-tv 0 post, ute, went instead to Attorney General dcp?,), dircoor. Benjamin Civiletti?then quietly briefed Inman was not sure he wan te,l it_ Ile the press about what he had done. Tur- ner was wounded again when, during the controversy over the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, the Defense Department, fearful that CIA was using IICAVS Of the brigade as a stratagem to undermine SALT, pointedly checked the agency's data with Inman. Enraged, , Turner reportedly went to Jimmy Carter, his .old friend and Annapolis classmate; looking for Inman's head. Instead, Carter awarded Inman the National Security Medal. ? who had headed the Securities and Ex- change Commission under Nix n. And I Turner, also in attendance, did not seem as amused. Turner was !not the only one :evil? wasn't, happy. In a town like Washing- ton, where there are always wheels with- in wheels, there were those who thought that Ininan's technique----his courting of the Congress, his petting of the press? AV;IS merely a ploy: there were those who believed that, in seeming..so honest, Inman was actually being devious. As it happened, many of those people worked was content at NSA. he told friemls..md, if he (11(1 1 Ca VC, it would probabi be for private industry, uliere, reported; v, (lifers in the S250,000 range vver(;- her eq dan- gled, }W..' sons were approachime college age. 1Vith his military career al its ap- )arent ienith, he was tempted to accept one of-sthe lucrative offers. FrienTs. suell as James Schlesinger. himself a former CLA director, urged him to turn the ap- pointment, down. Inman was on the verge of taking their advice when Rea- gamesummoned him Lo the 'Whitt Itouse Alter an application of the famous Rea- Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-009GIROGGSG0250,008-11. tli star, Admiral Inman changed ltis ininc Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1 Since then he has not had an easy time of it. During the controvers' over the financial dealings of Casey's deputy for covert operations, a California businessman named Max Hugel, Inman was suspected of leaking the in that eventually brought ibout Hugel's downfall. The stories about the source of the leaks were untrue, but that did not prevent. further suspicions that In- man?"a sleeper agent." as one of his enemies called him?was behind Gold- water's call for Casey's resignation, when the CIA dfrector landed in a financial briar patch of his own. At one point, when it appeared that Casey was on the verge of being ousted, security advisor Allen let it be known that if Casey went. Inman would go with him. The Casey flap finally passed, but not before Inman was comiwlled to go on national television and, looking distinct- ly uncomfortable, commend his boss for doing "-a great job." But that was not a sufficient show of good faith for the po- litical right and, during the battle over CIA's proposed executive order, they went at Inman again. Human Events, the influential right-wing journal, warned ominously of unidentified "lib- erals" lurking within CIA's corridors, and The Wall Street Journal, in an edi- torial widely believed- to have been gen- erated by 'the White House, invited Inman to make good on his ? pledge about "personally repugnant'', executive orders and resign. About that time, CIA; spokesmen started talking about,Inman's "keeping a low profile." He has rarely been .seen. sine, The few times he has vcntured unt, it has not been as the Robb) Ininawof Casey keeping cover, he has become the agency's point man. the a nointed.bcarer of bad tidings. Ile was there when Reagan finally signed the agency's ex- ectitive order: there again - when ,the agency decided to crack.down.on civil- ian scientists, warning them of the legal , trouble that awaited them for disclosing sensitive technology; and. he, was there yet again to defend the widespread. ,use of Government polvgraphing. For his diminishing drde,of friends, it has all been very unsettling, ,"It's bad," a Senafor said recently? referring to the executive order:rhat; Reagan signed and Inman defended,,He_men- tioned the White _House cereniony, Inman standing there. looking-:;rather blank, assuring everyone that.the,revised version was really going. to, be i11 right, that they could go to sleep at, night not worry. because he had_kept,:,the genie in the bottle., The Senator,:-.an admirer of Inman's, recalled. ,how, at that moment. those wheels ,:within wheels spun again, and how-chis?Jime he found himself svoudering-? whether maybe they were right. "It's .,!d," he repeated. "Rut without Bobby; it..-.woidd have been a hell of a lot worse." ? 7 Was it true? Had Bobby real ,y become ; Horatius at the bridge? Or was he some- one elsc. entirely, someoney'darker,,and different? It certainly seems that Innian's role now is to keep the ,bad thiTtgs from getting worse, and it. is a pail ,.he per- forms without much convictimi. At the meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science,- where he called for voluntary censorship, his words seemed flat, their syntax tortured and stumbling. The gap-toothed smile was there, as always, but, no t seemed more forced, the man behind it. more ?-.1 fatalistic. When. he told, the .,assembled I scientists of a storm, that-,,waN ,coming, I how their way of life would ;he washed away if they. did not . bend efore it,. he seemed to some of listeners to ! be speaking as mucho1;,himself as he was of them. His .auclience, locked back at him.. A friend in. attentlarce,:shook his head sadly. No One ill Washington can, ,e certain now what will become of: the,agency or of Inman. People can only 1411c.iand speculate and wonder and ?vs?irry..But they can be sure that, whateNer, comes to pass in the shadowy .world ;,fie ui habits, Bobby Ininan yjJ1 e1,think-. ing ... always di inking. 1:3 Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500250008-1