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December 30, 1970
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.VE1f7. OEs: Triu]si Approved For Release 21:101/1#16 :19*-RDP91-00 901R000600300003-9 -Appeovedfor Reteate-2005/12/f4 : ciA-R1:091-Ob9Oii R000600300003-9 .nont, iriVie -3 BOSTON MASS. ? HERALD TRAVE.,proved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R ? 216,305 S 298,557 - OCT 2 (1. 1970 ' ? . ? ? ? - and. was misled into ch P Ltiharnel lug side's; ? Cuba, when he Y i supplied reports to the .CI.Aa 00600300003-9 _ s-s4 . ? ? . ? ? ? ? e Washington . during the 1950's ? -when`he supplied Allen Dulles ? - - . 1111 01 and Gen. Walter Bedell Smith t C21 with proof of how the Soviets ? .,'..sere." hacl infiltrated the French ? ? - , government. at the highest r .11 u - ? s If "Lamia" ttunecl out to be another aliag for Spy:Who-Came-In-out-of-the-Cold author John la - -Carre, it would bp a lot easier to accept than as advertisecl, the code name for De .Gaulle's chief-of intellie*Yence in Washington. If half of what "Lamia"- has written in a book published earlier this month *With that title (344 pp. Little, Brown $6.95) is true, - . then Henry Ford was right ? "History. is bunk." The other_ half of "Lantia" the sacrifice or determined can be dismissed as. the , men to keep their liberties. v,aporings of an intelligepce- Once "Larnia" was in for-hire who v,?as outsmarted North Africa and assigned to by his employes .and who is work for the Free French, he -.trying to get his own *back. began handling secret docu- , ? "Lamle" became involv- Illent's which convinced him ed in intelligence work way that De Gaulle was Ion in- back in 1943 when his know]. terested in -assuring those edge of the country round liberties for all Frenchmen and about the small town ef than in out-maneuvering his iltemorantin in the center of. campetitor, General Giraud. Vrance ? 'enabled hint -to -'At this 'point "Lamle's". view - smuggle many. people ? 'of history becomes a view of history as conspiracy. From especially Jews ? across the Cher River from German- , administered France into so- called free, Vichy-administer- ed France. Caught pp by the police on a trip to Paris when he was acting as a courier for ? British intelligence, he was ? more preoccupied with get- forced to flee to North Africa ting five stars on his license .by, way of ?Spain and plate than anything else. Portugal. ? When, after 24 hours of bickering and the General -UP TO THIS poinf the history of "Lamia" is under- could think of nothing else, stated, a believable account ; he got his five stars, lie was of. how the French under- tearfully grateful. Vanity vanity, all is vanity. of .. ground developed under Ger- As read "Letitia," the man occupation. ?A man here . with special knowl e d g.e, author was in on all the great another there irritated by the decisions in the history of the level. TAIcE -ANY significant ? ; event in recent history from ?,. the, trials, in Warsaw of the ' French consul Robineau to.: the doings of the Red Hand who supported nationalists in I, Algiers and "Lamle" has the story behind the story. . History for him has no con-- * tinuity. History Is the reSult* of conspiracies. ? Thp trouble with this view of history is that it is irrefut- able, , insidious. Who can attack this mountain of al- legations. and cut it down to a , molehill. There are more in- sinuations -- let alone out- right accusations --- here than a historian could review in a lifetime.. . . ? "Lamle" blew his cover on ' Oct. 18, 1963, when'he walk- ed out of the French embassy ' in Washington and headed for Mexico where he asked for, ' political asylum under his rf' real name P.L. Thyraud does/ Vosjoli. He stayed there for a ' year until he could apply for a visa to return to the United States as a visitor whereehe now lives as a political refugee. ? If he were writing as a -thriller writer, as an alias le Carre, ? there- would be no problem. Writing as a t? serious, reliable witness to events of the last 20 years, he challenges the integrity of all the great participants, De Gaulle preeminently, 'and the view roost of us have of... ? history. For most of U5 ? history is the record of ? heroism; for him it is the ! blotter of vanities. . . ! (P. Albert Dichamei is Her- ald Traveler literary editor.) now on the book reads like a clinical study in the .psychic abnormalities of . generals mad, all mad. When Gen. De Lattre de Tassigny visit- ed Washington in 1951 he wa5 "Beene," got together and be- gan taking concerted action cutting wires, blowing bridges and derailing trains, To this point history is intelligible as 'world ? not the East or the West, but the world ? from 1943 until 1063. These involv- ed Indochina when the United States was supporting the Vietminh led by Ho Chi Minh ? Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 5 ver,rnprnm-Pp.,nr, crwel 1'1'111 , OHIO ApIRWilIM Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R lt - 190 , 169 S - 302,042 APR 1 01969 Inlet igence officer re INTELLIGENCE AT THE TOP, by Major General Sir Kenneth Strong, Double- day, $G.p5. Perhaps the worst time ' for a man SO embark on a career in the military is during a time when there are no wars. This is exaotly- when the author of this book began his career. Sir Kenneth Strong first used his abilities as an in- telligence officer in Ireland during the "troubles." He didn't. think his work there was very distinguished be- cause it consisted of doing IVIAJOR-GENERAL SIR KENNETH Sl'RONG ' THE RECOLLECTIONS OFA BRITISI I nothing more than giving INTELLIGENCE OFF a few bob to an informer ICER - ----- -,---.,-_ well written, well illustrated, " now and then. His superiors dented eat by the Potsdam and possesses an extremely i well constructed index. Sir ; t must have thought differ- and Yalta agreements. Kenneth has gone to much , ently because he was later A number of interesting effort to substantiate every- ; sent to Berlin where he bits of information have ? thing he has written about,, was to acquire invaluable ', come to light in this book. In order to forestall any . Information for use by the ? One of them is that Admiral charges Of irresponsible i , Allies during the coming ' C an a r is, chief of the writing. The book is like the . war. Abwehr, was opposed to : to General Eisenhower's man -- cautious. Nonethe- L' Sir Kenneth was attached ,Hitler's plan for conquest. less w8 WO reading.rth ? ' ( , As a result he was the most ,, -. . , - ,Mark : staff in North Africa and ' important source of Infer- ..- ,, Behulzinger followed the General to.. the early days of the war. ? STAT Eisenhower and the q tempered Bedell Smiths, after the former was elected President. Smith seemed to hold Strong in high esteem and at one time offered him a position in the CIA. Smith, .refused because he did not wish to give up his British citizenship, although he : might have felt that Anglo- American relations were not yet good enough to allow an Englishman to work in an American Intel- ligence position. ? The book is extremely mation for England durin : ? ??;.' Europe as intelligence head , Another is that there was of SHAEF. Working closely apparently a split between ., with Bedell Smith, later ,. , ? ,'-)j head of the CIA Strong : helped arrange-Me Italia!? 1\ surrender. Later he held key positions in setting up'' the dual surrenders of the German. military. , On of the marks of a career officer is tact, and e" this is one of the most, tactful books I have ever 'read. Although there is ample precedent for doing t so, Strong carefully refrains from criticising any of the gemtals who operated Y :under Eisenhower's com- IP mand. What the author does point out is that a war ( fought by an alliance of powers is entirely different } from one fought by a single te state. The amount of 4, bickering and political maneuvering among thei, Western Allies is almost un- believable. The German t leaders were aware of this infighting and made s eleventh hour attempts to Intensify political differ- ences among the allies in Order to secure better peace t: 1,iteAlivImakee.AW_strufir truirrge 005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 thOwer felt his latitude of ?iiegotiatio4 to be _sharply WSWET3. Approved For Release Ift5/1241196g1A-RDP91-00901R ESPIONAGE: A Spy Goes to Heaven Hi, was the spy who came in fromthe , Dulles returned briefly to private prac- listablis n hinent?a witty, tweedy, donisn tice but soon found himself helping Har- sort who fairly doted on James Bond but ry Truman organize the CIA out of the would have looked silly in a trench coat. remnants of the OSS in 1947, later re- Allen Welsh Dulles was a middle-aged turning to Washington to consult with the ? international lawyer, well-heeled and then director, Gen. Walter Bedell Smi(h. ? well-wired, when he and the espionage for six weeks on a project. Six weeks 1 business discovered in 1942 that they i were made for each other. Walter Mitt)/ I turned into eleven years. Dulles was named deputy director in 1950, director i couldn't have dreamed it better. Dulles !' ran a brilliantly successful spy network with the advent of the Eisenhower Ad- under ministration in 1953?an appointment that Ilitler's nose during World War II, i put him in tandem with brother Foster, later?as a planner and then director of ; ??i Ike's Secretary of State, and gave them' the CIA?built a vast peacetime 'Pk)" i nage apparatus for a nation that hd extraordinary power over U.S. policy dur- ing the frigid worst of the cold war. I .a ; i hitherto shown neither the taste nor the i v'Keep out of politics," Dulles always cesses are unheralded, your failures 1 gift for this kind of enterprise. "Your sue- ' ,,, ill, but the fine line between an intelli- .1 - , .. trumpeted," gene? estimate and a policy paper was1 John F. Kennedy once told ',,?,riot always easy to draw. Dulles's CIA him. But, when he died of the Ilti corn-. plicated by pneumonia last week in Washington, Allen Dulles left behind a STAT 00600300003-9 pointed Dulles and j. Edgar Hoover in ! his first official act, ultimately soured on the CIA chief for touting the disastrous Bay of Pigs assault on Cuba. "Dulles is a legendary figure, and it's bard to operate wJ with legendary figures," JFK said at the time, and soon he told Dulles himself, ."Under the British system I would have. ? to go--but under our ?system, I'm afraid it's got to be you." It was. Even in retirement, Dulles continued the family tradition of service: he sat on . the Warren commission and he made a reconnaissance tour of racially tense Mis- ? sissippi for Lyndon Johnson in 1964-. But I mostly he worked on his memoirs, anthol- ogized spy tales and savored his mem- ories. Ilya Ehrenburg, Stalin's favorite . - propagandist, once wrote of Dulles that, if be should somehow get to heaven , "through somebody's absent-mindedness, he would begin to blow up the clouds, I t mine the stars and slaughter the angels." Dulles presumably was flattered?and,, ? 1. though none of his colleagues believed' ' that he would raise hell in heaven, none ? - Idoubted that he would at least have a: good line On the .other side.. ? pulled off some spectacularly successful operations, among them the fall of Iran's anti-American Mossadegh government in reputation as probably the best Amen- .1,993, the 1954.miti-Communist coup in ' can intelligence chief of his generation. ;Guatemala and a world scoop on Nikita_ He was born 75 years ago into one of ! those families that seem marked for pub- Khruslichevs anti-Stalin speech to the !lie service, if not precisely for spying. Twentieth Soviet Communist Party Con- His father was a Presbyterian minister, gress in 1956. A possibly apocryphal tale an influence that showed less on Allen , has it that Dulles sold Eisenhower on the, U-2 spy plane by showing him photos than on his austere big brother John of the Augusta National Golf Course shot Foster, and there were two Secretaries . from 70,000 feet up?yet so detailed that ? of State and an ambassador to the Court of St. James's in the family. Allen, bright rke coot(' spot a golf ball on a green. The and implacably jolly, followed Foster U-2, ii any event, was Dulles's baby, and,. through Princeton and the Foreign Serv- until Francis Gary Powers's spy plane was ,ice (including a tour in Woodrow Wil - ; _ brought down in 1960 by a Soviet Missile ? ; ,son's peacemaking mission to Versailles), heard 'around the world, the operation ! then into law practice in New York. He was one of the most lavishly profitable in took occasional government errands, but all espionage history. not till his pal the late William J. (Wild Torpedo: Yet Americans have always Bill) Donovan, head of the World War been squeamish about clandestine opera- 11 of Strategic Services, offered Lions?al fact of life that doubled the him a job after Pearl Harbor did Dulles protestations and pain when the CIA's discover his thing. . operations were caught out. The U-2 ad. Craft: His thing, of course !. was what venture is recalled less for its successes , t he later called the craft of intelligence, ? han for the fact that it gave Khrushchev: ? and he plied it masterfully well. Operat- a chance to torpedo an impending summit r ing out of a fifteenth-century house over- conference. John Kennedy, who eap- looking the Aar in Bern, Switzerland, ? Dulles mobilized a network of opera- - lives, magnisards and in (I(in- Lads reaching into the German Ctim- ' mand. One in form ant, a well-placed . anti-Nazi, filtered 2,000 top-secret For- eign Office documents on microfilm from Berlin to Bern. Another contact, high in Hitler's Abwchr, tipped him on the 1944 asassination plot against the Full- rer. Dulles's sources put him onto the German V-2 rocket 'experiments at Peenemunde as early as 1943, and sub- sequent Allied air raids set back the pro- gram by at least six precious months. His biggest coup of all came when, after months of painstaking negotiations with ? high-level Gestapo and German Army cont?ets, Dulles brought off the surrender of I million Cerllywdiseipr 1st fta Italy almost. a wetitaydet-if benTraw? 'Ono Reich itself collapsed in 1945. !.77777 ? -':"?? ." : 7 ' ?.? . r",orri, 777, g),,5/12/14.,:...CIA.RIbP91,00g. R000600300003-9 Dunce: A Mitty dream come true PROEM" REPUBLIC ronia?r, Rele4e 2005/42/14 : CIA-RDP,917009i1 R000600300003-9 - 155,995 S- 231 , 269 EB v?a STAT ecurity. Risk. "THE MEMBERS of the security hearing board" unanimously found that Mr. Davies's lack of judgment, , discretion, and reliability raises a reasona le doubt ). When ex-State Department official John Paton Da- i , , that his continued employment in the Foreign Service ; vies Jr. recently, had his security clearance restored, '1 of the U.S. is clearly consistent with the interests of :after it had been lifted for 15 years, the reflexive Left national security," Dulles said. "This is -a conclusion i immediately sprang into action. , ( which I am also compelled to reach as a result of my The New York Times said that before Davies's secu- .3review of the case. . . . ? . , .rity clearance was withdrawn, he . "went ?through nine .A..1 thies." And. of course it, blamed, ,the entire. flap, . .. Carthyisni." . - ? ? ? : , . ? ? ' - -. ' ' ' .1 half and?-?w' c'll.:: witness before them, when he testified on his own be- '' board that the personal demeanor of Mr. Davies as a conclusion of i:ie members of the security hearing "One of' the facts of the record is the .unanimous . . . . , ',security hearings, -nOne.of which turned up any informa- ? : ton that he was disloyal or had any Communist sympa-.... as subject Jo examination ? did not inspire I Newsweek did also,' and it, too, talked about the nine :confidence in his reliability and he was frequently less investigations and the failure to prove disloyalty. But it qthan forthright ,in his response to questions." I refrained from adding the partabout.failure to turn up .i. . It well 'inay 'be 'that it was proper finally to restore . i Communist sympathies on Davies's part. ? ... ',Mr. Davies's security- clearance. But that cannot be i Small Wonder.: For. Davies 'did exhibit Cornmunist Ji Fogarded as vindication .(as Newsweek claimed) for his !'sympathies. If he was not in fact a Communist, . as:: :?,, judgment. Nor. does 'it mean that Secretary Dulles was_ ; Ambassador Patrick Hurley charged, he was unques- ....mistaken.15 years ago! - ? . ? : ., . .. , . tionably symPathetic. to Mao, Tse-tung and, the entire F. Indeed, under the 'circumstances, the Eisenhower ad- ? [Chinese Communist .movement.. As China expert Gen. ministration treated Davies 'far ,better than lie- and his.; rAlbert C. Wedemeyer said about Davies, John Stewart ,' cohorts treated' the , nation'. they supposedly were serv- ' I Service, Raymond ?Ludden, and John Emmerson (the: ing- all the; 'while ' they :Verb beating., the .propagand, , Red China lobbyists ..in the U.S. State Department), , 'ruins.forRedChina i ,"Their sympathy for the Chinese Communists is ob-??:,? . . vious in their-reports and in their recommendations Ithat we back the Communists instead of the National igovernment." GRANTED, THIS DOES NOT prove that Davies was,. *a. Communist. Nor can it be proved, that he was 'a. 1..Communist merely.because of the six people:he most,) highly recommended for employment and use in . ! big U.S. policy toward China, four had close Commu-1 nist connections. and one had.been exposed by Novern-'I ?itier 1949 (the time,.of.Davies's recommendations) as fc.:ommunist agent. (One of the *six- was Anna Louise, 'Strong, the longtime Communist who today resides in., t- Red China . and .is an apologist for Mao's fanatical re- gime.). But it is disingenuous for the Times and Newsweek to.. ';'say that no one ever proved that Davies was not disloy-.,: I al. His loyalty, was never in question, and therefore hadl. inothing to do with .the removal of his security clear, lance. . ,? ? ' DAvuss,s CLEARANCE was lifted by Secretary' of' ,State John Foster Dulles, not becanse he was a loyalty i,c;ase, but because' he was a security risk ? a distinc- tion very clearly. made by 'Gen. Bedell Smith, 'former ',read of the CIA,, who testified before the-State Depart- Anent's Loya-Tijr'Itaiew Board in the Davies case. ?'. Dulles was aware that four. Democratic and three.i Itepublican- senators. on the Internal Security subcom- mittee -charged that -Davies' "testified falsely before'A the subcommittee in denying that. he ? recommended',: that the CIA employ, utilize, and .rely upon certain individuals'having ? Communist' associations and connec- itions." , ' , The subcominittee'recommended that Davies's fa1se:1 'testimony be turned over to a grand jury. Inswad, ipzirtly because Dulles-knew bow loudly the Times and ;11 the led tloib elriattl AmPepdvitaA iwttodu Fldec nsictlriteilalmee t"?wtiri4kc 1_4h yliupm /35. a1 dc&idr6i P 91 -00901 R00060030000,-9 enough step, in light of Davies's .froquent tergivei"sq.71 tioog while testifylogNr,der,oath. :?, : lq 13 Approved For Release 3(too /40149 ? CIA-RDP91-0090 R000600300003-9 1.6Y ESPIONAGE The Hearty Professional To Allen Welsh Dulles, who died at 75 of pneumonia in a Washington hos- pital last week, the gathering and in- terpretation of intelligence was vital to ? American survival in a threatening world. He modestly described his risky. arcane calling as a "craft" but pursued it with an unrelenting enthusiasm and ex- pertise that helped make the Central In- telligence Agency?for all its adverse.. -publicity and serious misjudgments? theVworld's most efficient espionage or- ganization. British Major-General Sir' Kenneth Strong, former head of in- telligence for the Supreme Allied Com- 1?.? "I was dressed for tennis," Dulles re- called, "and I had no time for him." The man, it turned out, was Lenin, and victory over the U.S. (since then, a sys- the interview that did pot take place tem of spy satellites initiated under Dtil- STAT might have changed history. lcs has much surpassed the U-2s). , T Early Surrender. Dulles did change The other was the ill-fated Bay Of history when he returned to Bern' in :'Pigs invasion, which led at least in- 1942 as oss chief in Switzerland. A ? directly to Dulles' retirement seven . ? contact known pseudonymously as months later. Dulles took it all calm- George Wood, in the German Foreign ; - ly. CIA directors, he said, were "cx- Office, sent him more than 2.000 doe- ! pendable." Ile wrote: "Obviously you cannot tell of operations that go along well. Those that go badly generally ; speak for themselves." The CIA became involved with caus- es aimed directly at countering Com- munist propaganda, like Radio Free Eu- rope. There were more intellectual ven- tures, among them an open $300,000 grant to the M.I.T. Center for Inter- national Studies. The agency also helped ? finance the National Student Associ- ation for just over 15 years; until mil- itant N.S.A. leaders denounced the deal in 1967. Dulles said dryly: "We ob- tained what we wanted." Of the Corn- - munists, he said: "We stopped 'them in certain areas, and the student area was one of them." :At the austere CIA headquarters, a bas-rclief plaque with Allen Dulles' like- ness bears the inscription: "His Mon- ument Is Around Us." It has been 40 PAIR SMITTEN-LIFE ALLEN DULLES & J.F.K. Six weeks v. eleven years, mand in Europe. says of Dulles: "No more acute intellect has served in the profession before or since." His. courtly yet convivial manner evoked the style of an old-fashioned prep-school headmaster, but Dulles was above all the man who professionalized the intelligence service of the U.S. Be- fore him, American espionage had been at best the work of skillful amateurs whom their countrymen sometimes dis- dained as unsporting. Dulles was fas- cinated by the romance and daring of his trade. In later years he hugely en- joyed Ian Fleming's James Bond sto- ries, and was delighted when his lab- oratory?at his prompting?found that one of Bond's fictional weapons, a spring-loaded knife embedded in the heel of a shoe, actually worked. He was absorbed by the personal cl- ement of intelligence gathering. He often told his juniors of the time that "an in- significant little milappoolgad?RaioRel one in authority at the U.S. consulate in Bern, where Dulles was a minor of- n,-;?1 inward the end of World War I. Annents from Berlin. Dulles kept in touch with the ring of German officers who , tried to assassinate Hitler on July 20, 1944. He learned of the V-1 and V-2 se- '1 cret-weapons development at the Pee- ncmiinde research center in time for Al- lied bombing raids to set the program ; back for crucial months. ' Dulles' greatest achievement ,in World War II .was the negotiation of an early surrender of German troops in Italy, - which he arranged through a secret ? meeting with the .SS commanding gen- eral in a Swiss villa. That act doubtless I saved thousands of American lives also infuriated Stalin. who .did not rel- ish the prospect of a unilateral U.S. set- . tlement with the Germans. -; Dulles .had a major role in writing the - 1947 law that set up the CIA, and in ? 1950, its director, Walter Bedell Smitl asked him to come to Washington to tal over revisions in the agency's structure. .years since Secretary of State Henry "I went to Washington intending to stay Stimson disbanded the only U.S. code- six weeks," Dulles rembrnbered, re-.1 breaking operation then in existence with maincd with the CIA for eleven years." the scornful remark. "Gentlemen ? do He became a deputy director in 1951, -; 'not read each other's mail." Allen Dul- CIA boss tWo years later. ?!. les was a gentleman, liut he also had a' Differing Brothers. During most of -bent ? for reading other people's mail. . the Eisenhower years. Allen and John .'.that was inemous and invaluable. . Foster, his elder brother and the Sec- " rctary of State, played a predominant role in national security. affair. Pres? byterians both, the two were very dif- ferent in temperament and style. Fos- , tcr. who died in 1959, was a still, as- cetic intellectual. Pipe-puffing Allen was a charming extrovert whose laugh would ? rock a room. To Foster, the more ideo- logical of the two, Communism was a morally repugnant philosophy; to Allen, .more practical, the Soviet Union was a powerful political and military enemy. When it seemed that political ad- , vantage could be gained, Dulles some- times risked operations that he super- ? _vised with cheerful confidence. In 1953, the CIA helped to 'depose Iran's leftist. Premier Mohamoied 'Mossadegh, mak- ing way for the return of pro-Western' Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi from exile in Rome. The next year, -when the regime of Guatemalan President Ja- cob? Arbenz Guzman seemed increas- ingly pro-Communist, the CIA stage- managed a civil war that ended in Ar- bcnz's overthrow. CIA agents dug a tun- nel from West.. to East Berlin that succeeded in intercepting Communist communications until it was discovered. ? STAT eadr TrelErkeltnAtp.1R000600300003-9 - One was the Russian capture of U-2 Pilot Francis Powers, which enabled Ni-! , -7, Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP ' LIONT1110M7RY, ALA. ADVERTISER FEB .? 190D - 62,074 S 80.611 ? _ Allen Dune's, An Honorable Spy ,.?.. I ALLEN W. DULLES, who died recently In 1950, Dulles helped draft the legisla- at. age 75, looked like a happy college ton setting up the Central, Intelligence , professer. He had all of the affectations Agency. ,After a short term as deputy of the absent-minded campus Intellect- director under Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, yal?high forehead, baggy tweed; rim- Dulles became head of tht.-Nz..--,CJA 40d less glasses and the everpresent pipe. directed it for 10 years; The CIA post This facade hid the real Allen Dulles, gave him full vent for his love of in ? , who was a master spy and eager in trigue. ? triguer. He followed his grandfather and He figured there was a 20 per cent ? ,both of whom had been Secretary chance of. overthrowing the communist of State, as his brother, John Foster, government' of Arbenz Guzman, i n was later to become, into the .diplomatic Guatemala., In -1054, he sold the idea ? service. But his first assignment was to President Eisenhower. It took 12 days in intelligence, setting his life's pattern, to seize control of the couitry from..;, Dulles resigned from the diplomatic Guzman. . . corps in the 1930s over a salary dispute Dulles engineered the coup that sent ? . ? he was paid an amount equal to his Iranian Premier Mossadegh packing and boss' salary. He spent several years with. ? restored Shah Pahlevi to the peacock-. - a prestigious New York law firm, work- throne. He did not always win his battles, ' in,g primarily with the firm's German 91-00901R000600300003-9 STAT however. Two of his losses were colossal.' clients, the Thyssen steel trust and the T'ne Bay of Pigs fiasco brought ridicule. Farben chemical trust. When the U.S.- to U.S. intelligence and sowed the seeds ,. entered World War II, Dulles set up of doubt about its efficiency, a condition the Office of Strategic Services tin- . , w'nich lingers almost' 10 years later. ? dercover operation in Switzerland, tap- Dulles didn't like to talk about the Bay' ping his German. connections for secretof Pigs. information. . . , .? In Switzerland, Dulles perfected the One of Dulles' greatest intelligence '? ' ? habit of silence, and the art of drawing achievements backfired, setting 'off an, others out: , international political furor. He had the . ? , "I have always trieci to have important U-2 reconnaissance plane designed and ? meetings around a fireplace. There is built. U-2 flights at 70,000 feet over the some subtle 'influence in a wood? fire Soviet Union provided the U.S. with vital that makes people feel at ease and less information about the Soviet missile, pro-'.. ? , inhibited in their conversation; and if gram. When a U-2 was shot down by you are asked a question which you are the Russians, Premier Khrushcliev call., in no hurry to answer, you can stir . ed off a, Paris summit talk with up the fire and .study .the patterns the Eisenhower and chilled relations between: flames make until you have shaped your East and West. . answer. Ill needed more time to answer, Dulles' accoMplishments, in the service-? ? I always had my pipe handy to fill and of his nation far outweighed his relatively few boners. In times when the U.S. has, ? Perhaps it was during a fireplace to employ a vast espionage and in-, session that Dulles negotiated his major telligence apparatus, there are not many ? accomplishment of World War. H, the men who can do the' job as cleanly and early surrender of the German armies honestly as Dulles. He was agentleman . in Northern Italy. spy. Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: ClA:kijOi9.41009 I 1R000600300003-9 VIRGINIA 0 NOV .1-3Ec? for an 'Meer direck,r, and vice WASIIINGT,()N ? versa. If Pse:ildt..rit %tett,: a ? . ? career r.irecodent by rolainir,- 4i h'?-????? ?%, . V .4 1.? , ? -? ??-? :41 Cl ? k ,--4??11 ???? it ? ? ??,?;? 0 ? 16,4 4?11 ? Helms, the irrielligence common ? ? ? ity as presently constitute, WOUIld to have no lack o' se.ein career talent. IY .r, ,,,-1, ..p.- .. . -,??-? i', ,,i'l PL., - t it has wisehi:1cl an 2.1)hi.E.:- groa, -\ ? Even ?,;1-1.e CLA crillcs ri;;;:ree tha , ?o 4 -sr k&........./ ./ 11 L.. L.,,, r l;;; .'?,' ?- 14;;;?.....A.,':;??!. ? L. ,,,.;." :i i? ? ;' '4 4..... . i of employes at its n?earby Lang , ? 0.1'' ? !*. ley, Va. , headquarters and i , ; ? In 1,31. - ;., 41( et, lih,e ill.,1?ated Bay ;..averseas -posts around the.. ),vorltt . .. :.. . - By 1:031;;IZT, S. ALL'EN and .. . or: Pigs acivetitu.r.e, De,ineci.al: 1 Ca the. military sidi!, 1:?';',,:ere i JOIN A. GOLDS:\ZIVA xcnn,edy n.alm a a - Rep iibli ea,,.., , the bilhon-dolia.r? Deitinse Intel ? Nalin? A. McCue, to succeed Dal. i 1.1e11(2.'e- ?Age.".aY' whlch ????ali- ? . ;N?VAS/I.N.3TON - Prosidon'!"-lNleCone 'had been under ; fl its qeParal-e 'ii n - Na1TY an elect Rid (1 M. Nixon, is tieing .. secretary of the Air I;7oreci: and ' " AtVii* I...oree. intellig?ence services ? f.srongly urged to retain. career- . a nieralier of the Atomic Erier,y :. - In? l'?4?6?1'k'-'11', l'IlC re' is l'llo sol1'4. - 144 ' man R.'xiiar.:?I Helms in !ills pros. ?(??!er?cati,,s.:,,:m in the Eis..e?,hewe? r ,secret Nationol Security Agency :eat job as :head of the ever- i Adm,this-traition,; .. w.-hiell s-pe.eializes in codes, crypt ? controversial Central Intelligence ; . -'...- oTatilly and other electronic inlet , ,.. , ' Agency. . -:, President Johnson named an 1.; ligence. ? , ? -.other railitav man, Adm. Wit-id ? ... .- ? ;?":'??????;:-. ? i.. . . ? fr:IS, appointed by Presioen?t !..i,;;, F. Rabera. as yre:Con,,,s : ,. Hc has' perforn-,a,-,ice - 8,S .CIA: . . - .-r:A.17'17..i. Janson. in 1.:1V;, has been with ? successor In 1565. Heilims was : ' oh j and the ? Perf?1marl"" ?I: 1?11'..' : ' - .......:., ... , CIA since the big soy t-14:,,en..cy 11111 1. as Rai.):01,a,s do.rmi.y a i Under his direction? is dif.; ::-."..,..,?,::,. ; .,..,.?*,.sTAT........ . was established ia 14,)47. his re- th me. at ti Ito was clevtit-ed to '? Lela to assess. No ? goverrarient-;',.?:7.,????.: ?-.- ? '. -? : ten:tio watdd go far towar the trip , job When Rnbarni left it ;- opera 1: i an in the weed is under; - ,..li .1:,1,;.i.:.?,.:?.? .-,:?::-... . .. .. ... .. n ds ' . nailing clown a precedent for r.on- :. a yar 1.ai?er. ? . !.- -as steady a dm ire- at CritiCiSTa . ? ? ..!-:: ,:-?':?: -.,:'-.....' . .. ' .poliiiwal, career directors of Con- . . i; - as CTA, but 1113 agency gets geri-? ..,./...-:-:- ..' ............. t tral Iatelligenoe. 'No raeinttioll was mia?dc.? oil .? ?- orally hign. inarics from the. in-' .--41; : : ::-.:.:?"-...?? :"...--; ?::';',.--.?. . ? i Holms' ?polidios "when he appeared ... siders who are fan:Aar with tne. . -. ; .. .-',.' .????;"::.:?-..;:..??: -.?????:,,, - . Some 6! the keep Helms seati- bellon:-? the Senate Ax.yrked Ele?rv- : . ? i atelli genee estimates which it : -- ; - - :' :".. --'1;"?':' :;..1'."....,.??-l.:.?;.-..i.. '' -... ,,,,.. , . mont is being reaaYed to 'Nixon ..ice Colarnitte.o at the time of i' produces. . - ? ? by Democratic tam:makers.. They ; lila .aippainirmeiat, 4,,n, 19:35 a11,41., !?, . . :are s-tressing tbie des-arability al t again, in 191t3. His ca.reer .sum- ?.: .-'? SeerataTY 01 Delel.1:2e Clurict Cl;?&-. .. : call'eer continuity in C.I.,.. The-l' imaly made it clear that lie...had bid.14"111t1f4i?ed e."1:1-1er 1-111' fall:ilia": ?; ., contend that the top CIA job,: never held a pollitical job. ? ' ;: ? U. S. int ellingelilee operations : Las never been 'treated as a., ,A reporter in Europe .,before ;? Provod "su?1si'alli4a;1.1Y"- 2. re- ?.'..: : patronage plum. ' . World War it Hernas became an ; ?c?ottl: years. He. said be -accol?Yrs -.....?.:'. ' . ., intoilligc.mee etkier. dating lie - and bel:leNTS i h,,..! - ? ',..ilt-Pili;"?;c:r.,1?C'El : . ? - '..!.. l l o i l 0 yr abl y 'e dg, no p on reigs-ilitalii?Itit,hreysitieit. war.? lie ba s h. c.,,ch, in m ilitary .,!...c,ona.',Ii.11,n,k,,s hill 41 al Soviet dent i and eivaan, intexi' ' w.nce inips.ever?I; :nuclear strength and thinks therein . .1 ; ?-...-A '-'.'11. - -.-?1 ? ..1, has ever ade a purely partisan ? ? . i:.?....is. .,a bight?. degr.,:ee nr? aiii,_ , .. ? ' .annej.-t;-?ent.. al a CIA director. - !since. . ? Three of the six CIA heads to -1 ?Fe, had hem serving; as CIA's. ' 111111r' in Pilo ? intell.tenee corn.- ?.' Hi . ? ... :1 ; ? . ',date have, in; fact, been military 'c".'?-1?1'irec et .4.ai plans,unda).? l .nni,gcu:nc,i,t,y, about such national 05--1?1.- - - ',) itv d' ? t - '' ?'"- , .- . ..? 3!,.Te.Cone. When he was siLle-cted i- -t ? ? ;':1 ?-'.1 - men-, insulatied by theiir proles- : . ? ior Inc nu:1,1er Iwo ??)pot with': .. -- ?? : ... , ? . 7 ? - SiOn from paths in pallitles. ? . ? i? ? .. EKcept :tor all early mistakict- .1 '...;. ? ,Raborn, who had been the ex- ?,-:., staa,t1?, ? 41 s . j w:u.?., ? . , ,? , 1 .- ; ,, - - ?An all but forgotten Naval of. 1Pediter (iir. the hignly saceessrad ii: ..1.,ra,r0,4..0.,/,:, D.Ark., chah?,?.,,,,,, ,f, . .- 1 .._ A .. ? . ficer, RE!..7.1? Adm.. Roscoe, IIi m illen ? ; Polaris subarine. prom and ! ? 'the Senate Foreil.r,, - poi., vcos . - ? hoe iter, wasi the lifts:: director or let it be liniow.a, the outset .c,otrimptte, 1..1.,i, ... ?". , :?..4, ex..,L,?3? ? ? , . .., ...d.....art,:.: Da., tY,. A . (ler:trail Inteilig;ence. He. bad been ?i'7-...tnat rie ' Would stay In CIA /or; teat relations with enn,-...,,, ,?????:, Y.--; ;? i - ..,?;??? ?. the head of a predeces?sor intl. ;?? only a short period. .! ; - ?'.1 ? . , ;?the i-fause and ?S'eatate coramilit es: .?.*.i.-,::??:--????:-." :: ._ . . . ?? Il,ctice agency and was -appointed 1 - The transition from the hard..., which ride herd, .on: CIA activi.;;?. ...( . . by President Trutr,an. in 1047" ; ; driving, Lpde-eallin IvirCeni. ta'....i.ii:e.s.? 00115nally,. Th.,,:inio has., as: :, :::.;....;_.?:",..:?.;? ,.. ; . . s; nm Congress .estabilts:hed 'the 1..,. 1 i. ; ..ta satin.11er 'Rahorn was a aim '.,110 pPOIlli',F,,OCI , ill", 196G, I:Opt CIA:- ? ...'::??:,,,?.';.-,. .,-! .1 :: '......:i new CIA. : ? ; l .. cult one. for CIA, and the cleva... out at liorctri, p.,..;;,4,? msking?.;:....1...--: ...,...::-....,.:.:?. ; t; ? ;? .; . .preidr.cit. Eisenhower appointeil :'..1,1.1?11' 0.: one ?47 Iht!'1.:1., (.);vv",1' ,.w..:L,..s:??:.:;.. I 0,peraitions crime under Tire:. :::...,:,:?". :..- ..: .?:.' ?:':::. -. ; - - ? :ll ?1:1 ' ? his ?Varld War chief or staff, ;.' led I''Y the ageneY1' (1."'el"' Cit`.'.,',....r?,?,, ,,?,,,?,,i.? ,,.,?:. Inc...i.,.., ; .; ?- - ?.: -.. ,:-... - ...??, ., ,????????,..,',,7,',7,',1'ZI"'n: ,,,,:!.,..',...,...q...1.7.!,,,.:'....:!''- ? `",'. ,,,-....'+e, J .q,Ccr ?... recent -. :. .:;! . ? :, , ... ...; .:.. :-. ."-..'..,"?- ? - ? ???4 " ; ?Gen. Wailer Bertelt ..Sraith, to sue- ; ' ?1'????' ";??;.; ??? ' ?????'??:"'ii ;,,......;:i:?..,-..,?-???:????i,:;....".?,?-,"1 :v:,?;0,1, oil czecheee.vakia ?by.. .: .....? :,-. . ..-....-_?;.",..;,... : . i .-';--.?:1 cced Hiliic?nikoafil"er in 11-)50. In in i,:. -,:,;;;,:..- ,...:..,,,.:::.., troops.frein it '-'i zind other a a-.? . ?.:..,:y;??-? . .i ? ?:?:?,1 ? Di Os appointed Allen . W.' - ''? ' ? ' ;.::1K?2,.1.!?!.;'iii:.. -flans of the Warsa.w pact. Crit?-.1:, : .-.. _:..-?'?: ??? . Di 1c as the Prst civilian di-,...- . 1-???:'?".. les contentlicia that 0.-Mts'?warkliog.4"--":1 ...--.: .:.?:'..... -; .1 - --?-l'i ? . :..;?.:4 - , rce.tor . of Central Intelli.?,?ence, .. s .. . sticoeeding Smith. ? - - . ?':' :. of alch a- move 'ware delicii,T,ckt. i ' ; .- ? , : CO ng r C S '''iOrAl li: rili;11 tar y experts, "y.;?::::.;.?? 1 '.-?--: 1 ? ?? .1 . At- that time Di 'Cs had an ex- ?." ten sive in;telligence bac c kground... .who looked . carefu lly I o t nthose-'../' ..;! Ci 1101 orre y s, -say CIA' eetl'N ...... ,-? -? 1 . ;.:;-.? 1?Ie had "been a.ctive in trrie study: .?: . ?.1 li: '.; ' clavi?le'd the pre -:invasion ralives . ? .''...: ..,,;.; . ......:1 process which led to the creation: , _?;:: .,"1 4-,......?,... -,i,....,......,..,-..2, .of the Warsaw poet arrnicti and ? ???;.:?-,::::::;'...? ? .. i . -.1 all th e government's int ell; genet: 4 ?? ? , ''' ' -? ? ? Golds-alit% reported the possirriitlity of a move!: :. :-...",. :...:. or a civilian agency to 000rdinate ; -... ,.I .- . aet iVil los. President Kennedy, as :? ' , The law wlitieh creal.cd 0.-,A? into Czei?hosto-,,-.aina,' aVd.:??;Slrag ',MS - .- : ? ' - .. ' , , ? - . 'Or& C.A.- 111.iiiitni9e9initrkliAtd?:?ak,:;- . ntirs iippointimeint al a?ry in?en .1"le definite word that 'Olt: Krem-. ???; ... .1 not:need-PM 716 ?11.!?als -`1?1;:t?M:111. seb 200502/104 CCIA4R13P91-191)100060#0101''3 46' ' . , . . . ?fr'.., requirement has been. ivitorpretc&---"a? 1.?e 1?' '4".1'L" "'1 ' -1 l'i1:1-`5".1.-11'? ? : . Diales. ._ ? , ? ? 3-...?, evr, , , d , . ? ?:., ,,..., , a ? '.- , .. ' .. - , : ' :;: ? '.. ?'-;-. ? .. ., as requiring a ' eiviIiria deputy ;.- ht";11.'.:?,... `-41.4."1, til 1c ext-.."--:L.u? , : - :..to gr:41:. that Siightly?hold infornui.- . PORTLAND, ALNE STAT Approved hor Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91- EXPRESS ? E-C 1? 3 9 798 L 1968 00901R000600300003-9 )7.7.-z7zs=tworgg The Conspirator rommanwrsigmammixonmmazto- z est Cola Was CIA ffiliiitio By Bruce Page, David Leitch and Philip Knightley Excerpttd from the book The Philby Conspiracy. Copyright (c) 1968 by Times Newspaper Ltd. Published by Double- day ig Company, Inc. Early in the summer of 1946 Kim Philby i relinquished his London department to take an important new post "in the field." He', I went to Turkey under diplomatic cover, ostensibly as temporary First Secretary with the British Embassy, stationed in Istanbul and in charge of passport con? - trol. His real work, of course, was still spy- ' ing for the Secret Intelligence Service. The? Diplomatic Service, wig? appeared to be his employers, were in fact only his hosts. Philby clearly did not lose any rank by . '. going out to Turkey. His subsequent ap- pointrnent to Washington, if nothing else,' Express Special Report proves that. But the nature of his work, did change sharply once he went out "Into the field." He was then bound to come into, . working. contact with the Soviet espionage' - networks?and thus be projected into a 130-' , sition where his real work as a Soviet spy was not in any? external way distinguisha-1 ble from his pretense of being a British' spy. Whether Philby took the lead in per- ' suading his British superiors to 'send him 'Turkey we do not know. But if he did not\ .. do so; he should have, because once he was in the field he was almost impregnable. IN ' THIS CONTEXT, the British Gov- ?ernment's terse admission, 17 years later, . that they knew the,truth about Philby's ? loyalty makes interesing reading. In 1963 ,.Edward Heath said that the .British were' ,"now aware" that Philby had "worked for the Soviet authorities before 1946." (Au- 1. thors'. italics.) In other words, the. knowl- edge that Philby. had worked for the Soviets after 1946 was not new?he was working for them .to the extent that any field agent must do so in order to survive. What was new was that he had been work- ing for them all along. 'Istanbul had been an important neutral center in the war against Germany: Now,. ! the East-West confrontation gavt it an even greater importance. It was at the cen- 'ter of'a cold war which seemed likely to go,. hot at the drop of an ultimatum. Turkey has. a long border' with Soviet Union and In the 1940s Stalin was loudly claiming a slice of Eastern Turkey plus the right to put Russian bases on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The Turks, in reply, were clamoring for Western military aid. A civil war was raging in nearby Greece which looked as though it could easily go Corn-' munist. Much Communist shipping passes through the Bosphorus, and Istanbul has flourishing communities of Armenians, Georgians, Bulgarians, and Albanians, with direct links to the homeland communities behind the Iron Curtain. A better place to make contact with spies would be hard to find. The Turks, of course, knew fairly soon that Philby was an SIS man. Indeed, a man on the Istanbul newspaper Curnhurlyet once asked Philby if he would be inter- viewed for a feature-aritcle on "The Spies of Istanbul." Kim discreetly refused. All that the Turkish security men noted was that Philby used to have meetings with "students" from Communist Balkan states? 'but as that was his Job, who cared? what he was. This is the only way to CX- plain the passionate defense of Philby by 4 his colleagues of the S1S when the security t? officers of MI 5 were convinced that he was 1;.a traitor. It was to be some time yet before things did go wrong for Philby but when k the day came the KS stood by him with $)' an extraordinary, apparently inexplicable ; determination. , In the meantime his stag: was still high 1" and his biggest coup was still to come: in .1949 he was sent to Washington, with the ,rank of First Secretary, to be the SIS :liaison man with the fledgling Central InV "telligence Agency. It is difficult to exag- gerate the importance of this posting. The ?Central Intelligence Agency had been set up in 1947 and although beginning to feel Its strength still tended to regard the SIS with some awe. Between the two existed what CIA officers describe as "a very ape- cial relationship," and with it, "an amaz- fingly free exchange, of information" took place. Philby was right in the heart of this. His Contacts ranged from the director, a 'tough ex-Army man, General Bedell Smith:. down through the ranks. He was privy to CIA planning; he told the CIA what the SIS Was doing; he Was oft n briefed by Bedell Smith himself on top policy and, above all, he knew what the CIA knew about Soviet operations. , In Turkey Philby spent a good deal of ?time traveling around the Lake Van dis- trict close to the Soviet border. He kept an odd souvenir of the period which in later -Years he displayed in his apartment in :Beirut: a large photograph Of Mount Ararat which stands on the Turkish-Soviet border. Most people who recognized the double- !humped shape of the mountain would puz- zle over the picture, much to Philby's - amusement. Some of the more technically- minded would believe that they had solved the puzzle: ? the print had been made with the negative reversed; the little hump was on, the left instead of on the right. This would amuse Philby even more and he would point. out that the little hump was only on the left when the mountain was - viewed from the Turkish side. The view from the Russian side was, like the photo- graph, the other way around. THE PICTURE seems to have been an apt symbol of Philby's enigmatic status. Clearly, 'throughout his Turkish period, he was closely in touch with the Soviet intelli- gence network, and equally clearly his ' superiors in London .knew this. The vital question is how far the superiors had given him permission to venture Into this moral twilight. The authors have had' confirma- tion that Philby had been giver; permission to play the full double game with the Russians?to Pretend to them. that he was a British agent willing to work for them: which, unknow..nto Loodori,? ?.,.was ,exactly another..border with o tramu ?Bulgaria . This, by itself, would have more than :satisfied Philby's Russian controller, but he ;was able to improve on it. Like most agcn- !cies of its type the CIA is compartmental- ized as a protection against penetration? no one department knows the whole story. :But an agent is prey to a normal man's ' 'need to talk to someone about his Job and ? ,the only person he can talk safely to is an- ? other agent. In the CIA that other agent was often Philby. Because he was cleared to speak' with Bedell Smith, Philby was 'cleared right through every department and , merely by drinking around he could have learned more about the agency and its op- erations than any man except the director and perhaps one or two of his assistants. A ?!high-ranking CIA officer, now retired, told U5; "How much did Philby know? The sky was the limit. He would have known as, much as he wanted to find out." _ , This explains the reason for the silence that has surrounded Philby's period, with the CIA. If an intelligence agency has one or two men whose careers are going well, and these men?through no fault of their own?are "blown," the agency immediately retires-them. This may appear ruthless but Is obviously essential.' What happens?as it did with the CIA and Philby?when the en- tire agency is "blown?" There is no choice but to cover up, reorganize, and keep going. ? When the extent of 'Philby's treachery was finally realized/ the CIA Iliad no choice " (short of disbanding the whole organiza- tion) hnt ; to Araile bravely ,and cam on. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 SAN DIEGO, CAL. UNION SEP 8 - 131,091 S ? 237,289 /00 11 It roved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-R0P91-00901 'PP Three Served Thew Cou . THE PHILBY CONSPIRACY, : By Bruce Page, David Leitch and Philip Knightley, with an , introduction by John le Carre (Doubleday and Co.: 300 ; pages, $5.95). This frightening book, the work of three British journal- ists, is an account of two com- paratively minor traitors, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean, and that major spy, Soviet agent, and master of treach- ery, Kim Philby. Recruited while students at Cambridge (Trinity College for Philby and Bur ges s, King's for Maclean) these three devoted their lives, while ostensibly serving their country, to betraying its most vital secrets to their Russian masters. And, due to the close rela- tionship existing at the time between the British and our- selves, particularly that be- tween the British Secret Intel- ligence Service (SIS) and our v/fledgling Central Intelligence Agency c,CL4,..,they also made off with our most Mt- portant secrets. For at least 30 years prior to 1963, when Philby finally "went home" to Moscow, nei- ther flagrant homosexuality i nor spectacular drunkenness -1 nor a known Communist back- , ground was any bar to em- , ployment in the most sensitive , positions in the British gov- ernment. Such people also en- , joyed social acceptance in diplomatic circles and access to the most secret information to be found in Washington, , D.C. I Even when the simultane- ous defections to Russia of ! i . Burgess and Maclean painted , the finger of suspicion ines- ' capably at Philby, his SIS col- leagues hotly declared it in- conceivable that he could be guilty of anything, and effec- tively blocked any real inves- tigation of his activities. A year after the defections which first placed him under suspicion, he was giVen a se- cret "trial" of which John le. Carre says in his introduc- tion: "(He) was incompetent- ly tried in private and incom- petently exonerated in public. (He) held out, with astonish- ing gall', against what seemed to be a', foregone conclusion. . (He) knew the great weakness of the Establishment: 'This Club does not elect traitors; therefore Kim is not a ? traitor.' " Phil b y continued, it ap- pears, on the SIS payroll for 12 more years before the deci- sion was taken to frighten him into defecting to Moscow; a , public trial would have been "politically undesirable." . Burgess was a minor-league operator and a psychological; misfit. Maclean was a suc- cessful spy of the nuts-and- bolts variety, able to pass huge quantities of valuable and hard-to-get facts across to the Soviets. ..But Philby was the really , 000600300003-9 big operator. The authors tell us: "In 1949 he was sent to Washington, with the rank of first secretary, to be the SIS liaison man with the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency. It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this posting ... "His contacts ranged from the director. ... Gen. Bede Smith, down t hr ough the ranks. He was privy to CIA plannin g. He told the CIA what the SIS was doing. He was often briefed by Bedell, Smith himself on top policy, and above all, he knew what the CIA knew about Soviet op- erations." The scope of Philby's be- trayal can be only guessed at; the damage he caused will ' things about the interwoven scandal of the Philby-Bur- , gess-Maclean affair is that it illustrates, in almost parable form, so many of the curable , weaknesses of our society. .. . (It) tells us a good', ,deal about the role of privi- lege in our society, and the 1' degree to which irrelevant in- I .signia of social and economic status can be fatally mistaken for evidence of political ac- ceptability. . "It also gives us an idea of - how much our bureaucracy is : prepared to hide: The White Paper on Burgess and Ma- clean, and the tightly circum- scribed official accounts of the role Kim Philby played in Br itish affairs, are classic - warnings to those who are tempted to believe the official Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA7RDP91`-00901000600390003,4 STAT Saturday Review Approved For Release 2005312314141/1-943P91-0090 Real -Life James Bond 1R000600300003-9 My Silent I'Var, by Kim Philby (Grove. The best and most readable account 262 pp. $5.95), Kim Philby: The Spy' of Philby's activities?by Edward R. F. ? . 1 Married,' by Eleanor PlinySheehan?was published in The Saint- tine. 174 pp. Paperback; 750, Tho:' day Evening Post in February 1964. The , Third Man, by E. H. Cookridge.P3ut- present crop of books about Philby -de- nam, 281 pp. $5.95), and The Philby.. rives from the deliberate Soviet effort in Conspiracy, by Bruce .Page, David . recent years to glamorize the work of - Leitch, and Phillip Knightley (Double- .secret agents, an endeavor that began ; with the issuing of a postage stamp , day. 300 pp. $5.95), -concern three. ? c: British diplomats who fled to Russia? carrying the image of Richard Sorge,' successful World War II Soviet , , double-agent Kim Philby and his co- agent in Japan. Philby was made avail- lean. K. S. Giniger, a New York book defectors, Clay Burgess and Donald Mac-. able in Moscow, and the outside world ' learned, among other things, that he had " publisher, served as'a United States In-. .shed the American wife.he had acquired i - telligence officer during' .World' War II?:; and the Korean War, in Lebanon for the American wife of his - ? ? great and good friend Maclean, and that .! he was writing a book to correct all the "articles and other books which had been ' written about him. :That book is one of the four con- sidered here. An apologia dedicated "to .,.?.the comrades who showed me the way .i. to service," My Silent War adds scant I -real information to the story and is dis- ! t anguished principally by technical dis- ques o primary interest to those with more than an arnateur's knowledge of such matters. ' So much for "his" book. "Her" book, although the story of a woman betrayed, another British diplomat, who had been ' A not-so-innocent victim of this stir Was , tells scarcely more than is indicated by , .; at Cambridge with Guy Burgess.' and ? 'man and 1 such chapter titles as "The Other Wo- "I Lose Kim," in that order. Donald Maclean; ? and whose, 'career in Published as a paperback and featured the British intelligence services had 'al.: ?,' ready Marked him for possibly' its top in a leading women's magazine, The Spy .' ? ? I Married does not quite manage to be ? post. This third maws named Kim either an espionage story or a tearjerker. , 1, Philby. . As a publishing operation, at least,'I As a result of the Maclean-Burgess de- The Third Man is more interesting, ; fection, United States Central Issued here originally. as a paperback, gence Director General Walter- Bedell the furor in. the English newspapers last! , Smith threatened to break off relations with the British intelligence services un-': fall about the Philby case apparently ' less Philby, then occupying the key Brit'. merited transformation of the book into ish intelligence post in. Washington, was . this hardbound format. The author, E. recalled. Recalled he was, but handled Cookridge? is a professional journal with great care in Whitehall; even ques- ist who; according to the jacket. tions in Parliament, asking that the Brit, ,; has known Philby over a period of thirty- ish government name the "third man" -; three years. But, leaning heavily on the ;. suspected of Warning Burgess and Mac! Sheehan article, he adds little to the , lean that they were under 'suspicion, H : remained unanswered. Philby was given:; what the British call "the golden hand- , shake"?generous separation pay?and .'. helped to find another job as a journalist ' ? in Beirut. What is known about his activities in ? Lebanon is mostly confined to his seduc- tion of the wife of another journalist and ? their eventual marriage. In January 1063 he disappeared, and rumors about 'his ; . work as a Soviet agent began to be pub- lished. The -USSR announced in July of ,L- that year thaA00041iiii10/1dEle/ftat?e? granted political asylum...... ' By K. S. CINIGER TODAY IN 1908 IT MAY DE Somewhat difficult to recall that back in :1951 the war Americans?and 'Britons, toe?were ? fighting was taking place in Korea, and that the name Senator McCarthy re- ferred to Joseph R. McCarthy (1008- ; 57). In the spirit of those times the disappearance of two British diplomats who had intimate knowledge of Ameri- can secrets (and a rumored homosexual relationship as well) created quite a stir. cus ion of inte ce tec hni record. Of the four books, The Philby Con- spiracy is the only one that can be recommended. A product of group jour- nalism for The Sunday Times of London, the work by Page, Leitch, and Knightley (what a name for a Wall Street law .firrnl) is consistently exciting and reports as much of the story as is publicly known, at this time. Even more to the point, the 'introduction by espionage' novelist John Le .Carre lends real .meaningfulness to . the entire exercise by raising two 'lay ? -2151915/41PV46P0A7ROP9:1700901.R00060030000?39 1DC MSC wnetner the oto uoy net- work in England makes it quite easy for men who have been to the "right" schools to betray their country, if they ; wish to do so, and enjoy the protection of otherwise honest colleagues who can- not believe that men of their own kind can be traitors. This is not solely a - British problem. Not long ago, the son- in-law of a distinguished American gov- ernor serving as New York City's Corn- missiOner of Water Supply, Gas and Electricity, pleaded guilty to a serious ?? crime. No one had really bothered to check his credentials'. ? The second question concerns .a mys- terious fourth man. At Cambridge Uni- versity in the 1930s someone Amkown - recruited three promising young men, Kim Philby, Guy Burgess,' and Donald Maclean, as Soviet agents. Their activi- ties, carried on more than twenty years, have cost their country?and ours . ?much. Who was this man? Whom else did he recruit? And is he still at work? Neither Philby's own book nor the ? ? other three_ awe us any answers. Approved For Release20D51012/114DRICIANIMPMEN May 31, 1968 Two views of Kim Philloy, the century's' most audacious spy By JOHN QUINN AROLD (KIM) PHILBY 'rvery nearly bungled his first as'sign- rnent as a spy for the Soviet , Un- ion, and very nearly lost his life in consequence. , It was in Spain during the Civil War, and Franco's police were not as thorough as they should have been, per- haps, with the young English journal- ist. In any event, Philby lucked through and went on to become an audacious and highly successful Soviet agent and one of history's more remorseless traitor*. Philby recounts the episode in his book, "My Silent War," which he has sent out horn his refuge in Moscow and which has been published here by Grove Press. Not a spark of regret animates his memoirs, which constitute a rather de- liberately blurred summary of his 30- year career as the Kemlin's window on British and American intellie:ence opera- tions. As a devoted?indeed, fanatical ? Communist, he tells nothing that would compromise the work of nameless colleagues still on the snoop. We must look elsewhere to learn about the staggering extent of Philby's treachery, the flaccid self-assurance that permitted it to flourish and the bitter consequences that it produced. A good place to start would be in another book, "The Philby Conspiracy" (Doubleday), a-meticulously detailed ac- count by three British newspapermen? Bruce Page, David Leitch and Phillip Knightley--of the reason why. It is not a pretty story, but it is a salutary and necessary one. It is good to see that it is the work of English hands, for a society that can indict itself can still reclaim itself. And make no mistake about it, English so- ciety is indicted, thoroughly and soberly, for criminal folly and indolent corruption that smoothed the way for Philby and his comrades in treason, Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean. In sum, it did not matter that Bur- gess was a raging homosexual and vio- lent drunkard. Or that Maclean had gap- ing character defects. Or that Philby's early Communist connections were a mat- ter of record easily obtained by anyone capable of picking up a telephone. No, they were of good families and had. gone to the right schools and univer- sity (all were at Cambridge). Hence they simplY Couid.not be traitors. Maclean, therefore', entered the diplo- matic corps and became the principal conduit through which so much dearly earned atomic data was funneled freely to the Soviet Union from sources such as Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Philby, therefore, could become head of England's counterintelligence effort against the Soviet Union without even undergoing a routine check on his reli- ability. As a result, from 1944 until the flight of Burgess and Maclean behind the Iron Curtain in 1951, every single Western attempt to gather anti- Communist intelligence or subvert Com- munist aims was known to the Russians well in advance. There is much blood on Philby's hands. His duplicity?first asserted in this newspaper, by our London correepandent, Henry .Maule,?becente Virtually certain in 1903, when the truly unforgivable' folly was committed. Philby was allowed to get away. V't sl HY ? Page, Leitch and Knightley cannot say. Philby, smugly showing a glimpse of the colossal vanity that doubtless led him into the world of be- trayal, suggests that he might have been tipped off, even as he had tipped off Maclean when Maclean's perfidy came to light. It is not hard to believe. For, RS spy- story writer John Le Carre suggests in his introduction to "The Philby Con- spiracy," someone recruited Philby for Soviet service. Nobody knows who that someone is, or what he does. But it is quite conceivable that this someone is still active, and that his activity could have been compromised if Philby had been caught and had cracked. Perhaps we shall never knoW. For what it's worth, however, we do know now what Philby thinks of the responsi- ble figures in Whitehall and Washington with whom he came in contact. And some of this makes rather good reading, for Philby is a witty and facile writer. He had nothing but respect and No/ fear for Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who was chief of the CIA when Philby was first secretary at the British Embassy in Washington and head of the English intelligence apparatus here. Smith had a cold fishy eye and a precision - tool brain," Philby writes about the investigation that followed the defection of Burgess and Maclean, and "I had an uneasy feeling that he would be apt to think that two and two made four rather than five." , , Allen Dulles, a subsequent boss of. the CIA, he considered "bumbling,", and ."easy to get around." He wonders why:. 'President Kennedy took Dulles' advice on the Bay of Pigs invasion. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, he writes, has "a bub- ble reputation." ."Hoover did not catch Burgess or Maclean; he did not catch , (another Russian spy Rudolph) Abel for years; he did not even catch me." Philby rates the CIA as superior to the FBI?in social graces at any rate. The G-men he dismisses as stolid, country-bumpkin types, gruff of speech and insensitive to the nuances of wine selection. The CIA boys, on the other hand, at least knew that Burgundy is served at room temperature. Philby says he once asked Hoover what he thought of the spy-catching ability of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy, ; and that Hoover replied, elliptically: "I often meet Joe at the race track, but he MA never given ine a winner yeti"' So much for the drollery. The fact ' remains that Philby gave his Soviet mas- ters just about every winner we had in the stable, all safe bets. It is tempting: to do anything to prevent this happening. again. Perhaps it would be better to say: "anything the law allows," for as Le' Cerra notes, "Philby is the price we pay' for being moderately free." _ Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 0 The Philby Conspiracy by Bruce Page, David Leitch, :..Knightley. r Doubleday, 312 pp.., $5.95 Approved For Release 2891/0142:0RAME.1111,90000600300003-9 .. May 90 1968 ? .. The ideal Husband ? acting With th d bi graphicai accounts of the two other kus... . contrived afterwards to bury his corn- mid P?hilip. sian spies?also, like him, Cambridge munist past, .this glimpse of the onl .? ? : ' men?with whom Philby was involved: period in. which he openly revealed his ' his close friend, the fascinating, btillian,. loyalty is of great importance, and Mr. . ? , ... ? : . but drunken and dirty Guy Burgess, and Cookridges otherwise shaky book seems , . ? the distant, enigmatic, unfathom'able schi: to me worth reading for this episode ''?rophrene whose wife he has now dc..' 'alone. , ? . , ,,, tached in Moscow, Donald Maclean...1 ? If Mr. Conkridge casts a narrow . : .Klm Pliny, The Spy I Married `... '; All this gives human interest to the "In- beam of light on the dark beginning of 1; by' Eleanor Philby. si,At" book. Unfortunately its /authors Philby's career as a spy, Mrs. Philby i 13allantine. 192 pp., (paperback) i.'75? ??? ? bave ignored the duller but more impor- : sheds a dim, diffracted glow over the ? '? ? ;. 'My Silent War ?:: by Kim Philby. '".. Grove, 262 pp:. $5.95 , ' ' IL R. Trevor-Roper, The Third Man ? by B. .H. Cook ridge. PUtnam's, 320 pp., $5.95 'They have also'givenfullan racy o- e communists. Since Philby y. ....: itant subject of Philby's solid work against end of it. She was his third wife and .. . the Germans in 1941-5, which was the , they first met in the Middle East, after ' Teat basis of his rise inside the Secret 1 his fall from power in sm. Politically. .,. Service; and they make no attempt to re- naive, personally incurious, she never ' . : construct the general chlatAt within learned or guessed anything about his We have recently had a spate, if *ilot a which he operated, either ai a British or r,..re character till he suddenly and secret- - .. surfeit, of Kim Philby, the Englishman as a Russian agent. This inevitably makes ly diseppeared, leaving her itranded andel% 'who, for thirty years?eleven of them in - their. book seem Superficial. Nor is it, '; bewildered in Beirut. Hers is a simple ' .... side the British Secret Service?spied for ? helped by the vapid and, vulgar. Preface., ! personal narrative, which ncvertheless ,.. Rtissia and has non' gone "home." What. : o!' "-- i ?An la Carr?nn exorcise In proton. has merit AS WC11 as charm. , She dos he did in those years is now 'generally tious, rhetorical class-hatred which no- , Scribes Philby's state on the eve of his * . ,known. What he is is still something of where touchqs any point of ' fact ? and, flight, her own predicament thereafter, ? ,'. a mystery. Here are three books about . serves only to emphasize and Inflate, in. I her journey to Moscow to join him, and ? . him and one by him. All reveal some- zation of the authors. their life there until. she returned, dis- ; stead of to correct, the weaker generali- ? ' thing about the psychology of -this cele- , . illusioned, to America, leaving him in ' , 0 ' bratcd double-agent. Inevitably the last Mr. Cookridges book (which also of them, his own book, is the most re- vealing. I shall therefore deal cursorily with the others *and devote most of this review to it, which I find the most in- !cresting of all. Of the first three books, the most 'ambitious and complete is undoubtedly that of Messrs. Page, Leitch and Knight- ley, the "Insight" team of the English ,,Sunday Times. It Can be ,described in- differently as instant history or as high- class journalism, and it has both the ? virtues and the faults of this, to me, un- ithraCtive genre. That is, it has behind ? it all the resources of high-powered mod- , ern journalism; it is enlivened by the products of interviews with living per- sons; and it ?is presented in an efficient, readable, if impersonal style. On the other hand it lacks dimension: it has no corrective context, no general back- 'around, no reflective depth. The authors bav'e certainly established the details of the arms of Mrs. 'Maclean. This book ? solves no factual mysteries, but it is deals with the other two members, of, ; valuable 'for its incidental psychological the "unholy- trinity," Burgess and Mac- 1.lean) is different in bvery way from that evidence, to.which, in due course, I shall. of the "Insight" teahr. In many ways it return. Is much worse. It is far less accurate in ? Finally we have Philby's own book.. ' detail, and some of its confident asser- This is less complete than the "Insight" work, and it avoids the seas iive areas tions ire hopelessly wrong. Nor is it so ? professional, or so lively, in ?presenta- Illuminated by Mr. Cook ridge tion. On the other band the author, who Philby. Philby skims very li the years before 1940, when 1 Ithilby's career with substantial accuracy' 1?."4 "bourgeois" dictatorship. On that' The time-span of the book As I.?he himself has admitted that?although ,.....o.c.:easion he' met Philby,_ who was then Philby's eleven years in that ie they persist in some questionable ,user- ! ? I rest is frills. , . ? Qlions?such as that be remained a "field 1, , . agent" of Ks after his dismissal in 1951.1 has studied the world ,of espionage a and Mrs. htly over he joined does the British Secret Service. He hardly good deal longer than his rivals, .1 He says Franco's he had Russians 1Burgcss) spondcnt xcept for 'provide some background. to his story. mentions the Austrian episod very little about Us activity in ?CIO held fewer interviews,' but he'hai :?'. done more homework among the docu Spain, although he reveals th. meats. More humane as a biographer, he been sent there secretly by th also secs that _mere personal biography (who paid him through Cu is not enough. And in one area at least before his open mission as con he gives valuable personal evidence. As a: of the London Tinges. Equally, Social Democrat in Austria, he. was per. a brief epilogue on his official lcarance sonally involved in the Putsch of 4934' by which. Dollfuss destroyed the Sociati - in 1956, he says almost nothin on the .! period after 1951, when be was dis. Democratic party ? and established his missed from the British 'Sccrc4 Service. - in tact, I lee: the ? Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 Con trated Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 ? EVERGREEN-MAY 1968 ? !W; AVMEtilqi IN.EVAI.MW Ika, L.04: 6'1 [fr co&ia fSt-,ire Lit 0 ? f0 ) z-) aott 1 r Hilatt, ''.F.Or Release 205/!2/i4: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 THE WASHINGTON POST April 28, 1968 00600300003-9 aris Aides Seen As Sy ,Suspects Special to The Washington Post LONDON, April 27?The ation less black and white London Sunday Times con-' than it hinted last week. eludes that American officials believe there are two men a ministerial rank in France "who fall under suspicion ? of having supplied information , to Russian intelligence." 1 The newspaper also said It concluded that President de 'Gaulle "has decided to treat these American suspicions as kpart of a CIA plot motivated 'in part by resentment at his policy of independence from America." These are the major find- ings of the paper's own inves- tigation into charges made in Its pages last week that 'France failed to act on evi- dence that Soviet spies were factive in the French govern- ment and that one was a mem- In fact, the spy maY be George Paques, the deputy In- formation officer of. NATO; who was arrested by the French in 1963 and jailed as a Soviet agent. _ "In many respects," the newspaper says, "Paques fit- ted Martel's specifications for the high-ranking political spy ... (he) was actually. ... on the personal staff of French minis- ters . . . and he confessed he had spied for the KGB since working close to de Gaulle in 1944." , Although other names were mentioned as possible Spies, none seemed to fill the bill. "Recollections are confused," the Sunday Times reports,", care so in most cases." STAT ber of de Gaulle's Cabinet. s The issue was complicated 0- The charges were made by further by mutual distrust be- Phillipe de Vosjoli, a former tween the CIA and the French S French intelligence official in Secret Service, the paper says. Washington who resigned in 1902 arid now lives in the United States. "De Vosjoli's story is true," the Sunday Times says, "inso- far as he is who he says is and the events he describes did take place." But the paper says it is not possible for it "to be catarogi- cal" that de Vosjoli is not act-1 ing partly out of a desire for' "vengeance" and to "please CIA. new friends," although it claims no evidence of ciA, protection or subsidy. "There was a defector," i.heI paper adds, referring to "Mar-, tel," the high-ranking defector: from the Soviet Secret Police and the central figure in de Vosjoli's story. "All the West- ern intelligence services 'de- 'cided that he was not a double agent . . . and he did 'blow' the KGB (Soviet secret police) ;networks in Western Europe .or large stretches of them." But on such points as the existence of Soviet spies in de ' Gaulle's entourage and French reluctance to ferret them out, 'the Sunday Tiws. finds a situ- We could never be sure whether it was Martel talking talking or the CIA," a senior French intelligence official told the Sunday Times. "We: accepted that there was a' French spy in NATO. ,We de- cided to track him down. But none of our men got more, than vague hints that there' was anyone beyond this Man, . . . All the talk of someone in, high places came to us via the The CIA, for its part, nur- tured a _long-standing con- tempt for the French intelli- gence apparatus. In the late' d 1940s, when Walter Bedell,lf Smith was serving as head of. CIA, he was reported as say- ing, "If France knows, so does Russia in which case I don't. want to." Judging from the newspa-1 per's account of relations-be- tween the intelligence agen-1 cies of the two countries, Smith's remark was only a, slightly exaggerated statement, of- he American view in the! !ensuing years. ? ? Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : CIA-R6P91-00901R000600300003-9 Approved For Release 2005/12444441WRIDPW30090 2 3 Ai" 1968 A BOOK FOR TODAY A Soviet Spy Lifts His Mask';a ? ? , MY SILENT WAR. By Kim Philby. Grove Press. 262 pages. $5.95. In one of the final incidents of his career in espionage in Washington, Kim Philby drove to Great Falls, slipped into the woods and buried a cam- era, tripod and related acces- sories. All this, the British diplomat accomplished in haste and se- crecy, since the threat of expo- sure appeared to be edging up on him. But in ensuing events, neither American nor British intelligence investigators could complete the chain of evidence that would assure his conviction. In the interval, Philby fled to asylum in So- viet Russia. Now Philby has begun his memoirs in "My Silent War" to add to the pool of books and newspaper articles written By JOSEPH G. O'KEEFE about him and his two accom- plices in spying for the Soviet Union, Guy Burgess and Don- ald Maclean. To expect Phil- by's work to be the final defin- ? Rive volume in the revelations of the diplomat-spies is to be overly-optimistic. Inste a d, "My Silent War" is rather narrow in scope. ? Introductory Sketch The author announces in a preface that the book is an introductory sketch of his ex- periences in intelligence work, and that more will follow. He apologizes for any embarrass- ment he may cause former colleagues in both the U.S. and Britain and adds: ? "I have tried therefore to confine the naming of names . to former officers whom I '? knew to be dead or retired." ' But apart from the incident ' of the buried camera, Philby 111. 1R000600300003-9 STAT at ? offers almost no details of his operations for the Russians. Presumably he wants to keep? the channels open for current and future espionage. There is much information, however, on American and British spying and counter- spying against the Germans in World War II. The author : maintains that British agents committed more sabot a ge' against the Germans in this country in the early stages of ?the war than the entire Ger- man-born colony in the states. ? Harold Adrian Russell Phil- by came to Washington in 1949. ps top British Secret Service officer working in liaison with the CIA and the FBI. For years he had funneled secret information to Russian agents, and with Burgess and Mac- lean, continued to do so. All three were well-born Britons in sensitive positions with full access to strategic data. When exposure threatened, Philby was the mysterious "third man" who warned the others. Burgess and Maclean dodged behind the Iron Curtain. Attacks U.S. Officials But it is difficult to accept at face value 'a so-called factual account by an author who built a 30-year career on treason and deceit. Philby warily re- ? veals what he wants revealed and not a syllable more. A reader could well assume the author is simply paying off old ? grudges by the degree of yin-' dictiveness with which he at- 'tacks American officials. . Dwight D. Eisenhower is de- scribed as "The most pedes- trian of United States presi- dents." Philby says of Allen.: Dulles: ."I had no fear of the,. bumbling Dulles; years later I was to be puzzled over Preri- dent Kennedy's mistake: in taking himIserlotisly over' the Pay af.Pigarti i . STAT Of J. Edgai Hoover: "His ' methods and authoritarianism are the wrong weapons fcr the subtle world of1 intelligenca. But they have other uses., They enable Hoover to collect ' and file away information' about the personal lives of lions of his fellow country- men." But to the Ro cnbergs who were executed for passing atomic secrets tO Russia and to Judith Coplon Who was sim- ilarly accused b t never con-. victed, Philby applies the word "brave." One American to win a ' grudging word o from the British Walter Bedell Sn . admiration , spy is Gcn. ith. "He had a cold and fishy eye and preci- sion tool brain. Bedell Smith, had an uneasy feeling, would be apt to think that two and two make four I rather than five." But Philby fails to find faultt With the gullibility of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan , who told the Parliament that ? no evidence existed thatPhil- by had betrayed, his country. Presumably, this whitewashed the espionage agent. Nevertheless, the author manages to inject a fictional ! note of suspense to his story as he relates how he pitted his 4 wit and audacity against Brit-1 ish intelligence agents who bring down this slippery operator. ? I .? tried earnestly to Approved For Release 2005/12/14 : Q1A-RDP91-00901R090600300003-9.'. BIR1,11,1;GII/dt, ALA. LEW& ? titoroved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 E-177, 626 8-.218,356 ci) CAA, flo 111b- BY GEMICE WELLER ATHENS (CDN) The 50th anniversary of the Soviet external and internal net?yoili KGB known unaffec- tionately in the West as the Cagey Bee. centers on the rising name of its newest demo y cha ,1.111 an, Semyon Tsvigim. The organization, now num- bering a mind I,000.090 em- ployes with 25000 troops at its disposal, thereby acquired a leader in the special art of unrolling spies or turning Western spies into spies tor the Soviet Union. Tsvigun has been promoted above several more expe- rienced men and lakes the No., 2 post directly under Yuril ,e Andropov, a regular party official who was amvinted chairman this -year to keep the sprawling agency under civilian control, FOUNDED BY Russo-Pole Felix Dzherzhinski, the vast apparatus 'Changed its name with a change in dictators. The organization lost heavy weapons like tanks and air- craft when, after Stalin's death, the portly Georgian former architect who headed NKUD, Lavrenti Berk+, made an abortive attempt to con- front the Red army by sur- rounding the Kremlin. Out ma-. netivere(l, he lost and was .executed. Publicity from Moscow cert., tering on Kim Philby, the British spy,, is part of the) directed effort to make spying as popular a vocation as ; skydiving. Nothing is said in 'Moscow of some 30 Soviet " spies who have been spotted , working with the United Nations as a front and have been eased out. Philby has boasted of .deals ailed araaairiz T Trn ?int ,011,11,_ s Lv U licit Blitz" States ha' back prize I urn for nob .!)e ly les MON(; TI11; 'est 13 triumphs in vas - drugging of a- swoman in 1f0 lwhy pictures of 14f'?- a a di iinkard in lzvestia iiid then (Teeming the American pmss corps into suppressing a story aiready printed throughout the Soviet Union. So far unrivaled in this anniversary year is the marv- elous lIttle bug which mum invented and placed in an American embassy to listen to conversations of at least four -generations of ambassadors. Averell Harriman was .the unwitting fall guy who accept. ed a golden eagle with this gadget embedded in It. The gift was supposed to symbolize . Russia's gratitude for American help. during the Second. World War, The Rus- sians cleverly calculated that the eagle Would be perma- nently mounted in a promi- nent place in the ambassa- dor's office, to serve as a reminder .when bargaining with SOviet officials. THE BIRD transmitted not on y Harriman's private con- versations and. dictation. :but those of several successors, including', ironically. the fu- ture dir*tor of. the Central Intelligence Agency, LI, Gen. Bedell Smith. - ? After about eight years of work the bug was discovered accidentally In the mid-1950s by Ambassador George. F. Krun-an. His words of: muffled outrage when he reached Her.. Iiii were so sulfurous that they caused his removal from .his post. Anybody who has ever been honored with . (he' specially bugged rooms in Moscow or Warsaw. hotels knows what, ? is like to hear after midnight the low clicking chuckles com-' big from the numberless 101111)5 and pictures as the. listening circuits are checked against each other. It was no surprise when, at the height, of the American aid program to Nasser, an electric Soviet bag was found in the Cairo home of. an American press ' attache. But that self-powered bug that ran nearly a decade without renewal inside Sta- lin's eagle is still honored and unmatched. 1 A. ; - STAT Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 ? 16. NEW l'ORK nylia.s? Approved For Releitrereng14 CIA-RDP91-00901P000600300003-9 ? \ ? ? BaSed on Interview With' P .Who Spied for 1Soviet STAT ? - ? . ?- 10SCOW, Dec. 13 (Reuters) -?? stir up trouble In various ollowing, in unoffici laces which when merged al trans- In the spring of 1951. an ! ? ' ? p, , )n, is the text of an article' inportant meeting was called ? together, would lead to an ?-o,stia based on1/4an inter-_ in the office of one of the \ . explosion and the toppling with Harold A. R. inlay, leaders of the Central Intent- ' of the existing system. ',Ion who spied for Moscow 'gence Agency, the sanctum .! sanctorum of ? the Ameritan : . A big stake had been now is a Soviet citizen: ,, N. frosty December - morn- secret service. In addition to ? placed on the operation. Ac- :. The night's gloom has Allen Dulles, around the long cording to the thinking of Its originators. It was, in the t yet left the snow-covered ? table sat Frank Wisner, the first place, a "test stone" eets: The trees on Gogol .. head of the service for super- , .. posed to become the start- secret subversive political op- and, in the second, was sup- ulevard are covered with a ;zy hoarfrost. At the trol- erations. His post was ? 'a bus stop stands a chain of secret even to trusted work- , ing point for broad countre- )s ers, he was listed as. an as- ? revolutionary actions against ple, wiping their cheek all the Socialist countries., i stamping their feet. Peo? Sisthnt to the director of the , ;, The for policy coadP ? .iArThaeititneg for the signal for the'ams of saboteurs were, ? ! are hurrying. A new day... 1 its cares and concerns,, nation. Alongside him was ' drop. , his ? ,:f mginning. Automobiles are i assistant, Frank Lindsay. ' p. Lindsay, Wisner's as-o. o hurrying, passing one : The participants .in the sthisetaniitilmhgaodiabtoeen designated. executor or other. ; meeting were waiting fpc,11% ogle operan 11 no longer young but still i? impertaimportant guest. Rim Pniley, , Foldiby -approved the plan; i '.,i tng strong marl of wilddlo, the head of a special liaison ' ;certain details seemed to have ? ght walks unhurriefily, ' mission between the British, been' inadequately worked j ag the sidewalk, breathing , -frosty air with pleasure. secret service and the CIA. 1 , out and he made a number.' in Washington, was supposed '-', of corrections. The partici- Is wearing a warm sheep- to take part in working out 'pants in the meeting caught I a-lined coat and a fur hat., ah operation of extreme im- tis , every.. word; Philby 's ? A Meeting at the C.I.A. ! takingly prepared were pains-1" . takingly analyzed. All but I one, Dulles, a man with 's Imagination. could imagine...!?. everything that suited him. i But even n'nightmare he 4 ?. could not conceive that a.;:; . . staff worker of the Soviet,i; ' intelligence had sat opposite V him at the table In his office 4 that August morning. Soviet spy Kim Philby had . fulfilled his latest assignment . from the center. ? And now it became our. 'turn to sit at the same table with Kim Philby. The table was a small one, the polish; does not shine. An English table; covered with old Work' papers. The rest of the fund. i? tures which seemed to haveq arrived in this Moscow apart- 1, ' ment straight form the novels ?' ? ? of Dickens, also suited the darkened wood of the :1 bookshelves, the armchair'i, that seems almost preten- tious to' our modern taste 1. '? ' and the fireplace, an electric 'a one though.. The apartment ,1 is filled with books, of all kinds for the most part Eng- ? ,, lish. The host of the apartment??1 fits harmoniously in this' en...] vironment He is very ,calm,',k ? ! nnhurried, nis big gray head 4 '' ? with a straight part is seated ; on strong sho:Iders and his weathered, ma.a'uline face bi ? . softened by brieht eyes with:, ? ' ' a slight squint. When he'; smiles, wrinkles run from the corners of his eyes to his?I temples and his face becomes even warmer. Kim Philby, a . man of great destiny, Is re-.; ,! ceiving us, two Soviet Jour-.4 nalists, for the first time. a There are millions of ques- 4 tions in our heads, but where should we begin? Comrade ? Philby quite obviously catches ;`i the confusion on our faces. I "Let us start with the be- ' ginning," he proposed softly, from the stove, as the Rus-,I ? ians say." I. portance. The C.I.A. had opinion was. worth a good ? teu by the morning and pinned high hopes on the .deal. Dulles, puffing on his frost and the rushing: British guest, a prominent pipe, listened to the English am of pedestrians. Oc- : member of the 'British secret guest with emphasized re- Dnally people bump into .service who was considered ' sped. He had vast informs- "E ," they hast. an outstanding expert on op- say to him. "Don't men- tion about him. He knew that' erations against the, Soviet Vary had gathered experi- it," he answers pleas- , ,Union and other Socialist, ence as long before as the r, speaking with a slight ! countries. Philby had stood at , Spanish Civil War, that nt the cradle of the C.LA.?the Franco had personally pinned - glances at the people, American espionage system the Red Military Cross on his to trolleybus stop and, was created under the guld- ' chest. Dulles also knew about cheerful good-natureance of the highly experi- the extensive ties between a, after a fashionable enced British secret service. the English spy and the ruj- g girl in a mlnicoat, who The Englishman was as'lag circels of Hitler's Ger- . lag borne along to the precise as ever. He arrived .many, the 'fact- that Philby regularly visited Berlin before the war, where he quite simply met with von Ribben- trop. He was an outstanding .g y I on the minute: Very.elegant, -n. He looks with inter- I thoughtful,. he 'was the model t boys with schoolbags ; of a British gentleman. A : ,eir shoulders throwing slight stammer did not spoil oaths a eachother on his speech, and legends of"' specialist and the C.I.A. knew noulevard. He always the powes! of his charm dr- ? it ? 1 .:, this man with a good culated in both the CIA.-- i. It. Was a Catastrophe': open face. ' and the British secret serv-1 ? One of the most significant ice. After cordially greeting . i ' operations of the C.I.A., cake- :, what unusual things it) is he, what is he smil- those assembled,,he took his ol, found on the boule- seat at the table. :1' fully concealed throughout 1, ;. the subsequent 17 years of; in the coated trees, on ? The C.LA:had been ordered I.1, the cold war, ended in an Un-?' rdinary Moscow morn- to work out an operation on ' expected failure. The team of ; he young boys on the . organizing a counterrev0111- ; , ? dropped men was greeted in s ? ? ? ' -ard, the passers-by on: tionary uprising in one of the dewalk?who of them 1 a proper way. It was a catas- ' Dalkan Socialist countries. . ? trophe, and moun ring was imagine the surprising The first stage in this action : 1- observed in CIA. headquar .ory of 'the man who was supposed to be the..! at them this morning? ! dropping of a group of sev- ' f l, d All the services were, ' s been called a mystery1 eral hundred saboteurs on i his life a riddle. Long ? the territory of, this country. ;' turned upside down. All the; hypotheses linkedl whole decades, 30 long I Almost all oaf ' them were ...possible -f eternal riddles. A life ' emigres from the country.. ' f, with the failure of the opera-::, plex as a labyrinth. ., ? The poop waif' supposed to: 1, .149.1hat had been so painsyt His English reveals him as., a man of high culture. -He was born in the 'In? ian ' town of Ambaia and pent the first four years of his life in India. "On Jan. 11 will be 56,". Comrade Philby says. "My father setved as, an officer ? ? ? 4. L ? - ? ? ' ' ??-?? ? , . Approved For Release 2005112/14C.I,ARD,1361-00901.1:20006DM0003-9 umslal,d ? ?ti. ? ? ? ?? ? 2 STAT ? ? ? tJ Phil) WIWI =MS HERALD Approved For ReleANAgidarg4 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 ' Washington Pot Foreign Service MOSCOW, Dec. 18--The So- viet security police, celebrat- , big its 50th anniversary this week, introduced British de- fector Harold Adrian (Kim) Philby to Russian readers to- night. In a fiv _-column interview produced for the government newspaper Izvestia, Philby de. scribed proudly how he had , outwitted Western intelligence ? agencies during the 1940s and 1950s and publicized his re- .cently completed book of memoln?which MMociates ?.have been attempting, thus far unsuccessfully, to place in ? British and American news- D. r papers. The Philby interview fol- ' lowed an article in Pravda . 'earlier toda Y accusing two Lir met . American military STAittaches here of espionage in r the Ultratne 1nJun, 1968,?Ife- .eIisR 0 ied on iWest cusatien!s which Ow U.S. Erni bassy called "fabrications' ,.. without foundation."' . The organization, known! ince 1954 as the ,?Committeel on State Security (KGB), is with Allen Dulles, Frank Wis- ncr and Frank Lindsay of the CIA about organizing an anti- Communist revolt "in one of the Socialist countries in the Balkans." This.operation, which currently headed by. Yuri P. Andropov. It was founded six Weeks after the Communist seizure of power as the Cheka, or Extraordinary Commission Against Sabotage aria Specula- tion. Its leaders over the years have included Henryk Yagoda, Nikolai ,Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria?all of whom died vi- olent deaths here?and Alex- ander Sheiepin, a member the present Politburo. ' The Philby intervieW: added -, little to what had been dis- Washington between ?1949 and normal tours of duty last sum closed in British pubkations 1951. He said Allen Dulles mei% Pravda gave thi impres? - it( - - 7 ' about the'double agent's "'betty. "was attentive to people but 'sion that the Incident itici,Just ities and was curiously reti fact treated them comics occurred. . :4116.1.:4?46 cent on several points. For ex- condingly. He never consid-' ample, Philby described a talk ere'd matters deeply and I would say that, with all his: ,aggressiveness, he *as nev- ertheless a dilettante. The best proof of that was the ad- venture of the Cuban invasiond which resulted in such a; ,shameful failure. It is believed! he occupied this post only: thanks to his brother, John' ,Foster Dulles . .; .?1 Philbyl ,said he had tried hard ,to have ,good relations with Richard, Reims, the present director of the CIA. "He was an easy per- son to work with, though he was very reserved. He could never have invented gunpoW- der?he's certainly no Walter Bedell Smith . He is more ,of a politician than an expert .at his trade. As I was once ,told by an FBI officer, Helms was connected with a certain; Influential . political group, '1 'which was Always pushing. him forward."..: ? Philby 'said his' conversa-1 tions with J. Edgar. Hoover' were "sometimes of a very cu- rious character," and dealt mostly with the methods of Soviet Intelligence agencies. Philby claimed that Hoover's'. deputy, identified only as Ledd or Ladd, once tried tot persuade him "in utmost seri-I ?unless that President Frank./ lin Roosevelt was an agent of the Communist International." [In Washington, an FBI spokesman said a man named D. Milton Ladd had been a deputy of Hoover, but had re- tired in 1954. The spokesman Philby betrayed to his super- declined to comment ?on the ions in the KGB who thereuponi Izvestia article.] The Pravda charges this foiled it, was revealed earlier morning referred to an inci-. this year to have been directed dent in Orsha, the Ukraine. 18 at Albania. Why the KGB pre- months ago involving Lt. Col, ferred to avoid mentioning its! Robert E. Liichow, the assist. role in saving the Albanian re- ant U.S. Army attache, and Lt. gime of Enver Hoxha was not Comdr. Robert B. Bathurst, as- known.. sistant Naval attache. Both ate Oen. Waite(' Bedell smith ilby appeared to rate the Ird2 i woretrieetzusbjseacitri WasWilltimat. Iiighest of the various intelli- proper detention" but stayed gence officials he met in on In Russia to complete their he had in 1951, in ,Washington ? Approved For Release 2005/12/14 ; CIA-RDP91.00901R000600300003.-9:. ? 6.011101.. Approved For Release' 2005/12/14 : Cl 1.7:41;.c Vcz4 Si' ATID ; 11FAUTLVI la-6 JU N 6 1C37 -RDP91-00901R000600300003-9 Th Ct-.4 17 ? A. . An absolute requisite to any organ- ization such as the CIA is that thing called esprit de corps: pride, enthus- iasm, devdtion and jealous regard for the honor of the group. The Marines have it. The FBI has it. In the CIA it is almost 'totally lacking: Two men are primarily responsible ;.ior this situation. Both were Presidents of the United States.. 1 The first was Harry S. Truman. HeY ? appointed the man who is considered by most observers (and CIA employ-. - ; ees) to have been the best man ever '- hto head the agency, Vice Admiral Ros- coe H. Hillenkoetter?and then refused to back him rip. Most readers of. these ! lines Vill think immediately of Tru- man's dismissal of General MacArthur at-the height of the Korean War. But it may be that h replacement Of Hill- eankeetter was more disastrous, histor- ically. Admiral Hillenhoetter was ap- pointed Director Of the CIA in May, 1917. He was a professional intelli- gence officer, ran a tight shop, and a good one. President Truman left guid- ance of the CIA. to the Policy Planning ? Staff at the Department of State. In . - practice that meant that George Ken- man; John Paton Davies, Jr., and Ham- an Cleveland gave the orders. There came the inevitable showdown, and Truman sided with ? the State Depart- n-lent. In 1950, Hillenkoetter was mc- .aced by General Walter Bedell /Smith, who bent to the. State' Depart- ment's, will. A number- of top CIA, .ca- reel. officers doi.a,-nted when Hillenlioet-.. ter did. Agency moral never recovered.. ea. ? - The _second blow was administered - by John P. Kennedy. It is the record that one of. the CIA's most brilliant ? achievements was the overthrow of the Cmmunist- government of Guatc- '.2.he man who engineerd-d it was one of , America's authentic heroes ? and CIA's: Prince- ton, B. S., cum laude, 1028-; top ten ; percent,- Harvard Law School,. ? nqi.; . .varsity. football and lacrosse; Multi- engine aircraft pilot; .:luent in Spanish, -French, Germain, Cninese; coondina. tor of Admiral Byrd' a second Antarctic .expedition; special assistant Attornkr;;,?::..-. - General. Of the U. S.; assistant to Gen, Chennault information of the Flying' . Tigers; special representative of like US in the Philippines; Ambassador to Honduras and to Costa Rica. lathe fin- al months of "his administration, Pr, j- - dent Eisenhower chose Whiting latter to plan and organize the invasina of Cuba, a salute to hi a earlier succaa3 in Guatemala. - :John F. Kennedy relieved him, with. out explanation, discussion or coin- mon courtesy.? - The Bay of Pigs tragedy followed. But CIA morale had died months earlier. Hillenkoetter and. Willauer Wen the two most - respected professionals. in CIA's 20-year ? history. Each was shabbily. dismissed. . Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600300003-9