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ARTICLE APPEAREDt pproved For Rdle4e2.0,0S142/'V4 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R0006002000 ON PAGE a9.~.. PARAMETERS - JOURNAL OF THE US ARMY WAR COL SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND DISINFORMATION: by OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT DENNIS KUX Lately there has been increased public attention regarding Soviet "disin- formation" and "active measures," attempts by Moscow to influence political attitudes and public opinion in non- communist countries through deceptive and often covert means. Yet serious analysis has been limited. There has been a great deal of focus on Moscow's espionage endeavors, but this other facet of the Kremlin's intelligence operations has received far less scrutiny, either by the press or academics. The terminology pertaining to the subject is unfamiliar and loosely defined, even among specialists. In fact, the terms "active measures" and "disinformation" are both imported directly from the Soviet in- telligence lexicon. "Disinformation," the more frequently used and better-known term, is the English transliteration of the Russian "dezinformatsiya" or misinforming through the dissemination of information that is totally or partially false. The phrase "active measures" is the English translation of "aktivnyye meropriyatiya," the name of the Soviet KGB unit charged with implementing these activities. In Soviet intelligence doctrine, the concept of "active measures" covers a wide span of practices including disinformation operations, political influence efforts, and the activities of Soviet front groups and foreign communist parties. All active measures have the common goal of enhancing Soviet influence, usually by tarnishing the image of opponents. They generally involve elements of deception and often employ clandestine means to mask Moscow's hand in the operation. Overall, where active measures fit in the Soviet framework may be better understood by considering the whole spectrum of Soviet foreign policy endeavors through the optic of "white," "gray," and "black" operations. Normal diplomatic, trade, aid, and in- formational efforts can be considered "white" or overt activities. "Gray" ac tv tires are those involving communist fronts, foreign communist parties, "clandestine" radio stations, or well-known media outlets for disinformation. While not officially acknowledged to be Soviet sponsored, semi- overt "gray" activities are widely known as under Soviet direction and control. In contrast, "black" activities involve genuinely clandestine operations: the use of agents of influence, spreading false rumors, duping politicians and journalists, and disseminating forgeries and fake documents. Active measures fall under either the "gray" or the "black" rubric, although the line between the semi-overt and the clandestine is often blurred. Finding an appropriate English phrase to describe active measures is difficult. Former Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagle- burger has written: "No phrase in English conveys precisely the meaning of active measures. Perhaps World War II psychological warfare operations provide the closest parallel."' The So% lets first used active measures as a policy tool in the 1920s when :Moscow sought to discredit emigre groups in Western Europe, particularly rt France, by spreading disinformation and by luring emigre activists back to Russia through various subterfuges. Even before the 1917 Revolution, the Tsarist secret police emplo%ed similar deceptive techniques, using foreign agents not only to collect intelligence but also to sow dissent among emigre groups and, by covert sub- sidies to selected journals, to attempt to create a better foreign press for Imperial Russia. In the 1950s the Soviet Union in- stitutionalized these practices, establishing an intelligence unit that specialized in disin- formation; this was Department D within the First Chief Directorate of the Soviet in- telligence organization. In the 1960s, the term Continued Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Qre Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R000600200001-2 WASHINGTON TIMES 25 December 1985 ~E TIE BELTWAY Polygraph 'em Journalists are often the equals of Doubting Thomas in the face of "official statements." The latest cynical aside following a line de- livered by an official spokesman is: "Give him a polygraph!" The use of polygraphs, de- nounced by Secretary of State George Shultz, also has become an issue for various activists to ride piggyback. Free the Eagle has joined the Federation for Amer- ican Afghan Action, for example, in calling for "a public lie-detector test for CIA Deputy Director John McMahon" on the matter of covert Afghan aid. According to John Houston of Free the Eagle, a "polygraph test for McMahon is necessary to determine if the di- sastrous covert aid is deliberate policy or sheer incompetence." Mr. McMahon, often mentioned as a successor to William Casey as director of the CIA, has been a target of the two groups for some time. The current polygraph flap offers them yet another opportu- nity to bring their charges to the fore. - John Elvin Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 ARTICtAIff For Release 2005/12/ll Sq1 R~91 01 R000600200001-2 ON PAGE 12 December 1985 Panel vote .expected today on Sporkin judgeship By Bill Gertz THE WASHINGTON TIMES. The Senate Judiciary Committee investigation into charges that CIA General Counsel Stanley Sporkin shielded a senior CIA official from a Justice Department espionage pros- ecution is expected to end today with a committee vote oq Mr. Sporkin's:-- nomination to a federal judgeship. The controversial nomination has been held up for 18 months. during an investigation of allegations of im- proprieties relating, to Mr. Sporkn's role in a CIA investigation of a leak. The only open hearing an the nomination revealed `Tuesday that Mr. Sporkin was involved in a dis- pute between the CIA and the FBI, and that both agencies had delayed giving details of the investigation to committee investigators. Sen. Jeremiah Denton,. Alabama Republican, told the hearing that he had become Mr. Sporkin's primary antagonist in the affair because of "missives" from FBI officials who sought to challenge Mr. Sporkin's nomination. Mr. Denton heads a Ju- diciary subcommittee on security and terrorism that oversees FBI ac- tivities. Mr. Denton said in an interview 'Ittesday the investigation into the nomination has produced numerous "sworn contradictory statements,' that may involve perjury. According to congressional sources close to the investigation, FBI officials oppose the nomination because, they say, Mr. Sporkin blocked a Justice Department espi- onage investigation of a senior CIA intelligence officer that began in July 1982 and ended with the res- ignation of Charles E. Waterman, a CIA national intelligence officer for Middle East affairs. The congressional sources, who requested anonymity, provided the following account of the dispute be- tween the FBI and CIA, which has been verified independently by other sources close to the investiga. tion: The investigation began when the National Security Agency obtained electronic intercepts that indicated data from an internal CIA publica- tion relating to Middle East sources had been passed to a Washington re- search center and published in the center's monthly newsletter. The Justice Department then or- dered an FBI investigation into the leak and traced its source to Mr. Wa- terman, the CIA's top Middle East affairs intelligence analyst. In the spring of 1984, this account goes, Mr. Waterman's attorney, Sey- mour Glanzer, called the FBI's Wash- ington field office and told FBI agents that Mr. Sporkin had ar- ranged for him to provide pro bono legal counsel for Mr. Waterman. Mr. Glanzer told the FBI agents that the leak of classified information had been authorized by. CIA officials. Therefore, Mr, Waterman had vio-? lated no laws regarding the disclo- sure of classified information. Mr. Glanzer has said he did not provide free legal services to Mr. Waterman, but would not say how much Mr. Waterman paid him for his services. The FBI reply to Mr. Glanzer was that the investigation could be con- cluded if he could produce an affida- vit from the CIA saying the leak had been authorized. Deputy CIA Director John McMahon refused to authorize an official CIA statement on the disclo- sure of the secret data. Mr. Glanzer then called the FBI and arranged a meeting, which was attended by Mr. Sporkin, Mr. Water- man and CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence Robert Gates. The meeting was called to dispel the allegation that Mr. Waterman had disclosed information without authorization, without an affidavit from the CIA. Instead, the meeting prompted a letter from William French Smith, then the U.S. attorney general, to CIA Director William Casey, warn- ing that the Justice Department might prosecute Mr. Waterman on espionage charges unless the CIA took action. CIA spokesman George Lauder said no letter had been sent on the subject of Justice Department pros- ecution of Mr. Waterman, but he would not say whether the Justice Department sought to prosecute a senior CIA official. Mr. Waterman left the agency in late 1984 and now works as a foreign policy consultant. Mr. Sporkin, who has previously said he was carrying out his respon- sibility as CIA general counsel in no- tifying Mr. Waterman to obtain legal counsel, could not be reached for comment. The FBI also opposes the Sporkin nomination because they believe Mr. Sporkin woad favor the CIA as the presiding judge of the Foreign Int$ JL ligence Surveillance Act (FISA) court, congressional sources say. With his CIA experience, I:. Sporkin as a judge would be a prime candidate to head the seven-judge panel when the term of the presidillt; judge ends in 1989, the sources said. The FISA court was establisht:,1 by the 1978 act to authorize wiretaps and other electronic surveillance techniques by the FBI and the Na' tional Security Agency. Judges as e appointed to a single seven-yc,.r term by Chief Justice Warr~n Burger. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 ARTICLE ON PAGE.f~iy.. YORK f IM Approved For Release 20 ~1ay/*bJ ES Washington Pondel ui iieiuco: A Troubled Spy or an Actor? ing consequences for the C.I.A., whose By STEPHEN ENGELBERG Sgcw a Tss New York rams operational procedures are under acru- WASHINGTON, Nov. 9 - Vitaly S. tiny in Congress and within the Admin- Yurchenllso's voice was breaking and istration. Until now, the criticism of he appeared to be brushing tears from William J. Casey, the Director of Cen- his eyes this week as he described for tral Intelligence, has focused on covert reporters what he said were his experi- operations such as the mining of the Co- ences during three months in the hands rinto harbor in Nicaragua. of the Central Intelligence Agency. For the first time, it is Mr. Casey's "When I was sleeping, they prohib performance as this country's chief spy ited me even to close the door,, I he said. master that is being called into ques- "Door should be closed, and next room tion by members of Congress and the was sitting such fat quiet, stupid - ex-i Administration. Administration offi- cnrse me - unemotional person who is (dais and members of Congress are following the order. Only following the troubled by the Yurchenko case and by order." the agency's handling of Edward Lee Mr. Yurchenko's rambling perform- Howard, a former C.I.A. officer who ance at the news conference this week Mr. Yurchekno said had helped Soviet may have been the finale in a elaborate intdllligence identify a valuable Amer- play staged from the start by Soviet in. ican agent who was a weapons re- telligence. Or it was a remarkable pub. searcher in Moscow. lic display of the inner turmoil of a mid- Members of Congress want to know dle-aged man, a spy spurned by his why Mr. Howard was forced to resign lover and torn by guilt over betraying while he still knew sensitive informa- his homeland. tion. And some are asking why Mr. No one in Washington is sure which Yurchenko was allowed to dine with explanation is the truth, and members only one companion last Saturday at a of Congress and knowledgeable Admin- restaurant just a short distance from istuation officials are divided over how the Soviet embassy compound on Tun- to interpret the evidence. law Road. U.S. Denies Mistreatment 'Some Tough Questions' The State Department has called Mr. "All this has cost the agency," said Yurchenko's charges against the C.I.A. one senior Administration official. "completely false," and members of "And they're going have to answer Congress including Senator Dave some tough questions." Durenberger, chairman of the Senate "Either a mistake was made in get- Select Committee on Intelligence, have ting into this situation or a colossal denied the C.I.A. mistreated him. mistake was made in not spotting a C.I.A. officials now have begun to double agent," said Senator Patrick view everything they were told by Mr. LAY, the Vermont Democrat who is Yurchenko. The agency hhooppeses its ef- Vice Chairman of the Select Commit- forts to verify leads he prrndded will es- tee on Intelligence. tablish that he was a legitimate defec- On Friday, in an unusual public tor who changed his mind. Agency offi- cials believe the evidence available so far supports this view. But the doubts within the Adminis- tration reach as high as President Rea- gan, who last week said that Mr. Yur- chenko's revelations were of little value. The entire affair, Mr. Reagan marriage and said he was a "general should not underestimate the emo- suggested, may have been part of designate" of the K.G.B., responsible . tional content of state security offi- Soviet ploy to disrupt the summit for a variety of spying rations in cars." He said a Soviet in gene scheduled fair later this month. North America and !officer he had once worked wiwith As senior intelligence officers, mem- fected because an East German The case7s'teTy toiiu -e fFIi leach. bers and Congress and exrerts in the woman who was his lover had told au- 0(jnaed field begin to assess central issue of Mr. Yurchenko's bona fides, several themes have begun to emerge. A Classic Pattern Those who support the theory that; Mr. Yurchenko chan his mind under the stress of de say his case appears to have followed a classic pattern. Current and former intelligence offi- cers said that virtually all the defectors to the United States - from senior in- telligence operatives to merchant sea- men - have suffered severe emotional strain that prompts them to seriously consider returning to their homeland. ,,we get an awful lot of defectors," said one official, "and some of them go back." Only last year, Oleg Bitov, a Soviet journalist who defected in 1993, returned to the Soviet Union and at- tacked the Western nations in which he had lived. Mr. Yurchenko cryptically ! referred to that case at his press con-: ference, saying, "I read on the newspa- pers about Bitov. I don't know," but adding: "But I can understand him ex- act S me former officials familiar with I the C.I.A.'s handling of defectors say i the Yurchenko case is part of pattern of insensitivity that has surfaced In other instances. Donald Jameson, a retired C.I.A. of- ficial who dealt with defectors and has remained close to many of them since his retirement in 1973, said: "This has long been one of the least adequate ele- ments of the agency. The willingness and the ability to do the right thing has been lacking." 'The Emotional Content' statement, the agency appeared to be i Many have questioned whether a trying to blunt some of the criticism senior K.G.B. official such as Mr. Yur and to show the Russians that Mr. Yur.: chenko would be willing to return to his chenko had given away extensive in. homeland after detection, knowing that agency's three-page biography of Mr. , and a lifetime of disgrace. Yurchenko?mentioned the strains in his Mr. Jameson responded, "One Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 a Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 thorities about his Swiss bank ac- counts. Nonetheless, this spy went back into East Germany to rescue the woman who had turned him in. "He walked into a trap, and I think he knew it, but he couldn't help himself," Mr. Jame- son said. Mr. Jameson, who has remained close to defectors since his retirement, asserts that the agency has often not paid enough attention to their precari- ous psychological state. "I cannot think of a defector-who has not, how- ever briefly, come to the conclusion that the only thing to do was go back and make restitution." Lave Affair Cited Mr. Yurchenko, according to Amer- ican officials, had hoped to continue his longtime love affair with the wife of a Soviet diplomat who lives in Canada. In September, American authorities drove him to Ottawa where, by their normal signals, a face-to-face meeting was arranged, according to officials In W on and Canada. The woman spurn him, officials say, and Mr. I Yurchenko appeared to grow de. pressed and less cooperative after that trip. When an intelligence officer defects, the C.I.A. assembles a team of officials to conduct interviews and analyze the information gleaned. One senior intelli- gence officer noted that defectors usu- ally arrive prepared to tell a set story. After this initial phase, the inter- viewers begin to investigate more deeply, asking the defector to reveal things he would prefer to keep secret. It is at this point, the official said, that the homesickness, guilt, and emotional. stress often reach their peak. Ladislav Bittman, a Czech intelli- gence officer who defected in 1988, re- calls that his experiences with the C.I.A. were mixed: Some officials were sensitive but others did not seem attuned to the cultural shock suffered by an Eastern European plunged into American society. Of his debriefing, he said: "Basically) it was done on a professional level ands not much attention is paid to psy- chological stress of the individual. This is an extremely important issue bcause the defector is going through the most dramatic trauma of his life. He has given up his home, his values, his coun- try. He is like a defenseless child to find a new life." The most important piece of evi- dence that argues against Mr. Yur- chenko being a genuine defector would be what some officials say is the "am- biguous" importance of the informa- tion he has provided. Senator William S. Cohen, a Maine Republican who was one of several senators who doubted Mr. Yurchenko's bona fides, notes that much of the infor- mation that has been publicly revealed was historical in nature. Mr. Howard, the former C.I.A. officer, was a "spent agent" in the parlance of the intelli- gence trade, and Mr. Yurchenko's help in identifying him has largely served to cause in the C.I.A. Additional- ly, he i #ald to have explained the ; death of Nicholas Shadrin, an Amer-, ican double agent who disappeared in Vienna in 1975. 'Historical' Information A White House official said it was the "historical" nature of these revela- tions that had led him to downplay Mr. Yurchenko's value. The C.I.A. contends that the remain- ing information, which has not been leaked to the public, will establish his bona fides. But Administration offi- cials outside the C.I.A. who have re- viewed the whole body of statements taken from Mr. Yurchenko are said to remain undecided about whether he was a genuine defector. One official questioned Whether the Russians would risk a live press confer- ence with a man supposedly cracking from emotional stress 'without some very good reason to believe he would follow the prepared propaganda line. Senator Malcolm Wallop, a Wyoming Republican who doubted Mr. Yur- chenko from the first, said the C.I.A.'s Deputy Director, John McMahon, told him several weeks ago: "I'd stake my career an Yurchenko's bona fides." But a White House offi0al re- marked: "The jury is still " I, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 J ARTICLE AMUM 1 r WASHINGTON POST M4 PACE, 3 November 1985 - CIA Anti-Qaddafi Plan Backed Reagan Authorizes Covert Operation to Undermine Libyan Regime Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R001 By Bob Woodward Washington Poet Starr Writer President Reagan has authorized a Central Intelligence Agency co- vert operation designed to under- mine the Libyan regime headed by Col. Muammar Qaddafi, according to informed government sources. The plan, which involves CIA as- sistance to another country or countries in North Africa and the Middle East that oppose Qaddafi, has run into initial resistance from the House and Senate Select Com- mittees on Intelligence, which over- see the CIA. The chairman and vicei chairman of the Senate panel re- cently wrote Reagan to outline op- position to the covert operation. However, a narrow majority of the members of both panels so far supports the covert action, admin- istration sources said. Secretary of State George P. Shultz appeared before the House committee as re- cently as last week to support the plan. The operation, authorized in a formal presidential "finding" signed this fall, is at first designed to dis- rupt, preempt and frustrate Qad- dafi's subversive and terrorist plans, the sources said. Secondly, they said, it might lure him into some foreign adventure or terrorist exploit that would give a growing number of Qaddafi opponents in the Libyan military a chance to seize power; or such a foreign adventure might give one of Qaddafi's neigh- bors, such as Algeria or Egypt, a justification for responding to Qad- dafi militarily. After 41/2 years of ineffective eco- nomic sanctions and perhaps some minor financial support or encour- agement to Libyan dissidents in ex- ile, the administration has decided that Qaddafi is such an international menace to U.S. interests that co- vert action should be undertaken, argued that the new covert plan is That 1984 assessment, part of designed to stop terrorism, not to the analysis that led to the decision support the assassination of Qad- to launch a covert` action now, also dafi. concluded that disaffected ele- ments in the [Libyan] military could A at- signed by Reagan expressly forbids spurred to assras with h the the CIA or any other U.S. govern- tempts or to cooperate with the ment agency from direct or indirect exiles against Qaddafi." In light of the executive order involvement in any assassination banning U.S. involvement in assas- plan. sination, several sources voiced This is the issue that most con- surprise that the word was used in cerned the chairman and vice chair- this; -vulnerability assessment that man of the Senate Select Intelli- was prepared under the direction of gence Committee, Sens. David F. the national intelligence officer Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Patrick (NIO) for the Near East and South J. Leahy (D-Vt.) respectively, who Asia, the top analyst in the U.S. conveyed their opposition to the intelligence community for that re- plan against Qaddafi in a letter to gion. the White House, sources said. In The vulnerabilities of the Qaddafi the letter they asked Reagan how government could only be ex- the plan would avoid the prohibition ploited, according to the assess- against assassination attempts or ment, "through a broad program in plans. cooperation with key countries The White House responded, combining political, economic and sources said, by insisting that there paramilitary action." It also said was no plan to assassinate Qaddafi that "the exile groups, if supported and by asking the two senators to to a substantial degree, could soon delete the word.assassination from begin an intermittent campaign of their letter. The senators declined sabotage and violence which could to do so, sources said. prompt further challenges to Qad- Administration sources said dafi's authority." there is no doubt that Reagan, The assessment said Libyan ex- Shultz and Casey would like to see iles who oppose Qaddafi have re- Qaddafi toppled, and believe that a ceived support from Egypt, Iraq, support operation costing several Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and million dollars through a third coun- Tunisia. try is the type of antiterrorist op- The State Department intelli- eration that can safely and legally gence branch disagreed with the be undertaken. vulnerability assessment and said in According to intelligence reports, a footnote that it "rests too heavily Qaddafi gives support to some 30 on fragmentary, unsubstantiated insurgent, radical or terrorist reporting and fails to give sufficient groups worldwide, ranging from weight tot Qaddafi's enduring pop- current hot spots such as Nicaragua ularity ...... and the Philippines to groups in Since 1981, the first year of the Lebanon, Pakistan, Europe, South Reagan presidency when' Qaddafi America, the Caribbean and Africa, allegedly dispatched "hit teams" to that, reports allege, are pursuing assassinate the president. or other goals contrary to U.S. interests. top U.S. officials, Qaddafi has been A top secret, 29-page "Vulner- a thorn in the administration's side. ability Assessment" done by the The president has authority to CIA and other U.S. intelligence begin covert operations that he agencies and dated June 18, 1984, deems necessary for the national concluded that "no course of action securi ty Under the law the con- officials said. short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall ressional oversight committees Shultz and q4 ~i IN lea 2@~S/ '/4 if6 4tPWE~P~9 ff0901 RO QQ0~?Q{ @Mfully and in a A J. Casey, according to sources, have ing change in Libyan policies." A Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 timely fashion. If Congress objects to the operation, the only recourse is to cut off the funds, as was done. with the CIA covert operation against Nicaragua. An alternative to an actual at- tempt to overthrow Qaddafi, ac- cording to sources and documents, might be some paramilitary support to Egypt or Algeria, the chief coun- tries that might be able to bring pressure on Qaddafi, though both have had serious reservations about cooperating with the United States in the past when covert anti-Qaddafi proposals have been discussed. Last year, according to sources, a covert plan against Qaddafi was blocked by CIA Deputy Director John N. McMahon on grounds that the exiles were "Boy Scouts" and too weak to have even' half a chance at success. Casey supported that decision not to move ahead with a covert operation because no U.S. ally would support it. Last year Qaddafi was gaining some respectability in Europe, expanding intelligence ties with Greece and enhancing military relations with Italy and Turkey, according to intelligence sources. The sources were unable to ex- plain exactly why the administration has chosen this time to launch the covert operation. But they pointed to a Special National Intelligence Estimate entitled, "Libya's Qaddafi: the Challenge to the United States and Western Interests," completed earlier this year, that said Qaddafi "provides money, weapons, a base of operations, travel assistance or training to some 30 insurgent, rad- ical or terrorist groups." The report said reliable intelli- gence showed Qaddafi stirring up trouble worldwide by continuing .subversion in Chad, Sudan and Tu- nisia; pursuing common goals with what the estimate called the "rad- ical states" of Iran, Syria, Ethiopia and Nicaragua, and through con- tinuing support to groups in the Philippines, New Caledonia, Pak- istan and Zaire. A map in the intelligence esti- mate showed Qaddafi supporting insurgents or terrorist groups in countries such as Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, Colombia, the Do- minican Republic, Lebanon and Iraq. In addition the map showed Qad- dafi providing financial support to the political opposition or to leftist politicians in Costa Rica, St. Lucia, and Dominica. The estimate said there were 50,000 Soviet and Eastern Euro- pean technicians or advisers in Lib- ya. Such special or regular intelli- gence estimates are issued by Casey with input from the other U.S. intelligence agencies. Calling Qaddafi "a judicious po- litical calculator" and pointedly say- ing that he was not living up to his madman image, the intelligence estimate said that Qaddafi would continue to be a threat to U.S. and Western interests. Early this year some Libyan mil- itary officers launched two unsuc- cessful assassination attempts against Qaddafi, who responded by executing as many as 75 officers accused of participating in them. U.S. intelligence agencies re- ceive almost a steady stream of re- ports-many considered reliable- that Qaddafi is expanding his ter- rorist capabilities and planning var- ious actions against U.S. installa- tions or individuals. Earlier this year one report said Qaddafi had formed two new special operations units to conduct com- mando and terrorist operations, including one naval unit headed by a senior aide. Within the last two weeks there have been intelligence reports that Qaddafi was targeting the U.S. Em- bassy in Tunis and the U.S. ambas- sador to Tunisia, according to gov- ernment sources. Staff researcher Barbara Fein man contributed to this report. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901ROO0600200001-2 RET N,~; WASHINGTON TIMES 1 November 1985 Afghan rebels backers blame CIA, official for restricting covert aid ~ By BjII Gertz J THE VYFSRIRUT(J?I'TIMES Representatives of three Afghan resistance support groups yesterday called for the ouster of Deputy CIA Director .iohn McMahon who, ,tey charged, has impeded the covert aid program to Afghan guerrilla fighters. "We need to start hitting this ad- ministration where it hurts, by nam- ing names and helping to create a justifiable outrage among the American people that there is a genocide going on [in Afghanistan]," said Neal Blair, president of the con- servative lobbying group Free the Eagle. The remarks were made at a downtown press conference, where Mr. Blair said U.S. aid was not reaching Afghan freedom fighters and he was not satisfied with the response from many government agencies. The group's 265,000 members are pressing the CIA's inspector general to investigate "the botched oper- ations under McMahon's supervi- sion;' he said. "We've undertaken the effort to have our members write directly to Donald Regan, White House chief of staff, urging him to call John McMahon to account for his per- formance, Mr. Blair said. "And unless or until McMahon is able to do so, we are urging his im- mediate dismissal from his position at the CIA," he said. A CIA spokesman called the al- legations against Mr. McMahon "asi- nine" but would not comment fur- ther. Nabi Salehi, a college professor who represents one of the Afghan mujahideen guerrilla groups, said "time is running out,, for Afghan fighters opposing Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Since the Soviet invasion in De- cember 1979, more than 1 million Afghans have died in the fighting, he said. "The war in Afghanistan is no longer a battle of one armed force against another," Mn Salehi said. "It is the systematic technological de- struction of an entire population by the army of a superpower." He called. on the United States to provide advanced anti-aircraft mis- siles and ammunition. Congressional sources said yes- terday Mr. McMahon has opposed. supplying the Afghan guerrillas with the advanced weapons needed to knock down Soviet helicopter gun- ships. He fears the U.S. weapons would fall into Soviet hands and that the Soviets would then develop coun- termeasures against the arms, the sources said. Andrew L. Eiva, a former U.S. spe- cial forces soldier and director of a group called the Federation of American Afghan Action, said Mr. McMahon was singled out for doing the most "in blocking effective aide to the Afghans and misleading Con- gress about it." He provided reporters with a fi- nancial analysis of CIA covert arms deliveries to Afghan guerrillas, which shows that last year less than one-third of $122 million in weapons appropriated by Congress had reached the Afghan resistance. The loss was attributed to "skimming" by Pakistani-based Afghan rebels. The conclusion reached by the three groups resulted from an inves- tigation that included information supplied by Congress and the rebel forces. Mn Eiva also distributed a "report card" grading CIA Afghan oper- ations that he said were limited by an effort to provide only the Afghan guerrillas with "enough to survive," but not enough to win any major bat- tles. Mr. Eiva estimates that since 1981 the Reagan administration has appropriated a total of $342 million in covert assistance to Afghanistan. But since the aid was covert, U.S. officials insisted on supplying out- dated and militarily ineffective weapons that could not be traced to U.S. sources. He called for ending covert assis- tance and providing more modern weapons, particularly advanced shoulder-held Stinger and Redeye surface-to-air missiles. Mr. McMahon served as "point man" for CIA efforts to curb legisla- tion that would facilitate the flow of advance weapons and briefed at least three members of Congress in an effort defend the CIA's efforts in Afghanistan, Mr. Eiva said. Indiana Republican Representa- tive Dan Burton, a supporter of con- gressional aid to the Afghan guerril- las, said in an interview that he has pressured the CIA to "get through to those mujahideen people everything that Congress sent." "People are dying over there;' Mr. Burton said. "They are fighting for freedom and, by gosh, we as a Con- gress have made a commitment to help them, and we ought to do it.,, Approved ApproAR ' as 005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-009018000600200 1 CIA spy gave clues of intent to ends By Bill Gertz TH w*->a+QTON nos The CIA mishandled both the hir- ing and firing of Edward L. Howard, a former employee suspected of sell- ing the Soviet Union top secret infor- mation. on CIA operations in Moscow, an intelligence official says. Fugitive and former CIA oper. ative Howard had trained for a MOs- cow assignmentand learned some of the agency's most sensitive secrets before he was fired in June 1983 after failing two lie detector tests, the official said. The intelligence official, who spoke on the condition he not be identified, called the affair "a secu- rity scandal of major proportions." He said the CIA had failed to take steps to put Howard under surveil- lance even after he told two CIA offi- cers in Austria he had considered getting even for his dismissal by revealing details of the CIA's Mos. cow operations. During a L984 trip to Austria, Howard gave the Soviet intelligence service, the KGB, information that led to the arrest of a CIA agent in the Soviet avionics industry, according to federal officials. Howard met "two current employed of the CIA" four days later and told them he had considered spying for the Soviets in Vgtshingoon, according to court documents, Howard's meeting th thOMCW said .CIA offi- cers was not reported laths FBI, but CIA officials contend -appropriate action was taken" Under federal pri. vacy laws, the CIA cannot monitor Americans who express "fantasies" about spying, a CIA official said, "We were obviously. very can. cerned about him the Official, said. the Hem was nnot neglected nor ignored," Published WASHINGTON TIMES 21 October 1985 reports have said the CIA hired a psychiatrist for Howard after he left the agency to work as a financial analyst in New Mexico. Howard has since fled the United States and is believed to be in Mos- cow Howard's treachery was dis- closed by Soviet defector Vitaly Yurchenko, a senior KGB offices Senate Select Committee on Intel- ligence spokesman Dave Holiday said the committee is investigating both the CIA's hiring of Howard and charges that the FBI was not alerted to Howard% statement that be had United espionage against the States. Under CIA guidelines, all con- tacts with Americans suspected of espionage must be reported to the FBI. The FBI maintains a liaison office at the CIA's headquarters in Langley, Va., to handle such cases. Mr. Holiday said that during ini- tial committee briefings on the How- ard case, no mention was made of the CIA's contact with Howard in Austria. Regarding the CIA's hiring of Howard, "one of the questions that we have wanted to know all along is what was the result of the first [poly- graph test], W. Holiday said in an interview, "If he had problems on the second one, did he develop them in that 21/2-year period or was it detected in the beginning;" he asked? A CIA official said Howard would not have been hired by the agency if he had failed polygraph testing. But another administration offi- cial said Howard failed one of two polygraph tests when he was hired by the CIA in January 1981. Although he passed a loyalty test, a test about his personal lifestyle indi- cated illegal drug use- He was told to "clean up his act" and began training within the CIA's clandestine oper-. ations division, the official said. Two and a half years later, Howard again failed a lie detector test, which showed continued drug use and also theft of agency funds, the official said. Rather than transfer Howard out of clandestine services, the agency summarily dismissed him, he said. The CIA's handling of the Howard case has focused attention on Deputy CIA Director John N. McMahon, the agency's executive director at the time Howard was hired in January 1983. According to an intelligence offi- cial, Mr. McMahon vetoed an over- seas counterspy program, which might have and before he tagents contacted the KGB in Austria. The Program also might have detected 'Y John Walker, who allegedly met frequently with KGB officials in Vienna, and CIA clerk Sharon might have prevented Scranage from Passing secrets to a Ghanaian intel- ligence agent, the official said. Scranage pleaded guilty last month, and Mr. Wklker is awaiting trial is Baltimore. In 1978 Mr. McMahon was pro- - fmieoltd ed Tbry nfeor rmto er dCeIpA utdyredrcecr tSor afnosr operations - the section that han- dles clandestine operations - although records show his exper- ience was limited to technical and electronic intelligence collection. Conservative critics have charged that Mr. McMahon's control over CIA policies eclipses that of CIA Director William Casey. CIA spokesman say what oleLauder Mr. would r McMahon played in bringing How- ard into the agency. But he said "John McMahon had absolutely nothing to do with Howard's depar- ture from the agency." After Howard's disappearance last month in New Mexico, the CIA's chief of security, William Kotopish,. was transferred from his post, an administration official said. He described the new CIA security chief as a "manager" with no secu- rity background who had been rec ommended by Mr. McMahon. He declined to reveal his name. Mr. Lauder confirmed that a new security chief has been appointed but said the selection had been made by Mr. Casey. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 -IV ARTICLE APP proved For Release 2005/1 JA8V%7ctommffld500901 R000600200001-2 IN PA stunned U.S. spy network as Yank traitor betrays our man in Moscow SOVIETS EXECUTE By NILES LATHEM Bureau Chief WASHINGTON - The CIA's most prized "mole" in the Soviet Union was arrested and executed last summer, The Post learned last night. He was captured through information provided to the KGB by fugitive CIA turncoat Edward Howard. Top U.S. intelligence of- ficials confirmed last night that the American agent, A.G. Tolkachev, was arrested and exe- cuted last July after being betrayed by How- ard - his former "con- trol," or supervising case officer, in Moscow. Tolkachev was an electronics wizard who worked at a top-secret military aviation com- pound in Moscow. According to an ac- count in yesterday's Wall Street Journal, Tolka- chev for several years had provided the CIA with details of the latest Soviet advances in radar and "stealth technology" - the most sensitive in- formation in military aviation. He also is believed to have given the U.S. its first tipoff about Soviet plans for the large phased-array radar system under construc- tion in Krasnoyarsk - the center of the Sovi- et's own Star Wars nu- clear defense system. Last night, the CIA would give no official comment on the latest revelation to rock the in- telligence underworld. But administration and congressional sources confirmed to The Post that the CIA had lost one of its most treasured "human as- sets" behind the Iron Curtain as a result of Howard's double-deal- ing with Moscow. Tolkachev's arrest for espionage was an- nounced by the Soviet news agency Tass in July. Howard, a former CIA agent with a history of emotional problems. es- caped an FBI dragnet in New Mexico on Sept. 23 after his dealings with Moscow were exposed by KGB defector Vitaiy Yurchenko - the No. 5 man in the KGB. He had been working as an economic analyst for the New . Mexico Legislature. He is now believed to be under safekeeping in Howard, 33, joined the CIA in January 1981 and was assigned as a deep-cover case officer to the U.S. Embassy i Moscow. His main assignment, sources confirmed, was to handle the information being provided to the em- bassy by Tolkachev through a series of "dead-drop" sites estab- lished throughout Mos- cow. The CIA had estab- lished through a series of polygraph tests that Howard had a history of drug problems in- cluding cocaine. In 1983, Howard was eased out of the CIA under orders from CIA Deputy Direc- tor John MacMahon. It is believed that Howard's bitterness at being fired by the CIA is what prompted him to become a traitor. The loss of one of the CIA's most important spies and the bungling of Howard's case by the CIA has angered key members of congres- sional committees. The congressmen are demanding that both the FBI and the CIA im- prove its counter- intel-ligence-capabilities. telligence abilities were crippled in the '70s in the wake of the domes- tic spying scandals that led to the firing of coun- ter-intelligence chief James Angleton. Intelligence experts say that the FBI has never been given the proper funding and re- sources to keep up with the steady increase of Soviet espionage activi. ties in the U.S. Newly released photo shows F-15 jet launching anti-satellite missile during se- cret test. Technology is closely guarded because of high-stakes espionage war. The Soviet space shuttle - on which U.S. intelli- gence keeps the Red cen- terpiece in the space-weap- ons race. Approved For Release 2 C/A'S TOP MOL A T L ~ ~~A roved For Release 2005/YJ44 S AE JMWIIR000600200001-2 17 October 1985 A ON PAGE KGB Defector Confirms U.S. Intelligence Fiasco By WILLIAM KUCEWICZ - "He saved us billions of dollars in develop- was Intelligence In April 1982, Mr. McMahon t 11 t b lli month of issuing what can only be called a press release. In a statement distributed by the official TASS news agency, the So- viet intelligence agency accused a Soviet citizen of spying for the U.S. and also an- nounced the expulsion of a U.S. Embassy official. The KGB named the suspected spy as A.G. Tolkachev. He was Identified merely as a staff member of a "Moscow research institute." No other details about his back- ground were provided. His arrest appar- ently took place sometime in early June. The announcement maintained that Mr. Tolkachev had been caught passing infor- mation to an American diplomat, Paul M. Stombaugh, of the U.S. Embassy's political section. Mr. Stombaugh was ordered to leave the Soviet Union June 14. The KGB statement gave no explanation for the three-month delay in announcing Mr. Tol- kachev's arrest and Mr. Stombaugh's ex- pulsion. Western news correspondents in Mos- cow interpreted the belated announcement as one-upmanship by Soviet authorities. A week earlier, Britain had expelled 31 So- viets for spying and the Soviet Union re- sponded in kind by ousting an equal num- ber of Britons in Moscow. This exchange had been triggered by the defection of a Soviet spy in London, who had apparently worked as a double agent for the British for years. The Tolkachev announcement was seen as just another spy maneuver. Valuable Human Asset That wasn't the real story, however. Ac- cording to high-level U.S. intelligence sources, Mr. Tolkachev was one of the Central Intelligence Agency's most valua- ble human assets in the Soviet Union. And his exposure and arrest stand as indict- ments of gross mismanagement and inepti- tude reaching to the highest levels of U.S. counterintelligence operations. Mr. Tolkachev was an electronics ex- pert at a military aviation institute in Mos- cow. Over several years, he had passed in- valuable information to the U.S. about the Soviet Union's latest research efforts in new aircraft technology-especially avion- ics, or electronic guidance and counter- measures; advanced radar; and so-called "stealth," or radar-avoidance, techniques. Such research is at the cutting edge of mil- itary aircraft breakthroughs, both for the Soviets and the U.S. Mr. Tolkachev, one source hinted, may have also tipped the U.S. off to the large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk-a treaty-violating facility In the south-central part of the country aimed at completing a nationwide anti-ballistic- missile defense. "He was one of our most lucrative agents," said another well-placed source. men cos s y te ng the US. about the was named by President Reagan to re- direction of Soviet aviation efforts. In that place Adm. Bobby R. Inman as deputy in- way, American researchers could more telligence director. precisely target their own work toward In spring 1983, Mr. Howard was told to countering future Russian military resign or he'd be fired. Mr. McMahon took threats. this step despite Mr. Howard's privileged U.S. intelligence experts believe that knowledge of U.S. intelligence operations Mr. Tolkachev is fated for execution, if he in Moscow, and what his continued drug is not already dead. But how was he dis- use said about his emotional stability. covered? And why did the KGB wait three (Later, In February 1984, Mr. Howard was months before announcing his arrest? arrested for brandishing a pistol at three Mr. Tolkachev wasn't merely caught in men in downtown Santa Fe, N.M.; in a the act of passing secrets to the U.S. Em- plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to an as- bassy's Mr. Stombaugh, as the KGB sault charge and was sentenced to proba- claims. In fact, as U.S. Intelligence sources tion.) Instead of firing him, intelligence ex- Edward Howard, an untried and untested trainee suspected earlier of drug use, was, inexcusably, told about critical U. S. human intelligence operations in Moscow. tell it, he was betrayed by a former CIA agent, Edward L. Howard. And the KGB's peculiar September announcement was ap- parently a ruse to try to put U.S. counter- intelligence officers off the scent of this turncoat. Mr. Howard, who is now 33, joined the CIA in January 1981. An initial polygraph test indicated that he was an occasional drug user. Agency officials told him to end his drug-taking or face dismissal. He then promised to give up drugs. Shortly thereafter, he entered an inten- sive, 2%-year training program to become a "deep cover" case officer in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. One of his assign- ments would be to "run" Mr. Tolkachev; in other words, he was to.collect Mr. Tol- kachev's materials at "dead drop" sites in Moscow and to care for his needs. In the course of his training, this untried and un- tested trainee was, Inexcusably, told about critical. U.S. human intelligence operations in Moscow; he was even informed about anti-Soviet operations in the U.S. Mr. How- ard was also trained for several months by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in sur- veillance techniques and evasion. Before being dispatched to Moscow, Mr. Howard was given another polygraph test, which suggested that his drug use had con- tinued and also indicated at least one in- stance of petty theft outside the govern- ment. According to sources who have long been critical of shortcomings in U.S. coun- parts suggest, a more sensible course might have been to cancel Mr. Howard's transfer to Moscow but retain him in a nonsensitive area of the agency where his actions could be closely monitored. (Mr. McMahon didn't return a phone call yesterday requesting comment.) In September 1984, Mr. Howard told two of his former colleagues at the CIA that he was thinking of passing his informatidn to the Soviets as an act of revenge, accord- ing to documents filed in a Justice Depart- ment criminal complaint against him. These agents then told the proper CIA au- thorities about Mr. Howard's threat. But the agency's only response was to get a psychiatrist for Mr. Howard in New Mex- ico, where the CIA had helped him find a job as an economic analyst with the state government back in June 1983. Meanwhile, a momentous event was oc- curring a continent away that would darken further the profile of Edward How- ard. On July 28 of this year, in Rome, a visiting Soviet official was taking a stroll with some colleagues. He told them that he would meet them back at the embassy af- ter he toured the Vatican museum. His So- viet compatriots never saw him again, and a month later he was in the U.S. being de- briefed by the CIA. The Soviet official is Vitaly Yurchenko of the KGB. By many accounts, he is one of the most important The State Department officially an- terintelligence capability, Deputy Director pounced Mr. Yurchenko's defection last of Central Intelligence John N. McMahon pl( week. He was deputy chief of the North at this point decided he wanted Mr. How- American department of the KGB's First and (JUL of the agency. Mr. McMahon, a ca- reer intelligence officer for more than 30 years, had been the CIA's executive di- rector, responsible for the day-to-day man- agement of the agency, when Mr. Howard Chief Directorate, which is in charge of the Soviet Union's world-wide spy operations. He was "specifically responsible for the di- rection of KGB Intelligence operations in the U.S. and Canada," the State Depart- Continued Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 ment's announcement said. In addition, he held a senior position in the KGB's coun- terintelligence program, which aims to root out any Russian moles working for the U.S. or other foreign governments. Pre- viously, Mr. Yurchenko served as a spy in the Soviet Embassy in Washington from 1975 to 1980. As a result of these positions, Mr. Yurchenko was able to gain a broad understanding of the highly compartmen- talized operations of the KGB. Mr. Yurchenko gave his debriefers a code name for a former CIA agent who had supplied valuable information to the KGB. While he did not have the real name of the agent, Mr. Yurchenko did provide enough information for U.S. authorities to "sift through" the relevant data and fi- nally pinpoint Mr. Howard as the sus- pected spy, said law-enforcement sources, who asked not to be identified. According to other sources familar with the debrief- ing, Mr. Yurchenko said that this former CIA agent had provided the KGB with de- tails about U.S. human intelligence activi- ties in Moscow, including the identity of A.G. Tolkachev. Mr. Howard's revelations, therefore, prompted Mr. Tolkachev's ar- rest and likely execution. Major Foul-Up FBI agents were instructed to interview Mr. Howard but not to arrest him. Ex- plained a law-enforcement source: "The information provided by the defector, standing alone, was not sufficient to estab- lish probable cause." After he was quizzed, FBI agents kept Mr. Howard under sur- veillance. In a major foul-up, however, no one ever told the FBI agents that Mr. How- ard had been schooled by the bureau itself in surveillance and evasion tactics. On the moonless night of Sept. 21, Mr. Howard escaped his FBI watchdogs. On Sept. 23, the FBI issued a warrant for his arrest, but it was too late. U.S. intelligence finally succeeded in tracing Mr. Howard's trail to Finland and then to Moscow, where he is now presumably being debriefed on all he knows about U.S. spying operations in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. "The United States has virtually zero counterintelligence capability," Sen. Mal- colm Wallop (R., Wyo.) said recently in criticizing the CIA's and FBI's failures in the Howard case. Some experts are pre- dicting a major shakeup in intelligence management due to the Howard-Tolka- chev-Yurchenko affair. What will remain after blame is assessed, of course, is that the U.S. has lost one of its most valuable human assets in the Soviet Union and his alleged betrayer has fled safely to Mos- cow. Mr. Kucewicz is a member of the Jour- nal's editorial board. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 2- 17 OCT 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Telecons with David Matthews, Sen. Dole's Office 1. Mr. Matthews called the office on 11 October and asked to speak with someone about an article criticizing John McMahon which had appeared in the August 1985 edition of "Free the Eagle"(copy attached). The Public Affairs Office was contacted but declined to return Mr. Matthews' call. PAO suggested that OLL should field the call. I then called Mr. Matthews. 2. Mr. Matthews said that he wished to know what the Agency's position on the article was. He said that Sen. Dole had received constituent mail asking if the article was accurate. He(Mr. Matthews) had been charged with responding to the constituent mail. I told Mr. Matthews that I would check with our public affairs people on the matter. 3. I spoke to George Lauder about Matthews' call. Mr. Lauder std to tell Matthews that the article was "irresponsible, outrageous, and ridiculous." 4. I attempted to reach Mr. Matthews on 11 and 16 October. He called me on 17 October, and I passed on Mr. Lauder's words, telling Mr. Matthews that the Agency considered the article to be beneath the dignity of further comment. 5. Mr. Matthews called back on 17 October seeking additional information on Mr. McMahon. He asked if Mr. McMahon conerned himself primarily with Afghanistan. I replied that Mr. McMahon had many duties and concerns as the DDCI. I said the DCI was the President's principal adviser on intelligence matters. His deputy performs the duties assigned to him by the DCI and acts for the DCI in the latter's absence. I said we believe that Mr. McMahon is doing an excellent job as DDCI and that he is indeed supporting the President's policies. 6. Mr. Matthews thanked me, and the call was concluded. ze iaison Division, ULL Approved For Release 200 Approved For Release 2005/12Ftt:eCIAk1 DIl 1gdODIR000600200001-2 ?i iri:-~Y, STATE OF THE NATION August 1985 i- pr+e+eidc'nt Aea i tv ibt.t- aui^ -yew ? ~_.Ta?is.~r merest; -my friend, I th t these ir?aune simple reason why our government does nothing to stop the Soviet Union: it's because certain public o flcfials-ram4eiy John McMahon -refuse to carry out American policy. In a minute. I'll be more spe- cific.. But first, let me tell you of the latest events in Afghanistan. I'm sad to 'say that events there have taken a turn for the worse lately. Last month, leashed mas stare air strike the Af- ghan people- not just against the fi eedom fighters, but against peace- ful civilians as well. Why? Because Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachev wants to wrap up the conquest of Afghanistan. He's anxious to consolidate his is Ironically. an overwhelming majority of Americans would gladly give the Afghan freedom fighters the weapons they need to protect themselves from this air- born terror. President Reagan has pledg- ed to send effective weapons and supplies to the Afghan freedom fighters. And last October, Congress unanimously voted-for the first time ever-to supply effective aid to the freedom fighters. Then Congress approved the largest budget ever for a covert paramilitary operation-$280 million. Those votes came after Free the Eagle asked many of you last September to write and demand effective aid for the Afghan freedom fighters. Those letters made a difference! Yet. despite the Reagan ad- ministration's official policy, the unanimous vote of Congress and the overwhelming support of the American people... Neither our State Department nor the Central Intelligence Agen- cy will send workable weapons to the Afghan freedom fighters! As we've told you in State of the Nation, the weapons the CIA power over the Soviet empire. sends the freedom fighters- And he-wants to prove to the mortars, rifles, mines, machine world he Is decisive and ruthless. guns and hand-held missiles-are Gorbachev wants a. quick vic- fold and defective. tory. So he has stepped up his air- And 85 percent of the ammo born genocide-pounding Afghan is of the type that won't pierce the villages day after day, burning, armored gunships that at this maiming and mutilating thou- sands of terrified people. His unchallenged air raids even bomb hospitals, killing hun- dreds of helpless patients. very moment are burning, killing and maiming the Afghan people. It's no wonder Soviet air at- tacks on Afghan villages are so brazen-and deadly. Day after day, they maim and mutilate innocent Afghans-men, women and children who have no means to protect themselves. We could cite many more examples... Examples of how the CIA has failed to supply the Afghan resistance with effective weapons and supplies.. . Examples of how the CIA has failed to carry out the mandate for Afghan aid from the Administra- tion, from Congress and from the American people. Why does the CIA persist in failing to supply the Afghan freedom fighters with effective weapons? Who's behind this massive- and deadly-blunder? To find out, Free the Eagle has done some detective work. ;i= With the help of some of our sources, we tracked down and un- covered the specific individual responsible for this. His name is John McMahon. He's a deputy director of the CIA-one of the top officials there. And John McMahon has the task of carrying out the administra- tion's Afghan policy. But for three years. McMahon has pursued his own Afghan policy! McMahon runs a two-track Afghan program: a program of disinformation and a program of interference. In secret briefings to con- gressmen. McMahon has painted a misleading picture of CIA per- formance in Afghanistan, calling it "outstanding." Now, perhaps John McMahon thinks he's right. And perhaps he thinks he's doing what's best for America and for the Afghan people. But the fact is: he's wrong. He's negligent or incompetent, or both. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 John McMahoApprcategbFor Releaft2Q 6/1Wg4n-Gl l5P9t1460fi@d R0006VD2QQ11Q4PQ6rt to you in State Yet only President Reagan -one on this page... of the Nation on how our cam- aind his top advisors can force the Letters demanding that Mr. paign progresses. State Department and the CIA to obey his administration policy, Congress and the American people. Thus, the fight for Afghani- stan is really not in the Panjshir Valley but rather right here in our own country-behind the doors of the White House. Its time for the Reagan admin- istration to hold John McMahon accountable! That's why I ask you to sign the fetter on this page to White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. and then return it to me. It asks Regan to see that Deputy Director John McMahon gets fired-fired for letting down both the Afghan and the Ameri- can people! With your help, we can and will oust Mr. McMahon! After all. he works for us! Over the next three months. wC plan to collect 50.000 letters to :"McMahon be dismissed. We will deliver these per- sonally to Donald Regan's office. So please sign the letter to Donald Regan. Then mail it to Free the Eagle in the postage paid envelope enclosed in this issue of State of the Nation. At the same time, please help us to raise the other 50,000 letters by enclosing your contribution of $25 or more to Free the Eagle. The lives of too many inno- cent people cannot wait any longer. For your contribution of $25 or more, we will send you Afghan Update, the bulletin of FTE's sister organization. American Afghan Education Fund. Many in Congress tell us Afghan Update is the only source that gives them the full story on the war in Afghanistan and CIA aid to the freedom fighters. Send your gift of $25, $35 or more in the enclosed postage paid envelope. Once more, let me thank you for all you have done on behalf of these innocent people. It has been so heart-warming to see your ef- forts have such an effect in the last year. So please rush your letter and contribution to us today because: John McMahon must go! These people just cannot wait any longer. Sincerely, Neal B. Blair President P.S. If you can get others to write White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. please do so. But please sign and return your letter to us today so we can collect and deliver as many letters as possible. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 McMahon Must Go! Dear Neal. You're right. John McMahon must go! C I have signed the letter addressed to White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. asking him to see that McMahon gets dismissed. I am also including an emergency gift to help you in this project: $15 -~ $25 $35 $50 $100 $150 $250 E $500 $1.000 - $ Other Name - Address City/State/Zip Check enclosed Charge my ::: MasterCard = VISA emu-- C=1=cJUUU^^^^^^^^^ Expires Signature For my contribution of $25 or more. I understand I will receive Afghan Update for six months. Mr. Donald Regan Chief of Staff The White House Washington. D.C. Dear Mr. Regan: As an American citizen who supports the Afghan freedom fighters. I ask that you see to it that John N. McMahon. a deputy director of the CIA, gets dismissed. Mr. McMahon has the task of carrying out the administration's policy of aid to the Afghan freedom fighters. But for three years, McMahon has pursued his own Afghan policy' McMahon has been identified by congressional sources as failing to carry out in an effective manner the mandate of the Reagan ad- ministration. Congress and the American people for effective aid to the Afghan freedom fighters. Instead. McMahon has run a program of disinformation and in- terference that prevents effective aid from reaching the Afghan freedom fighters. To cover up his negligence and incompetence. McMahon has been spreading disinformation. In secret briefings to congressmen. he has painted a misleading picture of CIA performance in Afghanistan, call- ing it "outstanding." Anyone with any sense of compassion for the Afghan people would have to agree: Mr. McMahon is crippling the Afghan's struggle for freedom. As an American citizen, I will not tolerate negligence or in- competence by those charged with guarding my own freedom or anyone else's. John McMahon must go! The lives of many innocent people cannot wait any longer. Thank you for your attention to this matter. Sincerely, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 3 STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 ARTICLE AP, ON PAGE Approved For Wp6412404S'lEIA-RDP91 15 August 1985 Commando Helped Bfli Alleged Plot to Kill a President By Charles R- Babcock Walrin!ton ro,,t Staff write On a steamy summer Florida weekend, two former members of an elite U.S. combat unit meet with a foreign general and a Miami arms dealer. The topic: a plot to assas- sinate the president of a Central American country. The commandos later tell the CIA and 09 about the scheme a one agrees to work ercover o e it. The investigation m- chxles secret videotapes of tsus- pects aboard a yacht and to dis- cussions melt ionruIl on o-d~r drug deal to finance the assassina- tion. If that sounds like an outline for a new episode of "Miami Vice," it isn't. It is a prosecutor's version of how the U.S. government stopped an alleged attempt last year to kill the president of Honduras. Arrests in the case made front page news when announced last November, but the role of the two commandos in cracking the case wasn't disclosed until later. Their story will unfold in a Miami court- room later this month when two of the defendants, arms dealer Gerard Latchinian and businessman Manuel Binker, stand trial. The soldiers are retired Army colonel Charlie A. Beckwith, com- mander of the ill-fated attempt to rescue American hostages in Iran in 1980, and one of his Delta Force comrades, retired major Charles D. Odorizzi. One of the prosecutors in the case said Beckwith was "more John Wayne than John Wayne" and Odo- rizzi "deserves a medal" for his un- dercover work. In fact, the U.S. attorney in Miami gave Odorizzi an "outstanding law enforcement of, facer" medal last month. The investigation resulted in the U.S. indictment of several men, in- cluding former Honduran army chief of staff, Gen. Jose Bueso- Rosa, now the military attache in Chile, on charges of attempting to finance a political murder with a drug deal. The State Department has said the case "again demonstrates the link between drug trafficking and international terrorism." Latchinian's attorney, Laurel White Marc-Charles, contends in court papers that her client thought he was dealing with U.S. authorities because of Beckwith and Odorizzi's background in secret military op- erations. Beckwith testified that the claim was ludicrous. Marc-Charles also claims that Odorizzi, in his un- dercover role, entrapped the defen- dants by suggesting the assassina- tion could be financed by a drug deal. Beckwith declined in a telephone interview to discuss his role in de- tail and Odorizzi could not be reached for comment. But the tran- script and exhibits from a pre-trial hearing in April contain details of their involvement that seem more suited to a screenplay than reality. Beckwith, who is now in the pri- vate security business in Texas, testified that he accompanied Odo- rizzi to the meeting in Miami in July 1984 because he was "trying to get my oar down in Latin America to do a few things" and thought the dis- cussion would center on a training mission in Honduras. Instead, . he heard from the people he met that "they wanted to take someone out.,,, Beckwith said he wasn't certain; at first what was meant so he and Odorizzi called another meeting the' next day. There they were told. point-blank that the idea was to kill Roberto Suazo Cordova, the pres- ident of Honduras. Suazo has held office since 1981, when he became the first democratically elected president in his country in more than a decade. Beckwith testified that when he heard specifics of the alleged mur- der plot, "I said 'That is a hell of a job to have to do.' I said, 'I'd have to chew on this.' And I' said it would require a survey. Someone would have to go down there and look it all over. This is a big task to do. And frankly, I was a looking for a real nice soft way to get the hell out of there." He and Odorizzi met once more with the alleged plotters and re- ceived $3,000 for expenses, accord- ing to the indictment. "I don't work for nothing," Beckwith explained last week. On the way back to Texas, he testified, "I remember that I said what I have got to do is, I can't mess around here and go to some pissant about this. I have got to go to someone high in the government and inform them." Beckwith said he didn't think assassinating the pres- ident of Honduras was "a prudent thing to do." And he said, "I didn't think this would be good for Reagan and this administration for that to occur." The next day he called John McMahon, the deputy director of the CIA, whom Beckwith knew from his days with the Velta orce. But McMahon was on vacation. A week later he tried again, only to told McMahon couldn't see him un- til later in the week. "I said ' is is a hell of a way to run a railroad. I got something here I think is kind of sensitive, and I want to see him.' "The word came back that McMahon was booked up at the time. Beckwith and orizzi flew to Washington anyway and on the plane the former eta Force commander wrote a cryptic letter to ts deputy director. "Eight days ago in Miami, my partner and I were asked to devel- Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 r, a Approved For ReleaRs 9 ( /aA: PA- fDP91-00901 4 August 1985 Congress, Agencies Clash Over Counterintelligence.. Lawmakers Call Administration Efforts Weak By Charles R Babcock W j FM sue wrwr In the spring of 1984, Sen. Mal. Cohn Wallop (R-Wyo.) received a certificate naming him an "honorary counterintelligence specialist" in the Central Intelligence Agency. The award was said to be in recog- nition of his efforts to establish a semiautonomo s core of career counterintelligence (CI) specialists in the agency. Wallop, then chairman of the Senate Intelligence budget subcom. mittee, was neither honored nor amused. "The CIA ridiculed the career specialist by giving me the award," he said in an interview. "It was de- signed in total cynicism, with little boys laughing behind doors." . So he wrote, and Congress ap- proved, language in the classified intelligence agencies' authorization bill report for fiscal 1985 requiring the CIA to reestablish Cl as a ca- reer service. It still has not been done, he and other intelligence sources say. Doing something about counter- intelligence has been a hot topic since accusations In May that al- leged spy John A. Walker Jr. and others for years had passed U.S. Navy secrets to the Soviets. To Wallop and other critics, the Rea- gan administration's inaction on the "CI specialist" mandate reflects a broader lack of commitment to im- proving the nation's ability to pro- tect secrets from foreign agents. "This country," Wallop said, "has virtually zero counterintelligence capability." He argued that the CIA's coun- terintelligence system is inadequate because the officers now working 'in. it will someday rotate out to work for other officers whom they may have investigated or whose oper- ations they may have challenged. The result, Wallop said, is a too ca- sual effort, in which the tough ques- tions are not asked about the cred- ibility of agents, operations or even technical systems. Although few others are so crit- ical, interviews with current and former intelligence officials suggest that the Reagan administration's strong words about counterintelli- gence have often been matched only by half-steps. President Reagan said in a radio speech in June that "we've devel- oped a list of things to be accom- plished in the counterintelligence and security areas." He has signed two secret directives to study and act on the counterintelligence prob- lem, but little of substance has been accomplished because of bureau- cratic resistance, several sources said. A separate directive to re- vamp personnel security policies has been languishing without action for more than a year. . Funding for more FBI counter- intelligence agents-who are re- sponsible for counterespionage op- erations in the United States-has` been added to recent budgets. but only over the objections of admin- istration budget officers. There are now about 1,200 Cl agents in the FBI, sources said. But they are still outnumbered, and squads of inex- perienced clerks have been used for years to help keep track of potential foreign agents in at least four major cities. Administration spokesmen de- clined to speak on the record about the counterintelligence issue. But several members of Congress did. Rep. Lee Hamilton -(D-Ind.), chair- man of the Permanent Select Com- mittee on Intelligence, said "some- times it takes a strong blow across the snout," such as the Walker case, to get gress to iticians, spondin The b intelligei nation's tions an( etration. counteri of spy a trying t cruiting in place. The i between the CIA, which keeps track of foreign intelligence agents overseas, and the FBI. which does the same in the United States.. Hamilton and Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, said long-term solutions are ? re- quired, in addition to the increased use of polygraphs and the imposing the death penalty on military per- sonnel for peacetime espionage, the two measures passed by Congress so far. . . Hamilton said the least expensive and most important step to protect national secrets would be enforcing the "need to know" policy. "A secu- rity clearance shouldn't entitle any- one to see- anything. Someone should have-access only if he needs it for his job.- A theme in much of the criticism is that counterintelligence is not viewed as a path to career promo- tion at the CIA or FBI, or the State Department, where security has long been a low priority. Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-Okla.), chairman of the House intelligence oversight subcommittee that has been holding closed hearings on counterintelligence, said he feels the biggest security problem is at the State Department. He said CIA Director William J. Casey had ac- cepted a recommendation by an internal CIA commission to give more independence to. the Cl staff there. "It's fine-tuning at CIA," McCurdy said. "It's trying to stop a flood at State.. He cited recent reports of bugged typewriters in the U.S. Em- bassy in Moscow and the hiring of Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901 R00060020000i., 2 "'"^"~ ^ S '~ Approved For Release 2 ?/12A4t {A '009 STATE OF THE NATION *l+ent . ::~-:lltil'j~t? . l tl ttuawtraie simple reason why our government doers nothing tq stop the Soviet Union: It's _because certain public o$lcisla. - Iy John McMahon -refuse to carry out American policy. In a minute. I'll be more spe- ciiic-.-But ftrst, let me tell you of the latest events in Afghanistan. I'm sad to 'say that events there have taken a turn for the worse lately. Last month, the Soviets un- leashed mas- afawe- air strikes agdt the Af- ghan people- not juste against the fighters, but against peace- ful civilians as well. August 1985 Ironically, an overwhelming majority of Americans would gladly give the Afghan freedom fighters the weapons they need to protect themselves from this air- born terror. . President Reagan has pledg- ed to send effective weapons and supplies to the Afghan freedom fighters. And last October, Congress unanimously voted-for the first time ever-to supply effective aid to the freedom fighters. Then Congress approved the largest budget ever for a covert paramilitary operation-$280 million. Those votes came after Free the Eagle asked many of you last September to write and demand effective aid for the Afghan freedom fighters. Those letters made a difference! Yet, despite the Reagan ad- ministration's official policy, the unanimous vote of Congress and the overwhelming support of the American people. . . Neither our State Department nor the Central Intelligence Agen- cy will send workable weapons to the Afghan freedom fighters! As we've told you in State of the Nation, the weapons the CIA sends the freedom fighters- mortars, rifles, mines, machine guns and hand-held missiles-are old and defective. _ And 85 percent of the ammo is of the type that won't pierce the armored gunships that at this very moment are burning, killing and maiming the Afghan people. It's no wonder Soviet air at- tacks on Afghan villages are so brazen-and deadly. ---y --ca aily, axey maim and mutilate innocent Afghans-men, women and children who have no means to protect themselves. We- could cite many more examples... Examples of how the CIA has failed to supply the Afghan resistance with effective weapons and supplies... Examples of how the CIA has failed to carry out the mandate for Afghan aid from the Administra- tion, from Congress and from the American people. Why does the CIA persist in failing to supply the Afghan freedom fighters with effective weapons? Who's behind this massive- and deadly-blunder? To find out, Free the Eagle has done some detective work. With the help of some of our sources, we tracked down and un- covered the specific individual responsible for this. His name is John McMahon. He's a deputy director of the CIA-one of the top officials there. And John McMahon has the task of carrying out the administra- tion's Afghan policy. But for three years, McMahon has pursued his own Afghan policy! McMahon runs a two-track Afghan program: a program of disinformation and a program of interference. In secret briefings to con- gressmen, McMahon has painted a misleading picture of CIA per- formance in Afghanistan, calling it "outstanding." Now, perhaps John McMahon thinks he's right. And perhaps he thinks he's doing what's best for America and for the Afghan people. But the fact is: he's wrong. He's negligent or incompetent, or both. Why? Because Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachev wants to wrap up the conquest of Afghanistan. He's anxious to consolidate his power over the Soviet empire. And he wants to prove to the world he is decisive and ruthless. Gorbachev wants a quick vic- tory. So he has stepped up his air- born genocide-pounding Afghan villages day after day, burning. maiming and mutilating thou- sands of terrified people. His unchallenged air raids even bomb hospitals, killing hun- dreds of helpless patients. WNW Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 ease 2d?5/12/14 W2NI-1YG I UN1 -??Reg R0006002~ ? 04101110 Good morning.... Now that Undersecretary of Commerce for internationa trade Lionel Omer has announced his intention to resin June 14 sources close to the CIA sav Director aWilli m- Casev favors Mr. 0 mer or t e number two CIA post a by John Mc a on. umors ave been circulating in mte igence circles for L 11C past few months that epu irector John c a onwi retire a t o en of June for personal reasons. CIA officials aismissed the rumors and say McMahon has no plans to retire. "It's been going on for months;" one official said of the rumors. "And he's still here:' Mr. McMahon and Mr. Casey reportedly have clashed over CIA policy. According to Hoover Institution analyst Arnold Beic- hman, Mr. McMahon scuttled a Casey plan to bring 65 Soviet POWs from Afghanistan for a U.S. press conference and blocked three of Casey's top-level CIA appointments. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600200001-2 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CI Ih 'fPA9 1' 600600200001-2 May 1986 By Bill Gertz brought to trial as the result of information THE WASHINGTON TIMES supplied by Mr. Yurchenko, who defected last year but later redefected to the Soviet Union. The espionage trial of former National Se- Mr. Yurchenko provided U.S. officials with a curity Agency code specialist Ronald William tip that led to Mr. Pelton's arrest Nov 24 at the Pelton is expected to open today in Baltimore Annapolis Hilton hotel. federal court, a case surrounded by secrecy FBI Director William Webster has said in- and controversy. formation from Mr. Yurchenko has resulted in After 14 years as a cryptoanalyst specializ- a number of ongoing espionage probes. But ing in electronic intelligence-collection pro- ,ounterintelli ence experts sa that, based on grams against the Soviet Union, Mr. Pelton, t s career profile o r. urc en o e 45, left NSA in July 1979, three months after shou have supplied muc more etau m- he filed for bankruptcy and six months before formation on Soviet spy networks, which he met with KGB officials for the first time would have led to numerous arrests. in Washington, court papers say. So far the only other person known to have Mr. Pelton has pleaded not guilty to charges been named as a Soviet agent b Mr. Yur- that he sold NSA secrets to the Soviets be cen o is ormer CIA on -ra iv Fdward i tweet January 1980 and September 1985 for Howard, whoa slipped out the country more than $35,000. hours before FBI agents planned to arrest U.S. District Judge Herbert F. Murry, who him. will preside over today's trial, ruled Friday Mr. Yurchenko shocked the CIA when he that Mr. Pelton's statements to FBI agents bolted a eor?etown restaurant before his arrest and information obtained tad to the Soviet Union several weeks before from telephone intercepts of the Soviet Em- Mr. Pelton's arrest. bassy can be used as evidence in the case. The Pelton case also set off a storm of con- Fred Warren Bennett, Mr. Pelton's court- troversy over the publication of classifed in- appointed attorney, had argued that FBI formation. CIA Director William J. Casey re- agents used "psychological coercion" to ob- centl threatens to ---prosecute The tain statements from Mr. Pelton. Washington Post i it published NSA secrets Mr Bennett also challenged use of a court- Mr re>