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September 4, 1983
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Tle52 APPEARED WASHINGTON POST (.5ii PAGE C...-85proved For Release 20Qp/Mlyeing4-Fi9g91-00901R00)600290013-0 James H. Schlesinger Let's Keep Cool :reasons. Such an . incentive system le.aves:little!- room forflexibiliy. .: ? . In the 21/2 hours that the Soviets tracked the. jetliner, ample time was provided for ground con- -trol to refer the mattecto higher echelons. The decision was certainly referred backto Far East- - ern .Command and probably to :Mosenw.:Liven the time available, the . decision. Was ;Probably made by senior military officers 01 the PYO. One can assume, though one cannot be certain, that the issue was .not referred to the .political level. Within the Soviet system, more trouble -wnuld be ! caused for the military commanders if the airliner were .not shot down, than if it were. . Thus, given the nature of the Soviet system? its sensitivities, its rigidities and its pattern of re- wards and punishments -the outcome is scarcely surprising. It was not "calculated -murder," but rather the natural outcome of the creaky Soviet system. Only. those who disregard .:Soviet tough- : ness, and have been prepared to accept a vision of the Soviet system as a mild, inoffensive, peace- loving state, can have been truly surprised. The Soviet response to the international outcry Ens been somewhat: bizarre. After initial- silence and then fumbling,the Soviets have finally settled on the simple canard that the jetliner flight was?. however implausibly?an intelligence operation. Allegedly a camera with all its equipments was in- gtalled in the aircraft, presumably unnOticeil by bah passengers and ground service . crews in New York and Anchorage, despite .the. dis, - placement of baggaste and Wel oh along over- seas flight. The plane, however, fie' aboVe cloud cover:-Moreover, even the lits-siansimuSt acknowledgethe difficulty in taking goodpic-, tures in the virtually total dark- - ?ess of 3 a.m. There is simply no r reason (even at high noon) to -do inefficiently, and at great risk, What. is :performed efficiently and simply by --space : satellites. Finally, few nations -thetaphOriollsi.use women and children to clear. land*ritalOwsdivert; fire in !either -battlefield or intelligenceOperations . the netion4that'.269.7.innocent 'people rmght be risked for.suChapurPose is foreignitothe .Westero'.: mind, if nottn:theSoViet ? As acoverstory; this 'Sovieticanard is is fees' bleat it mendacious. ' Yet,l)e3iiind expressions of:outrage the , basic' question Tow is 7-what should the-internas tional response'? - '? The Soviet Union may be a bully brutal and insensitive .sbut it is a -Tut:Icor-armed bully. 'Moreover, it has the capacity to cause a great deal of trouble -in Berlin,in the ? Peasian- Gulf -and in Lebanon; for :starters; While we should seek on 'appropriate expression lir regret and compensation, Mir resi)onsennist be miens- ured -and our limited means 'recognized. The.. , episode should not be. allowed permanently to - darken the international climate.' - In the halcyim 'days of -,detente, this tragic episode .would have been handled quite 'differ- ? ently and more quietly -a talk between the Secs' Prior to the sinking of-the laisitania in -1915, , the Imperial German 'government placed-news- paper advertisements 'warning ?prospective pas- sengers that Britain and Germany were at war and that the Lusitania was-thus subject to sill). marine attack. Warnings issued, the .German goverment felt it had 'done ? its' duty. it .waS wholly unprepared for -the -vehement 'foreign... reaction to the Lositania's :sinking. The -event - was -regrettable perhaps;but.surely there would . be universal understanding-of actions taken for - reasons of state - Prior to the shootdownalif the Korean jetlin, . er, the Soviet- -Uniori-4had-,!tegularly -published ? -warnings,- placed on maps;that aircraft intruds'.-; .ing. into 'Soviet airSpacewere 'subject 'teitheing-:. 7-shottlowa Warningsissued, it, like the German; 'government in 191.5,-has been 'wholly ?,unpre- :pa:major the worldwide-reaction of outrage.it -could not conceive:how' offensive to Western -and other 'opinion is the needless destruction of' civilians. After all, warnings had ? been issued, a civilian airliner had been fired upon and forced . down . in 1978, and 4herewere good :and'stitfi- . cient reasons of state: .7.-- ss. ? Too_imuch ?attention,4seems.to me, -hasjieen-, devoted to the question; why did this shootdown occur? Given the Soviet cast ofinind -and :Soviet; -operational procedures-, the outcome was .highly probable,. if not 'foreordained,' Orice se_?'..deep;,a ',- penetration occurred inso sensitive an area. ? . First of all, the Soviet regimeistough,lif not. bloody-minded, about such matters. The Soviets. are hypersensitive, ifnot paranoid, about security.. ? Sakhalin, for example, has only 10 percent of the --Military assets located in the Hampton Roads :area, yet the United States would surely not shoot 7d6wn a civilian airliner that had strayed over the region. The Soviets, ,by contrast, are to deter- mined to prevent intrusion of their airspace that they are willing to defy international opinion and the Community of .nations.- - . -:::.Second, the Soviets have an exceptionally rigid ?conunand-control system. This is reflected, for ex- ample. in Soviet inaliilitypromptly to turn off the . politically costly :submarine operations , against Sweden, once they had been blown. When a Ko- . rem jetliner in'1978,penetrated so deeply into the even more Sensitive area of the Kola Peninsula be- fore being attacked and - forced down, ? one, can - 'readily imagine the consternation at the headquar- ters of the Air Defense Forces' (PV0) =in the ? Soviet Union an independent service. Reprimands Were issued; court-martial proceedings wereinstk, toted. New rules 'of' engagement were established, and warnings unquestionably issued that such an .? 'occurrence must not be allowed to occur-again. In the Soviet Union penalties rarely will be on- posed for following the book. By contrast; severe penalties will almost certainly be imposed for vio- lating standing orders?even for humanitarian STAT "The episode should not allowed perinanently.to darken the international ,?- retary of state and the Soviet :ambassador, a government confirmation of press 'reports after a day or two. The Soviets may well be aston- ished at the drastically altered American style ofhehavior?with the secretaryii state himself ! spearheading the attack. . - White Rouse aides are whispering-that the episode -confirms 'everything:that Ronald Rea- gan has 'ever Said about. the ,ItirsSiiins; is our policy now PriMarily to be moved by notions re-.: .garding the '"empire of cv117...iir 'the !"1.'welve Commandments according to Nikolai Unitr.? If so, it would. amity additiOnal trouble down. the line .-twith Our allies :and -'with which 'remains quite restless the ads MiniStration'S ripproatiatrinqiiiritiOL. :What the Soviets haiii,'elnife*OffenSive to.., the entire Conimunity of TatiOn'S,'Other nations 'must consequently remainlallYinValved. This legitimate issue shoUld,00t'be,turned into a simple Soviet U S ainfrentiitiOn. :All actions need to be coordinated coreftiliY,Italay be pos- sible to 'persuade most :,nntinns ,to Withhold :. landing rights from Aeroflot ontil the Soviets '...taiknOwledge the ciiipabilitY,4.?their action. A . more general cessation of *inde,if :it .should 'be considered, must be teinnor* and have a clear terniimition point: 'Above all, sanctions should .. not be permitted to becortiea.SOurce of Western... 'disunity tas so draMatierilly.,occurred in the pipeline dispute. - While others Will urge that the 'United States.. do something, we shouhl recognize the stringent 'limits on -prospective sanctions'and the need to maintain Alliance cohesion With the recently expanded sale of oral?. Which is unlikely to be: .interrupted, our eildibilityin persuading others to take costly measures':will, be, limitedtsand.n potential source of disputes. ln 1915 President WilsOn's protests over the ? sinking the Lusitania were ignored. The United States and Germany ultimately drifted into :war. war is no longer n sanction to be seri- ously considered against a -'nuclear-armed perpower. It is precisely-what We must avoid.. I he quest for nniwailent coexistence imposes severe and clear restraints.- = Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 ON PAO"-, ffroved For Release 201604/0k. c1ftfiRpP91-00901R0006 14 June 198S, - Ex-C.IA,Head Now Works f a Nuclear Freeze By PHIL GALLEY Special co Tbe New York Times WASHINGTON, June 13 ? Eight years ago, while this city was under- going its post-Watergate cleansing, William E. Colby did something un- usual for a director of Central Intelli- gence. He disclosed the agency's "family jewels," as its dark secrets and illegal activities were called by insiders, be- fore a Senate committee. At the same time he turned over to the Justice Dee pertinent the findings of an internal Inquiry that led to the prosecution of Richard Helms, one of his predeces- sors, for lying to Congress about C.I.A. activities in Chile. The agency's old guard reacted with harsh accusations and innuendoes. Some, including James J. Angleton, who had been ousted as head of coun- terintelligence by Mr. Colby, sug- gested at the time that he might be a Soviet mole; others accused Mr. Colby of paralyzing the agency's abil- ity to conduct covert operations by kneeling before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as if it were, in the words of one former C.I.A. director, "a mourner's bench." President Ford asked for Mr. Colby's resignation in late 1975. These days Mr. Colby, who prac- tices international law here, is again playing a surprising role for a former director of Central Intelligence. He has joined the public debate on nu- clear arms control on the side of the Catholic bishops and the nuclear freeze movement, and this has brought a new round of criticism of Mr. Colby by some of his old C.I.A. colleagues who never forgave him for opening the agency's black bag to the world. Known as a 'Soldier-Priest' "My position is a little incongruous for a former C.I.A. man, and I under- stand that," he said; adding that, con- trary to what some are saying, neither religion nor guilt brought him to his present view. Still, friends and critics alike, in- cluding two former directors of Cen- tral Intelligence, suggest privately that Mr. Colby, known around the _ C.I.A. as the "soldier-priest," may be motivated in part by his deep commit- ment to his Roman Catholic faith and a sense of guilt from some of the most painful periods of his life. After he was appointed C.I.A. Di- rector in 1D73, antiwar groups tacked up posters in Washington labeling Mr. Colby a "murderer" and war criminal for his role in directing Operation Phoenix, an effort to identify and re- cruit or imprison leaders of the Viet- cong an South Vietnam. Some 20,000 Vietcong "suspects"'were killed dur- ing the ?operation. Mr. Colby told ,a House committee that there had been some "excesses" despite his rules _against illegal killings, but he insisted . that the program had, on the whole, been suc,cessful. ? Still, Mr: Colby was-shaken by sug- gestions that he had condoned politi- cal assassinations. "How does it feel to be married to a war criminal?" be asked his wife when the posters went up. RiS public tribulations were matched by his personal grief. In 1971 ? his eldest daughter died in Washing- ton after a long illness, and friends say Mr. Colby, who was stationed in Viet- nam during the years her health was deteriorating, felt a sense of guilt for not having spent more time with her. Practical and Moral Aspects Mr. Colby, whose poker player's face rarely betrays his emotions or private thoughts, nodded slightly as a reporter repeated this speculation about why he went from the cold to the fleece. "If I were taking the other side, no- body would bat an eyebrow about it," he said. "I felt this way long before the bishops' letter came out and, in fact, I helped to some degree in ex- plaining the issue to Catholic groups. I figure the priests can take care of the moral aspects and I'll talk about the practical aspects." Mr. Colby, who is waging his per- sonal freeze campaign on the speak- ing circuit and in newspaper columns, ; contends that his ?antinuclear activi- I ties are "a logical extention of what I ? ? was doing in the intelligence busi- . mess." ? ? He goes on: "At the C.I.A. it be- came obvious to me that the real func- tion of intelligence is not to win battles but to help with the peace, to avoid the kind of destabilizing surprises that can occur. It is clear to me that the arms race has us on the verge of -an- other one of these terrible destabiliz- ing steps that is moving us toward a hair-trigger world with all this talk of launch under attack. My God, we're talking about the fate of the world." ?? If Mr. Colby's former colleagues in the intelligence community are per- plexed by the latest public role of this man who (-ells himself "an 'unrecon? - structed cold warrior," so are some liberals who .have welcomed him into the ranks of the nuclear freeze move- ment despite his support for the Rea- gan Administration's policies in El Salvador and his unwavering defense of American involvement in Vietnam. James R. Schlesinger, a former C.I.A. director, said that the freeze movement, "if anything but a political gesture, could be detrimental to the overall military balance," He said he did not doubt his former colleague's sincerity, but, like some other mem- bers of the national security corn- mtmity, said he felt that Mr. Colby's words were taking a turn toward stri- dency. Mr. Schlesinger, Secretary of De- fense in the Nixon and Ford Atiminis. trations, said he read with dismay Mr. Colby's recent remarks to an antinu-? clear group at Georgetown Universi- ty. Mr. Colby told that audience: "I think it's time for people to take this matter away from the priesthood that has gotten us into this mess and to simply insist that we stop building - these things." In an -interview, Mr. Schlesinger said: "I get restless, and I suspect others do too, over firebrand com- ments about a supposed nuclear priesthood. Bill knows ? better than that. Discussions regarding nuclear- strategy have been 'mite coma more . Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 STAT I e - riteproved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0 r .6; Front Burner Central America Issue Heats Up a.s President Follows His Instincts His Conservative Stand Risks Collision With Congress And Latin Allies of U.S. Setback on El Salvador, Aid By GEFLA.LD F. SEIB stAff Reporter of TiE WALL STREET JouRNAL. WASHINGTON?During the 1980 presi- dential carnpaien, an interviewer asked Ronald Reagan what foreign-policy issues he would put at the top of his priority list. "I think the whole problem of Central . and South America and the Caribbean has been neglected too long," he replied promptly. That response. little noticed at the time, seems prophetic now. It goes a long way in explaining why the president has pushed Central America to the top of his foreign-policy agenda?even though: by do- .ing so, he risks a huge collision with Con- gress and friendly Latin American govern- ments and may be creating a hot. issue for the 1984 presidential contest. . In part, Central America has vaulted to the top of the administration agenda be: cause of a genuine deterioration in the posi- tion of 12.S.-backed forces in El Salvador. But just as important, a new chemistry of? personalities and politics in Washington has suddenly brought out the president's natural inclination to 'dramatize the threat of Soviet- inspired insurrection in Central America. "You have a convergence of elements here,- says United Nations , ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, who has helped push Central America into the public eye, Shifting Winds For two years, the diversion of-pressing domestic issues such as taxes, !combined with his advisers' squeamishness about par- allels with Vietnam, muted the: president's alarm about Central Arnericii.. But now many of the restraints are goiie. Aides who favored a moderate approach have been chastened, and national-security adviser William Clark has stepped in-to-urge on the president. At precisely the Same time?,' Con- gress is forcing the president's hand by challenging the whole thrust of his policy in Central America. ?- ? THE WALL STREET JOURNAL 27 April 1983 The result is that tonight President Rea- gan makes one of the most unusual and dra- matic moves of his administration. He has called a joint session of Congress, to be na- tionally televised ,at 8 p.m. EDT, to press skeptical lawmaters to approve more mili- tary aid for .tra: government of El Salva- dor. It will be `die first time a president has addressed Congress on a foreign-policy issue since President Carter appeared in early 1979 to plug the new SALT. II arms-control treaty, congressional ? historips say. Mr. Reagan it going to the trouble mostly to win congressional approval of $I10--smillion in quick new military aid for El Salvtvior he proposed last month. Legislative Setback ? But the speech also will carry an implicit warning: Congress risks taking the blame for the fall of El Salvador to the Commu- nists if it ignores such a dramatic plea for help from the president. Underscoring the problems the president faces in Congress, a House Appropriations subcommittee yesterday cut Pt) million from the administration's request to funnel $60 million in military aid to El Salvador from funds earmarked for other countries. A separate request for $50 million in new aid for El Salvador earlier was cut out entirely by the House Foreign Affairs Committee. ' The administration hopes the president's speech can persuade Congress to replace some of the deleted funds, but resistance from Democrats is ,high. To save even half of the requested $60 million yesterday, the administration had to make a large conces- sion to lawmakers. It agreed under pressure to appoint a special Central American envoy to help El Salvador arrange talks with leftist rebel groups in an effort to lure them into national elections later this year. Salva- doran leaders are uneasy at the prospect of interference from a high-level . U.S. envoy but were forced to accept one. Case of Nicaragua Nor were the president's problems on the eve of his speech limited to the House. The Senate met in a special closed session yes- terday to discuss charges the administration is violating a congressional mandate by co- vertly aiding armed groups trying to over- throw the leftist government of Nicaragua. Even some administration officials think Mr. Reagan, in taking his case directly to Congress tonight, is being melodramatic and may undercut his support in Congress. They fear that his move could .reinforce impres- sions that he is an alarmist on Central America. "I tend says one State Department official. "There are those who think you have to get this out, of the public eye, not into IL" Officials say preparations far the speech have been marred by bickering between hard-liners at the White House, who want to play up the Soviet and Cuban role in fomenting unrest, and State Department aides, who fear Con- gress will recoil at anything resembling "Red scare" tactics. Regardless of their views, though, admin- istration aides agree that the high profile of Central America is here to stay in the Rea- gan administration. "It comes from Ronald Reagan's heart, really," says one official. He asserts that there now is a "fair amount of agreement" within the administration 1 that Mexico is the ultimate target of .Soviet- inspired unrest in Latin America. ?. The president's position is bolstered by the fact that even some former skeptics now share his pessimism on El Salvador. "Our _ _ impression is that the situation is deteriorat- ing very rapidly," says a European diplo- mat from a country that has often ques- tioned Reagan Latin American policies. ?rime is running out, and the U.S. has to be very quick." This diplomat is particularly worried that if Western Europe deals the Soviet Union a setback by deploying new U.S. nuclear mis- siles late this year, the Russians will begin casting about for a quick victory -elsewhere. They may mount a drive to help guerrillas topple the government in El Salvador or sta- tion new weapons in leftist-ruled Nicaragua; he fears. Moreover, top administration officials have begun to worry that failure to win con- gressional backing -for aid to Central Amer- ica is hurting U.S. credibility on other for- eign-policy issues. For example, Middle Eastern leaders won't take American peace efforts seriously if the Reagan administra- tion appears incapable of following through on initiatives in its own backyard, presiden- tial aides fear. Many Doubters Yet all this dire talk falls on" many deaf ears in Congress, as various committees slice or delay the administration's urgent re- quests for more aid for El Salvador. "I don't think the people think El Salvador is all that ? important," says Senate Democratic Leader Robert Byrd. Like many of his colleagues, he contends the administration is "going down the wrong track" by relying too much on military aid and too little on encouraging peace negotiations -between El Salvador's factions. The administration has itself to blame for much of the congressional skepticism. The White House has undermined its own credi- bility by swinging sharply from a calm de- . STAT meanor to an alarmist attitude about Cen- tral America, officials acknowledge. 600290013-0 STAT Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-009011R000600290013-0 PETtr.1-1 APPEAREPProved. For Re!elicit 29,1E3/02gliflAs8i9M-00901 Cti PAGE 14- A 20 April 1983 R000600290013-0 STAT Reagan Again Asks for MX-Missile Funds From Congress, and Road Remains Rug1i By WALTER S. MOSSBERG SI g.f.f Reporter Of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WASHINGTON?For the third time in 18 months, President Reagan asked Congress for money to field a fleet of 100-ton MX mis- siles. But it won't be easy to rescue the lat- est plan from the rejection that greeted its predecessors. _- As expected, Mr. Reagan embraced the recommendations of a high-powered com- mission he appointed to study the basing of the 10-warhead nuclear weapon. - That panel, which included several for- mer defense secretaries, urged that 100 of the 'missiles be stuffed into existing silos in Wyoming, even though the silos are vulnera- ble to a Soviet sneak attack. For the long run, the commission urged development of a small, one-warhead missile that would be easy to hide and thus tough for the Soviets' to attack. The cornmission'a report was worked out in close cooperation with the administration, and its adoption by Mr. Reagan was never in doubt. The recommendation is an effort to satisfy congressional hard-liners who favor the MX. while attracting some MX oppo- nents with the pledge to eventually deploy, in the early 1990s, the smaller, less-vulnera- ble missile. Part of Lobbying Plan Mr. Reagan's formal proposal yesterday was part of a thick lobbying and public-rela- tions plan to try to sell the MX during the 45-day period Congress has set aside to con- sider it. Speaking before assembled members of Congress and national-security figures, the president said deployment of the NO? is the only way to assure Soviet agreement on a new arms-control pact. "We can no longer afford to delay," Mr. Reagan declared. "Now is the time to act." Shortly after, House Majority Leader Jim ; Wright (D., Texas) appeared on the White! House driveway to endorse the plan and pre- dict its passage. But Mr. Wright warned that House Dem- ocrats won't formally grant Mr. Reagan's request for broad bipartisan support of the MX plan, and some influential Democratic members are already lining up against it. Chief among these opponents may be Rep. .Joseph Addabbo (D., N.Y.), who has great influence over military ? spending through his chairmanship of the Defense Ap- propriations Subcommittee. It was Mr. Ad- dabbo who led the successful efforts to kill production funds in December, and he con- tinues to oppose the missile. There haven't been any MX missiles built yet. Common Cause, the self-styled citizens lobby, issued a call yesterday for the contin- ued rejection of MX production funds, call- ing the missile "fundamentally flawed" and "highly destabilizing." The House has more Democrats and lib- erals than it did in December, and it already has slashed deeply 'into the Pentagon's bud- get request for fiscal 1984. In addition, it is widely expected that the House will soon ap- prove a nuclear-freeze resolution Mr. Rea- gan opposes. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and other top administration aides, who are scheduled to begin 11a testimony today, are likely to face a barrage of hostile questions about contradictions between the latest MX plan and its predecessors. ' The most important of these is the admis- sion, this time, that there isn't any feasible basing scheme that could make land-based missiles safe from a Soviet first strike?at least duringithis decade. The administration has tried to sell a number of basing plans it claimed could do just that. Further, the new proposal argues that this missile vulnerability isn't very worri- some because U.S. bombers and submarines can compensate for it. Mr. Reagan ran for election in 1980 partly on a pledge to close a "window of vulnerability" in missiles for which he blamed the Democrats. Use-It-or-Lose-It Weapon Critics already are charging that placing MX in "soft" silos will turn it into a use-it- or-lose-it weapon, likely to be fired in a pre- emptive strike or in response to ambiguous radar readings from Soviet territory.. To counter these charges, which It failed to deflect before, the administration hopes to rely on some of the prestigious national- security figures who served on the commis- sion and who are closing ranks behind its plan in an effort to obtain MX deploy- ment. Particularly important is Harold Brown, the most recent defense secretary in a Dem- ocratic administration and an expert on nu- clear weapons. Another important figure is James Schlesinger, who serveo in three ad- muustranons, Republican ana Democratic, as chief of the C'entral Intellizence Agency, secretary of defense and secretary of en- men have publicly attacked features of the Reagan defense program. But both were present at the White House yesterday for the kickoff of the latest MX sales effort, . and both are expected to work hard on liber- als and moderates to win backing for the planned deployment. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 N????=rof+A Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDIg10901 THE NATION 26 MARCH 1983 THE COMPANY (3: THE COPS THE C.I.A.'S SECRET TIES TO LOCAL POLICE PHILIP H. MELANSON Two years ago, President Reagan signed Execu- tive Order 12333, "unleashing" the Central In- telligence Agency to conduct domestic intelli- -gence operations. Civil libertarians have rightly criticized the order for creating the danger of a police state in which the C.I.A.., acting on its - own or through local police forces, will seek to suppress dissent. What has not been fully reported is the extent to which the agency has in the past worked with police departments in American cities. If the past is prologue, the President's order not only gives a cachet of legitimacy to such cooperation; it also will encourage its expansion. Executive Order 12.333 authorizes the C.I.A.. to conduct "administrative and technical sup- port activities within and outside the United States.. . ." (Emphasis added.) This is coupled with a sweeping authorization for all intelligence agencies to "wont-rate with appropriate law en- forcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the employees, information, property and facili- ties of any agency within the intelligence com- munity." Moreover, intelligence agencies can, under certain circumstances, "participate in law enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities." Prior to this order, it was widely believed that the C.I.A.'s charter, which states that the agency shall exercise no "police, subpoena, or law en- forcement powers or internal security func- tions," barred it from involvement in do- mestic security matters. When Congress approved Approved For Release 2006/02/07 thTaiarter in 1947, i operate exclusively a 1970s, the C.I.A. s departments, providi equipment and expl return, municipal p their intelligence um information on grou terested, provided C use as "cover" and, agency wanted thro 1972, when the press and several members of Congress got wind of these activities, the agency denied and downplayed them, while continuing to emgage in them until the mid-1970s. The agency also cooperated with local police officers in offi- cial and unofficial ways. Although domestic spying by the C.I.A. was reported in the press in the 1970s, given the tight security at the agency's Lasigicy, virginia headquarters, all the facts may never be known. However,) have obtained under the Freedom of in. Act a declassified 362-page file that provides numerous examples of C.I.A. involvement with police. The file, titled "Domestic Police Training" (hereinafter referred to as the D.P.T. file), reveals the Lip of what must be COD- sidereci a very large iceberg.* According to the file, the agency cultivated friendships with poll= officers mainly by entertaining them at its head- quarters and occasionally by giving them gifts and money. When a Fairfax County, Virginia, police chief took a vaca- tion in Puerto Rico, he was furnished with a car by the San Juan field office. Nor did the agency forget the cop on the beat. According to the file, one police officer was given a week's vacation at a C.I.A. safe house in Miami; the agency picked up an 5800 car-rental tab for another officer. Police chiefs and commissioners were frequently given red-carpet treatment at Langley.. Invitees to a 1967 get- together were sent identical letters of warm greeting by Howard Osborn, director of the C.I.A.. 's Office of Security: Mr. Helms has a keen, personal interest in our meeting and has directed that such Agency facilities as you may require be ' put at your disposal. He will host a dinner in your honor on 6 October ai the Headquarters Building. The schedules for the visiting police dignitaries stressed play over work. There were lots of coffee breaks, "get. acquainted sessions," "free time" periods and long cocktail hours?more than enough to take the pain out of the totirs and lectures, which usually ran from ten to forty-five minutes. "Recreation periods" took up as much as four hours of the nine-hour workday. Travel arrangements were made by the agency, and limousines and spacious suites at tigwaaeg/TPL-Ragt$19P993P16414)the guests. 000600290013-0 ./ ARV CLT.. 071 PA= NEW YORK TIMES d For Release 200VOWOZHQ1103DP91-00901R0 600290013-0 Schlesm&s ;W8IV Oil Special tone New 'York Times ? _ WASHINGTON,' March 18 ? How advantageous is the oil price decline? James R. Schlesinger, the nation's:- first Secretary of Energy, believes it is likely to inhibit the domestic indus- try's-ability to keep replacing the oil ? that is now being consumed:Nore- over, he says, it may further dampen efforts to develop alternative fuels. - Mr. Schlesinger, a former top budg- et, defense and intelligence official as ? well as Energy Secretary, is now a senior adviser to Lehman Brothers - Kuhn Loeb Inc. and Georgetown Uni- versity's Center-for Strategic and In- temational Studies. The following are excerpts from -a,- conversation -With him this week about the new pricing ',- and production agreement by the Or- ganization of Petroleum Exporting' Countries and other energy matters. ? Q. What does the OPEC price cut to $29 a barrel mean?' A. There is a chance the agreement will hold, but the probabilities are that .there will be further downward pres- sure on prices in the spring. If prices . break, they could go down to the $22-: A. Some of the power we presumed they had was illusion on our part. It was a rationalization for what were major trends in the oil market rein- forcedby two notable supply interrup- tions. For the most part, OPEC ' merely followed the market - . Q. Most people Dow seem to ? think that lower prices, while causing some problems, add up to - a substantial plus. Do you agree? , A. I think it is ? if we have eco- :, in8 something like Mil employment , nomic recovery. We ought not to thine and continued economic- growth, an "of the recession as a cure for our 1 assumption that apparently has been energy problems Indeed, oil supply . .unWarranted? . ., - - = prospects are grimmer , than five : ' Q. Is the Administration filling years ago.. ;-?,(4.,,,, ,,, ..,,, , the- strategic oil reserve fast enough? to.$23-a-barrel range. Q. Did OPEC bluff us into think- ing it was more powerful than it really was? A.. The fundamental point is that ?-what is useful for us in the energy market short term is likely to be costly to us in the long term. The con- verse is also true. There is no doubt that, if we could have a permanent re- duction or one that would last for five or six years, that would be beneficial. However, if prices are merely to dip for a short time, then pop back up, the result vrill be a decline in efforts to de- velop alternative supplies and in drill- ing activity in the United States and other high-cost areas.. ? Q. 'You didn't mention banking. A. I should have. This brings great -pressure to bear on those banks that have extended substantial credits to oil-producing countries such as Mexi- co. Q. I gather you think the decline - Fill he temporary. ? Approve For Fie Q. How do you quantify the rein- tive effects of recession and in- ' . creased energy efficiency? A. At least half of the decline in oil demand is attributable to the decline in international economic activity. We , should see a recovery of oil demand on the order of 4 million barrels a day. ,?That, with an end to destocking, would ' 'increase- demand from the OPEC countries. from todars 14 million bar- rels a day back up to 23 or 24 million and this would put us back into the- same position we were in the the late 1970's and early 1980's. , Q. Is this the time to Impose a gasoline tax or import fee? A. I have always been in favor of a substantial increase in gasoline taxes.- A. The Natural Gas Policy Act of ? This is an especially-good time. The . . F miport fee is a less certain item; it 1978 was intended to ? provide some - r might lead to a restoration of the enti- subsidization of those who would go k dements program. Nonetheless, given out and find new reserves. The Ad- the circumstances, we ought to pro- ministration's bill would end that; all vide some degree of protection for do- gas prices would be the same. Old gas mestic oil production ? we have the prices would come up to something lowest reserve-to-production ratio - like the equilibrium level. If one be-- amongst major countries? and such lieves the Administration, the new gas a fee would benecessary. , ? ' No. I believe in a maximum fill ra-teAnd right now there isn't a better- argument for that than, if oil prices are temporarily dipping, we can fill at lower cost_ ? - ? Q What should be done about - ? synthetic fuel projects? ? 'A.: The most important are those- that provide fuel liquids. We ought to have the technologies in hand to produce them synthetically. At the. present rate of progress, it appears those technologies will ambitiously be developed arotmdi.the :year 2000 in- stead of the year 1990. That's regretta- ble. - ? Q. What do you thinit of the Ad. , ministration's natural gas bill? Q. Should we sell Alaskan oil to prices would fall. That means that the incentive to go out and find new re- serves would be substantially cur- Japan? tailed. ', 4 .' ? A), .. -Z' . ? - ? , ''' ' -? ...i.e -, e. t- ? .. . - ? We should certainly _con.sider itillie_ r.Q. Didn't the Government trt the - ---Carairei-kiniiiiiiiation made several'sk 1970's mislead people by saying ' attempts to remove the restraint on ? that we were running out of natu- ; the export of oil. But we must reaps- "-- taigas? . -; , nize that the acceptability of that idea A. I think there Was some exaggera- has declined because major invest- tion and I think that there 'was undue meats have been made by the compa- - concern, probably, expressed on the ?,, riles in shipping oil to the amtinental gm by members of Congress.. But I .. United States. And, of course, one will think our estimates of gas production f,.. have the continued opposition of. the were very accurate. maritime unions. -, - , , .. ,, , , .1' - Q. What about the budget ef- , Robert D. Hershey j ..., lents of the price decline? ... .......5..-:. :..)......? 2.-- ,:...;..,-..4.4...;.-. ..-4.......... t, A. It certainly has an adverse ef- fect. It will increase the deficits. The ? Government is now a partner of the oil industry to a degree it has not been in ! the past. Q. How well have our bite)). ? gence agencies done in energy A. I think they were functional with , regard to prospective oil supply. They were less accurate with regard to pro- jecting demand The Central Inteili-. gence Agency's estimate_was assum._ ease 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 STAT Approved For Release 200 21 R000600290013-0 .4.2 7 1 az1.2:1----L:,:aro 25 JA'IJARY 1983 Ga. PAGE 17 Any Decline Soon in Oil Prices May Be Small, Analysts Say By H. ERICH HEINEMANN The breakdown of the OPEC meet- ing in Geneva yesterday has set the stage for a slight decline in oil prices and a further cutback in production by Saudi Arabia and its allies on the Ara- bian Peninsula, energy economists said yesterday. But a sharp drop in the price of oil from the current world average of - about $33 for a 42-gallon barrel ap. ? peered unlikely ? at least for the present, the economists said. The cur- rent price among members of the Or- - gantration of Petroleum Exporting Countries is based on $34 for Saudi Light crpde,,, Total oil production by Saudi Arabia " and its neighttors has _declined about 8.5 million barrels a day, from average of 13.7 million in' 198D, as' they have tried to maintain their price structure despite the abundance of oil ' in world markets. That has prompted '..ot..ber OPEC- producers "to- discount prices in order to sell their oil. If Saudi Arabia makes an attempt to maintain prices ? and is successful ? then the decline may be modest. But even a small decline could prove a mixed blessing. A Double Effect On the plus side, lower prices may increase business activity and lower Inflation, among other benefits. The negatives focus on the possibility of loan defaults by nations such as Mexi- co, which depends on oil revenues to meet debt payments, and reduced de- mand for industrial products by the 13 OPEC nations. According to Herbert W. Krupp, ? senior energy economist for the Bank- ers Trust Company in New York, there are these three major options available to the nations of the Arabian ?Peninsula ? Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar: cAn official price cut of a dollar or : two plus stated ceilings on their out. put "Such price realignment would be combined with a threat of further price reductions," Mr. Krupp said, . linking "the carrot of protected export volumes for non-Gulf producers with the stick of threatened production in- creases and further price cuts." IIA significant reduction An prices and increases in production. The hope, he said, would be to "coerce" other producers into relinquishing a share of the market in a .new agreement on output and prices. "This threat has not worked before," Mr. Krupp noted. IlPrice discounts, special credit terms or barter arrangements with major customers as disguised price reductions. "However," Mr. Krupp said, "if the Gulf producers erode con- fidence in their official prices, then widespread discounting could ulti- mately be far more serious." Saudi Arabia Again the Key than interview, Mr.Krupp said that whatever happened, "Bankers Trust -believes that OPECIfill bCSuccessful in avoiding a significant price break through 1983 anctbermd:12.= A senior energy economist for the Federal Government., Who asked not to be identified, agreed with Mr. Krupp's analysis that Saudi Arabia audits allies still held the key. He added, however: "I happen to think the present price structure is not in the Saudis' long-term interest, and that a lower price is in their interest. If they hold oil prices over $30 a bar- rel, that would result in a relatively low share of the world oil market, and ?over time ? lower revenues." According to data compiled by Wil- liam L. Rand& international energy analyst for the First Boston Corpora- tion, from the Central Intelligence Agency. OPEC's share of world oil production has droyoed from about 50 percent in 1979 to less than_35 percent_ in the second Quarter of19F2. Spokeimen for the Exxon Corpora- tion and Texaco Inc., two of the four partners in the Arabian American Oil Company, which produces and buys most of Saudi Arabia's oil, had no comment on yesterday's develop- ments in Geneva. "This is too sensi- tive," an Exxon official said. . But a senior economic adviser to an- other of the nation's largest oil compa- nies, who agreed to be interviewed if STAT he were not identified, argued that it made sense for Saudi Arabia to try to ' maintain oil prices at current levels. "If we get an economic recovery this year, as I expect," he said, "then this oil surplus won't look anywhere near so bad six months from now. My advice would be to try to hold the line, and hope for a pick-up in demand." . Richard O'Brien, chief economist of . the American Express International Bank in London, told a news briefing In New York yesterday that the fears of major international financial dis- ruption from loan defaults set off by lower oil prices had been "overdone.!'. Economic growth in the main indus- trial nations would accelerate sub- . stantially as a result of a sharp drop in oilprices to, say, $25 a barrel, without any adverse impact on inflation, he - added. ? Donald Htrasthe1m, who is- In - charge of short-term projections at Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates, strongly supported Mr......... O'Brien'i view. "A lower oil price has to be a plus," he said. , Effects on Rankin System Nonetheless, serious concerns re- main that a sharp price drop would in- deed pose severe problems. According to James Schlesinger. former Secretary of both DeempAnd, Energy as well as Director of Central jntellieence. "the oddity is. that, largely because of the run-up in oil prices, we have an international financial system and an international economy tfiat are in a parlous state." "There are a whole set of things that would be benefited, and a whole set of things that would be harmed," he con- tinued. "What I fear at the moment as I look at Mexico, as I look at Canada, which is in a 'delicate' condition, that the more sensitive relations may be the ones that would be harmed. Ad- mittedly, this would be a great boon for the Germans and Japanese, which are purely oil importing nations, but they are not in as sensitive a shape." Mr. Schlesinger concluded: "Vola- tility in oil prices may be worse in its impact than high prices, particularly In its impact on the .bnernational financial system." Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00 ARTICLE APPEAR= THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGE 2 PA R AIDE 5. DECEMBER 1982 0600290013-0 WALTER SCOTT'S Personality Parade QWhatever happened to James Schlesinger, who was head of the CM, Secretary ofDefense and held . other high positions in government? He seems. to. have disappeared .?Maurice Rosen. Albany, N.Y. A A James Schlesinger, "other high posi-. tions" included chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary of Energy?now works for the investment banking corporation of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb. The father of four sons and ' four daughters, Republican Schlesinger has decid- ed that he can no longer afford the luxury of full- time government service. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 STAT. Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R00060 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PACE. THE WASHINGTON POST 1 May 1982 ? eitense C ,iefs Urge rms reaty eview.0 ? By Michael Getler re, Washington Pnit Staff Writer , Two formersec' retaries Of defense yesterday urged? cOngress and the Reagan administratiOn to take an- other look at reviving the never-ra!; *;tified SALT' H Strategic arms lim- itation treaty with Moscow, and ex., 'pressed doubts. about President Rea- 'gan's claim that the-Soviets had "a 'definite margin of superiority" over country. e ?:- ? James R. Schlesinger, who served - 'under Presidents Nixon and Ford,' ! and Harold Brown, who was: under President Carter, advanced these 5 views during the second in a series of .4kSenate Foreign Relations Committee, hearings aimed at producing a res- t: ohition on nuclear arms control pole , icy that can command strong nation- support. . ? , Sen. Claiborne Pell ? marked wryly that. he was glad to ? have tivii witnesses : "who presided e over that decade of-neglect" on mile : itary spending that. the current ;de- fense secretary, Caspar W. Weinber: ger, says .is the cause of :so much -.trouble. .?? **. Under questioning by Chairman!' Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-M.), singer said "we. have lost valuable - time and, more importantly, the po-e litical initiative" both in Europe and - I among the U.S: population by taking so long in the Reagan administration to get started : on new arms talks, : which are now called Strategic. Arms '1?Reduction -TalkOr START-- . -:Schlesingei agreed that there Was, some validity to administration ;de-L;: sires to build up. US nuclear forces', flea: . But he said those goals Were over :7. taken by events and that this coun- try "is losing: more both Striae- gicallYand politically by the fail- ;"-ure : to ? negotiate than it would by - going to the negotiating table:with a ? somewhat .weaker .1.13"p rev? Percy has also bee pushing the White House hard for a U.S.-Soviet rnaatinci Schlesinger agreed that a meeting .would .be '-'desirable," adding that :this administration came to office- :believing that most Americans and 'allies were -not skifficiently aware of the Soviet menace and thus - feared. that ; any palsy-walsy" would detract ,from their ability to mobilize public opinion Although Congressional aides say ? chances are strongly against any re-: Cvival of the ? never-ratified 1979 SALT H.; a growing number of law. , *makers are pushing for it. ^ One is Sen. John Glenn:a:Ohio), who argued yesterday- that SALT II, which- is 'still officially in the Senate -although dormant politically, is a . "do-able", first step which would- re- quire cuts of some 250 missiles in the Soviet arsenal and then lead to the next round of START talks. Schlesineer said he .!eoped the ad- l ministration "would review that pos- sibility of reviving SALT II." Brown, , testifying later, "strongly urged this committee to consider again the vir- .tues of the treaty" which he helped design. ' ".The Reagan administration vehe- mently opposes the Carter-era trea- . ty; claiming that it puts no real lim :.:jtations .on the arms race and con :firms Soviet* superiority in certain - eweapons. Under- questiOnire:b; 'Percy :.:Brown said; "I would have to re- espectfullY disagree" With the assess - merit' of Reagan and Weinberger :about Soviet superiority in overall ;,nuclear forces. ? ?-re e-e? ; Both 'Brown and Schlesinger agreed that, ;Moscow's ;Iland-based missiles were now a threat to knock .out U.S.- land-based missiles and ethat ,the Soviets do have some ad- -...vantages.', But bah' ; did the chairman . of ? the Joint ...Chiefs, of .Staff, Gen. David Jones, t day be- Releaa?2tomers a 66 ae.rWs in rl Marines, and agreed . the \United , States still- has a arcing: ability to 290013-0 'fj. -"The Soviets do not hae,`k ii.,, 1 ,j-kidginent,- anything , like- stra,tegic superiority in the sense of 'a militari- , ly or politically useable advantage in istrategic nuclear forces," :Brown said: , furthermore, perceptions of. the ;strategic balance. are crucially impor- &tent because they "affect* the polit- 3cal will and morale-of government - and publics. Thus, it is important for !.. :informed individuals:: particularly etheeee with government resPonsibile. ' ity, th make eVery effort to express 4 - - . :their, judgment' of that balance in :terms . that - are accnrateneither 'alaririist nor conaplacetit," he said: ' .-? !.: - Schlesinger did: not, *directly? re- 'spond to the 'president's- 'claim; but :said the United States has signifi- ' cant nuclear strengths that Moscow "may or may not have. I would pre- fer not to buy a pig in a poke," he -said when asked if he ould: switch forces with Moscow. , ,,.. - Schlesinger said the ? S?et space , 'program turned: cut to, be a fraud 'and stressed that there '.re .".many unknowns about Soviet weapons,- --e.e. -.. Schlesineer;--e- former CfA direc- tor, stressed there vvns a aut missi e ac ura an STAT 'technical failure on both sidese"Giv- . en the spotty Soviet history, ink.deale 'ing with modern. technologies,' One ould hypothesize that thiseriinse be 1:a constant Worryzof the Soviet lead= ers. e- "We ourselves know. a great deal more' ''abOut---,:helicopteroperations 'and maintenance-than we do about' factual: operations-.Yet:, if we recall the abortive rescue operation In Iran in 1980, :even wee with a far. :more .impressive history of _technical 'success, should bear in .mind this :salient element," he said. . 1R000600290013-0 x ? u i?? lax ArA9 p rove d PAC3E 100 ? 0-7.? {-7,7*; ?eir;Pri For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290 PLAYBOY MAY 1982 ????? *i.`" eif; -- ? . r55 STAT 13-0 :;044:"tirfr'l 44-4. ? . , .7' . 444"44',..??,Q1. :',.' . ::47 '1.7:r5.2: 0:?"rf (17,4 $ +, 0, 4 ,?-?'1i.,...,;-.t - - . . -.. le ' ?., - . "ga Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 ARTICLE APPEARED ON _ Perlis and Promise TIME 11 January 1982 IN a 7 hen the White House speechmiters crafted Ronald Rea- gan's Christmas message, they tried desperately to get away from Charles Dickens' hoary label for any era:' "It was the best of times; it was the worst of times" But they failed, drawn again to that time-worn language to describe the mad- dening contradictions of the world today. And indeed, Dick- ens' words may be especially apt for 1982, a year with no poetry in its sound, no numerical magic. It is a year that a number of scholars and, statesmen are already predicting will be momen- tous for the industrial democracies of the West, a time Combin- ing peril and opportunity. The perils are obvious. The free world's alliances are weak- ened and some-of its economies faltering the adversaries are more threatening and the have-nots more demanding Military power and its illicit offspring, terrorism, threaten to break all restraints. Firm decisions elude American strategists on nucle- ar security. Recession continues and worries deepen over the impact of budget and tax cuts. Decline in the auto, steel and building industries spills over to small business, fanning and credit institutions. The accumulated stress spells fear: Zbigiiew BiLeilaski, National Security Adviser to Jimmy Carter, pulled his trench coat around him in Washington the other morning and said, "The foreign Policy crisis that I pre- dicted for late winteris starting to develop by early winter." He cited four areas?Poland, the Middle- East, Central America and China?that have reached critical mese against a dispirit- ing background of European neutralism, Third World alien- ation, frustrations about nuclear arms and indecision within the President's council about what we should do. Brzethiski's counterpart from the Nixon-Ford years, Hen- ry Kissinger, sees the next months as one of the most critical junctures in postwar American history, ranking with the 1956 Suez and. Hungarian crises and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. "It is almost exactly a generation since the great cre- ative acts of the immediate postwar years were put in place," says Kissinger, referring to such landmarks as the Marshall Plan and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance, The key tests today, in Kissinger's view, are for the nation to deepen values and transcend materialism at home, and to meld firmness and conciliation abroad in wise portions. Fa:ling that, he says, "we can become irrelevant in just a few months' time." - Public television's Scholar-Author Ben Wattenberg, a se- nior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, declares: "Po- land is one of those great events that happen once in a genera- tion to unmask the ? truth." Like former CIA Director and STAT 600290013-0 Ambassador to Iran Richard Helms, Wattenberg sees much of the world struggle transformed into a propaganda war of un- precedented scope, in which perceptions of strength and weak- ness?conveyed in words and spirit?are critical elements. Both Helms and Wattenberg would have the President muster academics, peace marchers, public relations experts, labor groups, corporations and churches in a worldwide educational effort to show, that the Communist system is a brutal failure. "Turn the bully pulpit into a bully spotlight," says Watten- berg, who, with Kissinger, believes that the U.S. is at the end of an era. "I've thought about it a great deal," Wattenberg Says. "Perhaps a new era is defined best when people begin to agee ? coNl'it? Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 . Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0006 I OLE APPEARED ON PAGE C._ 1 THE WASHINGTON POST 29 November 1981 STAT to PWheS tire utton? g In actual war games, the liberals and the women are the deadliest of the species By Benjamin F. Sehennner ?(1 URKHA SOLDIERS don't sheathe their 124-swords until they've drawn blood, tradi- tion has it.. The legend, is not exactly correct, but it illustrates that. warriors. understand how fatal combat is ? and why they don't .brandish weapons lightly., A similar psyche has. Icept .mankind from crossing the unthinkable threshold of nuclear war. There are certainly. enough weapons.to start one: The Soviet-Union and United States today have about 28,000 nuclear war- heads to throw at each other. They add up to ? about 20,000 times the destructive power of all the air-dropped mtinitions:used in World War H and more than all.the munitions fired . since the invention of gunpowder. ?- Who would start that kind of a war? It might be a Russian -- but who in America ? would start such a war? 0 Fortunately, no one knows. Hopefully, we will never find out., "-- Yet -a survey. of participants in America's recent war games reveals that in such mock conflicts, it is almost always a civilian partici- pant, ? not a military adviser. or decision maker, who decides to "go nuke"- first. Fur- thermore, in those few war games where women played significant roles, it was a wom- an, not a man, who decided to push the but- ton.' Finally, it is the liberal "dove," not the conservative, who is most likely to get so out- raged that he decides to use the "ultimate weapon." ? - The significance of this goes beyond con- 'founding the image of generals as Strangelo- vian warmongers. ' Presidents, after all, seem to have grown closer to their wives in recent times not just relying on them privately for advice, but ac- knowledging it Publicly. By some accounts, Nancy Reagan was the most influential per- son in Ronald Reagan's election campaign. Many people felt that Rosalyim Carter was 1 the most influential adviser by far in the I White House from 1977 to early 1931, , , And, of course, women are assuming in-? creasingly important policy posts. in govern- ment. We now have a woman justice of the Supreme Court; a woman, Jessica Tuchrnan Mathews, was Carter's National Security Council staff expert on conventional arms transfers and human rights; Harold Brown -,named a woman as the Defense Department's general counsel and another ,as under secre- tary of the Air Force. We now have 20 women in Congress; some may rise in seniority to be in the line of succession for our chief execu- tive. On eight occasions since Franklin D. Roosevelt became president, a-Woman has held one of the 14 Cabinet posts which fall in the line of presidential succession. ,T To find out how the "nuclear option" has figured in U.S. war games, we put the clues - tion to some 25 senior national security offi- cials, analysts and advisers from the current and past administrations. We asked them to: put aside the issue of civilian control over the , military and, instead, simply to recall from nuclear war games in which they have "played" whether it was a military person or a civilian who finally decided or recommend- ed, "It's time to go nuclear." ? ... ? In his years at CIA, then as Lyndon Johnson's deputyf national security-adviser, in ambassadorial posts, as a sen-! _ibr analyst at Rand, as special adviser on NATO affairs to the secretary of defense and most recently as under secre- tary of defense for policy, Robert W. Kamer has played in about a dozen war games which crossed the nuclear; threshold. He said, "It's been my experience that, almost invariably, it's the civilians Who are the most bloody- minded of all and the military who are the most prudent. I, And the most bloody-minded of them all," Korner adds, "have been the State Department types.". ? Asked if his experiences would suggest that the- civiliarzi -opted,to."go nuke" more often than the military, James ! Schlesinger agreed: I think there is some inclination. in,' that direction.,,The military does tend to be-more cau- tious.." Once a Rand analyst whose-work focused on: strategic issues?Schlesinger has served as-chairman of the old Atomic- Energy Commission, associate !director of ? management and budget for national security Prog,rams,' ? CIA directorrsecretary of defense and. secretary of energy. ; ? :et) Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0. , Benjamin Schemmer is editor of the independent nulgazine Armed Forces ,-Ir17ervin1 h.^ rrs ? t ? i Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000 ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE Risk Analysis Bi Business y For x-Mdes . By CLYDE H. FA RNSWORTIrl SpecialtoTheNorsYoricTlates WASHINGTON, Oct. 27?At the end? : of a long shadowy corridor in a nondei script office building three blocks , from the White House, the sigi. by the locked door reads International Busi-; ness Government Counsellors Inc..".; - ? Afterpressing a buzzer, the visitor is swiftly led into a room filled with books, a large map of the world and se- cure filing cabinets. The air is heavy with the aromatic smoke of pipe tobac- CD. E. Colby, .a former director, ' of the Central Intelligence Agency, ap- praises a visitor from behind steel- ? , rimmed glasses and then ever so cir- cumspectly describes his new job for private industry as an "investment. risk assessor- It's a "natural followeup" to his ex- ? prience in intelligence, he says, and then briefly sizes up conditions in Egypt, Saudi', Arabia, Mexico and- Prance as he used to do for his former client in the Ovaloffice. Thoughts on Saudi Royalty One of his conclusions: Expect a devaluation of Mexico's currency be- fore next year's general electioris. An- other: The Saudi royal house has far deeper political roots in that country than the Shah had in Iran and is there- fore not ripefor a coup. Mr. Colby is a leading practitioner of a biligeoning industry in Washing- ton, the selling of expertise tb the pri-- . vete sector by former Government of- ficials. It's known as the "revolving door" in the trade, and has existed for decadeseee ? NEW YORK TIMES 28 OCTOBER 1981 ' Lawyers in regulatory agencies take jobs with the companies they once regulated. Former trade officials ad- vise private clients on United States trade policy. Former Cabinet officers, with f kesh knowledge of the inner workings of Government, provide new Inpit to their old law-firnis or to the t boards of private compardes. I But now, after the collapse of the Shah in Iran and the clobbering that 1 many companies toolrdik. failing to foresee the revolution, a growing num- ber of former officials.' particularly those with experience in intelligence or the foreign service., are becoming investment risk assessors formultina- tional companies. A One-Man Consulting Concern ? - Richard Helms, another former top 'C.I.A. ',official, who was once the? American envoy tolran, now rens a. - one-man consulting operation, which- he calls Safeer, after the Persian word for ambassador. Among his Clients is the Bechtel Corporation, the interna- tional., construction enterprise that thrives on contracts with various Mid- dle Eastern.countri es. . ? : ' Jarties. R. Schlesinger Jr.- who had. been Defense and Energy Secretary as well as director of the C.I.A., now ad- vises Letunan Brothers, 'Kuhn Loeb. One of his current tasks is the exami- nation of investment possibilities in China fora host of Lehman clients. ? Not all have come in out of the cold.. James A. Johnson, who was execu- tive assistant to Vice President Mon- 'dale, and two other Carter Adminis- tration appointees, Richard C. Hal- ',make, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, and Decker Anstrorn, who hada high position in the Office of Management and Budget, have' formed a 'consulting operation, that they call Public Strategies. ? The assessment of a country. s politi- cal stability is only one element of what has become a highly sophisti- cated and specialized business of in- vestment analysis. ? ? . ? 4 - eee" e ew o ax ides - The analysts also look at a country's regulatory process and tax policies to see whether they will be excessively burdensome for the companies consid- ering doing business there. - While there has beei a proliferation orindepehdent risk-analysis consult- ancies, they are now due for "some kind of shakeout," said Gordon Ray- field, who is president imf the Associa- ? tion of Political Risk Analysts, which has 300 members. Multinational com- panies are starting to build irehouse- ? departments of full-time investment analysts. Gulf, E=on, Mobil, General- Motors, and Chemical Bank and Chase , Manhattan are among those that haves.? moved in this direction. The Chase" uses the services of former Secretary' of State Henry A. ssinger on its risk committee for foreign loans. Risk analysis is even being taught at- some milversities. Georgetown lir& ? *versity's School of Foreign Service is among these. And the professor, Thomas Reckford, not surprisingly is a form eraperative for the C.I.A. . Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 NI Approved For Release 2006/02/07: CIA-RDP91-00901 0600290013-0 - ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASHINGTON POST ON PAGE 9 September 1981 James R. Schlesinger. Reagan's Budgetary Dunkirk The last rites have now been pronounced over the great rearmament boomlet of 1981. Its demise had been expected by the diagnosticians for some time. Like Halley's comet, it visited us and then departed quickly, trailing only a long (though quite insubstantial) tail deserving fur- ther observation. For the past six months the defense debate has focused on the wrong issue: could the "immense" funds ostensibly being made available to the De- partment of Defense be usefully spent in signifi- cantly enhancing the security of our international position. With the Soviet Union outspending the ? United States by some 50 percent on defense gen- erally and by a disturbing 85 percent in the criti- cal area of military investment (procurement), with conventional capabilities in Europe porous and relatively weak and theater nuclear forces now overshadowed by those of the Soviet Union, with deterrence flimsy (at best) in the region of 'the Persian Gulf despite the West's enhanced in- terests and responsibilities, with the naval bal- ance deteriorating in the Far East, and with trou- ble even in the Caribbean (and an evanescent threat "to go to the source")?not to mention concern about the strategic balance, Minuteman vulnerability and aging B52s?that should have been an issue in principle easy to resolve. Yet, all along the real question should have been?given the administration's fiscal proposals?how to maintain adequate deterrence- with growing re- sponsibilities in the Indian Ocean and with re- sources dramatically less than those invested by the Soviet Union. Seven months have been wasted on an irrele- ' vent debate. We shall now have to make do with a smaller growth in defense resources than that projected by the Carter administration? previously denounced as hopelessly inadequate. So much for "making America strong again," "closing the window of vulnerability" and the vaunted "superiority" so casually endorsed in the Republican platform. The unavoidable outcome, given its fiscal goals, seems genuinely to have suprised the Reagan administration. Disregarding the nor- , mal laws of arithmetic, and bemused by its own distortions of,supply-side economics (alterna- tively known as "voodoo economics," snake oil or the ,Tooth Fairy), it lulled its pro-defense supporters (and itself) with farfetched projec-. tions supposedly demonstrating that the pro- posed rearmament effort could be achieved in the face of a massive shrinkage of the tax base. According to the initial mythology, dramati- cally lower interest rates and cutting the "balance 1 of government" almost in half (everything beyond 1 interest payments, defense and the "social safety net") would permit the achievement of a bal- anced budget by 1984. But interest rates have risen rather than fallen, and only so much blood- can be squeezed from the "balance of govern- ment" turnip, so the cuts unavoidably must now come from the fenced "social safety net" or from defense4 More significantly, the recent tax legisla- tion?which seems likely to go down in history as the single most irresponsible fiscal action of mod- , ern times?reduced the tax base to 19 percent of the GNP by 1984 (with expenditures running some 22 percent of the GNP), a revenue reduc- ? tion of $150 billion or roughly 17 percent. As an offset, some $35 billion in non-defense expend- iture reductions have now been achieved?less tlian one-third of those projected for 1984, less than one-fourth of the revenue loss., - - " The budget director, occupationally debarred - from an abiding faith in the Tooth Fairy, has now read- the grim arithmetic?the equivalent of a Budgetary Dunkirk. The fiscal consequences may be briefly, if sadly, stated. Unless the tax reduce tions are reversed?which seems unlikely?on the basis of present legislation and projected defense spending, the nation faces growing budget deficits of $65 billion in 1982, $90 billion in 1983 and $120 billion in 1984. Non-defense reductions will be in- creasingly hard to achieve. Thus, only the total jettisoning of the administration's goal of a bal- anced budget will permit even a modified defense buildup to survive. Nor should one believe that with the half-an- nounced cuts for defense of $20430 billion we have reached the end of likely defense reduc- tions. The best current estimate for FY 82 out- , lays is $715-$720 billion ($20425 billion over ceiling). The ceiling for FY 83 in the revised Reagan budget is $732 billion?a total in- crease over 1982 of $12-$17 billion. Limiting spending to this ostensible ceiling, given probable inflation rates, would imply a re- duction of real federal expenditures by 6-7 percent. Not very likely. Far more probably 1983 expenditures will run roughly to $775 billion?a sum $45 billion over the presump- tive ceiling. Substantially to reduce the out? - year deficits, given the growing difficulty in CON Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 achieving non-defense cuts, would probably require that some three out of four dollars in reductions come from defense. One can always spend less?by doing- less. Gone now are the fancies of nine additional tactical air wings, of three additional Army divisions. Gone, too, in all probability, is the 600-ship Navy?unless, like Jefferson, we provide mostly frigates or gunboats. Em- barking on major new systems like MX or B1 or new acquisitions like carrier task forces will ultimately lead to an ill-balanced force by leaving insufficient funds for opera- tions, readiness and sustainability. The planned buildup for NATO will have to be reduced--especially so in light of Id- dian Ocean requirements. What an ideal moment, given the anti-nuclear tide running in Europe, to increase the degree of depend- ence on nuclear weapons and diminish con- ventional capabilities. 7' The international ramifications are dis- quieting?to say the least. The already. ap- prehensive Europeans will conclude that, while the United States is prepared to dis- turb the international scene by threatening to launch an arms race, it is now seen to be unwilling to provide ,the resources either to run.the race or to provide additional tary muscle. The Soviets will not be loathe.. ' to exploit those European apprehensions. Moreover, the Soviets will conclude that, de- spite American bluster, they have little to fear in terms of additional forces to narrow the growing disparity in military capabil- ities. As for the Japanese (and others), this notable example implies that we might as well abandon the effort to persuade them significantly to increase defense spending. In creating and maintaining forces, wish- ful thinking is no substitute for an adequate tax base. In this ill-fated venture the cycle from bold words to budget cuts has been the shortest on record?a kind of instantaneous New Look. The historic failure lies in so casually dissipating the carefully forged na- tional consensus supporting higher defense spending?while leaving in the public mind the illusion that a sizable new defense effort has actually been.launched. The writer was acting budget director, di- , rector of Central Intelligence and secretary of defense in the Nixon administration. ' Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R0006002 0013-0 ..tRTIC LE APPEARF,D THE WASHINGTON POST PAGZ, 2 August 1981 David Wise. ? 1 . Control Outsiders or the William J. Casey has survived as CIA director, at least for the moment, but the wrong conclusions will probably be drawn from the Senate, investigation of . his activities and the pratfall from power of his spy- master, Max Hugel. . The moral of the story, some will assurrie, is' that the CIA should be left to the professionals. That, of - course, is precisely what the .powerful 'network of Old Boys, both inside and. outside the CIA, would like the public to think. The intelligence professionals, the ca- reer spies, prefer to regard "the agency" as their pri- vate preserve. Outsiders are poachers. " While the controversy may have appeared on the surface to be a struggle between the Senate intelli- gence committee and Casey, the real struggle was over who will control the CIA. Arrayed on one side were Casey and the president, who gingerly pup- ported his CIA director. On the other side were the Old Boys, the present and former CIA professionals, and their allies on Capitol Hill. . . It was an old battle played out again with a new: cast of characters. Back in 1965, President Lyndon Johnson appointed Mm. William F. Reborn Jr., the ? man responsible for the development of the Polaris missile, as CIA chief. The Old Boys were annoyed. ? Within weeks, stories found their way into print re- ? porting that at CIA meetings Reborn was ei muddle of confusion, "so unlettered in international politics," as: 'Newsweek put it, "that he could- not pronounce or ? even remember the names of some foreign capitals and chiefs of state." Six montlei latereRaborn was out as CIA director. With the admiral piped ashore, John- ? son named a professional, Richard Helms, to the peat. - Besides Reborn and Casey, at least two other out- siders who served as CIA directors..were targeted by the professionals. President Nixon named James A. Schlesinger to the job in 1973. Schlesinger fired a ? number of Old Boys, 'arousing much ire within.- the agency. Under Jimmy Carter; Adm. Stansfield 'Turner managed to survive as CIA chief, but many old agency . hands refer to him mockingly as "the Admiral." The current flap had its unobtrusive beginnings late in March when Casey quietly moved John McMahen out as deputy director for operations (the CIA's covert . side) to head intelligence and analysis. Then, on'May 11, Casey tapped Hugel, who had worked with him in . the Reagan campaign, to be the DDO. Only four days later, on May 15, Cord Meyer, the covert-operator-turned-columnist, surfaced Hugel's name, revealing the appointment of "a rank 'ama- teur" to head the agency's cloak-and-dagger direc-' . torateeThe drama had-beguile': ]..: Approved For Release 2006/02/07 Id Bo s. ? Two brothers, forrher business- associates of the Brooklyn-born Hugel, went to The Washington Post. On July 14, within hours of the newspaper's publica- ? tion of charges of improper or illegal business activities by Hugel, he had resigned. There were those who ary,ued, albeit not seriously, that the disclosures only proved Hugel's superior qualifications for the job. Ac- cording to the Hugel tapes and other revelations in The Post, the spymaster had threatened to kill a law- yer who got in his way, warned his business associate that he would hang him by the testicles and admitted (in his. unpublished autobiography) that he was a liar, infoimer and a bunko artist_ To top it all, he beat the CIA lie detector. What finer background could any- one have to head the CIA's dirty tricks division? ? But Hugel went quickly down the tube. Perhaps; one anonymous White House official speculated, with some help from 'eformer intelligence officials." Whether anyone, inside or outside the CIA greased the ways for Hugel's fall, remains, like So much about the agency, clouded in mists. But it is very clear that Casey's appointment of Hugel, a one-time sewing machine manufacturer, rankled the CIA pro- fessionals like nothing in recent memory. From the tree-shaded lanes of Langley to the Fed- eral-style homes of Georgetown, the sputtering could be heard wherever old spooks gathered. It was as though a busboy had suddenly been made a Mem- ber of the Club. Unheard oft On the very day that Hugel resigned, stories mys- teriously surfaced noting that a federal judge?two months earlier On May 19?had ruled that Casey and-others had "omitted and misrepresented facts',' to investors in Multiponics, Inc., a company that owned farm acreage' in the South. In succeeding days, Casey's image came to resemble nothing so much as a series of ducks in a carnival shooting gal- . lery. One duck carried a sign reading "Multiponics." Others read "Vesco," "ITT," or had similar labels of cases in which the crA director's narrie had figured. in the past No sooner would one duck be slotdown than another would pop up. ? - Casey had concealed a $10,000 gift, said one story. Casey had links to a New Jersey garbage man who might have links to the Mafia, said an- other. Soon Barry Goldwater and other influential Republicans were calling for Casey's resignation. In the midst of it all, Samuel and Thomas McNeil Hugel's accusers, vanished. ? , 00' : CIA-RDP91-00901R0006AW 3-0 ' Cu STAT ART CLE Ahlpteisl For Release 210Regfgg-RINCRAWP91-00901R000600290013-0 I ON PAGE 12 JUNE 2981 James R. Schlesinger! 'The U.S. Will That the Mideast provides- combustible matter for international conflagration akin to the Bal- kans prior to World Wart: has now become.,:al- most a cliche. Two distinctive elements make it impossible to treat conditions in the Mideast with '.he indifference normall*accorded to ...Cliches. First, unlike the situatiorrin the Balkani4n the pre-World War I period' (Which prospectively in- volved only the prestigenCthe contending great: powers),. the viteLinterestkii,of the WeSt--indeed;-; the entire free World---arOvholly engaged in coni tinuine,iecesseto the energy resources . of. the Persian Gulf: 8on& the existence and prospecae, ow STAT e torce etee,%ere? strengthening of Europe's" desire to Strike out on its own; arid the premature forcing of the United States to a decision pointe-in effect, the unmask- ing-!`-cit American diplomacy. Moreover, like the simultaneous crises in Hungary and at Suez in 19564 :this episode may.dilute the attention fu- cusedouEastern Europe-and provide the Soviets with cover for whatever miSchief they may 3, _ern- I.;?tark On in Poland. -To all this, appears sub- Wilily indifferent. ? eie,',AelkLi ??es ?rn-ie",;1_ _ This catalytic event has 'also underscoredAbe- s'ilIstantial void in'Ameiican foreign polic.7 eThii! creased doubts about the effectiveness of the American role in the region. With regard to these -regional tensions, the United States might have preferred to temporize. It can do so no longer. The raid makes these ten.1 sionsl central?and underscores U.S. inability to fulfill' its expected role of ensuring Israeli re- - ,straint. The United States will now be forced to, ,k choose. On the one hand, we may, tacitly condone the rairlly_mehetaining_arms shipments to Israel., To condone the attack?including Israel's use ' of American-suPplied weapons in a manner dubi- ous 'under American law?requires in logic a far tmay turn out to be beneficial since the situation-J tive further spiread: of nuclear weapons, whicht eie:presninably curabletNonetheless aside iron higher priority for 'anti-proliferation polies than might be employed in a .Mideast conflagration, Latin America, the Reagan administration in fivet the administration has exhibited to date. Sen.e geometrically add to the inherent danger of this.,iconths has done remarkablY little in establishing: '''Alan Cranston and others may quite consistently:: tinderbox.:,t . ;f,,thii specifics of goals arid, instruments, which are in view of their -long-term stress on preventing The raid on the Osinik..research reaciZi:neareilf(e7substance of foreigf4olicy. Elsewhere the the :spread . of nuclear weapons, find the Israeli Baghdad significantly T complicates the politics- of specifics are unformed or; at best, tenuous. Oppo- strike justifiable. So could the Carter administra- the Mideast and reduces diplomatic 'maneuver if Rion to Soviet aetivisire or international terror- tion, with its well-advertiSed, if ineffective, poll- room, especially for -American diplomacy: Aside. rim May be welcomed,'" but that represents a cies to prevent proliferation. But, to date, the frora the enhancement of Menachem Begins elec; mood or an inclination' rather than concrete Reagan administration has been indifferent or ioral prospects?a purely domestic matter?the PplicA (better revealed by expanding grain sales). fatalistic about the spread of . nuclear weapons,: principal beneficiaries of this development are the . Anti:commtinist rhetoric is no substitute for well perhaps most dramatically so in terms of its Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, the Khomeini. defined policy Least of all, whatever its value as evolving support and military assistance for Paid - regime in !ran, which may draw satisfaction from copy for the Washington fun-and-games depart- sten. Hiving immediately condemned the attack, the humiliation of Saddam Hussein. Even the ad?e'. mentAeee the recent phenomenon of let's-all- the administration will find it doubly hard subse- vertised goal Sharply to circumscribe the spread of pummel-the-secretary-of-state-to-teach-generals.? quently to condone it on the bails of non-prolifer- nuclear capabilities is; for reasons I'll get to in a ' requisite humility constitute foreign policy? The ation objectives to which it so far has been rather moment, essentially transiterY and probably pal- attack at Baghdad thus forces the administration, indifferent If the arms flow to Israel continues, in try. On balance, the decision to strike has Probably inclined to breeze along onan image of doniestic the face of the proprieties of American law, the augmented the forces undermining Israel's inter- good will and international toughness, to focus on distrust of American motives and of its intended national position. Begin has not merely demon the specifics of foreign policy, notably in the Mid- role as honest broker in resolving Arab-Israeli dif- strated his disdain for his neighbors with whom Is east, and on nuclear proliferation.- - 'fereiaces will be significantly heightened. ? - rael must ultimately coexist and for international- TO this point, the administration's approach in Since Israel's own power is quite limited; its unilateral effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in the region will prove, at best, tran- sient. An issue on. which the superpowers agree, though even they are limited in. their ability to grapple with the Problem, is Certainly beyond Is 1 rads very limited abilities. Israel's action may, by dramatizing the isstie,' strengthen Arab determi- nation to acquirenuclear. weapons. Perhaps more opinion of manifinde-eeo. ? theitimnificliate concerns and embrace our own significant; it Should be recalled" that the initial The additional costs associated with the raid; ;k.For ,:liothilsrael and its. Aral . neighbors, worry move toward ,"the - Islamic 'bomb" and the so- regrettably, may be quickly listed: the aborting of eabet4 the other's intentions and actions consti-': ; kiting of support for that venture was by Pakie the peace process (or what was left of it); addi: tuteita clear and present danger, which they will - stan's Mi Bhutto in the middle 1970s. And, tional reentry points for the Soviet. Union into .scarcly forget simply to accommodate our con- spite Begin's provocative rhetoric, Pakistan lies the region; the weakening of Arab moderates and 'cern 'regarding the longer-term though lower- - beyond the reach of Israeli War planes and is, ? the coalescence of the Arab world on more radical -probability -threat to the region 'posed by the ? moreover, under American protection. lines; the reinforcement of European distrust of -Soviet Union. Any hope that regional attention To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in America's policies and role in the Mideast, and a could be focused northward, .in the absence of a the region, Israel's own power is far too limited. simultaneous and effective grappling with the in The best that might be hoped for from Israel's The writer who was secretary defense? dur, Jernal tensions of the region, must now be abane, badly-thought-threugh though brilliantly exe- , :cloned. The raid; in short, means the end for that cuted strike is that it could once again focus in- mg the IV/it:least airlift in 4.973, also serval as dt.2 ? particular drift in American policy preferences, ternational attention on the problem of prolifera- rector of the Central Intelligence Agency and . for it has 'shaipened the apprehension's about the tion. Yet, it will do so in a badly deteriorated in chairman of the Atomic Energy COM'azission.- 'unresolved internal conflicts . while raising in ternational climate... Together the Mideast and Poland pose' tiro pro- , spective crises for the United States in the next few , weeks?with the secretary Ofstate abroad in China.' It should provide dseridui test of the adininistral - ? ? ?.? ; Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901ROW0IIIIHRM1AWYgeT,ntiPachulerY opinion in general; he has placed his treaty part--the - Mideast has been to focus on the Soviet ner, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, in a most threat and to seek a "strategic consensus" awkward position and has apparently been indif-1 presumably ending in cooperative action of the ferent to the substantial embarrassment of Lsraeli ?states of;the region in' improving the- military - protector, the United State& Asa small state (un- deterrentlo' Soviet intervention. While such an like, say;, the Soviet Union), Israel's ultimate sur-' outcome Wpuld be highly satisfying to many of us, vival cannot rest on a-flagrant disregard for what it is the height of American ethnocentrism to as - Thomas Jefferson called a decent respect for the ?*'surntilliat ;the states of the region will abandon? STAT Approved For Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901 AP,PP PAGE ? , owe rips 0 ReporkdRsui WASHINGTON STAR 19 APRIL 1981 Detente-Fueled Seen Aiding:Moscow:: By Henry S. Bradsher Washington Star Staff Writer ? The Soviet Union plans to i ncreaSe- its spending on military equipment,, which is already higher than U weapons expenditures, by about 10, percent a year during the 1980s.? ac!.= cording to a leading American spe- cialist on Soviet military budgets:. e s The specialist. William T. Lee, also- calculates that -increased-foreign- trade has 'enabled the Soviet Union to devote-more of its domestic pro-, duction.to armairTeriand seeS'this' as an example o(detente's helping. shift the military balance in the Se- viets favor. e. &be. ; - As a privetefconsultaiii working "ii contracts from the Pentagon and other sources, Lee has been present:, ing his findings to congressionaV committees and other panels around Washington in conflict with CIA spe- cialists, among whom he once. worked. He has contended foryears'. that the CIA ,underestimates SoVie military spending. The CIA admitted lir 1976 that its estimates of themilitary burden on; the Soviet economy, and. tlierefOeei. the priority that Kremlin leaders gave to armed strength; were.- low. It doubled its estimate of the share of Soviet gross national prod- uct going into the armed forces and related military spending: The new range- was 11 toil3 percentaeeeet::: Since that admission, wbich, ad.: justed CIA figures to close to-what' Lee was alreadycalculating. Lee his' won an increased following anfongl US. and Western European students' of the subject.-ScantY estimates pub:- lished by China support Lee,: With its overall economic-growth' slowing down while military spend- ing continues to speed Up. the Soviet' Union is now spending 12', to 14 per.. cent of GNP for military purPoses; the CIA says. It estimates a ruble figi ? tire of 61 to 72 billion in- 1980' . Lee and another-leading critiC"cif -the CIA estimates,. Prof.- Steven S. Rosefielde of the University of North: - Carolina, say the ampsyniatiortet again fallen behinilltie Lee calculates:that the figure Was 18 tier-, cent in 1980, and liosefielde's -Cii- tiques of CIA estimating ? methods, support this. - ? ? ' Lee says the percentageWill rise' to above 20 on the basis of the pat- 'tern of allocations in the-1981-85 Sci-: viet economic-plan; ?-? Foamer Defense Secretary:James' R Schlesinger. who Was critical of- the CIA estimates when beheaded the agency in 1973, said the other day that he believed "the Soviets are de- voting 17 or18 percent of their na-; tional effort to military efforts. The'. CIA numbers may be misleading, with the agency trapped in method-. ology that underestimates the mag.-7 -nitude of the military effort, hesaid4 The: Reagan- administration's' proposals would increase-US: de- fense. spending' for. the 1982 fiscal' year to slightly. over 6 pe' cent of GNP. Announced plans would raise that_to a little over 7 percent by Both the CIA: end its critics con..: tend that an understanding of the, .share of Soviet GNP going into its- - military effort is important. Western intelligence'ingencies have what. ,they believe. to be a pretty good count of Soviet missiles, tanks and submarines, regardless of their cost But knowing the economic burdetv, tells Western leaders much about Kremlin thinking. ? :- In the new Soviet economic plan,. both investment in future growth- and consumer goods output will in- crease at -a slower rate than in,the past. Rut military spending will con- tinue to speed up'at the expense of other sectorSof an inCreasinglyslug-'. gish eCononay." This shows= a Soviet: devotion to"armed power as more im- portant :than future' prosperity Or: present?Iiving standards. - ,"! e This fits the picture of Kremlin thinking described in articles by Na-i tional Security Council specialists' on the Soviet Union. eaa Army Brig. 'Gen; William Odoin,' who worked on the Carter adminis-. 4 R000600290013-0 N.410 ? trz th , de -et) NS pe th, an str me'as central to Soviet Communism as the pursuit of profit is to societies with market-oriented economies? Lee contends that during the 1970s the Soviet. Union increased its sales to market economies of natural gas ? and other raw materials in order to? --import- more advanced- -industrial- - equipment than it could produce it- self. Not only did it get better equip- 'rnent-this way but it also freed-some ' of its own industrial capacity to con- - centrate on weapons. . Thus, according to Lee's calcula- tions from Soviet data, the era of -detente made it possible for the -Kremlin to order more and better. '.weapons .rather than diverting- the economy from armaments to, more peaceful purposes - as has. been Nidely_..believed in the West, *eve% - daily by Europeans who have been eager for Soviet trade.- ? - Lee draws his conclusions primar- ily from Soviet data, adjusting them to include -in military spending many things hidden elsewhere in - the Soviet budget than under pub- .:- ; lished defense accounts. He says the Soviet Union is now making a mili- tary effortof between 108 and 126 bil- lion rubles a year, rather than the 62 to 7Lbillion estimated by the CIA. Under Lee's questioning in con- gressional hearing whose tran- scripts were published late last year, ' the CIA conceded that 'its rubles were artificial values rather than - the real rubles that would show up In the secret Soviet accounts. The , ;US. government therefore lacks any 'official estimate of actual Soviet ' spending, Lee argues in his often scathing denunciations of the ex- -pensive CIA effort to find Soviet mili- tary figures. ? ' ' In a confrontation last Wednesday !..`between a CIA official, James Stei- ner, and Lee. Steiner disclosed that. the agency knew actual ruble prices -of only 135 things that the Soviet ? ? military buys. Other prices are cora- ' ..puted .by various mean; including ; estimating dollar, costs and then using.ratios. to convert to_rubles...... CONTIlltin Release 2006/02/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600290013-0 ?