NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600370001-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 23, 1977
• Content Type: OPEN

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HEARINGS
ER 0001-4
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
86-073 WASHINGTON : 1977
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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d sess.)
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
BARRY GOLDWATER,.Arizona, Vice Chairman
BIRCH BAYII, Indiana
ADLAI E. STEVENSON, Illinois
WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, Maine
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina
GARY HART, Colorado
DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, New York
CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey
JAKE GARN, Utah
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
JAMES B. PE ARSON, Kansas
JOHN II. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Er Officio Member
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee, E.T Officio Member
WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director
1 ioWARD S. LIEBENGOOD, Minority Counsel
MICHAEL J. MADIGAN, Minority Counsel
AUDREY H. HATRY, Clerk
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CONTENTS
Page
Tuesday, February 22, 1977------------------------------------------- 1
Wednesday, February 23, 1977---------------------------------------- 00
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977
Statement of Adm. Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, nominee for Director of
Central Intelligence_________________________________________________
Testimony of Adm. Stansfield Turner__________________________________
Statement of David Cohen, president, Common Cause__________________
Statement of John Marks, project director, Center for National Security
Studies -----------------------------------------------------------
Statement of Richard Cohen, United States Labor Party ___________.___
OTI3ER MATERIAL
Vote on nomination of Adm. Stansfield Turner_________________________
70
Adm. Stansfield Turner's responses to February 28, 1977, written interroga-
tories submitted by the Senate Select Committe on Intelligence----_-
71
Personal and financial information provided by the nominee-------------
87
Letters to Chairman Inouye from CIA General Counsel, Anthony A.
Lapham, February 17, 1977, February 18, 1977, and April 11, 1977-----
95
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NOMINATION OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
The committee e met, pursuant to notice, at 10 :04 a.m., in room 235,
Russell Senate Office Building, IIon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman)
presiding.
Present : Senators Inouye, Goldwater, Bayh, Stevenson, Hathaway,
Huddleston, Biden, Morgan, Hart, Moynihan, Case, Garn, Mathias,
Chafee, and Lugar.
Also present: William G. Miller, staff director; Michael. J. Madi-
gan, minority counsel; Audrey Hatry, clerk of the committee; and
Harold Ford, Anne Karalekas, Sam Bouchard, Charles Kirbow, Stan
Taylor, Jean Evans, Daniel Childs, Spencer Davis, Martha Talley,
Edward Levine, Michael Epstein, Mark Gitenstein, Walter Ricks,
Thomas Connaughton, and Thomas Moore, professional. staff
members.
The CHAIRMAN. Today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
begins its hearings to consider the nomination of Adm. Stansfield
Turner to be Director of Central Intelligence.
Timely and accurate intelligence is a major means of preserving the
peace and constitutes our first line of defense. For these reasons alone
the post of Director of Central Intelligence is one of the most impor-
tant in the U.S. Government. Accurate intelligence and rigorous analy-
sis of that information will play a critical role in the forthcoming
strategic arms limitation talks, the possibilities for peace in the Middle
East, and the viability of the NATO alliance. In all of our relation-
ships throughout the world, our national intelligence system will play
an invaluable part.
The national intelligence system requires a leader that will. be able
to direct the activities of many highly complex organizations in the
national intelligence community such as the National Security Agency,
elements in the Department of Defense, as well as CIA, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the counterintelligence activities of the FBI and
the intelligence functions of the Departments of State, Treasury, and
a number of other Departments and agencies. The position of the
Director of Central Intelligence requires a man with the ability to
manage, to set priorities, and allocate resources. In order to carry out
this task he must have the clear authority and support of the President
of the United States, the Congress, and the people.
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The most important duty of the Director of Central Intelligence
and the purpose of the vast and complex national intelligence system
of the United States is to provide the President and the national
leadership, both in the executive and legislative branches, with the
best information and analysis of that information available to the
U.S. (xovernnient. Independence of mind, mature judgment and all
analytic bent, are qualities that must be possessed by the Director of
Central Intelligence if he is to fulfill his mandate.
It will be the task of the Director of Central Intelligence to assure
that our national intelligence system is not only effective but that it
will work under the Constitution and the law. Without question, the
overriding purpose of the national intelligence system, as indeed of all
our agencies of government, is to protect and enhance the liberties of
all Americans.
This committee has made every effort to work together with both
President Ford and President Carter and the intelligence community
to set in order problems that have emerged in recent years. A close
working relationship between the Director of our national intelligence
:iysteni and the committee is vitally important if that important work
is to contimie. phere must be trust between the legislature and the
executive branch if our national security policies are to have support,
and if the public is to have the confidence that necessarily secret activ-
ities of the United States are being conducted in conformity with the
Constitution and the law and with the purpose of strengthening our
Iree democratic society.
The Chair wishes to recognize the ranking Republican Member,
Senator Goldwater.
Senator GoLDWATER. Thank you.
Admiral, I recall with great pleasure our visit to the South Pole
It fell- years ago, and if you are going to remain an admiral and want
to do it again sometime, I will go with you.
You know as well as I know that the dual position of Director of
Central Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency is a tough assignment, perhaps the hardest of all the jobs in
govertunent.
The job carries unusual responsibilities and requires unusual quali-
fications. It demands the ability to manage, set priorities, allocate re-
sources, and direct activities that cut across many agencies of the
(lovernment..
Tn addition, the Director has to furnish all kinds of information to
the President and the Congress that is vital to the peace and welfare
of the country, while at the same time maintaining the confidence of
the. people.
Your own experience in handling various command responsibilities
in the Navy over the years, plus your intellectual training early as a
Rhodes Scholar and later as college president, indicates to me that you
are well qualified to handle this difficult assignment.
T believe that your appointment as Director of Central Intelligence
is one that brings the right man, to the right job, at the right time, and
t will be very happy to support you.
The CxATI.MAT. I am pleased now to recognize a very distinguished
member of the committee, who will in turn introduce the nominee.
I -would like to introduce and recognize Senator Stevenson.
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Senator STEVENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
11Ir. Chairman, my colleague Senator Percy could not be here this
morning, and has asked me to express his regrets and to also offer to
your record a statement. I trust that statement will be entered in the
record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Percy follows : 1]
Senator STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman, the last time this committee
acted on a nomination for Director of Central Intelligence, it offered
its advice. This time, I believe, is an occasion for consent.
It is a great pleasure to introduce to this committee a distin-
guished ? Illinoisan, Adm. Stansfield Turner. Admiral Turner's edu-
cational background, including a Rhodes scholarship, his thoughtful
publications, his energetic leadership of the Naval War College, and
his past professional experience with intelligence and policyniaking
all suggest the intellectual stature and the intellectual integrity this
most difficult office begs for.
Admiral Turner is it proven executive. He has served with dis-
tinction as Commander of the 2d Fleet, and as Commander in Chief
of Allied Forces, Southern Europe. Admiral Turner has the Presi-
dent's confidence, it would seem. His record in all suggests the for-
titude to tell the President about the world as it is, and not as the
President might wish it to be, and an authority that would command
access to all policymakers at the highest possible levels.
The Admiral's innovations at the Naval War College, his appetite
for intellectual combat suggest little patience for habit, not all of
which is right in the intelligence community. It would be possible
at least for things to change, and for new priorities to be established
in the intelligence community, to better reflect all of the requisites
of survival in a new era.
And, Mr. Chairman, as to his commitments to our national decency
and the rule of law, he, like anyone else, can only offer his assurance,
as I am certain he will, and also a record that is bereft of any evidence
to belie them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Stevenson.
I am pleased to now welcome to the committee the nominee for the
Director of Central Intelligence, Adm'. Stansfield Turner.
Admiral Turner, welcome sir.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed in any manner you wish, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, U.S. NAVY, NOMINEE
FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am
very pleased to be here this morning and to have the opporunity to
express to you some of my views on the conduct of our national in-
te] ligence activities, and on the President's decision to nominate me to
i Senator Percy appeared later at the afternoon session and read his prepared statement,
see page 37.
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the post of Director of Central Intelligence. May I first, however,
thank Senator Stevenson for his very kind words, and Senator Percy
for his in absentia.
I would like to start by noting that governments, no less than any
of us as individuals, depend upon accurate and timely information
to make decisions. The collection, the evaluation, the dissemination
of information to protect our national security, and upon which to
base the foreign policy, is essential for any sovereign state. And in this
day when our state has such international responsibilities, a good
intelligence collection organization is absolutely vital.
Today, however, we are in an era of effort to reduce international
tensions, and in this era, the United States, in my opinion, needs an
organization for intelligence of high quality and responsiveness per-
haps more than any other time. The Congress itself has recognized
the fact that the success of our ongoing negotiations for SALT and
MB'FR may very well depend in part on our ability to verify that
past agreements are in fact being carried out. Thus, our intelligence
will be one factor in developing that mutual trust which will be essen-
tial to further progress in this important area. If our intelligence is
--faulty, we may misjudge; if it is inadequate, we may read the signals
incorrectly. Without good intelligence, we may simply miss oppor-
tunities to insure the world of peace. I believe, then, that we must
have the best intelligence agency in the world. I think we can do this
and still be fully consistent with American values and law.
At the same time today that we are working toward international
understanding, we are also witnessing the substantial investment of
the Soviet Union in their military forces, whether their forces are
larger cr smaller than ours, stronger or weaker, better or poorer is a
subject that could involve interminable debate. It does seem clear to
me, however, that we are going to require all of the leverage which
good intelligence can give to our military posture if we are going to
remain adequately strong in the future.
However, today there are more than military requirements for in-
telligenee. Our intelligence must be acutely aware of foreign political,
economic, and social trends, as well as the military ones, and must be
able to relate these in assessing the prospects for our future.
There is no doubt in my mind that we possess the capability to
have the best of all intelligence services in all of these areas. To do
that, though, we must insure that our intelligence resources are em-
ployed in an optimal manner.
In this connection, the President has within the last few days made
it expressly clear to me that he expects the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to be able to insure him that our total national intelligence
effort is being conducted in accordance with established priorities and
with minimal duplication of effort. He also wants to be certain that
the foreign intelligence work of all agencies of our Government is
being conducted strictly in accordance with law and with American
values. The President indicated that while he believes that existing
law and executive orders encompass these objectives, lie intends to
work closely with the Congress on any revisions of law or executive
orders that may be desirable to assist the Director of Central Intel-
ligence in fulfilling these charges.
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I believe that we can adhere to the President's guidance for greater
efficiency and responsiveness within full legality while simultaneously
maintaining the individuality, the imaginative initiatives, and the in-
dependent voice of the various agencies of our national intelligence
structure. I appreciate the importance of maintaining a degree of in-
dependence in our subordinate national intelligence activities, as well,
of course, as in our tactical intelligence operations.
I have already discussed this question with- the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense and know that we all approach it
with open and cooperative minds. We all seek greater effectiveness
and efficiency from better direction and coordination. We all abhor
any thought of such a degree of centralization that alternative judg-
ments cannot be heard, and uncertainties discussed.
Again, the President stated that he feels that the decisionmakers in
Congress and in the executive branch will be better served if they
all work from the. same foundation of intelli ?ence. This is not to say
that consensus among the various elements oftlie community need be
forced, or that dissenting opinion need be stifled. Contrary views
must be presented, but in such a way that the rationale for such dis-
sent is clearly evident.
In fact, were the Senate to confirm me for this position, I would
look upon maintaining the objectivity which comes from considering
divergent viewpoints as my highest priority. Objectivity benefits both
the producer and the user of intelligence. The user obviously benefits
because lie is given all reasonable alternatives. Asa frequent user of
intelligence, I understand, I believe, the importance of approaching
decisions with a range of choices in hand, not simply one option. I
also believe that I am aware of the dangers to military planning and
operations of intelligence estimates that are biased in one direction.
The -producer of intelligence also benefits from an emphasis on ob-
jectivity because he is not asked to sacrifice his intellectual or scientific
integrity to support an established position, but rather, he is asked to
lay out all sides of a case indicating the level of confidence he has in
the deductions he makes from the facts at hand. Objectivity simply
must continue to be the hallmark of our intelligence effort.
My second point of emphasis would be to insure that the work of
the intelligence community is conducted lawfully. I believe with my
deepest conviction, that the greatest strength we have- as a world
power is our moral dedication to the rights of the individual. If any
part of our government is perceived to function outside of this funda-
mental American tenet, it can only.bn:ing discredit on the whole. I be-
lieve that it is the solemn duty of every agency of the U.S. Govern-
unent to protect the constitutional rights of our citizens.
I also believe that there are valid national secrets and recognize
that the Director of Central Intelligence is charged by law to prevent
the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. Thus,
though American citizens can rightfully expect their government to
operate openly, there must be a relatively small amount of informa-
tion and activity which is kept secret. As long as representative groups
of elected officials such as this committee and the Chief Executive are
kept informed, and as long as they can act for the society in regulat-
ing the secret information and activities, I think that the difficult
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balance between necessary secrecy and an open, democratic society can
be, maintained.
From the discussions I have enjoyed over the past 21/2 weeks, it ap-
pears to me that this committee has taken great and successful. strides
in improving communications between the Congress and the intelli-
gence community. I fully support this progress and philosophy. With-
in the limits of the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch.
I would intend to do my part in insuring that Congress remains
a full and knowledgeable partner.
Similarly, I believe that it is incumbent upon the intelligence corn-
triunity to make a serious and continuing effort to avoid the overcla.ss-
ification of information and even to attempt selectively to publish
unclassified information which is of high interest and value. to our
citizens.
Even though the various disclosures of questionable intelligence ac-
tivities (luring the past several years were quite necessary, they have
had an adverse impact on the reputation of our intelligence com;;iu-
nity. A third area of emphasis which I would suggest would be to
continue to rebuild this reputation. The intelligence community is, by
and large, composed of well-qualified, hard-working individuals who
are as dedicated to our national ideals as are any of us. As in any
organization, they need a clear understanding of. what is expected
of them, and a clear recognition of the importance of the work that
they would do. I intend to make the realization of these goals my next
highest priority should I be confirmed in this office.
To achieve this, we must continue the work of restoring confidence
in the credibility of intelligence effort, and this can only be
(]one by actions, not, by words. Redundant programs, parochial causes,
needless controversy within the community must be eliminated.
Everyone's full effort, must be turned to producing intelligence infor-
mation and. estimates of the highest quality. That product will meas-
ure our intelligence community's worth. And coupled with good com-
inunication with the Congress, maximum permissible disclosure to
( he, public, we should be able to create that measure of confidence and
credibility which is vital to a successful intelligence program.
There is much work ahead, and if T am confirmed by the Senate, I
;would be excited by the challenge. I have been in the service of our
iN ation for 30 years, and I view this appointment as another oppor-
tunity to continue that service in an area of special importance. today.
Since, You have my biography, I would not want to detail further
my experience in managing large organizations or in the analysis and
r ationalization of defense programs.
I would like to conclude simply by reiterating that I do respect the
dedicated professionals in both our civilian and military components
of the intelligence organizations. I hope to encourage them to realize
their full capabilities, to be innovative, questioning and objective. in
their approach to all problems. At the same time, I believe that I also
understand the need for honest, rigidly accurate intelligence assess-
rmrents if they are to be useful to the Congress and to the President.
If I am confirmed, I would work to re-establish the full credibility
,if the community's work, to insure that a worthwhile contribution is
made in support of our decisionmaking process, and to require that
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the gathering and dissemination of intelligence for the United States
is consistent with the ideals upon which this country was founded. .
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, I would be proud to be
the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, and to work closely with this committee, in help-
ing to provide this country with an intelligence service second to none.
Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral Turner.
Before proceeding with the questioning by the committee, may I
administer the oath, sir?
Admiral TURNER. Please.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you swear that the testimony you are. about to
give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Admiral TURER. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.
Because of the interest shown in this nomination, the Chair would
like to once again institute the 10-minute rule, and so I will begin
with the first 10 minutes.
Admiral Turner, as you know, one of the purposes of the creation
of the CIA in 1947 was to insure that U.S. intelligence would be
independent of military control.
Although the Department of Defense intelligence activities rep-
resent the largest part of the annual U.S. intelligence budget. I believe
that, purpose still continues, and so the question I ask, sir, is whether
you might be able to better serve the intent of civilian control were you
to resign your commission prior to becoming the Director of Central
Intelligence?
How do you react to this issue, sir?
TESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD' TURNER
Admiral TURNER. Mr. Chairman, I come to this nomination as an
active military officer. The law provides that an active officer may
serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. In fact there have been
1.1 military officers who have served either as Director or Deputy
Director. Ten of them served while on active duty. Six. of those ten
returned to military service after completing their duty in Central
Intelligence.
Having thoroughly enjoyed serving my country in active military
service for 30 years, I am anxious not to foreclose the possibility I
may follow in the footsteps of those six.
The 'CHAIRMAN. Do ,you perceive any conflict of interest in your
serving with your commission?
Admiral TURNER. I do not, sir. To begin with, I am charged, or
would be charged by law, not to accept any responsibility to or carry
out any responsibility with the military services while. serving as the
Director of Central Intelligence, and I would intend to comply with
that law, not only to the letter, but in its spirit.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you discussed this relationship with members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Or with the Department of the Navy?
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Admiral TURNER. I have discussed it with the Secretary of Defense
and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I believe that we have a
thorough understanding, and I think that is the level to which I will
be communicating with the Department of Defense primarily.
The CI-I MRMMAN. What are the thoughts of the President on this
issue, sir?
Admiral TiURNEE:R. The President has told me that it is his strong
desire that I remain on active duty.
The CHAIRMAN. If you retain your military commission while serv-
ing as the Director of Central Intelligence, your Deputy Director
nmst he a civilian.
Do you have in mind as to who should be the Deputy Director?
Adniir.i.l TURNER. I am very pleased with the incumbent Acting
Director who came from the position of Deputy Director, but I
would not feel it appropriate at this time, having such a short acquaint-
anceship with him and with the community, to commit myself ir-
revocably to maintain him in that position. But I am pleased with
him and'I would certainly want to consider him as a candidate, among
others.
The CI [A] aMAN. Y-on are speaking of 11Ir. Knoche.
Admiral TITRNFR. Yes, sir.
The CIIATRMAN. Now, as a senior ranking military officer, I believe
you are entitled to personal staff. Do you intend to maintain this
personal staff while serving as Director of Central Intelligence?
Admiral TURNFR. I have asked the Chief of Naval Operations and
obtained his permission to maintain four officers as a personal staff.
The, C1rArr.MAN. And will these men be drawn from naval
personnel?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
The Cn.AunrAN. Senate Resolution 400, the resolution that created
this committee, expresses the sense of the Senate that the head of any
department or agency of the United States involved in any intelligence
activity should furnish any information or document in their posses-
sion, custody, or control whenever requested by this committee with
r esnect to any matter within the committee's jurisdiction.
Do you intend to honor this request of the committee with regard
to any information requested which is within the jurisdiction of this
committee',
Admiral TURNER. Within the accepted prerogatives of the executive
branch, I certainly intend to do that, and it is my pleasant impression
that the arrangements that currently exist between this committee
and the intelligence. community are working well to the satisfaction
of both the committee and the. community, and I would pledge myself,
sir, to continue that, spirit of cooperation in every way.
The CTIATRMAN. I am glad you brought that up, and I would like
to say publicly that as Chairman of this committee-and I believe I
speak for the members of this committee-I have been extremely
pleased with the cooperation that we have experienced with all of the
:agencies of the intelligence community. They have been most forth-
corning and forthright and open with us, and I look forward to the
same type of relationship with you, sir.
AIy first, question on eonmressional oversight is related to whether
you will honor our requests for information.
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Will you also, without a request, advise us as to information which
you feel we should know about?
Admiral TURNER. I feel that is an absolute responsibility, sir, not
only to your committee, but to the entire Congress. I think that the
intelligence community should be acutely aware of the activities of
all the committees of the Congress, and anxious to offer intelligence
information that may be of assistance to any of them.
The CHAIRMAN. This Senate resolution also expresses the sense of
the Senate that each department and agency of the United States
involved in intelligence activities should report to this committee
immediately upon discovery of any and all intelligence activities
which may constitute violations of the constitutional rights of any
person, violations of law, or violations of executive orders, Presiden-
tial directives, or departmental or agency rules or regulations. The
resolution further provides that each department and agency should
also report to this committee what actions have been taken or are
expected to be taken with respect to any such violations which occur.
Will you pledge to make such reports promptly to this committee
with respect to any and all such violations?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, there are established procedures and
regulations within the executive branch for reporting such improper
activities, and I pledge myself to follow those absolutely and
completely.
The CHAIRMAN. One of the major problems in maintaining the
necessary secrecy has been the proliferation of committees and Mem-
bers of the Congress involved in intelligence activities. I believe at
one time the Director of Central Intelligence theoretically had to call
upon about a dozen committees.
Do you have any thoughts on this?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I would draw a distinction between
information concerning sources and methods of intelligence collec-
tion and covert action, and substantive information of an intelli-
gence nature. It is very important that we maintain-and it is the
legal responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to main-
tain, the secrecy of our sources and methods of intelligence, and of
course, covert operations must be dealt with very discreetly because
people's lives may be at stake as well as other great matters of impor-
tance for our country.
I would think it would be very desirable if the dissemination to
the Congress in these categories of sources and methods and covert
operations could be limited to a committee in each of the houses of
Congress that could assume responsibility for adequate dissemina-
tion and adequate measures of control elsewhere. I don't think there
should be any restriction at all on the number of committees who are
given the product of our intelligence, effort as it applies to their work.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. My time is up.
Senator Goldwater?
Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you.
Admiral, you have the dual role of Director of Central Intelligence
and Director of the CIA.
Do you feel that these two positions should be separated and headed
by two individuals?
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Admiral 'I'rr: ~r:r.. I do not at this time, Senator, but lain certainly
ope,, to looking at that suggestion. I have in the last. couple of weeks
here heard arguments on both sides of the fence, but I am really un-
willing to jump down at this time one way or the other.
Senator GO DWATER. Will you keep us posted as to your thinking in
this matter?
Admiral Trnxvu. I certainly will.
Senator GOLDw.1TER. As Director of Central Intelligence, you con-
s rol only a small percentage of the intelligence budget. The remain-
i n,? is mostly controlled by the Secretary of Defense.
How ran the Director of the entire intelligence community operate
effectively when someone else controls most of the money?
Admiral Trr.ri';r. If I might, sir, say that the executive order of
la ebruary 18, 197(i, which created the Committee on Foreign Intelli-
.Vence, I believe gives that committee considerable authority over 100
~l)ereent of tile, intelligence budget, and I as Director of Central In-
ielli;gence, if confirmed, would be the chairman of that committee.
I think that is a very important tool. It is one that has been exer-
crised in i-hi, last budget preparation for the first time, and my pre-
liminary view is that it was reasonably effective. It is possible that the
lmdzetarv authority of the Director of Central Intelligence might
be strengthened, but again, I feel it would be preliminary for me to
l)Iss such a judgment.
Senator GOLDW ATrr.. Thank you.
As Director of Central Intelligence, which includes the operations
of the 1) [A and others, you have the responsibility for them but not
the authority over them.
Do you think this would be a problem, and how would you
handle it?
Admiral TURNER. I don't think it need be a problem. It certainly can
be. I think it is a matter of good leadership and particularly per-
suasive leadership. These are tools, such as the budget power that I
just mentioned. There is provision in the executive order I described
also for the establishment of priorities by the Director of Central
Intelligence. All of these things have to be worked out on a cooperative
basis, and there may be some need for strengthening the law or the ex-
ventive order in addition.
I think it can be done, and particularly with men of good will, and
I am very impressed that both Secretary Brown and Secretary Dun-
can are men of good will, and I intend to cooperate with them in every
way.
Senator GOLDWATER. Thank you.
That's al I I have. Mr. Chairman.
The. Cr3AIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator Bayh?
Senator BArH. Admiral, I want to add my welcoming voice to those
that you have already heard.
Let Inc go directly to one of the critical questions, it seems to me.
that past. CIA Directors have had to confront, and which I assume you
might be forced to confront yourself. I say this in. no way with the
intention of suggesting that either you or the present Commander in
Chief will be tempted or succumb to temptation to do something that
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you feel is basically wrong, but individuals differ in their appraisal of
factual situations and legal guidelines.
You have to have the trust of the President of the United States to
fulfill this role, trust that you will do your job right and report to
him honestly. Also, it seems to me, the country has a right to demand
a degree of independence so that where your judgment conflicts with
that of the President you will have the capacity to say no, Mr. Presi-
dent. As past Director Helms has mentioned, it is difficult to say no
to the President of the United States.
I guess what I want to know, Admiral, is if you are Director of the
CIA, and your assessment of the situation is that something should
not be done and the President thinks it should be done and counter-
mands your order, are you prepared to say no, Mr. President, and if
you say no and he continues to say yes, what alternatives are avail-
able to you, and what alternatives are you willing to pursue?
Admiral TURNER. The issue in my mind, Senator Bayh, -would be
-whether I viewed this as a disagreement with the President on the
proper course of action, or whether I felt that the President was pro-
posing an action which contravened my sense of morals and ethics or
the law of the country. Surely if I just think the President's course of
action is not as wise as another ones but is perfectly legal and moral
and ethical, I feel a responsibility to make my views known to him.;
but I am not a policyma,ker if lam confirmed as the DCI, I am a
provider of intelligence.
If, however, I am put in a position of being asked to execute some-
thing I feel is immoral, unethical or illegal, I believe I have only one
option, and that is to make my point extremely forcefully to the Pres-
ident of the United States, perhaps calling; upon the new Intelligence
Oversight Board for counsel, advice, and support, and then, if I am
unable to reconcile that difference with the President, simply to resign,
and I would be prepared to do so. I have discussed this with Presi-
dent Carter, but I would not be sitting here today, sir, voluntarily if
I thought there was any possibility that I would be confronted by
this situation by this President.
Senator B.-YH. As I. say, I don't anticipate that possibility, but we
have boon confronted with some rather unusual circumstances in the
past, and I think that is a question a lot of American people are ask-
ing themselves. Have you explored in your own mind the possibility
of the alternative of reporting those significant differences to this
committee?
Admiral Tunniai. Yes; I have explored that, sir, and I do not be-
lieve that I would report such differences to this committee. I believe
that as long as I am employed in the executive branch of the Govern-
ment, my loyalty is to the President of the United States. I believe
that if every member of the executive branch who disagreed with the
President went to the press or went to the Congress independently, we
-could have anarchy in the executive branch.
Senator BQYii. Well, Admiral, if you will excuse me, we are not
talking here, again, about your definition of differences, simple differ-
ences. I accept your definition, that on petty differences, even differ-
ences on policy, you have to follow the Commander in Chief, but if you
are talking about a President who is embarking on something that is
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clearly illegal, clearly unconstitutional, don't you have a responsibility
not to go to the press or not to go to Congress generally, but to go to
one of those committees that might be in a position to change that
policy or say wait a minute, Mr. President, let's rethink this?
Admiral TURNER. I would come to you, sir, but after having resigned
my office.
Senator BAYnI. That's a fair assessment.
Let me ask you to go again, and here I guess we are talking about
hindsight andVhoping that that can be it's normal 20/20, and keep us
from getting into situations that we have had before. This last session,
the Congress was considering the matter of how we. can limit if not
totally avoid the invasion of individual rights, civil liberties. Our
committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 3197.
which tried to strike a balance between the, right of individuals to be
protected and secure under our Constitution, and their right to be
secure from foreign invasion and this kind of danger.
Could you give us your judgment of this kind of legislation? We
were dealing in that area specifically with limiting wiretap legisla-
tion. We were trying to provide the same protection in the foreign
intelligence gathering area that now exists as far as the application
of electronic surveillance to domestic matters.
I would like to know whether you 'would support our efforts to
try to put reasonable guidelines, protections, the use of a warrant, not
only on electronic surveillance but other invasions such as surrepti-
tious entry. the mail openings and the other invasions that we are
painfully aware of that had taken place in the past.
Admiral TURNER. I certainly would support those efforts, Senator.
T am not prepared at this early time to make specific comment on spe-
cific provisions of the, legislation, or to say which should be treated
in the Executive order as some of those you mentioned already are,
or which would be better in legislation. However, I think the intel-
ligence community, as I briefly mentioned in my opening remarks,
needs a real sense of direction from the Congress and the executive
branch, so that people know the rules within which they are required
to work.
Senator BAYU. You see nothing inconsistent with doing your job
of collecting information necessary to protect the country and protect-
ing the rights of American citizens by requiring that warrants be
used?
May I ask you to expand this to apply also to American citizens who
are abroad.? There seems to be. a rather unique distinction where if
you are an American citizen at home your rights can be protected, but
if you are an American citizen abroad, there is significant leeway, so
far at least in the way the intelligence community has looked at this.
Would you give us your thoughts on that, please?
Admiral TURNER. On the first part of your question ; yes, there is
an inconsistency between maintaining full rights of the individual
;:nd conducting secret operations, but I don't think that that means
that we should not spell out reasonably explicitly how we are going
to draw the line between those conflicting interests. That is the whole
problem of conducting intelligence in a democratic and an open soci-
ety. And each instance is going to be a judgment call, and some guide-
lines laid down by the Congress and the President can be useful in
making those decisions.
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As far as protection of Americans overseas from invasion of their
proper liberties and rights, I believe here again we must recognize that
although it is more difficult overseas because we are not in full control
of the situation, we must extend to Americans there the protection of
the Constitution to the degree at all possible.
And we must conduct our activities over there in accordance with
American law.
Senator BAYls. I guess the key lynchpin of what we are trying to do
in most instances is apply the same standard, the same proof on intel-
ligence agencies in the foreign surveillance and gathering area that is
now appli ad domestically, which basically has been the criminal stand-
ard, and in the legislation which we passed through this committee, in
ah areas save one, we did apply the reasonable cause standard, the
criminal standard, to the foreign area. The one area of exception was
where we could find someone about whom we could say we had reason-
able cause to believe, and could nail down that he or she was on the
payroll of a foreign intelligence system involved in clandestine acti-
vity. Given that one roughly minor limitation, do you see any prob-
lems? Would you support asking a Federal judge for a warrant before
this kind of activity could be initiated as far as American citizens are
concerned here and abroad?,
Admiral TURNER. I am really not prepared to go into that degree of
detail, sir. I can foresee considerable problems in seeking timely ap-
proval of a judge in the United States before carrying out an activity
abroad. I am not necessarily opposed to the concept but I am not ready
to endorse it at this point because I simply haven't been into it deeply
enough.
Senator BAYIT. Are you-would you support that as far as intel-
ligence activities in the foreign area as they applied here at home?
Admiral TURNER. I think we should conduct our intelligence activi-
ties in foreign areas in as close a manner to those in the United States
as we possibly can.
Senator BAYII. Does this include your support of an effort to require
a Federal judge to give permission before electronic surveillance and
mail opening and surreptitious entry can be conducted?
Admiral TURNER. I beg your indulgence, sir. I am simply not that
familiar with either the problems that that would create or how that
would be executed to pass that judgment here, but I will certainly look
into it with all dispatch and be back to you, if I am confirmed for this
office.
The CHAIRIMIAN. Your time is up.
Senator BAYII. Let me make one observation, Mr. Chairman. If the
admiral is confirmed, he will soon find out.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.
Senator MATIIIAS. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief statement which I
request be included in the record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Mathias follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES MCC. MATIIIAS JR., A U.S. SENATOR FROM
TIIE STATE OF MARYLAND
Secrecy and democracy are at best uneasy partners. The investigations of this
committee in the recent past have provided evidence that secrecy can be a spawn-
ing ground for abuse.
86-0713-77-2
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The failures of the intelligence system we uncovered jeopardized not only the
rights and liberties of individual Americans, but the very values and principles
t:iat are the bedrock of our society. And the requirements of secrecy were
stretched so far that they inhibited even the legitimate review of basic programs
:wd policies.
if they are to exercise their responsibilities wisely. Members of Congress, Flx-
ecutive Branch officials and the American people themselves must be adequately
iiiformed. They must know enough about intelligence activities to be able to
neigh and evaluate the moral and political issues involved.
By bringing the intelligence services back within our constitutional system,
by correcting abuses and checking excesses, the Select Committee has, in my
ouinien, strengthened our intelligence arm. Now that the proper range for intelli-
gcuce activity has been reassessed and the primacy of law has been reaffirmed,
our intelligence agencies can carry out their vital mission unencumbered by
dnubts about lgitimacy.
The hireetor of Central Intelligence plays a crucial role in seeing that our
int.ellit;enee agencies operate effectively, accountably and constitutionally. He
roust keep alive a continuous interaction between policy groups in the Executive
Itranch and Oversight Committees in the Congress. Ills assistance will be re-
quired in the mutual effort to develop clear statutory charters for the intelligence
:agencies. Ile must he personally committed to continuing and close cooperation
between all elements of the intelligence community and this Committee in the
discharge of its oversight function. The exercise of that responsibility requires
that there he full access to all information necessary for stringent accountability
to the legislative branch.
As this confirmation hearing proceeds, those are the criteria I will have in
mind.
1 would just like to add one personal remark. As a Navy man myself, I welcome
.ldmiral Turner's nomination. I am confident that the leadership and discipline
that have been required of him in his service with the Navy will enhance his
ri i I.ractiveness to this Committee and his suitability for the position for which
lie is being, considered.
`;enntor MATH IA S. Admiral, again I congratulate you. It is a pleas-
ure to see you here today.
Admiral TTm ER. Thank you.
Senator MATxIAS. You have expressed your opinion that Congress
should be. a knowledgeable partner, within the limits of the constitu-
tlonal prerogatives of the executive branch, and I certainly agree with
the first part of that statement, that Congress should be a knowledge-
l)le partner, but, if we are to exercise oversight, we have to have access
to lolowlectge, fill access to knowledge.
~-;o T ani wondering if you could tell us what your concept of the
cons titutional prerogatives may be which could, in some way impinge
adieu this committee's need for information.
,admiral TuiiNr:r,. Yes, sir. I think there are two that come to my
mind. One is I believe that deliberations on policy decisions within the
executive branch are not necessarily suitable for transmittal to the
Congress and are, not a necessary part of the information the Congress
needs.
Second. I had in mind the phrase that the Director of Central In-
telliuence does have a statutory responsibility to prevent the unauthor-
ized disclosure of sources and methods of intelligence, and it seems to
me that there are some very delicate details of covert intelligence
operations which the committee may not want to hear.
It is my understanding that this, as I said earlier to the Chairman,
is an area that has been working well under present arrangements,
and I would hope to certainly keep it that way.
Senator NIATaamAS. Well, I would say to the Admiral that that phrase
"may not want to hear" is a bit of a sore phrase around here.
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Admiral TURNER. Sorry.
Senator MATTITAS. '.There are sonic very senior Members of the Sen-
ate, no longer-I can't think of anyone still here-who used to employ
that phrase: "I don't want to hear it," or "I don't want to know," and
there are a lot of things in this life that we don't want to hear and
don't want to know, but it sears to me that we have some constitu-
tional responsibility to know and to help bear the burden, and I don't
think that it should be a criterion of withholding information that it
is something that this "committee would not want to know."
Admiral '_ruRNER. I apologize for using a phrase that could be inter-
preted in several ways. I did not mean it as a part of the traditional
doctrine of plausible deniability. I don't mean that at all. I simply
mean that I feel a great sense of responsibility for the protection of,
say, individuals who are involved in covert intelligence operations
and whose lives may well depend on their identities being kept secret.
What I am talking about is being sure the committees of the Congress
are advised fully to the extent and nature of the operations, but per-
haps, not the detail which is of such sensitive significance and would
not be germane to their making a decision on the case.
Senator MATIIIAS. You are not asserting this as a right to withhold
information?,
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I am not. I think this can be amicably
worked out between the, committee and the Director of Central
Intelligence.
Senator MATmAS. When you were kind enough to come and see me a
couple of weeks ago, we discussed a very sensitive question of conflict-
ing loyalties that someday might confront you. I hope they never will.
I hope that we in this country shall all be moving with such common
purpose that you won't have a sense of conflicting loyalty, but you have
spent your professional career as a member of the Navy, you hold very
high rank and very high responsibilities in the Navy, and in those
circumstances, the orders of the commander in chief, the President of
the United States are unquestioned.
Do you have any compunction about revealing to this committee
information it needs to know, even though it might be the wish of a
President-I am not talking about the incumbent President, but a
President who might clearly indicate to you that you are not to com-
municate that information to the committee?
Admiral TURNER. As long as in my personal view the committee had
a lawful right to that information, that is, it was not in the categories
we have just discussed, ssir, I would not have any such hesitation.
Senator MATHIAS. But, if a President were to lay that upon you as a
positive injunction, how would you resolve that?
Admiral TuRNi-:r.. I would do as I discussed with Senator Bayh a
few minutes ago. T would go to the President and make, my position
absolutely clear to him. I would not. come to you before Thad done
so. And if we could not resolve that, my alternative is only to leave
illy position, and resign.
Senator MATTIIAS. Admiral, do you draw a line between national
intelligence and tactical intelligence?
Admiral TURNrr,. There certainly is a line, Senator. The line, I be-
lieve, is becoming fuzzier. The tactical intelligence used to be the
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roan on patrol. Now it may also be an overhead reconnaissance system
controlled from thousands of miles away by the squad leader who
would have sent the man out on patrol. There are still, of course, the
patrols, the individual reconnaissance aircraft controlled by the local
tactical commander, and I believe the commander must retain control
of those. But we are going to have to in the near future rethink this
definition of the dividing line between national and tactical intelli-
gence, and, how we best apportion those collection assets that can serve
both purposes simultaneously. It is a difficult issue.
Senator MIA?r'trrAS. In view of the fact that tactical intelligence
is removed from the I)CI's management, have you thought out and
are you prepared now to give us some idea of the guidelines thatyou
yourself would like to see applied?
Admiral. TURNER. No, sir, I am not anywhere near that, but I think
the definition may have to go to something like the source of the con-
1 rol of the intelligence asset.. But it would be foolhardy of me to try
to jump in and say I had reached a conclusion in this short a time.
Senator IIATrtrAS. Having in mind your previous concern for pro-
tection of sources and methods, would you be inclined to provide, on
a regular basis, to this committee counterintelligence information
about hostile activities of foreign intelligence and foreign security
services which might be of some use to the Congress in developing it
comprehensive national policy?
Admiral TTTRNI:R. Yes, sir, again in each case we have to make a
d i thicult deeeision as to how much of the detail is needed for your proper
oy-ersiglht. responsibilities and how much of it is very, very sensitive
and needs to be protected under the legal responsibilities of the DCI.
Senator MATHIAS. Well, to give the committee at least a sense of
the level at which these activities are taking place, the direction that
they may hare or the kind of impact that they could have on policies
that. we should be adopting or policies that perhaps we ought to alter?
Admira! TURNER. Yes, sir, that gives me no problem.
Senator M \r1TrAS. What level of priority do you give in your mind
to counterintelligence activities? Do you feel that they ought to be a
major function of the intelligence community, that counterintelligence
deserves to be treated on a level with other functions of the commit-
s i tv. or do von think it. is a l esser concern?
Admiral TURNER. I don't know that I have really made a judgment
as to where it fits with the collection, the analysis, and the covert action
activities. Tt certainly seems to me a very important function, but it
seems equally important that it be strictly in accordance with the law,
which my understanding is that counterintelligence by the intelligence
agencies, particularly by the CIA, is an overseas responsibility and
by the FBT a national responsibility.
Senator MATfIIAS. Would you plan to give this some personal atten-
t ion as you shake down in this particular period?
'Wmiral TURNER. Absolutely ; yes, sir.
Senator MAT1HTAs. And make your own evaluation as to exactly the
relative priority that it ought to receive?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, indeed.
Senator MATITAS. And will you communicate your judgments to the
committee when you have reached them?
Adinirat TimNER. I certainly will.
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The CHAIRMAN. Your time is up, Senator.
Senator Stevenson?
Senator STE-,ENSoN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I would begin by following up on some of the questions
raised already by the Chairman and by Senator Mathias.
Effective congressional oversight is' a recent phenomenon and a
little-understood phenomenon, and I say effective because this commit-
tee is kept informed, imperfectly, but we are continuously informed,
and misunderstood or little-understood because we are informed in
secret.
Now, perhaps it is possible for all of us today to relieve some of the
anxieties that I believe you alluded to earlier about intelligence activi-
ties by being a little more specific.
Now, I recognize that you can't go very far without touching upon
sensitive subjects.
Will You inform us in advance of covert operations?
Admiral TURNER. I understand the sense of the Senate in Resolution
No. 400 with regard to advance notification, and I would anticipate no
difficulty in making every effort to comply with the sense of that reso-
lution, and in complying strictly with the law in the Hughes-Ryan
Amendment.
I would think it would be an extremely rare occasion when it was
not, possible to provide information on covert activities in advance.
Senator STEVE, NSON. The Hugh es-Ryan amendment speaks of timely
notification, and it has been the source of some confusion. The resolu-
tion to which you referred to speaks of advance notification.
I think that answer is satisfactory, and I think we can assume that
all of your answers are subject to your earlier remarks about your
relationship with the President..
In addition to the extent it is possible, advance notice of covert
operation, will you likewise inform us in advance of collection opera-
tions which carry high political risks?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator STEVENSON. And I think you mentioned this earlier
Admiral TURNER. And again-I'm sorry, sir-again with the same
provisions.
Senator STEVENSON. And qualifications.
Admiral TURNER. There is always that possibility that something
might come up in the middle of the night when a decision absolutely
has to be made right now, and that is the kind of thing I have in mind
on not wanting to be pinned down absolutely.
Senator STEVENSON. We can't expect more of you than is possible,
and we are not unfamiliar with such situations.
Senator MATIIAS. If the Senator would yield, our Chairman sleeps
lightly.
Senator STEVENSON. In fact, he has a beeper which wakes him up.
[General laughter.]
Senator STEVENSON. The same question with respect to improper or
unlawful activities which come to your attention-this is after the
fact--you will inform us?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, through the normal or the established
procedures for this.
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Senator STEVENSON. And our mandate makes specific reference to,
in, this connection, to security problems, breaches of security, unau-
thorized disclosures of sensitive information. You will again inform
us, and to the extent it is possible, of your own knowledge, of such
actions?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator STEVENSON. Of unlawful activities.
And how do you feel in this connection about public disclosure of
the aggregate budget figure for the intelligence community?
Admiral TURNER. My inclination at this time is that we should
publish an aggregate budget figure for the total intelligence com-
rnunity, but I have not, sir, had an opportunity to hear all of the
arguments on the contrary side, and I feel that it would be imprudent
to make a final judgment until I have heard people out. I know there
are certainly those who do not agree with that point of view.
Senator STEVENSON. Now, this committee is assigning a new congres-
sional emphasis in connection with oversight to the quality of Ameri-
can intelligence, its collection, its analysis, production, and its com-
munication to appropriate policymakers. In addition to the disclosures
to the Congress that we have already discussed, will. you view the
Congress and its appropriate agencies as a consumer, that is to say,
undertake to bring to the attention of Congress information available
to you which is relevant to deliberations in the Congress?
This has not happened in the past, and yet this is a policymaking
branch of the Government..Can we feel. that you will make an effort to
inform us of relevant information that will help us in our legislative
committees make sound policy?
Admiral TURNER. Absolutely. sir. I think that is a responsibility
of the intelligence community, and I think that one of the ways to
restore the credibility and confidence in the intelligence community
is to do just that.
Senator STEVENSON. Now, there is some feeling in the Congress, a
reeling which I share, that intelligence, both in the collection and
production, has been too narrowly focused in the past, and that new
priorities are required, priorities which attach more importance to
economic and political matters in this interdependent and rapidly
changing world.
In this connection with respect to the quality of intelligence, what
in your opinion are the principal deficiencies in the intelligence com-
rmm1ity, the principal problems which you face?
Admiral TURNER. The principal. problem that concerns me, from
the preliminary view I have had of the. intelligence community, is
insuring that all of the shreds of intelligence which are available,
whether they are in ERDA, Treasury, FBI, DIA, or anywhere else,
are brought together and synthesized so that we take advantage of
all that is available to us, and so that we are sure that the President
and the Congress are getting the most balanced view of a situation that
we can possibly construct. The operation is so complex, there are so
many different interests involved, that I don't think that is an easy
task, but it is one that I think must be continually faced. It has
been in the past, and I intend to continue efforts in that direction.
The CtuATRMAN. Your time is up, sir.
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Senator Chafee?
Senator CFIAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to join in the congratulations to you, Admiral Turner,
for your selection, and congratuTate the President for having chosen
you. It has been my privilege to have been associated with you for
many years, and I must say that every job you have done, you have
just been superb.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you.
Senator CHAP EE. I would like to ask one question.
Under the 1947 act, as I read it, it talks about the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence as responsible for protecting intelligence sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure.
Now, it seems to me we come down in this modern era to a dilemma
in that I think Congress and the Nation feel that they were burned
by overclassification, by what were considered improper actions in
the intelligence community, and therefore it is perfectly proper for
those people to have made these disclosures, yet-and now we have a
torrent of books and news articles and scoops and even stealing clas-
sified documents. And we don't as a Nation seem to be able to do
anything about this.
Do you see it as one of your responsibilities, if you consider this a
problem, to come to Congress and press Congress to get on with the
enacting of some laws that can somehow handle the situation, or do
you think it is just up to Congress to take the lead in this area?
Admiral TURNER. I certainly think that the Director of Central In-
telligence is charged with a very difficult task because of questions
about the ability to prosecute people who violate their trusts to pro-
tect sensitive information. I would be very happy to study this in
order to make recommendations to the Congress, though of course it
is the ultimate responsibility of Congress to decide whether a law is
needed here.
Senator CrrAFEE. Well , I am not suggesting there is any easy answer.
I think it is a dilemma, particularly based on recent history, but cer-
tainly as we go along, I would be interested in, first of all, whether
you have considered the problem as you proceed in your activity,
should you be confirmed, which I certainly hope you will be, and then
the burden falls on Congress, it seems to me, to carry the ball from
there based on the recommendations that we look forward to you to
come forward with.
Admiral TURNER. All right, sir.
Senator CrrAFEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Hathaway?
Senator HATHAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that a brief statement be
inserted in the record.
The CrIAIRMAN. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Hathaway follows :]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF IION. WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MAINE
Admiral Turner, I am pleased to welcome you here today, the CIA is an
Agency which needs the wholehearted support of every American. It needs our
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trust and it requires our confidence. Its dedicated men and women are the unsung
heroes of our society. We hear about the mistakes, but never the successes--
the day-in and day-oat efforts of the Agency's heroic officers and agents who
each and every day take enormous risks on our behalf for no other reason
than love of their country.
I have been impressed by your outstanding record of service to our Nation.
1 have been persuaded during our limited contacts that if confirmed you intend
In send a message which is loud and clear that you and you alone will be in
charge, and that you intend to provide to this Agency your exceptional talents
of leadership and command.
i ;tlso believe that you are personally committed to insuring that the CIA is
n,)t only ewitled to, but deserving of the respect of every citizen of this country
,is the result of maintaining our security and our strength without ever sacri-
iiving our traditional national values.
Senator IJATTIAwAY. I would like to pursue the covert activities
questions that have been asked you. You indicated that you are, of
course, in ,Favor of pre-notification of any covert activities. Would you
gg;> a :step further and advocate a pre-clearance by the committee so
that no covert activity could commence until the committee had given
its OK, within a certain length of time, say, a week or 10 days.
Admiral TTTRNER. Senator, I think that in my position as the execu-
tor here for the executive branch, it is my responsibility to comply
with the enactments of the Congress, and if the Congress wishes to
wake that the law, certainly. Otherwise, the resolution of the degree
co approval that the Congress is going to llaye over these must be some-
thing taken up between the President and the Congress, I believe.
Senator IATIIAWAY. Well, would you support such legislation by
t1 e Congress ?
Admiral Turxnlz. I would personally have some qualms here, again
as to the issues of timeliness that I raised with Senator Stevenson
previously, because it seems to me there are practical problems in-
volved. Bit I surely have not had the time to study this in enough
depth to answer you with a definitive yes or no. I will certainly look
into it further.
Senator IIATi1AWAY. And how about the 'Congress establishing cer-
tain guidelines with respect to covert activities, such as activities that
we don't think should be carried out; such as, assassinations of any
kind; and guidelines for other categories, such as whether we are
,Ding to ,,pprove influencing elections or payments to foreign digni-
taries or activities. Would you welcome congressional guidelines along
t hat line?
Admiral rFTTRNFR. I would, sir. Which and how many is another
i ne that I instant not prepared at this time to be specific on.
Senator HATHAWAY. What about the paramilitary operations of the
('IA? What are your thoughts on that? Should that be discontinued?
Admiral TURNER. I do not think that we should deprive the country
of that possibility. I think in this particular time in our history, the
possibility of wanting to rely on paramilitary operations is very low.
Senator HATHAWAY. Let me ask you some questions in regard to
classification. You mentioned in your statement that you would wel-
vorneclassifi--~,ation legislation from the Congress.
Would this be. along the lines of establishing limited authority. I
understand that now almost everybody in every agency has a rubber
stamp that he can stamp a document with, with the result that we
have a lot of documents that have been classified that shouldn't be
classified, and many that have been classified for many, many years
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without being reclassified. There has been a movement on in Congress
to limit the authority to classify, to limit the number of classifications,
and to limit the length of time that a document may remain classi-
fied-not that it wouldn't be subject to reclassification, but at least
every year or 2 at the most, it would be subject to reexamination.
Would you support legislation along that line?
Admiral TURNER. I am not sure whether I believe that legislation or
executive directives--and there are, of course, directives today that re-
quire many of the things that you have just suggested sir-is the best
way to handle this. My feeling is that even with regulations and legis-
lation, it is going to be very, very difficult to curb the overelassification
problem.
My particular approach to it, as Director of Central Intelligence,
were I approved, would be to conduct periodic reviews of what infor-
mation can be gleaned from existing secure sources and classified in-
formation, and deliberately, either declassify it, or if it is unclassified,
extract it.
We often find a document with 1 secret paragraph in it and 10
pages
Senator HATHAWAY. Right.
Admiral TURNER [continuing]. Of unclassified information, much of
which is of value to the public as well as to the Congress. I would
like
Senator HATHAWAY. When you say periodic, do you mean at least
annually?
Admiral TURNER. Well, yes, sir, but I mean, I would select particu-
lar subjects that are of current importance to the country and make
sure that we are not unnecessarily withholding information that would
improve the quality of public debate on them. So I think it would be
ad hoc in many ways. What is really important is that the public know
what information we have which can be shared with them.
Senator HATHAWAY. Now, with respect to organization, you men-
tioned in answer to Senator Mathias' question the knotty problem of
separating national from tactical intelligence. I don't recall whether
you came to any conclusion on whether this committee should have
jurisdiction over all intelligence, regardless of whether it is classified
as tactical or national or whatever way it is classified. For instance,
should we be establishing the . budget authorizations for tactical
intelligence?
Admiral TURNER. I think that I would respectfully like to stay out
of the crunch between you and the Armed Services Committee on this
one, sir. I think that is as difficult an issue as deciding where Defense
and Central Intelligence divide their jurisdiction over the two intelli-
gence activities.
Senator HATHAWAY. We could use your recommendation, provided
it is favorable.
(General laughter.]
Senator HATHAWAY. There has been some talk, too, of consolidating
our intelligence activities so that rather than having each element, like
the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, having its own intelligence
arm, we have just one intelligence unit, whatever you may call it, and
each element would simply refer to that unit for whatever informa-
tion is needed.
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Do you think that it would be sensible to reorganize the intelligence
community in that way?
Admiral . TURNER. I think we must look at a number of alternatives
for reorganization, but I think we must at the same time be very clear
that we cannot so centralize that we in any way make it too difficult
for dissenting, differing views to come forward. We must not ever
think that somebody is prescient in the intelligence business. We must
let different evaluations come out, and I think in any reorganization,
a careful compromise has got to be made between centralization in
order to effect necessary control and efficiency, and decentralization to
be sure that there are differing views.
Senator HATHAWAY. On that very subject, do you favor continuing
the team B approach that was used recently with respect to evaluat-
in.r our international posture?
Admiral TURNER. I believe that there is a place for outsiders to
evaluate what is being done inside the intelligence community. I be-
lieve there is certainly a place for a wide divergence of biases, atti-
tudes, opinions to be brought to bear on any intelligence problem. I
don't think you necessarily have to go outside to get the wide variety
of attitudes and opinions, but I think that there are good opportunities
for something like the team B-team A operation, but I would not
necessarily endorse that particular method of having done it. But
particularly--
Senator HATHAWAY. But you are in favor of the concept of having
some other independent group evaluate the data and come up with its
own conclusions?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, very much so.
Senator HATHAWAY. What about disclosure of the intelligence
budget?
I)o you have any views on whether we should disclose the total
fk ure, or make a detailed disclosure? Just what disclosure do you
think is necessary to keep the public informed?
Admiral TURNER. My inclination is to disclose the one total and go
no further, but I mentioned earlier that I am reluctant to make that
a commitment to you until I have heard more of the opposing views.
Senator HATIHAWAY. Fine.
`['hank you very much, Admiral.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.
Senator HATHAWAY. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Senator Lugar?
Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Turner, do you believe
that the armed services have traditionally resisted attempts at over-
sight and consolidation in the intelligence area, and if so, how do you
presume to try to overcome that resistance?
Admiral TURNER. I don't think there is any bureaucracy in the
world that hasn't resisted its collapse into some more central organiza-
tion. and I think one has to overcome that resistance by persuasive
leadership, and by a combination of encouraging the Executive to
issue the proper Executive orders, and working with the Congress to
insure that there is adequate legislation to effect whatever changes
may be necessary.
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Senator LUGAP. Earlier on you tried to reflect on and answer this
question, but let me pursue for just a moment the problem that might
be analogous to that which faced George Bush. Because George Bush
was a politician, it was suggested that he ought not to move on to
further office in the political realm, at least not too rapidly after his
service.
What sort of problems do you see in terms of your naval career,
granted the desire to continue with the commission and to move on
in that service, and given very difficult decisions that you may need to
make with regard to the other armed services, or very unpopular de-
cisions with regard to future colleagues or those who might be in
command over you when you resume that career?
Admiral TURNER. Senator, throughout my career to date, I have felt
it was always necessary to transfer one's loyalty completely to the job
at hand and let the future worry about itself. I am convinced in this
instance if, having transferred my loyalty, if I am approved, directly
to the President of the United States, to whom I would report directly,
if I ever showed a subsidiary loyalty to the Navy, to the Department
of Defense, the President of the United States would detect that very
quickly, and my usefulness to him and to the country would soon
diminish rapidly.
Senator LUGAR. Will you have unrestricted access to President
Carter, and have you discussed that access or some modus vivendi for
reporting with him?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, we have discussed it. He has assured me
that I have direct access to him, and we have or are working out an
arrangement for regular meetings between the two of us.
Senator LUGAR. Let me carry on a point that you made earlier which
I am certain is the right course to follow. In the event that after a dis-
cussion with President Carter you came to a very severe disagreement
as to the constitutionality of an action, or its illegality, and therefore
you resigned and then informed this committee. Still, as a practical
matter, a resignation under those circumstances of course is bound to
lead to questions by friends and foes alike, not only of the President
and yourself, but of this country as to what is going on, what sort of
problems are involved. There is no easy way to make certain that at
some point reconciliation occurs all the way along the line, but is it
your judgment of the conversations you have had with the President
or with others in his administration that they are so sensitive to the
course of history, at ].east with regard to intelligence in this country,
that they are of a mind to make certain that they do not transgress-
in other words, put all of us in a situation in which there is a blow-up,
literally, that would cause your resignation, and perhaps cause diffi-
culty with this committee and with Congress and with the public. In
other words, the question I am raising, asks itself, if we are all suffi-
ciently sensitive in this country about the things that have occurred,
the misuse of authority, that we are all on guard not to do again. I am
just simply curious in exploring this relationship which you will have
to have with the President, to what extent he or others have really
thought through what would occur in the event of your resignation,
its a matter of conscience, you saw that you could not perform?
Admiral TURNER. I am very persuaded from my several conversa-
tions with the President that he is most sensitive in these areas. I am
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very pleased at the high degree of interest that he has shown in the
intelligence function, and the surprising, to me, amount of detail that
he has absorbed about it in the brief time that he has had.
So I look forward, if confirmed, to working for a man who I think
has an intense interest in the job he is asking me to take, and that is a
wonderful way to start.
Senator I,TTTGAR. As a matter of detail, are you prepared to log all
contacts, the President included, and. everybody else, with you so that
there is some record for yourself or the President, or this committee of
all persons who contact you with regard to CIA business?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I certainly am, and I think it would be a
very prudent thing to do.
Senator LUGAR. What assurance. can you give the committee that im-
proper influence will not be brought to bear, not by the President, but
by his staff members, b other intervening persons or by persons in
business or labor or public interest groups or other? How will you
guard against persons who, albeit from good motives, at least as they
See them, want to see you and to have a word and to suggest ways in
which you might further your mission?
Admiral Tmn n. I can only assure you, sir, that one in public
office has to develop a sense of propriety. At the same time, I would
also assure you that f have always had a great quest for contact with
people with a wide variety of attitudes and opinions, and I would in-
tend to maintain that attitude, if confirmed as Director of Central In-
telligence, but certainly being very careful that no one placed me or
themselves in a position of impropriety.
Senator LUGAR. Let me ask this question finally. Throughout your
career, obviously, you have been a consumer of intelligence. You have
some ideas of its value in regard to command decisions or staff work
in which you have been involved.
In what ways could you work effectively with this committee, or for
that matter, with Congress generally, in thinking through what ought
to be the role of your agency in providing intelligence for the
Congress?
I am thin king in this case not simply information as to covert activ-
ity or sensitive data. but I am thinking more in terms of the fact that
the legislative body has a mission to perform, sometimes independently
of the President, in legislative initiatives, or at least having good data
with which to work. This comes from all sorts of sources, but have you
given any thought as to how the development of your role might pro
ceed so that you not only serve the President directly and are part of
his administration, but think of yourself in more national sense, serv-
ing the legislative body, too, for that matter, the Supreme Court,
should it have need for your services?
Admiral 'rTTRNER. C hadn't thought of the Supreme Court, good
idea, but. yes, sir, f would hope that my experience as a consumer
would help me to take the point of view of the committees of Congress
who are approaching national problems. I would hope that I could
stay abreast of what the principal interests of the committees of the
('onmress were, and charge my staff to be sure that we were carefully
seeking out that information that we possess which could conceivably
be of value to these committees. I speak'not only of the Intelligence
Committees, and the Foreign Relations and the Armed Services Coin-
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mittees, who are major consumers, but it seems to me we should be
scrutinizing virtually all of the committees.
Senator LUGAR. Well.; for instance, take a look at agricultural data
and think of food supplies and other energy supplies and sources and
what have you that may very well be universal in their application.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, very much so.
Senator LuGAIm. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Iluddieston?
Senator HUDDLESZON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent that a short statement that I have prepared
be included in the record.
The CrrAIrMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Iluddleston follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF LION. WALTER (DEE) IIUDDLESTON, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I will only take a moment, since we are all anxious
to hear from the nominee. But I want to take this opportunity to welcome Ad-
miral Turner and to say that my brief contacts with him and my reading about
his background have impressed m.e very favorably. In the course of his career
Admiral Turner has shown himself to be a man of intelligence, independent
judgment, and firm leadership. Those are important personal qualifications for
the sensitive office of Director of Central Intelligence.
Today, however, this Committee and the public are anxious to hear from
Admiral Turner about a variety of specific issues central to the course of Ameri-
can intelligence for the foreseeable future. We intend to que:ution Admiral
Turner in some detail on such subjects as improving the intelligence product,
collection, covert action, protection intelligence sources and methods, and simul-
taneously protecting the civil liberties of Americans. As Chairman of the Sub-
committee on Charters and Guidelines, I will be particularly interested in the
nominee's view on enacting legislation to define the authority of the various
intelligence agencies.
As this Committee has done since its creation in May 1976, we will address these
issues in a spirit of cooperation, and not confrontation. We do not expect Admiral
Turner to have all the answers to every problem, for if there is one thing which
we have learned in these past few months, it is that the problems of the intelli-
gence community are extremely complex, and simple solutions which will resolve
all of them simply do not exist. But we do expect the nominee, together with the
entire intelligence community, to join with us in addressing these problems with
certain common assumptions in mind : that the intelligence community must be
subject to the rule of law; and that it must be accountable to the Congress and
ultimately the public.
If we base our discussion today and our efforts in the future on those assump-
tions, we will have moved a long way toward restoring the faith of the American
people in one of its most sensitive and important institutions.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Admiral Turner, in looking at your statement,
I find on pages 4 and 5, an indication of what the President's objectives
are. If I can paraphrase them, his objectives, and yours, are to explore
ways of improving the efficiency of our intelligence gathering, and to
sec that all elements of our intelligence community operate within the
law in ways consistent with the values of Americans. There is also the
statement that indicates that the President believes that this can be
accomplished under the existing Executive orders and the existing law.
It goes on to say that you will consider any new approaches that the
Congress may suggest along this line.
Is it correct that the President, and you, too, have an open mind, as
to the need for additional statutory charters for the various elements
of the intelligence community?
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Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you believe that the Executive order under
which you are now operating, 11905, plus the 1947 act, give you the
authority that you need to successfully manage the intelligence
community?
Admiral TURNER. I am not prepared, Senator, to assure you that, I
think that is optimal. I am drawing a fine line, here. I think it can be
done under the existing orders and laws. I think it might be
Senator HUDDLESTON. You don't rule out the possibility that it might
be done better if changes were made?
Admiral 'i'TJRNER. That is just what I was going to say.
Senator HUDDLESPON. Under statutes that might be developed?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, easier or better, or both, if there were
some changes.
Senator IIUDDLESTON. Is there any way to really manage the intelli-
gence comnrnunity without having authority, for instance, over the
ttmrse, that is, being able to assign various appropriations on the
basis of assignments that you as DCI would make?
Admiral TURNER. f am not actually a believer that you have to have
control of the purse in order tolcontro7 bureaucracies
senator HrmDLESTON. It is usually a pretty effective tool.
Admiral TURNER [,continuing]. But it is very helpful, and whether
we need in the DCI's hands more control than presently exists through
the Executive order and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, I am
not really sure at this time.
Senator ETUDDLESrON. The previous investigative committee, that
was chaff red by Senator Church, and on which I served, in reviewing
the act of 1947, described it as no loner an adequate framework for
(lie conduct of America's intelligence' activities. It went on to say
that it was a vague and open-ended statement of authority for the
President.
Do you disagree with those findings?
Admiral TURNER. I am not in disagreement with them, but I am not
sure I would be quite that explicit or emphatic.
Senator IIuDDLESroN. But you are willing to review with this com-
mittee the possibility of additional statutory authority.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator IIUI)DLESrON. Even to the extent of separate charters for
each element ,of the intelligence community?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I have not formed an opinion on whether
charters are appropriate or necessary, but I am certainly very open
to considering the subject.
Senator HUDDLESTON. You are not foreclosing the possibility?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, in no way.
Senator HimDLr:SroN. One of the things that we found was that it
was virtually impossible to ascertain to what extent the President
knew about some of the activities, specifically the assassination activi-
ties, even though those who were in the field carrying out those, activi-
ties or attempting to, seemed to be certain in their own mind that they
had approval "at the highest level," which was either the President
Or someone speaking forhim in the White House.
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Do you believe it is important that we have a system whereby ac-
countability is clearly defined?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. So it can be determined who gave the orders,
what they knew, and who was in the chain of command so that persons
all the way from the top to the bottom can be held accountable?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you believe that that is possible or likely
under the present system of operation?
Admiral TURNER. I believe that the current procedures for gaining
approval of covert operations give a very high assurance that that
would be the case, but it still would depend on the Director of Central
Intelligence absolutely demanding that he knows that it is the Presi-
dent who has given the approval and not one of his subordinates, and I
would intend to take that position.
Senator IUDDLESTON. If a covert action is to be approved, certainly
there could be an awareness of just precisely how the covert action
is to be carried out. Then the President, the highest authority, can be
aware of specifically what is taking place down on the local level.
Admiral TURNER. It would be an act of irresponsibility to fail to
inform the decisionmakers through the entire chain of command of
that kind of information and ask them to make a decision on a covert
operation.
Senator IIuDDLESTON. In other words, I am saying if somebody at the
top believes that it would be better for this country's interests if a cer-
tain leader were "disposed of," then the words used ought to be ex-
plicit. It ought to be clear whether "disposed of" means supporting an
opposition candidate who might defeat him in a free and open election,
or whether it means something else. We have recommended legislation
prohibiting peacetime political assassination, but the point is, the man-
ner in carrying out a directive sometimes is far different from what
might be perceived in the directive itself.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Do you agree with that?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator HUDDLESTON. The 1947 act doesn't specifically give the CIA
the authority to collect intelligence. Do you think that the act ought
to be amended and specific authority given for that purpose?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Rather than the vague terms which scorn to
allow CIA to do whatever else the National Security Council might
direct?
Admiral TURNER. I think there is undoubtedly room for improve-
ment here. We can operate under the existing one, and have, but I am
certainly amenable to reviewing--
Senator IUDDLESTON. But not always in an exemplary way.
The investigating committee found a rather wide use by the CIA of
various types of individuals and institutions, including use of media
employees academics, and the clergy, in carrying out covert activities.
In the case of the media, new directives have altered that to a great
extent.
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What is your feeling about using institutions where knowledge. of
that use might be detrimental to the institutions themselves?
Admiral TURNEII. I don't think that the intelligence community
should attempt to shape the opinion of students on our campuses or
to use academic institutions as a tool. for propagandizing in any way.
At the same time, I would be reluctant to think that a member of an
academic cornrnunity would be denied his right of serving his country
in any legal way that he wanted, whether it was in helping the
Agricultural Department
Senator HUDDLES'IO c. But you feel he ought to be knowledgeable
al ,out what he is doing?
Admiral rI`URNER. I don't feel that the intelligence agency should
recruit as=istance from people on our campuses without making it
clear that it is the intelligence community that is doing it.
Senator HUDDLESTON. Admiral Turner, do you consider the Con-
gress a legitimate user of intelligence?
Admiral TIIRNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HimmiESTOy. And you would treat it as such 'O
Admiral TUnNEu. Yes, sir.
Senator Hr?DDLESTON. Even if such intelligence might be contrary
to stated policies of the President?
Admiral 7'urzxEr. My responsibility, if confirmed as the Director
o l, Central Intelligence, is to provide intelligence, not policy.
Senator HuoDLESTON. Even if the intelligence might be embarrass-
iug- to the President?
Admiral TtnINER. l es, sir.
Senator HUDDLESTOX. You would supply that.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The C>>_lrvtn Senator Biden.
Senator BIDEN Tbank yon, Air. Chairman.
Admiral, i have had a new-found feeling of power sitting here.
i don't lcnoiv of anvlodv who has ever kept Pat Moynihan waiting,
srnd I am able to do that for 10 more minutes.
(-General laughter. I
Senator B 1mN. The more he thumps his foot, the more I will hurry,
though.
I would like, on a bit of a humorous note, to raise another question.
I never thought of the Supreme Court as being a consumer, but in
light of recent decisions on busing, I would like you to investigate the
courlterintell igence activities in that area. It would be very helpful
to rne.
I would like to make a brief comment. I feel very, very strongly, as
I indicated to you in my office when we had an Opportunity to speak,
that as several members of the committee have suggested, the DCI
needs greater control over the entire intelligence community, iriclrrd-
ingr the purse strings, particularly that aspect which is part of the
I)epartment of Defense. I feel very strongly that-and I realize you
can't make that push. even if you agreed, and I don't know that you
do or don't, but I would hope that this committee will pursue with
you and with the President of the United States, the need for there
to be one person, if you are confirmed, you, who has control of the
intelligence community. Not maybe, not sometimes, not part of the
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time, not part of it, but all of it. I would hope that as we investigate.
that, which I, as one member of this committee, am going to pursue
with the President-and I suspect the whole committee will in some
way or another-that you will be amenable to listening to our sugges-
tions to move the DCI into a position of greater authority, because I
think it is absolutely critical that when the President turns to you, if
you are confirmed, and says, "What is the situation?" that you know,
that you do not have to be embroiled in a controversy, in internecine
warfare with the Secretary of Defense or some underling in the De-
fense Department or any other agency.
You also mentioned, and it has been mentioned here, the need for
the administration, executive branch, and in concurrence or in con-
junction with the-with this committee, to determine a more definite
policy as to what constitutes classified material, what constitutes sec-
recy, what should and shouldn't be treated as a classified document;
and what sanctions prevail for violation of any directive in that
regard.
I know it is the intention of the Chairman of the committee to, if
not have a subcommittee, but for the whole committee at one point to
pursue that -issue with you, and we look forward to your cooperation
when that time occurs, assuming you are confirmed.
I would like to raise a few specific questions within the remainder
of my time, if I may.
With regard to covert activities, I have been somewhat disturbed
as a member of this committee that there is a very fine line between
what constitutes clandestine collection activities and covert activity,
and as I understand the law-and staff may correct me if I am
wrong-under the present situation and the situation which you al-
luded that you agree with, that is, informing this committee, if not
prior, at least simultaneously, with a decision to undertake a covert
activity.
Everyone agrees that that is the case, but in my experience on this
committee, there are things categorized as clandestine which have po-
tentially more danger to our national security and embarrassment to
the United States of America were they to be uncovered, that are of
greater consequence and importance, than the covert activities that are
going on. I wonder whether or not you feel there is a need for you to
advise us prior to, if not at least simultaneously, with the initiation of
a clandestine collection activity which is obviously of major interna-
tional consequence?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I think that ties in
Senator BIDEN. It is clandestine, I am told by the distinguished
Senator from Kentucky, who said "you all."
Admiral TURNER. I think it is part and parcel of the overall pack-
age of proper oversight of our activities.
Senator BIDEN. Do you agree that there are clandestine, secret ac-
tivities on the part of the intelligence community that can be of greater
consequence to our national security than certain covert activities?
Admiral TURNER, I would suspect that is the case. I have not yet
read into the covert and clandestine activities of greatest sensitivity
other than those that I have known in the course of my military
activities.
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Senator BIDEN. Well, again, assuming you are confirmed, I would
hope that the committee will pursue that question with you and with
the President of the United States.
I would like to move to an area that we have already discussed and
ask you, because I am sure, I suspect the press is going to ask us why
we weren't a little bit harder on you in terms of your retention of your
rank of admiral, I was one of the several who voted against the con-
firmation of George Bush. We went through this great long debate as
to whether or not his activities subsequent to service as DCI should be
within the purview and scope of consideration by committee or the
Congress as a whole. It was concluded that it was, and yet we haven't
asked you yet how long you plan on serving as DCI, if you are con-
firmed, assuming you stay, and you keep the pleasure of the President.
Admiral TURNER. I intend to remain in that office, if confirmed, as
long as the President of the United States desires me to do so.
Senator BIDEN. Now, that is in spite of the fact that in July of 1978
the positions of Chief of Naval Operations and Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff will become vacant.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator BIDEN. You are aware that that vacancy will occur in 1978.
Admiral TURNER. I have heard about it.
Senator BIDEN. And are you in a position to indicate to this com-
mittee that it is not your intention to seek that Chairmanship and
Chief of Naval Operations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator BIDEN. Fair enough.
And I have another question in that regard.
I am not quite sure why you want to remain on active duty. I am
not sure I understand. I understand your feeling a commitment to the
service and your love for it, and your not wanting to preclude the
possibility of becoming-of going back to the same function or simi-
lar function you had prior to becoming DCI, but why is it required
that you remain on active duty in the interim?
Admiral TURNER. Retiring after 30 years of service will in no way
change my accumulated background and attitudes. The law specifi-
cally provides for an active duty man to be in this position. In the
years since the first founding of the Central Intelligence Agency, with
the exception of the last 7 months, there has never been a time that
there has not been one military man in either the post of Director or
Deputy Director. and the majority of those have been on active duty.
I see no conflict arising.
Senator BIDEN. I am not suggesting a conflict. I am just looking for
your rationale. You will have no command, and so I am not sure why
the need to remain on active duty. Does it affect if and when you
go back where you come in?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, the law specifically provides that there
is to be no impact upon the position. so far as that is concerned, and
I am not worried about where I would come or go in that event, in
any case.
cena,lor BTDEN. You indicated earlier that you have requested four
naval officers remain on your personal staff.
What is the cnpral capacity of those officers? T mean, you know,
we hear a lot about admirals having people who wait on their tables
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and that kind of thing. I realize this seems, may seem inappropriate
in light of the gravity of this hearing, but it is not, in my opinion, in
terms of the need to establish the degree of public confidence which
we all feel very strongly, as you do, must be established there. I
would not want any impression left in the minds of anyone in this
room, or the viewing audience, if any of this is played, and/or the
reading audience after this is covered, that you are maintaining your
active duty status to insure that you have four personal servants.
Admiral TURNER. No, sir, that is not my intent in any way, and I
don't view them as personal servants whatsoever. They are highly
qualified officers. They are officers who have served with me in the
past few years. They are officers who I have a great rapport with in
writing speeches, in performing duties that are necessary in any office,
answering large volumes of correspondence, taking care of the sched-
ules and
Senator BIDEN. Administrative kinds of
Admiral TURNER. Administrative.
Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Kinds of duties.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. I would anticipate that after I have
settled into this job, if I am confirmed, I might find that the need for
them atrophied. I am reluctant to step into what looks to me like a
maelstrom of activity without this kind of support that takes day-to-
day burdens off your shoulders. If I do not need them in the course
of time, I would certainly not ask them to stay.
Senator BIDEN. I quite frankly think that is appropriate. But my
time is up. Thank you very much.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, Senator Moynihan.
Senator MOYNIHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I don't want to take issue with my good friend Senator
Lugar, but I don't see why you shouldn't show a little partiality to
the Navy.
Sir, I should like to take the opportunity to express my own great
pleasure that you are before this committee in these pleasant circum
stances, and to take the occasion to put to you a question which, while
specific in its particulars, has, I believe, a general bearing or the role
of the Central Intelligence Agency in world affairs.
I have recently been in Jamaica where I had the honor to pay a call
on Prime Minister Manley, and as ? I am sure you know, during the
recent general election in Jamaica there was much discussion of the
role of the CIA in that country. I asked the Prime Minister about this
and his answer was somewhat general. However, he did say most
explicitly that during the campaign the opposition party, the Jamaica
Labor Party, received funds from the CIA. I replied that if this were
true, it was an outrageous act upon our part, and that we would owe,
at the very least, an apology to the government of the people of
Jamaica.
On the other hand, it is my understanding and my belief that this
was not true, and is not true, and in that circumstance it grieves me
to. consider the damage this charge may have done to the JLP. As
you know, the Jamaica Labor Party, is an established and staunchly
democratic political party which on several occasions has formed the
Government of Jamaica, to use the parliamentary term.
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32
As you also know, Jamaica is one of-those few nations-there are
scarcely three dozen of us-which not only carry out democratic elec-
Iions. but in which those elections have brought about a change in
the political party governing the nation.
Inevitably, a party's opposition accused in the manner that the
.ILP has been accused bears the impossible burden of disproof. In the
nature of things, any disavowal on our part is of not much greater
avail, and for these, reasons, accusations of CIA involvement have
become a feature of the political rhetoric of our time around the
world.
And I ask you, sir, if as Director of Central Intelligence, you
would not give some thought to ways in which the United States
could make such charges less rewarding to those who make them in
circnmstanc:es where we know the charge is not true.
idrmiral TURNER. That is a most interesting thought, Senator, and
T certainly agree with it. I agree that we should make efforts to
.make unjustified statements against our country and its activities less
rewarding. I can see that in some instances this could be done by
policy decisions of the executive and legislative branches, decisions
that would bring the weight of the authority of this country to bear.
f can see that the intelligence community itself can also play a role,
but largely by a gradual process of enhancing our credibility in the
world, enhancing the confidence that people will have that when we
say we have not done something, that that is in fact the case, and
I would hope we can move in that direction over time.
Senator NIOYN.IIAN. Thank you, Admiral.
You recognize, Admiral, that the reputation of respected political
parties and of respected people are at stake.
I have two other quick questions, sir. I assume that for 30 years
now there has been a fairly consistent effort by the Soviets to infiltrate
the Agency, and to some extent they have succeeded.
W 'ould you want to share with us now or sometime, your judgment
of just how much they may have succeeded, if at all? You have your
first major defector in Mr. Agee. I think this committee would want
to know-has Mr. Agee gone over to the KGB? Is lie now a Soviet
agent, in your knowledge, or what do you think lie is doing?
Admiral TURNER. I do not have knowledge of that at this time,
Senator, no.
Senator MOYNI IAN. Would you let us know what you think has
happened?
Admiral TrTRNER. Yes, sir, I will look into it if I am confirmed for
this office and let you know.
The CHAIRMAN. The committee will call upon the T)itector of Cen-
tral Intelligence at one of our later meetings to advise us of the type
of activity you have just. described.
Senai-or MoYNIIIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A last point. The Boston Globe on February 11 reported that the
British Intelligence Service in early 1973 brought to the United States
a docunne.t which they regarded as of extraordinary importance, com-
parable; to the text of the 1956 speech in which Nikita Khrushchev
denounced Stalin and detailed his offenses, which I quote now from
the Globe, speaking of the British report :
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It quoted Brezhnev as telling a secret meeting of East Europeans, Communist
leaders in Prague, that detente was a stratagem to allow the Soviets to build
up their military and economic power so that by 1985 a decisive shift in the
correlation of forces would enable the Russians to exert our will-
I am quoting the story-"exert our will wherever we need to."
This was not accepted in our Government, as least some parts of
government, as trustworthy, and was dismissed, and yet it is now very
public and I gather.it appeared in the national intelligence estimate
in 1976, after a sort of subterranean life.
The Nation, I think, probably ought to know our judgment of the
validity of the report, the accuracy of the report, did Mr. Brezhncv
make such a speech, and is that text as we understand the case?
Would you propose to make any general statement about that
sometime?
Admiral TURNER. I am not at this time specifically familiar with
that document other than, as you report, in the press. I would be very
happy to investigate its authenticity and also determine whether, with
an eye to protecting the source from which it was obtained, we can
release more information on this to the public, but certainly to you
in this committee.
Senator MOYNIiiAN. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, too, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.
Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my apologies to you and the committee, and to you,
Admiral, for not being here until just a few moments ago.. I was in
the Foreign Relations Committee, and we had actions to take on be-
half of the administration in another field which I was obliged to at-
tend to.
I think I only have one question that I would like to raise with you,
and Senator Biden I believe raised it before. I would like to sort of
underscore it. That is the great importance of a period of continuity,
of single strong leadership in the CIA, and while. no one would want,
and I would not want to inhibit the President from choosing you for
any post that he might find you qualified for-and I can imagine many
Posts which I would want to engage you in-I want to underscore the
importance that I think this choice of you for this post makes with re-
spect to an indefinite, at least, period of continuity of leadership in this
agency.
I understand you have said you would not seek another post and that
you would, of course, serve as long as the President wanted you to.
Have you any indication from the President as to how long he has in
mind for you to serve in this post?
Admiral TURNER. I have no indication of how long he wants ine to
serve. I have no indication that he has any ideas of any other use of
my services.
Senator CASE. Well, obviously you cannot bind the President not to
ask you to run, say, NATO or the Armed Services of the United Staten
or anything else, but choices have to be made, and I do just want
strongly to underscore the great importance of the choice that is being
made here now. You are choosing to do this, and my own view-and I
am not asking you to make any further comment-is that you ought to
stay at it until the job is thoroughly done.
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Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The (ii73AIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Before recessing this hearing I would like to make two announce-
ments.
First, this hearing will reconvene at 2:30 this afternoon, and Ad-
miral, sir, if you can be ready to answer questions because I am certain
other members would like to ask further questions, and receive the
testimony of three other witnesses.
The second announcement is that at 2:30 tomorrow afternoon the
committee will meet to carry on committee business, including the
confirmation discussion and hopefully the vote on Admiral Turner.
So with those two announcements
Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask, that certain questions
which I didn't think I should delay the committee for, be answered
for the record?
The CIIACRMAN. Without objection your questions will be handed to
the Admiral, sir.'
With these two announcements, this hearing will stand in recess
until 2:30 this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
2:30 p.m., the same day.]
The CHAIRMAN. We will now resume the hearings.
Senator Stevenson?
Senator STEVENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have a few holes that I would like to plug in the record.
First, Mr. Chairman, I know there are questions about the so-called
Hussein affair.
Is my understanding correct that that will be taken up by the com-
mittee in executive session?
The CHAMIVIAN. Yes; tomorrow at 2:30 I will be presenting this to
the committee.
Senator STEVENSON. Now, Admiral, getting back briefly to covert
operations both the President
[Pause.. j
Senator STEVENSON [continuing]. Admiral, both the President and
the Secretary of State have said in words which I can't seem to find
at the moment, that covert operations will only take place in the most
extraordinary of circumstances. Covert operations are difficult to dis-
cuss because the phrase signifies one thing to the public and it means
something that is much broader, including conduct of activities which
in the main is innocent.
What is your own attitude about the wisdom of covert operations?
Could you just address yourself to the general subject?
i Senator Case's questions and Admiral Turner's answers are included in the additional
interrogatories which appear on pages 71 to 8,6.
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TESTIMONY OF ADM, STANSFIEI,D TURNER-Resumed
Admiral TURNER. I would be pleased to, Senator.
I think no covert operation should be undertaken until two stand-
ards have been met. The first would be that there was a thorough explo-
ration of any alternative ways to accomplish the objective in an overt
manner. The second would be that there was a very careful weighing
of the potential value to the country of what might develop from the
operation versus the risks that have to be accepted. I would urge that
we think of the risks in two categories: The risk of disclosure of the
covert operation against our desires, and then simply the risk of under-
mining our own respect for the fundamental laws and values of our
country.
Senator STEVENSON. Now, I detect some interest, there certainly
should be, in your general attitude toward the Soviet Union. Your
impressive article in foreign Affairs sheds some light on that subject.
Is the Soviet military buildup in your opinion due to aggressive
or imperialistic designs, or is the Soviet Union reacting to a perceived
threat, or in your opinion is the reason some combination of both?
Admiral TURNER. I believe that the Soviet Union today finds, itself
at a disadvantage with respect to us in the field of economics. They do
not have the economic power or the economic access to the rest of
the world that the United States does, and they see little prospect of
being able to close the gap with us.
I believe that you might say politically or culturally they also find
themselves behind us in their ability to deal in the international
forum-witness their debacle in Egypt with their heavyhandedness.
The Soviet Union, however, is quite accustomed to using military
power at home as well as abroad, and I think they believe that the
existence of strong military forces can be translated into political ad-
vantage for them, and I would think this is a primary motive behind
their very considerable efforts today, the great expense that they are
accepting to build up their military power.
I would be reluctant to hazard a guess as to whether that means they
intend to use it in an active, combative fashion or whether they hope
that they can simply gain enough political leverage with it to satisfy
their needs.
Senator STEVENSON. Well, you have referred to their needs and the
political. advantages.
What are their needs? What political advantages are they seeking?
Are they basically defensive, or are they offensive? Is this Russian
imperialism, or is it a response to a perceived threat which could also
be explained against Russian history, or as I said, some combination.?
Admiral TURNER. I think it is a combination. Their actions in
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia it seems to me clearly indicate
a total resolve not to give up their so-called empire. I think that they
are still attempting to be the world's last empire. I think that Russian
imperialism is by no means losing sight of that in the Soviet Union
today, and I. believe that they would be very happy, at least by political
means, including the application of military pressure, to try to domi-
nate Western Europe, and through it, the United States.
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Senator STEVENSON. So you wouldn't place, yourself squarely in
either the Russians are coming school or whatever the other extreme,
on the other side?
Admiral TURNER. I think they are neither benign nor warlike, but
I think we must be cautious, we must maintain a strong enough posture
economically, socially, and militarily to be sure they do not translate
such advantages as they have into political leverage against us.
Senator STEVENSON. Well, that sounds like a neutral and a prag-
matic, but a reasonable approach to me.
Has the President assured you access to him whenever in your judg-
ment you have information that he should have?
Admiral TURNER. He has, sir.
Senator STEVEN soN. And now getting back to where I think I left
off earlier on the quality of intelligence and the estimating process, I
believe in response to Senator Lugar earlier you indicated that you felt
intelligence should be concerned about such sources of authority in the
world as food supplies, natural resources, the economic sources of
authority as well as the more typical military concerns that have
tended to dominate the intelligence community in the past.
Is that correct?
Admiral TURNER. Absolutely, there are many more factors than
military that determine the fate of our country today.
Senator STEVENSON. On the estimating process, do you think the
NIEs make a significant contribution to the policy-making process,
and if so, or if not, how can they be improved?
Admiral TURNER. I think they do make a significant contribution.
I hesitate; as a near outsider to suggest, at this short time exactly how
they could be improved, but I would emphasize that T think we
should be sure the divergent views, the alternative. conclusions that
could be drawn from the facts that are the foundation of those esti-
mates, nmst be. clearly displayed, and I would like to see a confidence
level displayed in many of our intelligence judgments as opposed to
factual statements.
I have seen cases. Senator, where people express a conclusion from
a set of facts, and don't acknowledge that another line of deduction
might take you to another conclusion. I would hope that we would
express several lines of reasoning and show some level of confidence
that one conclusion was right and others were wrong. Maybe one con-
clusion is 90-percent persuasive, and another only 10-percent so, but it
sometimes is worth showing that there is at least an alternative.
Senator STEvENsoN. Do you think regular competition between esti-
mating trams is desirable?
Admiral TURNER. I would hope that the very process within the
intelligence community that brings estimates forward would have
built into it an adequate opportunity for the expression of these
divergent; views, and that the creation of special teams, if that is done,
would be reserved for special occasions rather than just the routine.
But I certainly want the divergent views to come forward one way
or the other.
Senator STEVENSON. If I understood you earlier, you indicate that
you approved of competition between estimating teams inside and out-
side the intelligence community. Is that right?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
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Senator STEVENSON. Good, I'm glad to hear that.
I might just mention for the record, Mr. Chairman, that since the
subject came up earlier-I think Senator Moynihan mentioned it-
that this committee. is conducting a major study of this estimative
process, including the recent A-B' team controversy, and we will wel-
come your help and cooperation in conducting that study, Admiral.
Admiral TURNER. You will certainly have it, sir.
Senator STEVENSON. One question more, Mr. Chairman.
For many years the Office of National Estimates has served as the
focal point for production of the intelligence community's national
intelligence estimates. In 1973 the Office of National Estimates was
disbanded. The successor mechanism, the ? National Intelligence Offi-
cers, has been criticized as an inadequate substitute.
Will you review the present mechanism for producing those NIEs?
Admiral TURNER. I'm sorry. You asked if I would review it?
Senator STEVENSON. Yes.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I intend to.
Senator STEVENSON. And are you considering any organizational
changes now with respect to national intelligence officers?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator STEVENSON. Would you care to tell us what they are?
Admiral TURNER. I would prefer to keep my counsel until I have a
more firm judgment, sir, but I am certainly exploring that as a matter
of high priority.
Senator STEVENSON. We will have additional opportunities.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.
The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Turner, regretfully we will have to take
a short recess. There is a vote on the final passage on Senate Concur-
ring Resolution No. 10, the budget. So-but before we do, I am pleased
to recognize a very illustrious Member of the U.S. Senate. He is from
the State of Illinois. He wasn't here this morning. He wanted to be
here very much but because of some flight schedules he was unable
to make it. Senator Percy.
Senator PERCY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Goldwater, I will be very
brief indeed because of our vote, and also that I just simply wanted
to express my appreciation for the opportunity to be here with Adlaj
Stevenson to present Admiral Turner.
My distinguished colleague has spoken about him this morning. I
had a lengthy discussion with Admiral Holloway, whose judgment I
consider very good indeed, and with other members, I might say, of
my own branch of the service, the U.S. Navy, six or seven flag officers
who have known directly or indirectly of Admiral Turner, so that I
speak with the conviction that his own colleagues, both those who have
been subordinate, worked along with him, and his superiors, think
that the President's judgment in making this appointment is just
outstanding.
We in Illinois are very proud to have such a distinguished native son.
He is a man of many proven abilities. He is a recognized scholar,
capping his position in his class in the Naval Academy with a
Rhodes Scholarship. He has made a significant contribution to the
intellectual world through his writings, and as an innovative and ex-
tremely effective president of the Naval War College.
But Admiral Turner is more than an intellectual. He has consist-
ently proven his merit as a commander both of United States and naval
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forces. Through his naval career he has commanded mine sweepers, de-
stroyers, guided missile frigates, a carrier task force, NATO Strike
hleet, Atlantic, and he is presently Commander in Chief of Allied
Forces, Southern Europe.
In his Washington assignments he has been in the vanguard of Navy
and Defense decisionmaking, in highly competitive assignments on
the staffs of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Systems Analysis. As aide and executive assistant to
the Secretary of the Navy, he compiled an outstanding record of per-
formance, and certainly Admiral Holloway emphasized what he con-
sidered to be an extraordinarily important asset, not only the work
that he has done in systems analysis-and I happened to head a systems
analysis company for a number of years. I didn't understand half of
what the engineers and scientists did, but at least I gained a compe-
tence or a recognition of a competence for someone who can engage in
that process, but even more complicated, he feels that lie thoroughly
understands Congress, and has had a relationship here that will stand
him in good stead as head of the CIA as well as in the duties and func-
tions performance that we have directed the CIA to perform to this
very, very vital committee.
Now that Admiral Turner has reached the top rank in the Navy, has
been acclaimed for his creativity, lauded for his administrative abili-
ties, and proven himself an outstanding diplomat in varied assign-
ments, the President has called upon him to make use of all of these
considerable talents.
I can think of no more difficult challenge than that facing him as the
Director of Central Intelligence. I can think of no one better qualified
to assume this key assignment.
We in Illinois have no doubt that he will meet all of the challenges
and take all of the frustrations in stride. I am sure that you will find
Admiral Turner an excellent choice for this critical and sensitive post.
I trust at the end of several years experience working with him, that
you will have even greater admiration for him than you have today,
because I think he will work intimately and closely with you, and hav-
ing spoken to him, I know how sensitive he is to the position that we
must restore the CIA in the eyes of the world as one of the great
intelligence-gathering agencies the world has ever seen, and in the van-
guard of the protection and defense of this country, absolutely crucial
and essential. And certainly I think he will be respected by all of the
professionals inside, by intelligence all over the world, which is im-
portant, but I think he will have the respect of the American people,
which is absolutely crucial.
Thank you.
Senator GOLDWATER. May I say to my friend from Illinois that the
Chairman and I have decided that the Air Force` and the Army like
him, too.
Senator PERCY. That's either all bad or all good. When I was in the
service they didn't get along very well.
[General laughter.]
Senator STEVENSON. I will just add a word for the Marine Corps,
since the Navy is a subsidiary of the Marine Corps, we will accept him
also.
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The CHAIRMAN. The committee will stand in recess for 15 minutes
[A brief recess was taken.]
The CHAIRMAN. Let us now resume our hearings.
Senator Huddleston ?
Senator HUDDLE STON. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Mathias.
Senator MATHIAS. Admiral, under Executive Order 11905 the Gen-
eral Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency is required to make
reports to the Intelligence Oversight Board with respect to any im-
proprieties that may come to his attention within the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Now, my question to you is, would you, as DCI, provide
this committee with the substance of those reports-and I am careful
to say the substance, having in mind our colloquy this morning as to
certain fine points, but with the substance of those reports, so that the
committee can carry out the oversight function with respect to any
improprieties which might arise in the future.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator MATHIAS. Now, in the same connection, Executive Order
11905 provides for the Intelligence Oversight Board to report to
the President any activities which it deems to be improper and which
it discovers within the intelligence community as a whole.
Will you, as Director, provide this committee with the substance of
those reports, so that the committee can carry out its oversight func-
tion again?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator MATITIAS. So that we get it at two different sequential
stages.
Admiral TURNER. I see the difference you are
Senator MATHIAS. In the event that it moves to two different,
sequential stages.
Admiral TURNER. Yes.
Senator MATHIAS. Well, I am very gratified to have your unequivo-
cal answer to those two questions.
Admiral TURNER. I may be in for unequivocal problems, but I
will
Senator MATHIAS. Well, I don't expect that you will. I hope that we
won't have such questions arising, but I think it is of the greatest
importance for this committee to be advised of them if those problems
do exist.
Now, turning to another question, in our original study of the intel-
ligence community, one of the most difficult, problems that we observed
was the lack of statutory charters governing the activities of different
elements of the intelligence community. Where there was no statutory
charter. the boundaries of jurisdiction were very difficult to define.
They could lack permanence. Individuals who might be affected by the
activities of the community would find it difficult to ascertain exactly
where their rights began and where they ended.
It has been a subject of concern in the Congress that we should
develop statutory charters for the different elements of the community
that are not governed. by charters at this time.
Do you have any problem in working with the Congress in the
development of that kind of statutory base?
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Admiral TURNER. No, sir, none whatsoever. I mentioned this morn-
ng that [ don't have a preconceived notion in my mind as to whether
statutes or executive branch instruments are the appropriate vehicle
for intelligence charters, but I am certainly openminded and would
look on the Congress' interest in better definition of the responsibilities
of each of these agencies as something that could be a big help to the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Senator MATrHIAS. I believe it could be a substantial help to the Di-
rector, to future Directors, to have a clear understanding of the guide-
lines that the Congress adopted with the concurrence of the Presi-
dent, as to what was the proper role and sphere of activity of the in-
telligence community. I think that is really the opportunity which
lies before us, because this hasn't been done. In some cases jurisdiction
is defined only in executive orders and directives, some of which are
so classified as to be unavailable to certainly the average citizen, and
in many cases, to senior government officials. If this could be em-
bodied in a code of law that was sufficiently flexible to make it pos-
sible to operate, but sufficiently firm and defined so that people knew
where they were, I believe we should have. made a substantial ad-
vance, and I appreciate your willingness to move forward in this area.
Admiral TURNER. I think the problems you have mentioned of flexi-
bility and of security are very real in developing such charters, and
again, having read a few arguments against charters and a few argu-
ments for them, I can only say I am openminded at this time.
Senator MATHIAS. And you have. no fundamental personal reserva-
tions ?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
Senator. MATamAS. All right, thank you.
The Cr[A]RMAN. Senator Hart.
:Senator I[ART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, let me add my welcome. I am sorry I missed this morn-
ing's session.
As you know, when we discussed your appointment, I said my per-
sonal reservations were based not on your record or qualifications, but
rather about having a military director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. i raised that with you, and because I have. those reservations
1 should raise them for the record.
I don't think this is a sufficient reason to vote against you. But the
record of the purpose and history of the CIA is such that it was estab-
lished to provide. an independent analytic capability separate from the
capability of defending this country, so that those who were assessing
the threat and those who were responding to it were two different
groups of people.
I think you are extremely well qualified for this position. I think
you will be confirmed and will do a very good job. But it would be
unfortunate if we got into a pattern over a period of time of having
the DCI and the Director of the Agency being from the military side.
Having said that I would like to get to the area that concerns me
the most, and that is the independence of the CIA's analytic
capability.
As you know, there has been a deep discussion in this community
here in the last several months, over the so-called A team and B team
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reports. And with your background in the Navy, in the military, I
would like you to give your thoughts on what you as the head of the
Central Intelligence Agency can do or should do to protect the inde-
pendence of that Agency and its analytic capability from, let's say,
outside intimidation by those who do not agree with its assessments
or its analyses.
Admiral TURNER. I think one of the primary devices, sir, is to be
sure that nobody feels lie has to intimidate the Agency or the analysts,
by being sure that there is adequate opportunity for the divergent
views to be expressed. When it comes to the, crunch as to which one is
the view we express with the greatest level of confidence, when there
is an issue, I am going to be the one who makes that decision per-.
sonally. There is no way I can guarantee you that I will be unbiased,
but I can assure you that that would be my certain intent.
Senator HART. Let's say over a period of time, just to repeat what
has actually happened, hypothetically, over a period of time other
elements within the intelligence community do not agree with or do
not share or like the analyses or the judgments put forward by the
Agency analysts. Pressure is brought to bear on you to construct or
develop a B team which-with the purpose of challenging that as-
sessment from one direction or the other, not just from a more con-
servative point of view.
What would be your response to that pressure?
Admiral TURNER. It is very difficult to hypothesize response to a
particular pressure, but I said this.morning I am not opposed to out-
side re-view, I am not opposed to A-B team type review where one side
is all on one spectrum and one on the other. I personally would prefer
to make sure that all spectra were represented in the initial review, or
in an outside or post-analysis review. I want to make clear that I would
not want to respond to pressures for these reviews; I would want to
be persuaded that they were really needed and not being done because
somebody wanted to have them done, if you see what I mean, sir.
Senator HART. I see exactly, but I would like to put you in Mr.
Bush's shoes, your predecessor's shoes, and that was exactly the pres-
sure he was under 6 or, 8 months.ago. And if you were in his shoes,
given those circumstances, and you. were convinced that the analysts
under your direct control in the Agency represented different points of
view, were not all hawks or all doves or all anything, but were selected.
for their independence and their unbiased analytic capability, and had
in fact over a period of time come up with accurate assessments, and
pressure was brought to bear on you by those who didn't share your
conviction, that, you should appoint an outside group with a bias,
what would be your response?
Admiral TURNER. My initial attitude toward that would be negative,,
toward having a group with a bias. I can see that there is merit in
that under some circumstances, but it seems to me you are inviting.
problems when they come in with a deliberate bias under a pressure,
situation.
If you construct a bias here and a bias there, I think you have m.
better opportunity of keeping control of it.
May I elaborate on one point?
Senator HART. Please do.
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Admiral TURNER. I think the way to avoid these crises is to try to
make those who feel the estimates are erroneous be more specific and
more quantifying in their reasons for objecting. I think if we say
hypothetically that we think there are 32 submarines of a particular
type and somebody else says it is 52, I am going to ask that they pre-
sent the evidence as to why they think it is 52, such as the building
rate is higher in their estimation, they think our intelligence has only
detected 50 percent of the ones that are in existence. I mean, there
must be some basis for this.
And it would he my hope that you could develop your estimate in
such a way that the driving forces of difference were readily apparent
and nobody could have a complaint that his view was not adequately
stated, and yet the decisionmaker would not just know that one party
thought it was a very dangerous situation and one thought it was a
negligible situation, he would know that it is because of stated dif-
ferences in the way they made their calculations.
Senator HART. Well, I think that is one of the things that disturbed
mne so much about the so-called B team was that one of the areas they
looked into was Soviet intentions. And this was based upon undisputed
data.
The B team took data which they did not dispute and reached a dif-
ferent conclusion about what was going on inside the Soviet mind, as if
there were, first of all, a Soviet mind, and that is where they quarreled
seriously with the Agency. Well, that is a very subjective judgment.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HART. And my own view is it is very demoralizing for the
analysts at the Agency to have their judgments attacked on a subjec-
tive basis.
Shifting to another area, my understanding is you testified this
morning that you would not accept an order from the President to
conduct an illegal activity.
Is that correct?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator HART. If it were determined that a head of state repre-
sented a threat to the security of this country and had to be eliminated,
are there any circumstances under which you would agree to plot
the elimination of that head of state ?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir; not in peacetime.
Senator HART. It has been suggested that it is very difficult for a
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to know all the things
that are going on at any given time inside the Agency.
Can you suggest to us, either through a completely independent and
highly autonomous Inspector General system or some other system,
how you intend to be satisfied in your own mind that you know every-
thing that the Agency is up to at any given time, that you can go to bed
every night thinking, I know exactly what is going on there?
Admiral 'IrRNER. I don't think that will ever be possible, sir, but I
certainly expect to be able to know the things of critical importance,
the thinfTs that could lead to problems, and I would lean heavily on
the existing Inspector General and his staff. As far as I understand at
this point, their charter is clear and adequate. I will certainly be
reviewing it to see if it needs any strengthening.
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But getting control of any large organization takes more than rules
and inspectors and others. It is in part the tenor of leadership that you
exert. It is in part the example that you set when somebody pulls a
surprise on you, and I am going to make it clear in my first days in
office that I don't want any plausible denial theories with respect to
illy stewardship. I am going to make it clear that if I ever have to come
before this committee and confess that I didn't know what was going
on, and it was not good, that I will not ask you for excuse. I will
accept the responsibility, and my subordinates in the Agency, if I am
approved for that job, had better be prepared to accept the responsi-
bility also. If I ever And that their sense of their own responsibility is
such that they feel they are entitled to hide anything from me or in
any way feel I am not entitled to know every detail of what is going
on, there will be some fireworks out there.
Senator HART. Thank you, Admiral.
Thank you very much.
The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Turner, a. number of significant CIA.
policies are embodied in CIA internal regulations rather than being
fixed by law.
If you become head of the CIA and you find that you can waive the
application of these regulations or simply change them without noti-
fying Congress, would .you do so or would you insure that this com-
mittee would be notified of any change in CIA regulations?
Admiral TURNER. I 'have no problem with notifying you of changes
in CIA regulations, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure what detail these
get into and how much detail you want to get into. My only hesitation
is that I would be very happy to be sure you were advised of those
which seem to be of-seem worthy of your attention.
'The CHAIRMAN. Fine.
Admiral TURNER. And if you feel there are others that are worthy.
of your attention that are not initially included I will be happy to
go deeper.
The CHAIRMAN. I would like to apologize.
Senator Lugar, do you have any questions?
Senator LUGAR. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Turner, following up Senator Hart's questions a moment,
ago about the control of the Agency and your knowledge of what was
occurring, you know, obviously this is critical in terms of the relation-
ship with this committee or the Congress or the Nation, that you have
this control.
Now, having examined the organization, do you feel that you have
sufficient control with regard to personnel policy, or maybe to state it
another way, without doubt are going to have the loyalty of persons
who have been affiliated with the Agency fora long period of time, so
that they are going to accept without any difficulty your leadership,'
the, chain of command, or whatever the organizational relationship is.
The reason that I ask this, in a parallel situation, much less grave,
from time to time a chief of police may be appointed, and he may
come in from the outside, and sometimes all of the police officers who
are members of that police department do not share enthusiasm for
the chief. As a matter of fact, they may feel that the attitudes that he
is adopting are very different from the code. that they have followed,
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and they believe they are going to outlast him, that they will still be
there after he has gone, and maybe four or more successors.
What is your basic feeling as you enter this situation prospectively,
about your ability, really, to obtain management control and to have
knowledge and to have loyalty and to have the sort of feeling on the
part of subordinates that they would really genuinely care that you
new and. that you were thus able to represent the truth to this
committed?
Admiral TURNER. Senator, I think that the tools, the official legal
tools available to the Director for those purposes are adequate, today.
From there, I think it is a matter of personal leadership. You must
not only have a threat of some sort over people, you must be able to
win their enthusiastic support for what you are doing.
I cannot guarantee you I am that leader, but I can only say with
some sense of immodesty that I don't think I have over failed to be
in control of an operation I have commanded.
Senator LTTGAR. But you perceive the importance of that, obviously,
from Senator Hart's questions and from mine, that if this was not to
bn the case, then we are all in trouble. In other words, you have been
appointed and may be confirmed, but there is somehow rather-T
suppose some would feel on occasion that people might be going off
doing their own thing, and your feeling is that whether that has been
true historically or not, that it will not be true in your administration
of the. Agency.
Admiral TURNMR. Sir, I am not so immodest as to agree that it will
not be true, but I will be making every effort, to be sure it is not true.
Senator LUGAR. This morning the wire services report that Presi-
dent Carter was disturbed over leaks in intelligence, and at least the
wire service report. suggests that from the executive branch standpoint,
lie felt that the number of persons who had a need to know ought to
be reduced substantially. At least one ticker tape story that. I saw
mentioned a reduction to as low as five persons, although I am not
certain what type of information that might have referred to. Ap-
parently he left the ball over in Congress' court as to what the response
of the Congress ought to be.
Let me ask you now as a professional in the intelligence business,
if you were to have the-best of all worlds and to indicate how many
persons ought to have a need to know in the Congress, about how many
persons can safely be entrusted with information, given the normal
odds of hearsay and problems of security and so forth, what sort of
target would you advise us to be aiming at if we were to have the sort
of control that we would want on behalf of the people we represent.,
but at the same time, from the standpoint of national security and
intelligence, the odds would be substantially diminished, as apparently
thought they needed to be in his distress this morning.
Admiral TURNER. It is my view, sir, that I would feel more corn-
fortable, if confirmed in this office, and assuming the responsibilities
under law for the protection of sources and methods of intelligence,
if I could report these very sensitive clandestine collection operations
or covert operations only to one committee of each chamber.
Senator LuGAR. And you feel that the committees, at least constituted
ltl~ they' are, about the size that they are, are appropriate, at least,
ti mat. this is a reasonable situation.
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Admiral TURNER. At this point I see no problem with that, sir.
Senator LUGAR. In the regulations for the Agency-and you have
offered to share those with the Chairman or with the committee, as the
case may be, so that we can have some, surveillance, are you satisfied,
}raving read through those, that there is an adequate code of conduct
for persons affiliated, in all sorts of activities with the agencies, in
terms of how they ought to conduct themselves in interrogating per-
sons, or in a worse case, maybe, of capture, how they ought to react if
they were under capture? Are you satisfied that the situation has been
explored and that the rules are reasonable, and that everybody in-
volved has a good anticipation of what he or she ought to do?
Admiral TURNER. No; I am not satisfied, but only because I simply
have not probed into this in depth as yet, sir. I ain sorry, I just:have
not had the time.
Senator LUGAR. Would you agree that this is a reasonably serious
proposition that probably ought to be looked into, given the debate in
the military services from time to time on similar situations, especially
the prisoner of war situation?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
Senator LUGAR. The code of conduct there, and what ought to be
anticipated in the national service.
Admiral TURNER. I certainly agree.
Senator LUGAR. Finally, what in a general sense do you see as an
ideal course for the development of superior intelligence gathering or
evaluation in this country? I suppose two prongs of my question : Is
there a part, at least, of Your administration, as you look at it, that
would be devoted to research capability, discovering new ways in which
information can be found. Obviously the discovery means that we
don't know precisely which technique we are looking at, but the re-
search and development aspect, if that is appropriate, will that be a
part of your outlook as to how we refine technique, andthen I suppose.
second, what should be the objectives of intelligence finding, what sort
of capabilities, and beyond that, has the President discussed with you
his philosophy of what intelligence ought to be about, an other words,
any new dimensions that he sees or that you see in' conversation with
him?
Admiral TURNER. I certainly think we insist pursue a vigorous
research and development program. There is a prospect that new'
developments in intelligence collection techniques can perhaps make
unnecessary some of the more risky ones that we must suffer today. In
addition, we must always stay ahead of the competition. This is one of
the great strengths we have, it seems to me, over the Soviet Union, is a
more advanced technology.
The President has shared some of his philosophy with me, par'-
ticularly his great desire for well-coordinated intelligence, drawing
upon all the sources that are available to us, and particularly his
desire for a very balanced presentation, perhaps, as he said in the
press several times, with several sources coming to him separately.
Again, as I said this morning, I am just very encouraged because of
his intense interest in this whole area, and I am sure that means that
you and I are going to have lots of interchange with him and lots of
cooperation.
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Senator LUGAR. Did you mean in that last answer that the President
might on occasion encourage the publication of-take this A and B
team controversy, suggest that A, B, and C teams have looked at iden-
tical data and have come up with these evaluations, and for the good
of the national argument, he might say I want to share this with you.
or does that go well beyond what the President's intent would appear
to be?
Admiral TURNER. It goes beyond any specific discussion I have had
with him, so I don't wish to commit him there, sir.
Senator LUGAR. Thank you.
The CH\IRMAN. It appears that I will be the one to wrap up the
questioning, sir.
Reading some of our front pages and books being published, I
gather that many Americans have reached a conclusion that the CIA
and the other agencies in the community are insidious, closed, ultra-
secret, conspiratorial type organizations. The very nature of the work
requires secrecy, but I think the record should show that of all the
intelligence-gat-hering organizations in the free world, ours happens
to be the most open.
As yot are well aware, Admiral, in a great democracy, Great Bri-
tain, the identity of the head of MI-6 is not known to the people
of that country. In fact, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister
are the only two who are aware of the identity of the Chief of MT-6.
Here we are having an open hearing on the Chief of our MI-6, and
tomorrow we will have an open discussion, and open vote as to your
confirmation.
As Senator Lugar has pointed out, the President unquestionably
is and should be concerned with some of the unauthorized disclosures
that have been appearing in the press and elsewhere, and my question
is this : employees of the Government who are made privy to highly
sensitive material, such as those who are working for the CIA, are
required to take a special oath, and the oath would in essence say that
we will never divulge the information that we have received during
our service to this country, and yet we know that in violation of this
oath, articles have been written, books have been written, names have
been printed, operations have been described.
Do you believe that criminal sanctions should be provided for by
law to punish those who violate this oath?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any suggestions as to what sort of crim-
inal sanctions?
Admiral TURNER. I really do not at this time, Senator.
The CI[AIRMAN. If confirmed, do you intend to work with your col-
leagues in the community to come forth with some sort of legislation
that we can look at?
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I would certainly be very amenable to
doing that and bringing any legislative suggestions through the nor-
inal channels of the executive branch to the Congress and to your
committee.
The CiiA(RMAN. You have indicated that you would like to be
required to just respond to one committee. Here in the Senate we have
this committee. Then you have the Appropriations Committee with a
special subcommittee, a highly secret subcommittee handling intelli-
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gence appropriations:; the armed services, I think will jealously guard
its prerogatives over the activities of the defense intelligence activi-
ties, and I presume the Foreign Relations Committee will insist upon
having its hand in the foreign policy aspects of intelligence gathering.
How do you think we can improve the situation?
Admiral TURNER. What I intended to say, sir, was I would hope
that for very sensitive, clandestine collection efforts or covert action
operations we could report those to one committee who would assume
the responsibility for oversight of these delicate, risky operations. I
certainly do not propose, for instance, not reporting to the Appropria-
tions Committee on appropriations matters, but I am not sure that
need carry through to the degree of detail that I am suggesting on
the sensitive side.
The CHAIRMAN. Well, I believe I speak for all members of this
committee when I say we are very much impressed by you, sir.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.
The CZIAIRMAN. And we appreciate your forthrightness and your
responses to our questions, and although this may sound rather pre-
mature, and maybe uncalled for, but I don't see any problems tomor-
row at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
So if you have an assignment in Naples this evening, I would say to
you, bon voyage and you can go ahead knowing that you will be con-
firmed, sir.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you very much, and may I thank all the
members of the committee for their generosity and for the stimula-
tion that I have received, and I do look forward, if confirmed, to
working very closely with all of you, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. And Admiral, if we may, we would like to submit
to you questions that were prepared by members who were not able
to be here today, and by some of the staff people, and your responses
will be most appreciated.
Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.
The CI-AmMAN. Thank you very much, sir.
Admiral TURNER. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is the President of Common
Cause, Mr. David Cohen.
Welcome to the committee, Mr. Cohen. We have received your
statement.
Without objection, your statement will be made part of the record
in Coto.
[The prepared statement of Mr. David Cohen follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID COHEN, PRESIDENT, COMMON CAUSE
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate the opportunity
to testify for Common Cause on the nomination of Stansfield Turner to be
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
We regard these hearings as among the most important of the confirmation
proceedings to come before the Senate : first, because of the power and the
potential for abuse of the office to which Admiral Turner has been nominated ;
second-and equally important-because of the unique history and status of
this committee.
I
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is the youngest legislative com-
mittee of the Congress. The legislation creating it-which Common Cause strongly
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supported--was introduced in response to the revelations of a decades-long pat-
tcern of abuse of power by Presidents, Directors and agency operatives. The crea-
tion of a single intelligence committee was public acknowledgement that Con-
gress had fallen down on one of its essential tasks: oversight.
The confirmation process is an essential part of that oversight responsibility.
In few areas is Congressional oversight more important than on. intelligence
operations. The nature of intelligence operations severely limits the ability of the
general public or outsiders to appraise the behavior of intelligence institutions
and their personnel.
This hearing is more than an opportunity to examine the qualifications of the
nominee. That is just one of the tasks facing this Committee. This hearing pro-
vides the only chance to examine and debate the appointee's views on a variety
of substantive issues related to the CIA's statutory responsibilities, as well as
those procedural steps he will take to insure accountability and respect for
the rights and liberties of citizens. Even more important, this is an appropriate
forum to develop guidelines for future cooperation between the nominee and this
Committee as both go about their necessary duties.
Admiral Turner comes before the Committee with a distinguished record of
military service. However, little is known about his views on the role of intel-
ligence gathering operations in a free society. Common Cause urges the Com-
inittee to develop a full and substantive record for consideration by the Senate
and the public.
We recognize that during a nominee's initial appearance before a committee
conducting confirmation hearings, he cannot be expected to immediately answer
in depth and detail all of the questions put to him by the Committee. Nor can he
at the time fully anticipate or respond to questions which will be raised by
groups which take the stand after he has testified. Therefore, we urge that,
before the Committee votes on Admiral Turner, it should recall him to answer
those questions he did not fully address in his opening testimony. The nominee
should be pressed to answer the questions straightforwardly, without indulging
in the semantic games which were engaged in by some of his predecessors. Only
determined pursuit of difficult questions by this Committee will provide an ade-
quate public record.
The confirmation process tests the Senate as much as it tests the nominee.
The office of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency merits special atten-.
lion. The occupant of that office wields vast powers which are in constant ten-
sion with fundamental values of a democratic society. Many previous holders:
of that office have abused those powers systematically. It is unclear whether
the agency they headed has yet reformed.
This Committee has a clear mandate to develop sensible procedures for con-
trolling intelligence activities, to rationalize an often disorganized assemblage
of agencies and improve their product, to provide thorough protections for civil
liberties and to insure that the intelligence apparatus implements and serves na-
tional policy goals, not its own or those solely of the President.
The person selected to head the CIA and serve as director of Central Intelli-
gence can play an important part in assisting the Congress and the President. in
resolving these problems, or he can effectively block needed reform. The task
facing the next director is to lead the intelligence community out of the wilder-
ness of crime and abuse that characterized the past decade. The Committee must
realize that its success or failure during the next few years will depend heavily
on the qualities and ability of whomever it confirms to head the American intelli-
gence community.
This will not be accomplished in a hearing room or through testimony, but
there is much that the Committee can do to get the process off to a good start.
We suggest that the Intelligence Committee take the following steps in ban-
dung the Turner nomination :
The Committee should develop standards to govern its decision on Admiral
Turner's confirmation. These standards should cover administrative competency
and relevant expertise, as well as a commitment to various principles of ac-
countability and ground rules regarding CIA operation.
The Committee should carefully evaluate Admiral Turner's background and
views on the basis of these standards. This evaluation should entail broad and
extensive questioning. One or two days of hearings is insufficient to do the job.
We know-as do the members of the Committee-that this nomination is un-
likely to encounter opposition. But the fact that the votes are present for con-
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firmation does not excuse the Committee from the duties (and the opportunity)
to examine important questions about the operation of the intelligence agencies.
The Committee should require that Admiral Turner's financial disclosure state-
ment filed pursuant to Rule 5.4 of the Committee be made public. That statement,
along with a complete description of all actions he will take to comply with Mr.
Carter's recently announced ethics guidelines, should be made a part of this
hearing record.
The Committee has adopted admirable rules for considering nominations.
These rules guarantee that nominations will be considered in a timely and deli-
berate fashion. We hope the Committee will follow these rules without waiver
or exception.
To enable the full Senate to have a similar opportunity for deliberation, the
Committee should issue a report to the Senate on the Turner nomination at least
three full days prior to a Senate vote. This will give other Senators and the
public time to scrutinize the record and the Committee's findings.
Mr. Chairman, in order to help the Committee develop a full and substantive
record on the nomination, we have set forth those areas of concern that Common
Cause believes Admiral Turner should address. We will focus on four essential
tasks which face the next director of the CIA :
(1) Setting clear limits on covert activities ;
(2) Protecting the rights of American citizens ;
(3) Improving the product of the intelligence agencies; and
(4) Restoring public confidence in the intelligence community.
We think that the following specific questions can aid the Committee in il-
luminating some of the major difficulties facing the next head of the intelligence
community and that Admiral Turner's responses can assist the Committee in
-drawing up new charters for the community and overseeing its behavior.
Admiral Turner will inherit an institution governed by two major enact-
ments-the National Security Act and a Presidential Order issued February 18,
1976. That order represented President Ford's response to intelligence com-
munity transgressions. The Committee should ask Admiral Turner to evaluate
the Presidential order. Does he believe, as do many critics, that it actually sanc-
tions past improprieties and approves their commission in the future? Does it
leave too much discretion remaining within. the Executive Branch? Does it con-
tinue to exclude Congress from activities which directly impact on foreign rela-
tions? What changes and improvements will Admiral Turner propose in the
current rules?
On the same subject, Admiral Turner should be asked whether he believes
executive orders-which carry no criminal penalties and are subject to change
or supercession without notice-are appropriate to govern intelligence activities?
Will he support new legislative charters for the intelligence agencies which
codify strict limitations on permissible behavior and apply criminal sanctions to
violators?
The most controversial issue facing the new Director will be the handling of
covert operations. In many previous Administrations, covert operations, often
rightly described as "dirty tricks", have been used to implement policies totally
lacking in public and Congressional support. The Committee should carefully
question Admiral Turner on what limitations he will place on covert activities.
Will he totally foreclose certain types of behavior which have occurred in the
past such as assassination, acts of war or intervention in the domestic politics
of treaty allies? Will he commence major foreign policy initiatives by means
of covert operations? How will he assure the Congress and the public that covert
operations will not be used to carry out policies which could not have gained
public support?
We recognize that treatment of covert operations is a difficult problem in
which there may be no easy, categorical answers. That is why this Committee
must question Admiral Turner, in depth, on his views on the limitations of covert
operations. The Committee should be able to fully inform the Senate and the
public of Admiral Turner's views on the subject of covert operations in its report
on these hearings.
Common Cause strongly urges this Committee to make Admiral Turner agree
to notify the Committee of any significant covert operations before they take
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place, so that the Committee can comment on them. The current law only pro-
vides for ex post facto notification. The Committee should also ask Admiral
Turner whether he would support a statutory provision to this effect in any new
legislative charters.
There are currently few statutory reporting requirements placed on the Direc-
tor of the CIA. Congressional committees have often found it difficult to obtain
needed information from the Director on matters which were directly related
to their responsibilities. There is a pressing need for this Committee to be fully
informed on covert operations, on domestic investigations and on any possible
conflicts between CIA actions and the law. We believe that the Committee
should require Admiral Turner to put in writing the consultation procedures
he plans to follow in providing information to the Congress.
No less troubling than the covert intelligence operations abroad, are the activ-
ities of U.S. intelligence operatives in this country which have clearly infringed
constitutional rights of American citizens. The Committee should ask Admiral
Turner to detail his views of the current authority of the Central Intelligence
Agency to conduct domestic operations. What authority does he believe the CIA
should have to operate within the confines of the United States? Does he support
revisions of the National Security Act to clarify ambiguities in the existing
law?
Beyond the controversy over the authority of the CIA to conduct domestic
operations lies the general issue of domestic intelligence gathering by whatever
agency. As Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Turner would supervise
all domestic intelligence gathering. He should be asked whether he supports
legislation to condition intelligence-related domestic investigations on appli-
cations for and receipt of a warrant. The Committee should also question
Admiral Turner on the standards which he believes should apply before the
commencement of an investigation and the types of information he thinks
needed to justify the use of such investigatory procedures as wiretaps, mail
covers, searches and seizures. Admiral Turner should also be asked to detail
measures lie will institute to insure that his subordinates and agents are not
guilty of violations of constitutional rights. We feel that these issues are so
important that the Committee should not vote on Admiral Turner until it re-
ceives from him a statement outlining the procedures he envisions using to safe-
guard constitutional liberties, We believe that the Committee should explore
this issue as fully as possible during these hearings and receive from Admiral
Turner a commitment to prepare by a certain date a comprehensive written
report specifying the steps he has taken.
Unfortunately, Admiral Turner's appointment as Director of the CIA does
not and cannot wipe the slate clean insofar as past actions of the agency are
concerned. Numerous investigations have revealed that wrongs were committed
by operatives of that agency, but few have faced criminal punishment. No
investigation of past, present or future CIA behavior can get to square one
without the full assistance of the Director.
We think this Committee must get Admiral Turner on record concerning the
steps he will take to assist and encourage the Department of Justice in pursuing
any wrongdoing that has or will take place within the CIA. What types of
cooperation will he make available to the Department of Justice? What access
to files and. to employees of the agency will he allow? Will he follow the recom-
mendations of the Rockefeller Commission to upgrade the status of the CIA
Inspector General and give that officer investigatory authority broad enough
to insure active internal controls on illegal behavior. Will Admiral Turner see
that those who were victimized by clearly illegal past CIA activities, such as
operation CHAOS, are notified and given CIA cooperation in securing informa-
tion to redress whatever violations of rights may have occurred?
We do not believe that the Committee should accept any disclaimer regarding
past actions of the agency. The resolution of past scandals is one of the major
tasks facing P. new director. Unless he can convince the Congress and the public
that the CIA is observing fundamentally fair procedures, the past will cripple
the agency's ability to operate in the present and future.
There are three other specific areas on which the Committee should question
Admiral Turner. The first is his position on publicizing the budget of the CIA.
Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states :
No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Ap-
propriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the
Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
to time.
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Present practice with CIA expenditures seems to run airectly counter to thfa
clear statement of the Constitution. The final report of the Church Committee
stated, "The Committee believes that the overall figure for national intelligence
activities can be made public annually without endangering national security or
revealing sensitive programs." This does not seem to be an unreasonable sug-
gestion. We think Admiral Turner should be asked exactly what plans he has
to improve public understanding of the CIA budget and keep members of Con-
gress better informed as well.
The second area for questioning involves the dual role Admiral Turner shall
assume as both the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence. Many observers, including the Church Committee,.
have questioned the wisdom of combining the two roles and the effectiveness
of the present arrangement in providing for coordination and supervision of all
intelligence agencies. The Church Committee particularly recommended an in-
crease in the powers of the Director of Central Intelligence vis-a-vis the other
intelligence agencies.
The Committee should question Admiral Turner about his views on the separa-
tion of the two functions and on changes in the authority of the DCI. It,will
obviously be difficult for Admiral Turner to fully address this matter before he
has served in his post, but the issue is important and may play a critical role
in decisions that will be made about charters for the intelligence agencies.
Therefore, we believe the Committee should require Admiral Turner to make a
commitment to prepare a comprehensive report-stating his own views and
presenting general considerations pro and con on the role and powers of the
DCI-in time to assist this Committee when it reaches the issue during the
drafting of legislative charters.
Finally, we believe the Committee must question Admiral Turner on how his
past and continued service as a member of the Armed Forces will affect the
performance of his new duties. The bulk of intelligence manpower and expendi-
ture is assigned to the Armed Forces. They have traditionally resisted attempts
at oversight and consolidation. Admiral Turner will have to deal with the de-
minds of the defense intelligence agencies and defense Intelligence consumers.
He will be responsible for the preparation of intelligence estimates at a time
when dedicated professionals differ over the nature of Soviet military strength
and the relative importance of military power as a component which affects the
behavior of states.
The New York Times has suggested that Admiral Turner voluntarily resign
his commission and agree not to return to uniform. This may be an appropriate
act, although we do not believe that a military background and service as Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence are necessarily incompatible. Even were Admiral
Turner to take such steps, it would not resolve problems which might be raised
by excessive application of a "purely military view" to intelligence problems or
the question of how he would deal with military demands and views.
So whether Admiral Turner remains in the Navy or not, the Committee has
an obligation to question him on how his military background might affect his
performance, particularly with regard to the development of intelligence esti-
mates and oversight of military intelligence agencies. If Admiral Turner indicates
a preference to remain in the Navy, the Committee should explore how be will
maintain independence in evaluating views pressed by the Navy.
The Armed Services Committee required George Bush-who happened to be
a politician-to renounce any plans to run for political office immediately after-
his service as Director. We urged that view on the Armed Services Committee,
and fully supported their action. This Committee and Admiral Turner should
discuss whether his situation is at all analogous to the Bush situation and
whether some similar pledge, with respect to military advancement, Is
appropriate.
III
The list of abuses and misdeeds laid at the feet of the CIA and other members
of the intelligence community is long and varied. It ranges from assassination
plots to secret wars to the "destabilization" of democratic regimes to domestic
spying and political chicanery. It is not a record of which one can be proud.
The many investigations of these matters have agreed on at least one thing :
the bulk of the misdeeds did not result from "rogue" behavior by the CIA-the
agency was doing what it was told to do or what it had good reason to believe
it was expected to do.
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The CIA became for all intents and purposes a private army and police force
which the President of the United States could use without facing any of the
checks and balances which normally attach to his activities.
It is time to end such unchecked use of secret powers.
Common Cause believes that the greatest task facing the next Director of the
(IIA will be to return the agency to its proper role as an implementer of national
policy and nothing more. The President will continue to exercise his lawful
powers over the CIA, but the exertion of improper political influence and the use
of the CIA to secretly implement policies which have been rejected by the Con-
gress must end.
There are several steps which this Committee can take to accelerate this
process. It must see that the CIA is removed from partisan politics and insulated
from improper influences whatever their source.
The Committee will be remiss in its duties if it does not question Admiral
Turner closely on how be sees his future relationship with President Carter
and what steps he will take to insure that there is no possibility of a recurrence
of White house directed or sanctioned illegalities.
Admiral Turner's character is clearly relevant to this issue, but it cannot dis-
pose of all questions. We hope the Committee will question Admiral Turner
about institutional barriers to improper influence which he can create. The Com-
mittee should seek a pledge from Admiral Turner that the Director and all other
top officials of the agency will log all contacts with the President, White House
Taff and other individuals outside of the agency. These logs should be made
available to the Committee on a confidential basis.
admiral Turner should also be asked what other steps he will take to Insure
."hot White House aides and influential businessmen no longer have improper
access to the CIA. Will he establish mechanisms for consultation and notifica-
tion which reduce the possibility of secret policies which contravene public
policy? What will he do if he is ordered to take an action he believes morally
wrong or illegal?
We hope this Committee will pursue these questions aggressively with Admiral
Turner. We urge the Committee to set a high standard for the Senate in terms
of thorough and responsible evaluation of a nominee. If Admiral Turner is con-
firmed, the public record produced by these hearings must serve as the basis for
healthy collaboration between Admiral Turner and the Congress in the task of
rebuilding and appropriately constraining the intelligence community. We thank
the Committee for this opportunity to raise matters of concern to Common Cause
for Admiral Turner to address.
STATEMENT OF DAVID COHEN, PRESIDENT, COMMON CAUSE
Mr. DAvID CoHFN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In that case, what I would like to do is summarize the statement and
really deal with three questions : (1) The nature of the confirmation
process; (2) some discussion on limits on covert activities; and (3)
some discussion on protecting the rights of American citizens.
Mr. Chairman, we consider these hearings among the most important
of the confirmation proceedings to come before the Senate. The crea-
tion of a single intelligence committee was public acknowledgment that
Congress had fallen down on one of its essential tasks, oversight of
intelligence activities.
We see the confirmation process as an essential part of that over-
sight res-pons ibility, and in a very real way the confirmation process
tests the Senate and this committee as much as it tests the nominee.
The task facing the, next Director is to lead the intelligence com-
munity out of the wilderness of crime and abuse that characterized
the past decade. The person selected to head the CIA and serve as ,its
Director can play an important part in assisting the Congress and
President in resolvin!~ these problems, or he can effectively block
needed changes.
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The committee must realize that its success or failure during the
next few years will depend heavily not only on the qualities and ability
of whomever it confirms, but also the oversight it provides.
This cannot be accomplished alone in a hearing room or through
testimony, and Mr. Chairman, in our Judgment you have made a very
significant step by announcing your decision to hold the debate and
vote on the confirmation in open session. I think the more that the
American people can watch what goes on and be able to know what
this committee does on questions such as the confirmation and the
discussion that surrounds the confirmation, is a very welcome step.
The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Cohen, I am glad you brought that up because
I would like to announce now that there is a slight change. The meet-
ing will convene at 3 o'clock instead of 2:30.
Mr. DAVID COVEN. It is in the fullness of openness to give us the
exact notice, and anyone who sits through these hearings cannot help
but be impressed with the tenor and tone of Admiral Turner's
testimony.
The reason we are talking about the confirmation process in part is
because this is not a controversial nomination in the sense of an up or
down vote, and so we think the committee should follow and be pre-
pared to follow some of its own rules governing nominations, and one
of the things that I hope this committee does is present a report to the
Senate stating the reasons as to why you support the nomination, and
some of the important matters that were discussed between this com-
mittee and Admiral Turner. It goes beyond evaluating Admiral
Turner's background and views. It goes to some of the institutional
questions and some of the consultations that were addressed when
Admiral Turner was before you.
In addition, we would hope that the committee would require the
Admiral Turner's financial disclosure statement, while pursuant to
the rules of this committee, be made public.
The CHAIRMAN. If the witness would yield, I am pleased to an-
pounce that we will be filing a report, and part, of that report will be
the full financial disclosure. We have discussed this matter with the
Admiral and he sees no reason why it should not be made public in
total, sir.
Mr. DAVID COVEN. We welcome that, Mr. Chairman, and we welcome
not only Admiral Turner's stand, but the fact that you pursued it with
him and that this committee pursued it with him.
Let me turn for a minute, if I may, to covert activities. Admiral
Turner will inherit an institution governed by two major enactments :
The National Security Act, and the Presidential order issued Febru-
ary 18, 1976. That order represented President Ford's response to in-
telligence community transgressions. The committee. in our judgment,
should ask of Admiral Turner his evaluation of the Presidential order,
and indeed, does he believe, as do many critics, that the order perhaps
sanctions past impropriety and approves their commission in the
future? Does it leave too much discretion remaining within the execu-
tivebranch?
We believe that the committee should continue -to pursue with Ad-
miral Turner questions on what limitations he will place on covert
activities, and we recognize that the treatment of covert operations is
a difficult problem in which there are no easy categorical imperatives.
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That is precisely why the committee should question, and among the
questions we would pursue is, would Admiral Turner commence major
foreign policy initiatives by means of covert operations? Clearly his
answers on the question of assassination in peacetime are very
welcome.
In addition, there are currently few statutory reporting require-
inents placed on the Director of the CIA. Congressional committees
have found it difficult to obtain needed information from the Director
on matters which were directly related to their responsibility. Ad-
miral Turner has indicated a desire to keep this committee well in-
formed, and we believe that the committee should require of Admiral
Turner his views as to what the consultation procedures ought to be,
and they ought to be put in writing, so that there is a degree of formal-
ity which I think is very necessary in a confirmation process, and I am
not suggesting that he put it in writing before you vote on it, but I
think that working out these consultation procedures in writing and in
a manner that permits change when change is very welcome. It places
the importance that you have placed, that you, the committee, have
placed, on consultation, and I think it will enable Admiral Turner to
provide the kind of leadership he obviously wants to apply in the CIA.
The C7rtA1nMAN. Mr. Cohen, I am certain you are aware that Senate
Resolution 400 sets forth procedure on notification by the Director on
covert activity, and as you may have heard, Admiral'Turner indicated
that he intends to abide with the sense of the Senate.
Mr. DlAvm CoHEN. I have no doubt about that, Mr. Chairman. Part
of what I am saying is-and this perhaps goes beyond just a discussion
on covert activities-is the recognition that there ought to be some
formality of understanding on the general consultation procedures
between the Director of the NA and this committee.
In addition, we feel that there ought to be some discussion with
Admiral Turner in which he would detail his views of the current
authority of the CIA to conduct domestic operations. We feel he
should I ;e whether he supports legislation to condition intelli-
gence-related domestic investigations on applications for and receipt
of a warrant. And I realize he began to address this question, I believe,
earlier in the day. But the whole notion of our safeguarding constitu-
tional liberties is so important that I think it would be very welcome
if the Admiral is asked to outline and provide a statement outlining
the procedures he would use to safeguard constitutional liberties. And
in fact, if that could be made part of the committee report, it would
be an additional item, a welcome item in building accountability into
the office of CIA.
Unfortunately, Admiral Turner's appointment as Director does not
and cannot wipe the slate clean insofar as past actions of the Agency
are concerned. Numerous investigations have revealed that wrongs
were committed by operatives of that Agency, but few have faced
criminal punishment. No investigation of past, present or future CIA
behavior can get to square one without the full assistance of the Di-
rector, and I think the tone he established today, as I said earlier, is a
welcome one.
We think the committee should get Admiral Turner on the record
concerning the steps he will take to assist and encourage the Justice
Department in pursuing any wrongdoing that has or will take place
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within the CIA. What types of cooperation will he make available
to the Justice Department?
We do not believe that the committee can accept any disclaimer re-
garding past actions of the Agency. To make the kind of leadership
that Admiral Turner talked about possible, there has to be a recogni-
tion that Admiral Turner and his colleagues must convince the Con-
gress and the public that the CIA is observing fundamentally fair
procedures. The past will cripple the Agency's ability to operate in the
present and the future unless those fair procedures are part of the CIA
operation.
And we know that Admiral Turner has responded directly to your
questions on his relationship with President Carter, but it does not
,alone dispose of all questions. We hope the committee will question
Admiral Turner about institutional barriers to improper influence, and
clearly his decision to use the log for himself of all outside contacts
should be made part of the committee report. We would also hope that
the committee would ask Admiral Turner to log the contacts of other
high officials within the Agency.
Admiral Turner has I think been quite forthright and frank with
this committee, and we urge that the committee set a high standard
for the Senate by issuing a comprehensive report and by using this as
a first example of this Congress as to the kind of aggressive and in-
formed oversight that the committee will begin to pursue of the
Agency.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
I would like to assure you that this committee has taken steps to
assure ourselves that we are fully advised and informed of all covert
operations.
For the record, I would like to indicate that at the present time the
agreement calls for the following : When the President of the United
States, after consultation with the Policy Review Commission, issues
a finding that a covert operation is justified and in the national interest,
and that such operation is not too risky as to endanger the community
and the good name of the United States, the President calls upon the
Director and issues an order to him. And this has to be in writing, to
carry out a covert operation.
At that moment, the Director is required to note the time that he
received this order. The Director is also required to set forth the time
when he notified this committee, and if the Director is unable to notify
the Chairman of this committee, he immediately seeks out the vice
chairman. That is why some of us carry beepers 24-hours a day,
especially if I happen to be in my State, in Hawaii, and there is a time
difference of 5 hours. I can assure you that since the formation of this
committee, we have had the fullest cooperation. The notification has
been on a very timely basis. It has been prior to the implementation of
the order.
Furthermore, under Senate Resolution 400, if this committee should
find that notwithstanding the Presidential findings, the covert opera-
tion to be a risky one and not necessarily in the interest of this
country, we are authorized to notify and aavi.se the President of our
feelings, of our decision, our conclusion. If the President decides to
ignore our views and proceed with the operation, notwithstanding our
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concern, this committee can request., and a request that cannot be
denied, reequest a special session of the U.S. Senate in secret session.
At this session, the committee is authorized to notify members of
the Senate as to the covert operation, and we may seek two decisions.
hie, a vote of confidence of the Senate, in other words, supporting
i he posit ion we have taken in opposition to the Chief Executive ; and
if the Senate sees fit, it can authorize this committee to disclose the de-
Iails of (lie operation. We can at that moment notify the President ac-
c.ordingly, telling hint of the action taken by the Senate, and I would
think that at that moment the operation is ended.
I don't expect that we will ever reach that stage, but I wish to assure
you and through the record, that this committee is now sharing part
of the heavy burden that the Chief Executive has had to bear by him-
self up until now. I can assure you that we have been notified in a.
timely manner, and notwithstanding what some articles may indicate,
we are fully advised of what is happening, and the fact that we have
kept our silence and made no comment does not mean that we are not
aware of what is happening. It may indicate that we approve the
actions taken by the CIA.
Any questions?
Senator )JUDDLESToN. No questions.
The CI.ArEMAN.Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. I)AViD COHEN. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Our next witness is Mr. John Marks, the Project
Director for Center for National Security Studies.
Welcome, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN MARKS, PROJECT DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
Mr. MARIts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today as a citizen with strong feelings about intel-
ligence, anc covert operations. Although I am not taking a position
on whether or not Admiral Turner should be approved. I urge you
to take advantage of the confirmation process to insure, in advance,
that the abuses of the past will not be repeated. If the CIA continues to
be marked by scandal and wrongdoing under the new DCI, this com-
mittee will not be able to plausibly deny its share of the blame.
In my view, the committee should make clear to the DCI that his
first prority must be to supply the country with the best possible intel-
ligence on what is happening in the world. While the concept of na-
tional security has been misused in recent years to cover up official
misconduct, the CIA's critics, of whom I am one, accept that it is
vital to the country's security that we know about such matters as
Soviet missile strength, Chinese nuclear testing, and world food
shortages.
U.S. intelligence agencies have suffered huge breakdowns in the
past-failing to predict the Tet offensive in Vietnam, the Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia, the Yom Kippur War. While nobody's
perfect. this committee should insist that the intelligence community
under Admiral Turner make better use of the $6 billion to $10 billion
of the taxpayers' money it spends each year.
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The recent controversy over the CIA's estimate of Soviet military
strength is a case in point. This assessment will determine to some
extent our national priorities in coming years, since if we sharply in-
crease defense spending to meet a perceived Soviet threat, the money
spent will not be available to meet other needs. Yet, so far at least, the
information available to the Congress and the public, who must ulti-
mately make the key decisions, is based on an intelligence process in
which it is difficult to have full confidence. Whatever the merits of the
particular arguments, there is no question that political, personal, and
institutional. biases all became factors in making the estimate.
In any case, the controversy surrounding the CIA has little to do
with intelligence. It is covert action, or the use of money, violence, and
propaganda to *secretly manipulate events, which is at issue. Un-
fortunately, Admiral Turner's predecessors have allowed the intelli-
gence process to be overshadowed and distorted by the CIA's covert
operations. Former CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline,
recently wrote that Allen Dulles spent only 5 percent of his time on
intelligence estimates. DCIs in the past have tended to be preoccupied
with the tradecraft of overthrowing governments here or propping
them up there. Our most recent DCIs have by no means neglected
the clandestine arts, even while the CIA was under serious outside
investigation, but they have also been forced to devote much of their
time trying to protect the Agency and to explain away everything
from the CIA's alliance with the Mafia to illegal domestic spying.
These more recent DCIs, starting with James Schlesinger in 1973,
have instituted a limited degree of internal reform, agreed to be bound
by Presidential and, to a lesser extent, congressional control, tried to
keel) information from surfacing about potential scandals, and gen-
erally worked to maintain the CIA's power to continue most of what
it has been doing covertly for the last 30 years.
Now, after a decade of Vietnam, Wateroate, and the ongoing intel-
ligence scandals, the popular perception of the CIA has changed con-
siderably. The Agency is no longer seen as a sacrosanct institution,
battling valiantly in the "back alleys" of the world. The revelations
about CIA abuses abroad and at home have made the Agency, for
many, a national liability and created for the first time a climate which
makes it possible for the Executive and Congress to bring about mean-
ingful reform.
In the past, most Congressmen and even Presidents, in their public
stance, at least, could claim ignorance about actual CIA operations.
This comfortable cover has now been blown, probably never to return.
From now on, Congress and the President will have to share re-
sponsibility for unleashing the tactics of covert action, and these
tactics, bribery, subversion, paramilitary warfare, and even assassins
tion, are criminal in nature, even when practiced by people sincerely
convinced they are protecting the national security.
Covert operations have unquestionably been cut back since their
heyday a few years ago. Senator Hart recently stated that there
were only six such operations going on around the world. That is a
level which may or may not be acceptable under Secretary of State
Vance's guideline limiting CIA intervention abroad to "the most ex-
traordinary possible circumstances." Yet, the CIA's vast clandestine
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apparatus still remains largely intact, particularly in the Third
World where it has been used mainly for either putting or keeping
in power anticommunist governments from which the United States
has seemed willing to accept virtually any level of internal repression,
as long as domestic order was guaranteed and foreign investments pro-
tected. The maintenance of this CIA-controlled network serves to
corrupt the societies we are purportedly trying to save, as covert assets
are built up and agents of influence are kept on the payroll. If the
T lnited States has a legitimate national interest in helping a particu-
lar foreign government or faction, it should do so openly, in accord-
ance with our own laws, and not be dependent on this secret
underground.
I believe this committee, and by extension, Admiral Turner, will
soon have to make a basic choice : you can either choose to clean out
the CIA's clandestine services and put the full force of the Agency
into the intelligence business, or you can try to protect past secrets
and capabilities by alining yourself with the professional operatives
and their supports against a changing society. The committee will find
it difficult to have things both ways, especially because of the very
nature of covert operations and because of the way our society now
reacts to these dirty tricks.
If the committee chooses to allow continued covert action, it will
find itself inexorably drawn into the process of covering up what the
CIA is doing. Secret operations are by definition based on deception
and lies, which this committee will become involved in protecting,
Moreover, there will be no respite from press disclosures about CIA
activities which, it turns out, are only well hidden from reporters
and other investigators who are not paying attention. Outraged
whistle-blowers and infighting bureaucrats will not stop exposing such
recent activities as a secret CIA war in Angola, wiretapping in Mi-
cronesia, or covert payoffs to the King of Jordan. As long as the
executive branch insists on using the CIA secretly to do things it is
unwilling to stand up for openly, the Agency will remain a legitimate
investigative target.
Even if the press could somehow be turned off or diverted, there
would still be grand juries, congressional committees, public interest
groups, and the Justice Department carrying on probes that will ex-
pose CIA operations. For example, investigations already under way
should soon tell us how the CIA could have learned in 1970 about a
plot personally authorized by the President of South Korea to subvert
the Congress of the United States without doing anything meaning-
ftzl to stop it until 1975.
And I might add that there is a question that didn't come up this
morning with Admiral Turner, and that is the fundamental tension
between protecting sources and methods, which is the statutory re-
sponsibility of the DCI, and enforcing the laws of the United States
of America. In other words, if the CIA finds out about criminal
activity such as a plan to bribe our Congress, shouldn't that be re-
ported 'to the Justice Department? Does protecting sources and meth-
ods extend even to covering up criminal activity? I think not.
Some other aspects that may be coming into focus in the next few
months or years include the CIA's relationship with and knowledge
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of corporate bribery, the Howard Hughes empire, organized crime, the
drug trade, and other forms of corruption around which covert oper-
ators seem to thrive; or why did the CIA withhold material evidence
from the Warren Commission, and then from 1967 on, as has been
recently revealed, embark on a worldwide disinformation campaign
against critics of the Warren Commission? Or what was the role of
high Agency officials in lying themselves and suborning perjury from
ITT personnel in Senate probes of covert operations in Chile? Or
how does the CIA use the intelligence services of friendly countries
to carry out operations that not only may violate all accepted stand-
ards of decency, but which also can be used to skirt executive branch
and congressional controls?
And these scandals which I mentioned will probably have their
follow-ons. Look for the Iranian SAVAK and Chilean DINA to
grab the spotlight from the Korean CIA. There may even be tales
of the China Lobby, one of whose prominent members, Anna Chen-
nault, recently admitted to authors Russell Howe and Sarah Hays
Trott that at the personal request of Richard Nixon, she intervened to
keep the South Vietnamese away from the Paris peace talks just
before the 1968 U.S. Presidential elections, and in the process, may
well have changed the outcome. That was in a recent issue of the
Washington Monthly.
This committee's predecessor, chaired by Senator Church, may have
thought it best in the 1976 election year, or at any other time, for that
matter, not to have probed the CIA's close working relationship with
the AFL-CIO's international programs or its many tie-ins with Amer-
ican business. But these matters will not remain under wraps forever,
especially as a new generation of leaders starts to take over the U.S.
labor movement and as American corporations become increasingly
vulnerable to pressures exerted by foreign governments. Despite rev-
elations about how the CIA has funded and manipulated a wide
variety of private institutions, the Agency still refuses to give up the
idea that nongovernmental groups and individuals can be mobilized
for covert activities. Thus, there will be continuing revelations about
the several hundred American academics the Church Committee re-
ported were still secretly working for the CIA, about the Agency's
continued sponsorship of propaganda operations, ad nauseam.
The CIA can try to fight the trend toward ever more frequent scan-
dals by going deeper underground, by mounting covert operations
against its critics, by pushing for an official secrets act, by generally
toughing it out. But this kind of hard line` approach is probably
doomed, unless American society reverses itself on basic notions of
civil liberties and press freedom. The revelations should keep coming,
and I for one have no doubt that there are plenty more skeletons,
literally and figuratively, in CIA closets.
The only real reform that has come out of the intelligence scan,
dais thus far has been the formation of this committee to oversee the
intelligence agencies. You should now work together with Admiral
Turner to make sure that the abuses of the past do not occur again.
I know that the committee's staff has already drafted legislative
charters for the various agencies, and such legislation, carefully
worded as to what the CIA and the others can and cannot do, should
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lie, adopted as quickly as possible. For better or worse, you and Ad-
iniral Turner are in the covert stew together, and it would be best for
'- oth the country and your own reputations if you work together to
ift yourselves out.
Nevertheless, there are a whole variety of measures which Admiral
Turner can take, as soon as he assumes office, which would go a. long
% -ay toward reassuring the country that the CIA is really changing.
urge you strongly, before you confirm him, to seek his assurances
lla.t he will take the following steps :
One, the new TWT should announce that the CIA will cooperate
fully in the Justice Department and congressional investigations of
"friendly"' secret services in the United States; and that the CIA
%i ill turn over transcripts of conversations in the Iorean President's
41{lice, and all other intelligence that bears on illegality within the
nited States; that the Agency will not tolerate operational activity
t3y the "friendlies" in the United States; and that it will break off
liaison and stop all other forms of aid to secret services which repress
human rights.
'FR-o, the new T)CT should announce that while the Agency has no
legitimate law enforcement role in the United States, it 117111 make
I~ vailable to appropriate police agencies all intelligence it possesses
on Cuban terrorism, which has been particularly murderous lately.
would add that the, CIA last year turned down a request by the
)ade County police for the names of Cubans who had been trained
by the CIA in the use of explosives. I would find this a reasonable
request in light of all the bombings that have recently occurred in
Miami and which have mostly been caused by people who got their
explosive training from the CIA; and that the CIA will be committed
to stamping out terrorism and drug trafficking among its former
tnployees.
Three, the new DCI should announce that the CIA will no longer
make covert use of American universities or academic activities; that
the CIA will stop secretly employing professors to "spot" foreign
students for recruitment as CIA agents, and hence to become traitors
to their own countries; and that all CIA-sponsored research on
r ampus will be identified as such, even if the results must on occasion
remain secret; and that academic exchange programs will not be used
for covert purposes.
Four, the new DCI should announce that the CIA will no longer
propagandize foreigners and Americans; that no more foreign or
American reporters will be secretly hired; that the CIA will end its
covert use for propaganda purposes of the 200 newspapers and maga-
zines, 2.5 book publishers, 30 press services and news agencies, and 20
radio and TV stations around the world that according to reliable
intelligence sources, the CIA had access to last year, and that the
CIA will try to correct the historical record to show where disinfor-
ination by the Agency and other secret services has resulted in false
public perceptions.
Five, the new DCT should announce that the CIA will close down
its paramilitary staff and transfer to the Pentagon responsibility for
all overseas combat and military advisory roles, and that the CIA
consider itself bound, as the Defense Department is, by the war-
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making limitations imposed by Congress in the War Powers Act
of 1973.
Six, the new DCI should announce that the CIA will sever its op-
erational ties to American labor unions, business associations, corpo-
rations, and other nongovernmental groups; and that it will no longer
be permissible for the Agency to secretly use nonpublic sectors of
American society for espionage or covert operations.
Even those who maintain that the United States must have the right
to secretly intervene abroad should be able to accept that the measures
I list above represent no more than a recognition that all Government
agencies, including the CIA, must follow our laws and not turn their
back on illegality; that constitutional limits should be observed; and
that the CIA should not penetrate our own society for any purpose.
While the Carter adininistration is apparently not yet prepared to
completely forego secret interference abroad, I would submit that
covert action is no longer acceptable to a large and vocal group of
Americans. As the country has changed in the last decade, covert
action has become a cold war anachronism. Its basic premise, that any
and all means are permissible, is antithetical to American ideals and
values. The scandals of recent years have shown, among other things,
that it is impossible to use these methods overseas without having a,
severe domestic fallout. We have, in effect,, adopted the tactics of
totalitarian states supposedly to protect our own security and, in the
process, wound up subverting ourselves. Moreover, the CIA`s covert
operations have done the country's reputation incalculable harm
abroad and changed our image from that of a, benevolent democracy
to that of a scheming manipulator.
Not only does covert action employ methods of dubious morality,
but it is, on its face, illegal because the United States is bound by
international obligations, including the U.N. charter and the 0,?
charter, which as treaties are the supreme law of the land, and which
bind the United States not to interfere in other countries' internal
affairs. Yet these treaty requirements are brushed aside by supporters
of covert action, as President; Ford did in 1974 when. he said:
I am not going to pass judgment on whether (i.e., covert action) is permitted
or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that historically
as well as presently such actions are taken in the best interest of the countries
involved.
I would only hope that the Carter administration would not take
such a contemptuous attitude toward our country's international
oblioations.
I7nhappily, arguments that stress the immorality .or amorality of
covert action, its antidemocratic nature, or its corrosive effect on our
own system have not yet been taken seriously by those in a position
to do something about it. Covert action partisans tend to ignore these
factors while stressing concepts like "the Russians do. it." They base
their defense on the expediency needed in the real world. Because of
the toughness and apparent practicality of this approach, they try
to pin a label of weakness and fuzzy-headedness on anyone emphasiz-
ing such values as decency, legality, democracy, or morality. My view
is that we as a nation should follow the toughest course of all : Stay-
ing true to our ideals on the foreign as well as domestic level. We
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should defend ourselves against any foreign subversion, but neither
the, Soviet Union nor any other country should be our model, whether
in silencing internal dissidents or in carrying out covert action. Our
country is supposed to be different.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
'l'ire CFTAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Marks.
Senator Goldwater?
Seuat;or GoLirw.vrEiz. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
Mr. JkL.RKS. Thank you, Air.. Chairman.
The CrrAIRAn . Our final witness is Mr. Richard ('1ohen of the U.S.
Labor Party.
Welcome sir.
We have received your staterlieiit, and without objection, your state-
ment will be made a part of the record, sir.
The prepared statement of Mr. Richard Cohen follows:-.]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD COVEN, UNITED STATES LABOR PARTY
The question before the Senate Intelligence Committee is, simply: should a
man who has publicly demonstrated a substantial lack of competence concern-
ing the fundamental strategic issues facing the United States be entrusted with
the highest intelligence post in the land?
We need only confine ourselves to our source, Adm. Turner's Most recent arti.-
cle---- "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game" in the January, 1977 issue
of the Council on Foreign Relations journal Foreign Affairs-to determine that
Mr. Carter's nominee for DCI would not be capable of fulfilling his mandated
responsibility of providing the President with objective intelligence estimates,
Adm. Turner betrays that his estimates would be overwhelmingly biased in
favor of the strategic evaluation of James Schlesinger, the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Trilateral Commission and-most importantly-the Rockefeller
family financial interests which dominate the latter two organizations. Such a
bias in a DCI would be disastrous for American national security-a point which
former President Ford was aware of when he removed Mr. Schlesinger from
his cabinet post.
As we shall document with extensive quotations, Admiral Turner's own writ-
ings certify his complete incapability of making an accurate intelligence evalua-
tions of the global situation at any given time.
In his Foreign Affairs article, Admiral Turner explicitly defends the Schles-
ingerian doctrine of bluff to manipulate "Soviet perceptions" of U.S. military
fighting effectiveness and then incredibly claims (against Chief of Naval Op-
erations.. Admiral James L. Holloway III's public evaluation) that the U.S.
has a strategic advantage in "naval war-fighting capability" over the Soviets.
Even more incredibly, he bases the latter "estimate" principally upon an
alleged U.S. technological superiority-and manages to completely ignore Soviet
breakthroughs in laser and fusion technologies which retiring Air Force Sec-
retary Thomas C. Reed now admits give the Soviets capability to inflict very
serious damage on U.S. surveillance and communications satellites and leave
the U.S. "dumb and blind" in a global war.
Turner, projecting his own (actually Rockefeller's) monetarist axiomatic
worldview onto the industrially-based USSR, also argues that the Soviets are
fundamentally a new "nineteenth century imperialism" who model their strategy
on the American mercantilist Admiral Mahan and "recall how Great Britain
and the United States succesfully supported imperialist adventures with their
fleets in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries."
Still thinking in the outmoded framework of the first two world wars, it is
hardly surprising that Admiral Turner fails to even discuss in his article the
question of the Soviets' preparations and commitment to fight a total, Integrated
land-air-sea thermonuclear war in any showdown confrontation with the U.S.
(he argues from the incompetent view of mutual strategic deterrence), and he
of course denies the existence of an actual Soviet marginal nuclear warfighting
advantage.
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In the event that the Trilateral Commission's Carter Administration manages
to plunge or blunder a deindustrialized United States into a nuclear war in its
desperate worldwide effort to collect the debts owed to Chase Manhattan and
other technically bankrupt New York-based institutions, Turner offers the fol-
lowing solace : "* * * our national purpose is principally to keep the peace if
we can, and if we cannot, to protect ourselves from storms, and to help our
friends to protect themselves."
The Trilateral Commission's effort to undermine U.S. intelligence capability
in behalf of their insane nuclear confrontation-from-weakness policy, set back
when conservative traditionalists shot down charlatan Theodore Sorensen, has
gained fresh momentum as usually alert pro-growth ,political, industrial and
military leaders displayed a foolish predisposition to swallow the Turner nomi-
nation simply because of his military stripes.
Carter announced his nomination of Turner with an allusion to his nominee
as "the next General Marshall"-a telling reference to the Council on Foreign
Relation's armchair World War II general who was also one of the architect's
of finance capital's post-war looting scheme which bears his name.
Indeed, Admiral Turner is the product of careful Eastern Establishment
grooming-Oxford College in. England, Harvard Business School, the presidency
of the Naval War College (where he boasts of "innovating" by bringing in in-
tellectuals' like his friend Herman Wouk, author of the horrendous "The Caine
Mutiny"), membership in the New York Council on Foreign Relations, an author
In such publications as Foreign Affairs, and so forth.
Not surprisingly, the New York Times, Trilateral Commission member col-
uminist Carl Rowan, Naderite politician Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.), and Turner's
sponsor Rhode Island Rockefeller Republican John Chafee all led the hosannas
for the Admiral. He was hailed as "the military man with a conscience" and
boosted as Carter's "brilliant compromise appointment," while the Fabian faith-
ful were reassured that the nomination "establishes no precedent for military
leadership at the CIA."
Granting that Stansfield Turner is not a blithering idiot on the order of Theo-
dore Sorensen, the Trilateral Commis don's first choice-and granting that he
could conceivably be won to a Clausewitzian strategic outlook based on national
self-Interest-nevertheless everything about Turner's background and stated,
fantasy-laden pro-financier views indicates that the likelihood is that at best
he would serve as a hometown umpire in favor of the Rockefeller banking and
financial interests on close calls involving the national interests with the intel-
ligence community.
Congressmen concerned that the United States government receive an honest
and high-quality intelligence product will want to review Turner's Foreign Affairs
article and ask the appropriate questions. One critical question is, does Turner
think the truth about the present marginal U.S. strategic inferiority and its
economic and technological causes must be hidden from the nation in order to
project a big bluff-a phony "aura of power"?
Turner's utopian, psychological wargame approach to strategic intelligence
is apparent throughout the article : "We even hear Paul Revere-style rhetoric :
"The United States is being left behind with a second-rate navy!"
"* * * Whether or not any particular force succeeds in influencing the actions
of others will depend on subjective perceptions which may be based on num-
bers, on superficial appearances (size of ships, new versus old, etc.), on techniques
of employment, or simply on the rhetoric which accompanies the fleet's arrival.
That perception may or may not be an accurate appraisal of what would hap-
pen if shells started flying. But if the bluff is called and fighting ensues, presence
has failed and must be succeeded either by combat or by backing down * * *
"* * * And as our Navy constricts and draws back from traditional deployment
patterns, the 'Soviet Navy has been demonstrating increasingly imaginative and
frequent global deployment of forces in response to developments. in international.
politics--as in Angola, Mozambique, the Indian Ocean and West Africa. It seems
a confirmation If the claim that we are a declining sea power and that they are
a growing and restive one. The invalidity of that claim is academic if it is
universally believed.
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"* * * T'ie nature of the debate of Washington over the budget tends to abet
this impression. To ensure adequate appropriations for warfighting needs, our
leaders point to the Soviets' naval expansion, their increasing presence in for-
mer Western preserves and their dedication to further naval growth . . . the
formidable qualities of the threat are stressed ; the available means to counter
it perhaps ,,lighted. We run the risk today of losing on the 'presence front' unless
we counter these negative impressions by exercising care in our public discus-
sions. A doomsday picture convincingly drawn by a congressional budgetary
committee may negatively influence other nations' perceptions of our naval
effectiveness *
Since the Soviet leadership regularly reads Foreign Affairs, who does Turner
think he is fooling and why*? What is he hiding and whose interests is he
protecting?
The incompetence demonstrated in his discussion of genuine warfighting is
just as :shocking. As every sophomore not working for Rand or the Council on
Foreign Relations knows, if the Soviets are provoked by the Carter Adminis-
tration into attacking the U.S.-and the global debt collection policies of the
Administration and the Trilateral Commission are creating an irrepressible
conflict--they will launch a total air-land-sea first nuclear strike which, among
other things, will kill 160 million Americans in the first hour of general war.
Yet Turner's "assessment" of "the naval balance" fantastically abstracts from
this reality and analyzes naval warfare in terms of four essentially formal and
separate categories-strategic deterence, naval presence, sea control and projec-
tion of power ashore-giving the U.S. the advantage ! Turner suggests the
Navy's mission should be denying "Soviet" imperialist the sea lanes !
In terms of the one "category" he goes seriously into, "sea control"-in which
in the real warfighting described above means Soviet capability to thwart all
American second strike retaliation from the critical U.S. nuclear submarine
force--'t'urner at first remarks: "Sea denial is essentially guerrilla warfare at
sea." Later Turner (in passing) lets reality finally seep through, contradicting
his own thesis though he quickly backs off and covers-up ; ". . the Soviet's big
advantage is their option to launch a preemptive strike. Ships of both navies
regularly operate in the vicinity of one another since there are no boundaries
at sea. An attack could be launched with virtually no warning from point-blank
range. The timeliness and quality of intelligence estimates, and our ability to
identify subtle changes in Soviet operational patterns, will determine whether
or not the Soviets can successfully carry out such a preemptive strike. Present
trends toward declining numbers of both submarines and carrier aircraft have
to be faced In the glare of these facts."
TELE ADMIRAL'S TRTLATERAT. FRTfT!O-
When Turner comes to the question of defining the Navy's mission, he uses all
the key and code phrases that let his Foreign Affairs readership know that his
allegiance lies with the Trilateral Commission.
First he advertises that he is in tune with the Carter Administration's dein-
dustrialization program: ". . . meantime there is growing competition at home
for military expenditures, especially when there are so many social demands on
our national resources."
Turner would allow the intrusion into the intelligence process of such outsiders
as the Committee on the Present Danger's "Team B" and the Rockefeller-funded
Tnstitute for Polley Studies "left" Fabian circles, to contain military professionals
from arriving at a Clausewitzian approach to national policy: "Civilian thinkers.
in turn, are not providing the help that they could. The estrangement of much
of the intellectual and academic segment of our society from the professional
military over the Vietnam War has damaged the respectivity of defense as a
worthy area of discussion, writing and study . .
"Professional opinion is pressed hard on the technical military issues ; civilian
opinion has to think hard on matters of national policy ; and from this interaction
arises tie consensus essential to the support of whatever level of naval forces is
selected."
In view of these facts, Congress has a solemn responsibility to determine
whether Admiral Stansfield Turner has the independence and competence to
serve the national interest in one of the most important posts in the government.
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STATEMENT OF RICHARD COHEN, U.S. LABOR PARTY
Mr. RICHARD COVEN. Thank you very much.
I would like to move off the course of the statement and develop
one essential point that I would like to make, and that point, from
our point of view, warrants our objection to the confirmation of
Admiral Turner.
And this, the point that I will make is one which seems to be a
central theme of the present administration, and that is, the present
administration is involved in a coverup of fundamental scientific and
technological. breakthroughs which have been displayed openly by the
Soviet Union to American officials over the past 6 mont s.
The central reason why we believe this is being covered up at this
point can be easily seen in the context of Carter's present proposed
budget which would eliminate or grossly diminish the capability of
our country to compete in those very spheres of technological advance-
ment which the Soviets are involved in.
Now, it is unfortunate that Admiral Turner makes essentially the
same point as the administration does in his article in Foreign Affairs
entitled "The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game," The central
argument, or what we perceive to be the key argument that he makes
there is that while the Soviets are in fact building up and have been
building up since at least the Cuban missile crisis, one point should
be made, and that is that at least in terms of our naval war-fighting
capability, we still maintain a strategic advantage, and the reason
why that is the case is because the United States maintains a techno-
logical superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.
So to the extent that Admiral Turner maintains that logic, he falls
within the purview of being manipulated or maybe even consciously
involved in the present coverup, a coverup which is contradicted by
General brown in his fiscal year 1978 military posture statement, in
which he elaborates for several pages the argument that the Soviet
Union has built up, since the Cuban missile crisis, not simply a wed -
ons capability relatively comparative to ours, but has built up a mili-
tary-industrial complex which prizes its research and development
capabilities, and in fact, he states openly that in terms of the engineers
being produced in the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States, there
is a 5-to-1 ratio. In terms of the number of scientists and engineers,
people involved in basic research and development, the Soviet Union
leads the United States by 2 to 1.
Now, the concrete expression of that lead was witnessed last year
when Mr. Rudikov, a leading Soviet scientist, visited the United
States and unilaterally declassified major Soviet experi. ments, break-
throughs that were takin ? place in the area of controlled thermo-
nuclear fusion, particularly with respect to particle beam processes
which have very, very important military applications. Those mili-
tary applications, in line with further breakthroughs that were an-
nounced by the Soviet Union, or announced in a very tenuous way by
the Soviet Union coming out of their Novosebersk It. & D. Center by
a scientist by the name of Mr. Boodka, indicate that they are far along
in this development.
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Now, the New York Times and other major magazines have pointed
out over the past year that the. Soviets have, indeed, on four occasions
possibly blinded U.S. satellites, principally through the use of lasers.
The kind of capabilities that are revealed through Rudikov's and
Boodka's disclosures go well beyond laser capability and involve prin-
cipally the capability of manipulating the plasmalike environment of
the ionosphere and using it as a major refractor or magnifier, shooting
a beam up into the ionosphere and having it magnified approximately
a thousand times through the plasma. You have to know how to control
that plasma. And having it redirected back to the earth, and that that
beam, extended in that way, could eliminate or grossly damage U.S.
early warning systems and communication systems. There are many
other military applications to these technological breakthroughs, yet
they have beat covered up. Not only have they been covered up, but
the very area in which these breakthroughs are being made-we now
have ? proposal before us in terms of Carter's suggested budget to
eliminate $80 million from the present fusion program, another $199
million from the breeder reactor program, a general assault on nu-
clear technology and nuclear energy, a general assault on research
and development in those areas.
In other words, what the Carter administration is telling us, and
certainly Admiral Turner, from his point of view would fall in line
with that, is that we are not going to compete with the Soviets in this
sphere, and to the extent that the Soviets move in that sphere, they
can gall! a decisive strategic edge in the very near future.
Now, I simply bring that up as the basic reason at this point for
our opposition to the Admiral, to Admiral Turner. There are many
reasons why the Carter administration is doing this. We have elab-
orated this in the past. It is not out of any good will to the Soviet
Union or a lay down and die attitude. There is a significant operation
on at this point-, not only with respect to the Soviet Union but with
respect to the emerging alliance of the Arab OPEC countries and
Western European countries which the Carter administration has fo-
cused at this point in prohibiting, and these essentially are the reasons
why this material is being blacked out.
I don't want to go through a long explanation of it. The material has
been made available in the past.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cohen.
Senator Goldwater?
Senator GornwATER. You have made one or two references to Clause-
witz, the last one, "arriving at a Clausewitzian approach."
What do you mean by that? He had many approaches? Which one
would you pick?
Mr.. RICHARn CONN. In terms of what Clausewitz himself was in-
volved in?
Senator GoLDw-AamR. I am interested in why you apply Clausewitz
to any policy that, or any approach to national policy, why use that
termn's'
Mr. ]RICHARD COVEN. Well, because Clausewitz was the first, one of
the first major strategists to adopt a policy in which he essentially
elaborated that military posture and military deployment must be
seen as an arm or an effect of one's political deployment generally.
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That is, military deployment is a weapon in an overall political
strategy, and I would say that in these terms, that if one were to take
a strict national political strategy of maintaining national security
with respect to this country, and one were to look at one's military
deployments and the development of one's military capabilities on that
basis, then one would have to say the development of controlled ther-
monuclear fusion and the various military offshoots of that, consider-
ing the world that we live in, the nuclear world that we live in, are an
absolutely necessity in that strict sense.
There are other options to an all-out arms race in that direction. I
simply point that out as a contradiction in Carter's own policy, which
is not Clausewitzian in that sense because he is denying the very, on the
surface, the very military capabilities that would secure the nation
politically.
Senator GOLDWATER. That is disturbing a bit to me, because I am
old enough to remember the 1930's. I remember these same arguments
being used, and we wound up in it war. You can argue all you want
either for or against Clausewitz. Ile was and probably still is the
authority, but we have peace in this world today because we followed
a national policy of strength. I don't like it any more than you do,
but to sit there and pretend that we don't have to follow it to me is
wishful thinking.
Mr. RICHARD COHEN. To pretend that what? Excuse me.
Senator Gor1DWATER. To pretend that we shouldn't have a national
policy based on strength, all of our strengths. That is the reason we
have peace. The minute we let the guards down we are not going to
have peace.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator II iddleston?
Senator IIIJDDLESTON. No questions.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cohen.
With this, unless there are, other witnesses, the hearings will come to
a close. I would like to once again remind the members of the com-
mittee that at 3 o'clock tomorrow in room S-407, the committee will
meet to consider committee business and the confirmation of Admiral
Turner.
Until then.
[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at
3 p.m., Wednesday, February 23,1977.]
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U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:10 p.m., in room S-407,
the Capitol, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Inouye, Goldwater, Bayh, Stevenson, Hathaway,
Huddleston, Morgan, Hart, Moynihan, Case, Garn, Mathias, Pearson,
Chafee, Lugar, and Wallop.
Also present : William G. Miller, staff director ; Howard S. Lieben-
good, minority staff director; Audrey Hatry, clerk of the committee;
Anne Karalekas, Sam Bouchard, Stan Taylor, Jean Evans, Dan
Childs, Spencer Davis, Charles Kirbow, Thomas Moore, Michael Ep-
stein, Edward and Harold Ford, professional staff members.
The CHAIRMAN. We are now in open session to consider the nomi-
nation of the Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield
Turner.
You have before you the copies of the committee report that I had
the staff prepare for us. It covers all of the major questions that have
been raised in his nominaton, including the matter of keeping his com-
mission during his tenure as DCI. It also refers to Admiral Turner's
promise not to seek the offices of Chief of Naval Operations or Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when these become vacant. At least he
will not seek them. But I suppose if the Commander in Chief should
call upon him to serve in these offices, he would have to respond
accordingly.
He has also indicated his willingness to provide this committee with
full and timely information on all covert and clandestine collection
programs. IIo has promised to work with this committee in consider-
ing new statutory charters for the intelligence agencies, and he has
shown, I would say, a real concern, both in his opening statement and
in his answers to our questions, for the need to insure that intelligence
activities do not adversely affect the constitutonal or legal rights of
American citizens.
I would like to at this time move that this committee recommend to
the Senate that the nomination of Admiral Stansfield Turner as Di-
rector of Central Intelligence be confirmed.
Senator GOLDWATER. Second.
The CHAIRMAN. It has been moved and seconded.
(69)
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";! OTE ON NOMINATION OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER
tienator GOLDWATER. Question.
The CITATRMAN. Question.
I will call upon the Director to call the roll.
Mr. M L LI F.R. Mr. Bayh.
The C I (A)RMAN. I have a proxy. He votes aye.
General laughter._]
Senator I(AYH. Can we count both of those?
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Stevenson.
Senator STEVENSON. Aye.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Hathaway.
Senator HATHAWAY. Aye.
Mr. AIrLLFIZ. Mr. Huddleston.
?.e)ator IITIDDLESTON. Aye.
Mr. M LI~ER. Mr. Bider.
Ti0 CHAIRMAN. I have his proxy. He votes aye.
MU. MILLER. Mr. Morgan.
Senator MORGAN. Aye.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Hart.
Senator -TART. Ave.
Mr. AIrLTER. Mr. Moynihan.
Senator MOYNITIAN. Ave.
AIr, AITLLER. Mr. Case.
Senator CASE. Ave.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Garr.
Senator EARN. Ave.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Mathias.
Senator TATHIAS. Aye.
Mr. f ri,LER. Mr. Pearson.
Senator PEARSON. Aye.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Chafee.
SC11,14,07' CIIAFEE. Aye.
Mr. Almi.xR. Mr. Lugar.
Senator 1,13GAR. Ave.
Mr. MILLER. Mr. Wallop.
Senator WALLOP. Aye.
ANIr. AIII.LER. Mr. Goldwater.
Senator (-OLDWATER. Aye.
Al r. Al TL r,Elt. Mr. Inouye.
The CTIATRMAN. Aye.
Mr. MILLER. Unanimous.
The CHAIRMAN. The vote is unanimous, and I am pleased to an-
=rorlnee that f will submit this nomination immediately to the Senate.
Ilopef>>lly this can be considered tomorrow by waiving the 3-day rule.
Ts there any objection to waiving the 3-day rule?
No rr'sponse._I
The CHAIRMAN. Hearing none, I will ask the leadership to schedule
this for tornorow.
Any further business?
(No response.]
The CHnTEMAN. The meeting is adjourned.
(Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee recessed subject, to the call
of the Chair.1
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ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER'S RESPONSES TO FEBRU-
ARY 28,1977, WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES SUBMITTED
BY THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLI-
GENCE
1. CIVIL LIBERTIES
A. Currently, one of the important controversies in constitutional law is the
question of how the President's authority to conduct foreign intelligence activi-
ties
terms first of wiretaps and foreign 4intelligene e
most with
frquently ari en of the
tion has meshes
cases.
Question 1. Could you explain your views of the nature and extent of Presi-
dential authority and how it is limited by the first and fourth amendments?
Answer. The Committee appreciates that this question is best and most prop-
erly put to the President and his advisors. For myself, I believe that the Presi-
dent has a constitutional duty to conduct the nation's foreign affairs and that lie
has certain inherent powers to enable him to fulfill this duty, including the au-
thority to collect foreign intelligence in order to protect the national security.
This authority, however, does not, in my opinion, exempt him from the require-
ments of the first, fourth, or any other amendment to the constitution. Rather
the exercise of this authority must be accommodated to the rights of U.S. citi-
zens under these amendments. I do not believe that his power to collect foreign
intelligence, including the use of electronic surveillance, is incompatible with
these rights. The determination of the proper balance between his power and
these constitutional protections has and probably will continue to be the subject
of debate, and is ultimately the responsibility of the courts.
Question 2. Do you believe the President has the power to conduct warrant-
less electronic surveillance of Americans at home or abroad for foreign intelli-
gence purposes?
Answer. It is my understanding that current judicial decisions permit, or at
least do not prohibit, such warrantless surveillance where the target is a foreign
power or an agent or collaborator of a foreign power. Of 'course, such surveil-
lances would be undertaken domestically by the FBI rather than CIA.
Question 3. Is it your understanding of the law that if Congress enacts legisla-
tion setting standards and conditions for the use of electronic surveillance in
foreign intelligence cases, the Executive Branch, including the President, is bound
by those standards and conditions?
Answer. While appreciating the Committee's concern, I suggest that the At-
torney General would be the appropriate official to advise the President in this
area.
B. Last summer, the Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee reported
S. 3197, a bill to require warrants for electronic surveillance conducted in the
United States for foreign intelligence purposes.
Question 1. Do you favor such legislation?.
Answer. Although I have not had a sufficient opportunity to study S. 3197 in
detail, in general I support the concept of such legislation, at least insofar as
it might apply to electronic surveillance directed against U.S. citizens or perma-
nent resident aliens, so long as the capability of the United States to obtain
necessary foreign intelligence is preserved.
Question 2. Would you favor expanding such legislation to require warrants
for electronic surveillance of Americans abroad, as well as in the United States?
Answer. Inasmuch as the full implication of an extension of a warrant re-
quirement to overseas activities of Americans is not clear to me at this time, I
am now prepared to indicate my support for such an enlargement in the scope
of the proposed legislation.
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Question 3. Would you favor expanding the proposed electronic surveillance
legislation to require warrants in foreign Intelligence cases for other intrusive
investigative techniques such as mail opening and surreptitious entries when
directed against Americans, either at home or abroad?
Answer. I would want to carefully consider any expansion of the proposed
electronic surveillance legislation to cover mail opening and surreptitious entry.
Question 4. Do you think that electronic surveillance of Americans for foreign
intelligence purposes at home or abroad should be limited to those instances
where there is substantial evidence that the American has engaged in criminal
activities?
Answer. It is my understanding that no such absolute standard or limitation
would have been established by S. 3197 as reported by the Committee in the last
Congress.. and the adoption of such an absolute standard or limitation might
well be undesirable in light of the inadequacy of existing criminal laws as they
relate to activities that are of legitimate foreign intelligence interest. It should
be noted with regard to this question that, generally speaking, the ;prevention and
prosecution of crime are not the purposes of foreign intelligence surveillances,
whether electronic or other.
Question 5. For the purpose of obtaining a warrant, would you be willing to
report to a Federal judge the facts determining the Agency's belief that elec-
tronic surveillance should be conducted against an American living abroad?
Answer. T'his question could only be answered in the context of a particular
case and in relation to a particular statutory requirement government governing
the scope and detail of the Information to be submitted in support of a warrant
application. As an essential prerequisite, I would want to be assured that the
court would provide security safeguards for the information to be submitted that
would he satisfactory to the executive branch. If such assurances could not be
given, it might be necessary to forego an electronic surveillance rather than to
risk compromise of the source in order to obtain a warrant.
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY
A. In February of 19'76, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 on
United States foreign intelligence activities. The Executive Order was issued
in order to "clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence
agencies." 4
Would you tell the Committee your views of the Executive Order, particularly
as it relates to the following issues :
Question 1. Is an Executive Order which can be changed at the will of the
President and which provides no penalties for its violation, sufficient to define
the varying missions of the Intelligence agencies and to fix firm limits on their
activities?
Answer. The intelligence activities of the United States have been conducted
for thirty years on the basis of Executive Orders and National Security Council
Intelligence Directives, as well as certain statutes. The Executive Orders have
the effect of law in terms of their directive control of intelligence activities.
Possibly, additional legislative action is needed to define the missions of intelli-
gence agencies and fix firm limits on their activities, but I consider any specific
comments by me must necessarily be deferred until I have more complete knowl-
edge of the manner in which the existing system is operating.
Question 2. While the DCI is to provide guidance on the relationship between
tactical and nautical intelligence, under the Executive Order the DCI does not
have any responsibility for tactical intelligence. Previous DCIs have had the
right to review the allocation of all intelligence resources, including tactical in-
telligence. Do you believe that the Executive Order has an undesirable effect of
weakening the DCI's authority in this area?
Answer.. Tactical intelligence is an essential and integral element of the effec-
tiveness of military forces in the field, and should be addressed in terms of the
needs of the military forces. The DCI, on the other hand, is primarily involved
with matters of national intelligence. The line dividing national and tactical
intelligence is not clear but, on balance, I consider that the provision in Executive
Order 11905 is appropriate. The DCI and the NSC Policy Review Committee
(which has assumed the functions of the Committee an Foreign Intelligence
established by E.O. 11905) are charged to provide guidance on the relationship
between tactical and national intelligence, and thus are responsible for insuring
that unnecessary overlap and duplication does not occur and that all programs
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are compatible with security and foreign policy. The important thing is to assure
that the potentialities of mutual support between national and tactical assets are
maximized, and in this I see the DCI as having a role.
Question 3. Under the Executive Order, the DCI is to "ensure the development
and the submission of a national intelligence budget." At the same time, the Com-
mittee on Foreign Intelligence, now the Policy Review Committee (PRC), is to
`.control budget preparation of the national intelligence program," and the Secre-
tary of Defense has the responsibility to "direct, fund and operate" the NSA. How
can these potentially contradicting charges be resolved?
Answer. The manner in which the National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget for FY 1978 was developed provides the answer to this question. The
Intelligence Community Staff was charged in the Executive Order to provide staff
support to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI). The DCI used his
Deputy for the Intelligence Community, who heads the Intelligence Community
Staff, to spearhead development of the budget and submit to the CFI. The CFI
held 20 sessions during which the Community program and budget were examined
in great detail and many issues identified and settled. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense, as a member of the CFI, participated in this review. The agreed-upon
budgets for the intelligence elements of the Department of Defense, including that
for NSA, were included in the DOD budget. The system involved close working
relationships among the intelligence Community Staff, the intelligence staff of the
Secretary of Defense, and the intelligence program managers, but what the ques-
tion describes as "potentially contradicting charges" did not prove to be such in
actual practice.
Question 1. What changes would you recommend in the present Executive
Order?
Answer. The President has directed a complete review of the mission and
structure of American intelligence, including an assessment of the adequacy of
Executive Order 11905, for which I will have a major responsibility. I suggest it
would be appropriate for me to await that review before making specific proposals
concerning possible changes in the Order.
B. The authority of the CIA to engage in certain activities rests on directives
issued by the National Security Council, called National Security Council Intel-
ligence Directives or NSCIDs. These NSCIDs have in the past been referred to
as the CIA's secret charter and were withheld not only from the public but also,
until recently, from Congress.
Question 1. If these NSCIDs are revised or new NSCIDs are issued, will you
provide these to the Committee as your predecessor has done?
Answer. The NSCIDs previously provided to the Congress were made available
through the NSC apparatus, and the DCI has no authority to make such release
on his own. I would be prepared to support a Committee request for NSCIDs
which relate to the Committee's area of responsibility.
Question 2. Do you believe that the oversight committees of Congress should
be consulted during the preparation or revision of these NSCIDs?
Answer. The NSCIDs are internal Executive Branch documents prepared at
the behest of the President. Whether, or the extent to which, oversight committees
of the Congress might be consulted concerning such directives prior to their
issuance is a matter for Presidential determination. Congressional access after
the directives have been promulgated would, in my view, be the better course.
C. CIA practices are also affected by directives issued by other persons, such
as the DCI and Policy Review Committee (PRC).
Question. Will you provide to the Committee all such directives and modifica-
tions of directives, including DCIDs and directives from the PRC?
Answer. I will provide the Committee those directives which are under my
control. The DCIDs are my responsibility, and I will provide them under appro-
priate security safeguards.
Since the PRC is an element of the NSC, I believe the NSC would be the appro-
priate authority for deciding to release or withhold the PRC directives.
D. As Director of Central Intelligence, your advice may be sought on the ques-
tion of charters for the intelligence agencies. The 1947 National Security Act,
the CIA's statutory charter, has been termed inadequate in a number of areas.
At the present time, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence
Agency have no statutory charters. The FBI's authority to engage in domestic
intelligence activities has been questioned.
Question 1. Should a new CIA charter explicitly authorize covert action?
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Question '. Should there be specific statutory authority for the CIA to collect
intelligence?
Answer. I am aware of the sentiment, and the substantial reasons for it, that
[ilA may need more explicit statutory authority to engage in covert action or
collection of intelligence abroad, notwithstanding the fact that CIA is the only
dement or the Intelligence Community which currently has any statutory charter.
As l stated at my confirmation hearing, I think that there is room for improve-
ment in the language of the National Security Act of 1947 by which the CIA
acts pursuant to NSC directives. We can continue to operate under the existing
anguage, but I am amenable to reviewing it 1
Question 3. What activities should the CIA be allowed to undertake In the U.S.?
Should a. new charter precisely define those' activities?
Answer. CIA must, of course, support, from installations within the United
States, its mission to collect foreign intelligence. Such support must include
providing security for its installations, activities, information, and personnel.
In order to provide the requisite security, the Agency must conduct investigations
of applicants, employees, and other persons with similar associations with the
Agency before classified information may be divulged to them. The Agency must
also provide, domestically, administrative and technical. support for its Intel]!-
operations. This support includes procurement, maintenance and transport,
communications and data processing, recruitment and training, the provision of
personnel, financial and medical services, the development of essential cover and
proprietary arrangements, and the conduct of necessary research and develop-
ment efforts. The Agency must also interact domestically with other Federal agen-
c]es in furtherance of their respective missions. For example, in the course of
performing its foreign intelligence mission, the Agency obtains information which
appropriately may he shared with the FBI in support of the latter's domestic
counterintelligence mission. There are also occasions when cooperating indivi-
duals within the United States have valuable foreign intelligence information to
c;upply the Agency. Similarly, planning, preparation and development of future
i'oreign intelligence sources must be undertaken In this country.
It is probably not possible to define exhaustively or In detail all activities of
the Central Intelligence Agency that must be performed domestically. A new
charter, if' there is to he one, could more profitably address itself to areas where
it is felt the CIA should not be active. For example, the National Security Act
currently provides that "the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforce-
ment powers, or internal security functions." T would not lift. those regulations.
Question 1. Do you favor statutory charters for the National Security Agency
and the Defense Intelligence Agency?
Answer. As I have already indicated, the President has directed a comprehen-
sive review of the Intelligence Community and the adequacy of existing legisla-
Jon and directives, and I consider it would he premature for me to comment
at this time on what the recommendations may be that will result from this
review. I have not yet, in fact, formed my own opinion as to whether statutory
charters are necessary, but I am not foreclosing the possibility.
Qneytmoe 5. Do you agree with Attorney General Bell that the FBI needs a.
clear charter?
Answer, The F1--;T is a. part of the Intelligence Community only as regards its
counterintelligence activities. Those activities represent a, relatively small por-
4on of the overall FBI effort, so I am really not in a position to comment
knowledgeably on the FBI as a whole. Since the Attorney General has organiza-
iional responsibility for the FBI, I consider that he is a qualified judge as to
whether a new charter is needed.
Que.tio'e 6. Should there be statutory limitations on the permissible activities
of all of the intelligence agencies? Should violations carry criminal sanctions?
Answer. Limitations on permissible activities are spelled out in detail for in-
relligence organizations in Executive Order 11905. I would need to delve much
more deeply into this matter before I could express an opinion as to any need
for criminal sanctions beyond those imposed on employees of any other branch of
r he Government.
I IT. CLANDESTINE ACTIVITIES
A. When von take over as Director of Central Intelligence, you will inherit
he present apparatus of ongoing covert action and clandestine collection opera-
tions.
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Question. Will you pledge to consult with this Committee on the feasibility and
wisdom of the various ongoing programs before making any final determination
as to their continuation or termination?
Answer. The decision to terminate or to continue major covert action or sensi-
tive collection programs resides with the President and the Special Coordination
Committee. Such programs are reviewed periodically by the Special Coordina-
tion Committee, which is responsible for recommending to the President which
of these programs should be approved, disapproved or redirected. However, in
the course of the review and approval procedure, I will make certain the Presi-
dent and the Special Coordination Committee are fully aware of any views the
Committee may have concerning such activities.
B. CIA clandestine operations, both covert action and clandestine collection,
compromise a wide variety of activities. In this connection, the Committee would
like to explore your attitude towards two specific kinds of operations.
Question 1. What are your views with respect to the covert involvement of the
United States, in any manner, in the elections of a foreign country?
Answer. As you know, under the Hughes/Ryan Amendment the President is
required to make a finding on all proposed CIA covert action programs. These
programs are considered by appropriate advisors to the President before he makes
his finding. Seven committees of the Congress are briefed after he makes his
finding. Under these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. Gov-
ernment would engage in activity such as the question suggests unless there were
a broad consensus within the Executive Branch and the Congress that it was
in our national interest to do so.
Question 2. Under what circumstances would you approve covert payments to
foreign leaders?
Question 3. What are the factors that would most influence your judgment on
the advisability of various types of clandestine operations, such as the two men-
tioned above?
Answer. As I stated at my confirmation hearing, I think such operations
should not be undertaken until two standards have been met : First, that there
has been a thorough exploration of alternative ways to accomplish the objective
in an overt manner ; Second, that there has been a careful weighing of the poten-
tial value of what might result from the activity as against the risks incurred.
Should such payments be intended for a foreign head of state or major national
figure for covert action purposes, the operation would require the approval of
the President after review by the Special Coordination Committee. In this even-
tuality, the proposal would also be reported to the concerned committees of the
Congress under the Hughes/Ryan amendment. Should the payment be intended
solely for intelligence purposes and I judged that the operation involved a high
political or other risk, I would seek the advice of the Special Coordination Com-
mittee, the National Security Advisor to the President or the President himself,
before approving the operation.
C. This Committee is reluctant to request the identity of covert agents because
we recognize the extreme sensitivity of such information and because the need
for such information rarely exists.
Question 1. If, in the view of the Committee, the conduct of the oversight role
were to require such information, would you provide it?
Question 2. For example, if the Committee were to investigate an abuse in-
volving a covert agent whom it would wish to interrogate, would the agent be
made available to us?
Answer. The Committee's sensitivity to the great importance of protecting cov-
ert agents and their identities is gratifying to me, as the official charged with
the responsibility for their protection. I consider it central to the viability of
clandestine operations. I see no difficulty in arranging for the Committee to
meet with employees, under appropriate circumstances and conditions. However,
I find it extremely difficult at present to envision a situation in which the Com-
mittee would need to have such information with respect to a covert agent, let
alone to feel required to interrogate him. I would therefore prefer not to make
any such commitment on this point.
IV. INTELLIGENCE AND POLICY
A. You served as NATO's Commander of Allied Forces for Southern Europe,
and previously served as commander of the U.S. Second Fleet in the Atlantic. In
both positions, you were exposed to a great deal of intelligence, provided not only
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i"brough service intelligence agencies and national intelligence agencies but also
through NATO itself.
Question 1. What was the value of the intelligence you received to long-range
military planning and NATO operations?
Answer. Long-range military planning could not be done without adequate
knowledge of a potential enemy's military capabilities, political strengths and
weaknesses, and economic viability.1
Question 2. What was the value of this intelligence to your more day-to-day
operational needs and to your requirements for indications and warning?
Answer. Day-to-day operational needs and requirements for indications and
rarnings are highly time sensitive. The closer intelligence inputs can be brought
io real tine, the more valuable they become to the military commander because
they enhance his capability to make accurate decisions based on fact rather than
assumption. Intelligence actually received from U.S. sources during my command
of Allied Forces Southern Europe was extremely valuable to me because often it
was the most complete and up-to-date information available.
Question 3. Did you perceive any significant gaps in U.S. intelligence reporting?
Answer. (Submitted separately to the Committee.)
Question 4. What ideas for improving the U.S. intelligence effort have you
gained from your experience as a commander of U.S. Navy and NATO forces?
Answer_ As indicated in my reply to question D.1.b., the closer to real time a
commander can receive tactical intelligence, the more likely lie is to make the
right decision. At sea, force survival in the initial hours of an engagement is
greatly increased if the. force commander can assume an alert posture prior to
aid attack. This does not require much time, but given the speed of missiles,
the difficulty of detecting them at low altitudes, and the routine proximity of
the Soviet and U.S. fleets in peacetime, greater speed in delivering tactical
warning indicators at sea is needed. In the area of national intelligence, again,
timeliness is critical. In an era when Naval presence forces are being used more
than ever as a. tool of foreign policy, it is vital that the on-scene commander
understand not just his military options, but national economic and political
options as well, and how these options affect or influence one another.
B. Between 1971 and 1972, you served as chief of the Systems Analysis Divi-
sion of the Office of Naval Operations. In that capacity you were involved in
the Navy's efforts in "net assessments."
Question 1. In light of your experience, how much emphasis do you think
the Intelligenee Community should put upon net assessments as opposed to more
traditional estimates?
Answer. Net assessments and more traditional intelligence estimates are com-
plenmentary, and both are needed. Many important topics of intelligence estimates
rise not subject to a "net assessment" treatment. I consider that, in the analysis
of key military questions, net assessments can be very important.'
Question 2. What should he the role of the intelligence agencies in net
a usessrnent i'
Answer. The role of intelligence agencies should be to condiiet :
-comprehensive net assessments on two or more foreign nations.
-,Soviet-U.S. net assessments to estimate the eapability of individual Soviet
weapon systems, to determine Soviet technical requirements and to
identify trends and estimate the implications of Soviet Programs.
Intelligence agencies should continue to participate in a variety of U.S.-Soviet
not assessments conducted by the DoD and other agencies of the government.
The role of the Intelligence Agencies should he to provide the intelligence data
and insights necessary for these assessments.
Intelligence organizations should not make comprehensive net assessments.
Such assessments are highly dependent on scenarios for war initiation, U.S.
operational plans and tactics and the success of future U.S. programs.
Question 3. Would you as DCI be adverse to conducting net assessments in
which analysis of U.S, capabilities and intentions would be explicit or implicit?
Answer. As I have already indicated, I am not adverse to conducting net
assessments essential to the intelligence analytical and estimating process, in-
cluding those in which U.S. capabilities and intentions are explicit or implicit.
Admiral Turner provided the Committee with a classified addendum to this Answer.
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I am against intelligence conducting net assessments for the purpose of evaluat-
ing U.S. weapons system options. I am also opposed to assigning intelligence the
responsibility for comprehensive Soviet-U.S. net assessments of the type which
would be regarded as an intrusion by the Intelligence Community into the de-
fense planning process.
Question 4. How would you evaluate the net assessment efforts of the Defense
Department and the Executive Branch?
Answer. It is difficult to generalize on the net assessment efforts of the Defense
Department and the Executive Branch over time. They have always reflected
a sincere attempt to provide useful and accurate information to the decision-
maker. When these efforts were less than excellent, it was 'usually the result
of compromise made to reach agreement. Compromise inherently seeks the
lowest common denominator and can preclude the user from the benefit of a
finely etched picture from which his options for action can be developed. It is
my intention to encourage divergent views which, if well supported by fact and
logic, will be assigned confidence levels and will appear in future net assess-
ments prepared by the IC.
C. As Director of Central Intelligence, you will have primary control over the
collection and production activities of the CIA. As part of its general effort in
military intelligence areas to support the President, the CIA produces intelli-
gence on naval forces.
Question 1. What is your opinion of the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA's
analyses of naval forces?
Question 2. How do their analytical efforts compare with those of the Navy?
Question 3. How do they compare with the work of DIA?
Answer. I have not had the time to adequately compare the CIA's vs. the
Navy's vs. the DIA's analyses of naval forces except superficially. As a user, a
naval commander does not often receive three separate sets of intelligence esti-
mates on a given situation which he can lay down side by side and compare. He
is sometimes lucky to have either a CIA,,or the Navy, or DIA estimate ; seldom
all three. However, I would expect the CIA to provide me with naval force
analyses of greater breadth and perspective than either the Navy or DIA, as its
capability to assess naval forces in light of the full spectrum of a nation's assets
is greater than either the Navy's or DIA's.
D. In the area of intelligence support to policymaking, one of the Committee's
concerns is the degree to which Congress has not been a recipient of intelligence
analysis that could assist the Members in making important national decisions.
Question. Are you prepared to provide the Congress with intelligence, even
when it may not support the policies of the President, or when it may embarrass
the President?
Answer. CIA currently provides finished intelligence support on a regular
basis to the seven Committees of the Congress : the Armed Services Committees
of both Houses of the Congress, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses,
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House International Relations Com-
mittee, and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of these Committees
receive the National Intelligence Daily, and I recently have instructed that they
receive the Weekly Review. In addition, each Committee receives periodic brief-
ings on significant intelligence subjects. The Directorate of Intelligence also pro-
vides substantive intelligence briefings to their Subcommittees, individual mem-
bers or Committee Staffs, upon request.
Other Committees, the Joint Economic Committee and the House Committee
on Science and Technology, for example, get annual updated briefings on the
economic situation in the USSR and China and on foreign scientific develop-
ments. Since assuming this office, I have directed the CIA to take more initiative
in expanding its provision of intelligence support to all Committees of the Con-
gress concerned with subjects to which intelligence can make meaningful
contributions.
Some sense of the scope of intelligence support that CIA has provided to the
Congress can be gained from the following : During 1976, we gave 30 informal
briefings to Congressional Committees or Subcommittees. We also provided 85
substantive briefings to individual members of Congress and 104 briefings to Con-
gressional Staffs. During 1976 we transmitted to the various Committees, their
members, and staffers over 500 copies of memoranda, biographic reports and
maps.
I promised at my hearing to provide intelligence even if it might be embar-
rassing to the President. I shall keep that promise.
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In offering this support, the fundamental criterion Is that whatever intelli-
ence provided he as objective and factual as possible, without regard to the
policy positions or predilections of any recipient.
E. Former DCI William Colby has recently argued that more of the Intelli-
iti'nco Community's analysis should be made available to the public.
Question 1. Do you share this view?
Answer, ii do.
Question 2. What advantages do you see in this more open procedure? What
angers?
Answer. The advantages are that such a procedure will make reliable infor-
roration more available to a wider audience. thus contribution to the public's
i-ppreciatioa of foreign affairs. It also will enable the public to he better aware
iii' the contributions the U.S. intelligence effort is making to problems of na-
I ional concern. It is my intention to continue a vigorous program of publication
iii, unclassitied finished intelligence.
One of my concerns in carrying out such a policy will be to ensure that those
inirees and methods of intelligence which require protection are adequately
i ? otected.
When sneaking of the products of analysis, an important consideration is the
rrircessarily privileged nature of information which Is being supplied to the Presi-
ili>nt as a basis for policy decisions. I see a danger of compromising this privi-
icgeti kind of intelligence by making it prematurely available outside the proper
i brecutive channel.
V. THE, ROLE OF THE DCI AND HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE
PRESIDENT
A. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence encompasses three some-
wdont coutib Ling responsibilities : intelligence advisor to the President, Director
the CIA, and manager of the Intelligence Community.
Question 1. How do nnu define the Director's role? Which of these responsi-
`r,ili.ties will be most central to you?
Answer- i must devote major attention to all three of the responsibilities you
ii:>:t, and I do not see any significant conflict among them. The fact is, of
course, that I have a deputy to assist me with the management of the CIA and a
deputy to assist me in Intelligence Community matters, but being advisor to the
.Ieesideut IS a responsibility I must necessarily bear alone.
Question 2. Do you believe there is a potential conflict between the need to
bi,?ovide the President with objective intelligence and a natural tendency to place
i nur trust in the intelligence generated by the Agency which you head?
Answer I do not.
B. One aapect of the personal relationship between the DCI and the President
involves the DCI'sability to maintain the delicate balance between having
f he absolnie trust of, while still being independent of, the President.
Question. What steps will you take to ensure that agencies in the Intelligence
Community will not overstep the bounds of legality or propriety because of
requests from the White House?
Answer. To me, this is a matter of management. I shall assure that appropriate
guidelines are, or have been, promulgated. Within the CIA I shall maintain a
$.Erong Inspector General and General Counsel capability and shall follow through
with appropriate disciplinary or other appropriate action if there are any in-
i~ances of illegal or improper activities.
I shall urge each element of the Intelligence Community to review its pro-
~i'dures in this regard and institute safeguards where necessary to insure that
.aoi nests for assistance from the White House and other entities be similarly
ti-viewed and approved so) as to insure legality, propriety and accountability.
however unlikely and improbable, if I am ever ordered by the President of
Elie United States to take an act which I believe to be illegal or improper, I
,vould feel obligated to try to have the order retracted or, failing that, resign.
C. The I?C1's Presidential advisory role overlaps in particular with those of
be President's Assistant for National Security Affairs and the Secretary of
4 ate.
Question 1. Have you discussed this issue with Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Vance?
iow do you view your respective roles?
Answer. I have discussed this issue with both Mr. Brzezinski and Mr. Vance
- iid we find no conflict in our roles. We are all advisors to the President in the
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area of security ; however, our terms of reference differ. The DOI is charged
with coordinating the activities of all the intelligence organizations in the
Executive Branch and producing intelligence which reflects their combined
judgments. His advice to the President is based on this combined product. While
the Department of State is a significant source of political and economic intelli-
gence, the Secretary of State's advice to the President usually reflects his re-
sponsibilities as the President's principal advisor on foreign affairs. The Presi-
dent's Assistant for National Security Affairs views security in the context of
the entire U.S. Government. While the intelligence on which these three advisors'
views are based should in most cases be similar, the President is assured at least
three different perspectives on a given security problem.
Question 2. Do you think that your ability to bring intelligence to bear on
policy would be enhanced by making the DCI a statutory member of the National
Security Council?
Answer. In my view, the impact of intelligence on policy deliberations does not
really relate to whether the DCI is or is not a statutory member of the NSC.
The key factors will be the degree of rapport, trust and confidence which exist
between the DCI and the President and other NSC participants, and the ability
of the DCI to contribute meaningfully to NSC deliberations.
VI. SELECTION OF DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1.947, a DCI who is an
active duty military officer must have a civilian Deputy Director for the CIA. A
second deputy directorship with responsibilities for the Intelligence Community
was created by Executive Order 11905. No restriction exists regarding that Dep-
uty's military or civilian status.
Question. Will you choose or request an active duty military officer for the posi-
tion of Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community.
Answer. The incumbent is an active duty military officer, Admiral Daniel J.
Murphy, and his three predecessors were senior military officers on active duty.
At such time as it may be necessary to appoint a successor to Admiral Murphy,
it would be my intention to nominate to the President the best qualified person
available, military or civilian.
VII. SECRECY : SOURCES AND METHODS, ESPIONAGE LAW, LEAKS
A. The National Security Act of 1947 provides that the Director of Central
Intelligence "shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods
from unauthorized disclosure." This language has been understood to authorize,
if not require, the Director of 'Central Intelligence to take action for protection of
such information in agencies other than the CIA.
Question 1. How would you define "sources and methods?"
Answer. The term "intelligence sources and methods," as I understand it, refers
generally to a broad range of information relating to the operations of foreign
intelligence agencies, the disclosure of which would significantly impair the ca-
pacity of the intelligence agencies to carry out their assigned functions.
Question 2. Does the term include information not presently prohibited from
disclosure by the Federal espionage statute or the executive order on classifica-
tion (EO 11652) ?
Answer. In my view, the term "intelligence sources and methods" may include
information not prohibited from disclosure by the Federal espionage statute or
Executive Order 11652. The espionage statutes essentially concern national de-
fense information ; the Executive Order relates to information the disclosure of
which would damage national security. While most, if not all, sources and meth-
ods information warrants classification, there may be some information deserving
of protection which falls outside that concept.
Question 3. Does it include information pertaining to illegal acts by intelli-
gence agencies? For example, could the DCI withhold from the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Congress or the press, information pertaining to violations of the CIA's
"internal security" restrictions? Could the DCI withhold a violation of the
Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring Congressional notification of covert action?
Answer. The statutory responsibility of the DCI for protection of "intelli-
gence sources and methods" would not permit the withholding of information per-
taining to acts by intelligence agencies which are illegal under the laws of the
United States.
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The DCI may not withhold information pertaining to violations of CIA's "in-
ternal security" restrictions which is required in the course of any properly
authorized investigation. Of course, the release of such information must be con-
ducted with certain safeguards to insure that legitimate intelligence sources and
methods which could he jeopardized in the process are not unnecessarily exposed
and their usefulness destroyed.
The matter of informing the press on any activity of the CIA can only be con-
sidered its terms of a whole range of issues affecting the national interest, of which
the protection of sources and methods is only one facet.
The intent of the last part of the question, "Could the DCI withhold a viola-
tion of the Hughes-Ryan Amendment requiring Congressional notification of
covert action?" is nuclear to me. Under the terms of the Amendment, the Presi-
dent is required to notify the Congress, in a timely fashion, before funds are
expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in for-
eign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelli-
gence. The President has designated the DCI as his agent in making the required
notification. The DCI's responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and meth-
ods does not conflict with such duties.
Question .f. How would you define the scope of authority relating to sources
and methods in the language of the 1947 Act?
Answer. The Act charges the Director with "responsibility" for protecting
sources and methods information ; the word "authority" does not appear. In
consequence. the reach of that language may not be entirely clear. In my view,
however, that provision, strengthened also by Executive Order 11905, authorizes
the Director to establish Community-wide standards and procedures for protect-
ing sources and methods information. Further, the courts have ruled that this
language authorizes the withholding of information from individuals who make
requests under the Freedom of Information Act, as well as in other contexts.
Question :i. Does this language only provide the authority to coordinate the
development of uniform Community-wide standards on protecting vital secrets,
the position taken by former DCI Colby and the Church Committee? Or does it
orovide an operational responsibility, e.g., the authority to investigate "leaks,"
including the authority to conduct surreptitious entries and electronic surveil-
(ance in the U.S. to determine the source of leaks, an authority claimed by some
former I)CI's?
Answer: This language clearly provides the authority to coordinate the devel-
opment of uniform Community-wide standards on protecting vital secrets. And,
in my view, the language also confers authority upon the Director of Central
Intelligence to require that Intelligence Community organizations comply with
these standards.
But the language obviously does not authorize the Director of Central Intelli-
gence to commit or direct violations of law in the process of enforcing these
standards.
Ti. The Frrrd Administration requested the Congress to enact amendments to
he Federal espionage statute on behalf of the Intelligence Community. Some
aspects of that legislation are non-controversial. Other provisions may prompt
some concern, especially those attaching criminal sanctions to the press for
printing classified information.
Qvestioe 1. Do you think it is appropriate to focus the sanction upon the press
as well as the Government employee who leaked the information?
Answer. No.
Question 2. Should such a statute authorize Federal investigations of news-
paper reporters who report classified information in their articles?
Answer. Criminal investigations are directed to a, situation-on belief that it
criminal act may have been committed. In that sense, individuals as such are
nof investigated. Any such investigation may involve a member of the press when
he facts warrant.
If Congress is serious about providing for the prosecution of those who leak
classified information. it must be recognized that reporters may be a source of
evidence with respect to such prosecutions and that their status as a reporter
should not generally exempt them from the investigation. This position has been
recognized by recent decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to the dis-
closure of a reporter's sources of information during grand jury proceedings.
Question. . Do you believe that the Espionage Statute of 1917 and the accom-
panying Presidential executive orders on classification permit too much secrecy?
Answer. Executive Order 11652, not the Espionage Act of 1917, establishes the
Government's classification system and the categories and guidelines upon which
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classification decisions must be made. It is my understanding that E.O. 11.652.
is now under study within the Executive Branch, and I would prefer to defer my
comment until that study has been completed.
Question 4. In addition to seeking amendments to Federal law which provides
sanctions against legitimate secrets, will you seek amendments in both the
Statute and the orders which will decrease unnecessary secrecy?
Answer. As to any amendments to the Order, see my preceding answer. I am
not aware of any statutes which cause unnecessary secrecy.
C. There has been a great deal of criticism in recent years, some of it from
the Executive Branch, suggesting that Congress has been irresponsible with
state secrets. However, two of the most serious breaches of security to occur
during this period pertain to secrets in the exclusive domain of the Executive
Branch. Section 3(d) of Executive Order 11965 provides that the DCI, among
other responsibilities, develop programs to protect intelligence sources and
methods and insure common security standards for the Community.
Question. Will you, pursuant to Section 3 of the Executive Order, re-examine
these various security procedures? Will you be proposing changes in the proce-
dures to combat such leaks?
Answer. I will be addressing the requirements of that Section. If it appears
that changes in procedures will prevent leaks or reduce their number, I of course
will take the necessary action.
D. Vital secrets are leaked in the newspapers. In some such cases, informa-
tion has been leaked which may he vital to the national security, e.g., a critical
clandestine collection program or information which appears to compromise
a particular source. These leaks threaten intelligence operations because they
put the target of the operation in a position to take effective defensive meas-
ures. It would seem logical for the CIA to attempt to confuse a hostile govern-
inent about what we had gained from that operation. In other words, the Agency
could actually engage in "disinformation" by leaking confusing information to
the press.
Question 1. Do you think it is appropriate for the Agency to respond to such
a leak by engaging in ;such disinformation programs?
Answer. No,
Question 2. If so, should such disinformation or misinformation programs only
be initiated after there has been a damaging leak, or do you believe that it is
appropriate to conduct such a program to confuse hostile governments in the
absence of such leak?
Answer. There are and will be no such programs.
Question 3. Do journalists knowingly participate in such disinformation
programs?
Answer. There are and will be no such programs.
Question 4. What checks or controls does the Agency have upon such programs
in order to avoid misinformation or disinformation from being used by the
Agency to confuse the media or the Congress about illegitimate activity of the
CIA ?
Answer. There are and will be no'such programs.
Question 5. Will you provide the Committee with any CIA assessment of the
damage caused by these breaches of security?
Answer. The current practice of the CIA is to report to the Committee on
security matters generally as a reflection of its commitment to keep the Com-
mittee fully and currently informed. I shall continue this practice. Assessments
of damage caused by breaches of security would be a part of this reporting.
. E. At the time that Attorney General Levi and President Ford were pursuing
their wiretap proposal last year, Attorney General Levi took the position that
it was necessary to authorize electronic surveillance of corporations which
export technology to foreign countries. In essence, he was arguing that our Gov-
ernment should monitor the expert of technological processes, even though such
processes are not classified or even classifiable ; indeed, even though the export
of that technology does not violate any law.
Question I. Do you agree with that position? Is there information in the hands
of private companies which is not directly relevant to the national defense but
which we should prohibit from export or disclosure to a foreign power, e.g.,
computer technology?
Answer. I am not aware that Attorney General Levi took such a position. How-
ever, I would agree that electronic surveillance of efforts of foreign powers to
acquire technological information and information about industrial trade proc-
esses should not be foreclosed in appropriate cases. The capabilities and inten-
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Lions of foreign powers with respect to technological and industrial matters
could be very important in the formulation of V.S. foreign policy. Whether the
disclosure of specific information in the hands of private companies should be
restricted is a policy decision for other elements of the Executive Branch and
the Congress to address.
Question _". Do you believe that such information should be subject to control
rhrough amendments to the Executive Order, the espionage statute or perhaps
some other Federal statute, such as the Export Administration Act?
Answer. In general, I do not think that I am qualified to answer this question
as it involves issues beyond the purview of the Intelligence Community.
Question a. Is the real issue with such information that it is vital to the na-
i.ional defense? Or is the real issue that since American "know how" may be an
important "bargaining chip" in negotiations with foreign governments such in-
formation must be controlled for foreign policy reasons?
Answer. From my perspective, the purpose of obtaining such information
by electronic surveillance would be to acquire insights into the capabilities and
intentions of foreign powers.
VIII. BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES
A. This Committee has responsibility for exercising oversight over national
intelligence, not only in the constitutional sense but also in the broader context
of ensuring that the long-range development of collection and production sup-
ports the needs of the national policy. Thus it is important that the Committee
understand your objectives and goals for national intelligence.
Question I. Given your unique perspective as a consumer of intelligence in the
senior ranks of the Defense Department, what do you think are the most press-
ing challenges facing national intelligence in the coming decade?
Answer. The continuing challenge will be to assure that our government has
the foreign intelligence it needs when it needs it. This is the key challenge,
and all other challenges are linked with it. Important among the other major
challenges are these :
To assure the truly effective use of the resources required to collect, proc-
ess, analyze and produce intelligence.
-To assure that collection capabilities keep pace with the changing demands
for information.
-To enhance the duality of intelligence estimates.
To strengthen the confidence of the President and his advisors, the Con-
gress, and the American people in the effectiveness of the U.S. intelligence
effort.
- -To devise operating methodologies that will assure the acquisition of the
needed information and at the same time assure that intelligence activities
arc being conducted in a legal and proper manner, with full recognition of
the rights of F.S. citizens.
Question, 2. In your opinion, what are the strengths and weaknesses in the way
national intelligence is now dealing with those challenges?
Answer. The strengths of the Intelligence Community are quite encouraging:
The collection and analytic capabilities of the Community are quite
impressive.
- -tt has a corps of dedicated, hard-working and highly skilled personnel,
many of whom have spent their entire careers in intelligence.
- -It has access to a pool of research and development expertise, both in-house
and in U.S. industry, that can be expected to respond as well to future
i:ech nical challenges as has been the case in past years.
It has strong support at top levels of the Government on the basis of recog-
nition there of the importance of dependable intelligence to policymaking
anti operational decisions.
On the other hand. there are potential weaknesses :
---iManpower in some organizations of the Community has been severely re-
duced in recent years, and personnel resources are stretched very thin in.
many areas.
--Budgets in most cases have not kept pace with the results of inflation, and
there is particular risk that discouragement of initiatives because of tight
fiscal constraints may have a deleterious long-range effect.
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-Much still remains to be done to take full advantage of the potential bene-
fits of new analytic methodologies and to make full use of computerized
data bases.
Question 8. Given the vast complexity of intelligence, what type of manage-
ment approach will you take in monitoring and directing the focus of the na-
tional intelligence community in the coming decade?
Answer. The management approach I intend to take during my tenure as the
DCI is straightforward. I will make certain that those persons who report to
me fully understand their responsibilities and what is expected of them. I will
see to it that they get whatever guidance is required. I will then hold them
accountable for proper execution of the tasks within their jurisdiction.
I recognize that under present arrangements there are very distinct limita-
tions on the extent of the management authority of the DCI, and this puts a
premium on effective coordination and consultation processes. I expect to make
full use of these processes in furthering the Community aspects of the national
intelligence program.
Question h. Has the President, or any senior-ranking official provided you.with
guidance on what they expect the national intelligence community to achieve
in the coming years?
[If so] What were the principal themes in that guidance?
[If not] What do you believe are the major management and policy objec-
tives which should guide your actions during your tenure as DCI?
Answer. As you might expect, the President and I have discussed what it is
he expects from me as DCI. In essence, I consider it my charge to meet the
challenges outlined in response to Question 1.a. above; and, primarily, that is to
see that the United States Government is provided with the timely, high quality,
responsive foreign intelligence that is required by our national interests.
B. One the major arguments against disclosure of the aggregate intelligence
budget figure is that publication will result in demands for more detailed
information.
Question. What is your response to that argument?
Answer. It is apparent enough that the budgets of many Intelligence Com-
munity organizations can never be publicly revealed in the depth of detail that
characterizes most normal Federal agencies. Disclosure of detailed information
on many of the Community's activities would eliminate our ability to carry out
those activities which Congress and others intended when we were established.
There are basically two reasons for this. First, many individuals and govern-
ments which now cooperate with U.S. intelligence would reassess that coopera-
tion in light of the possibility that details of their relationship with U.S. intelli-
gence could become public knowledge. We have seen recent examples of this. We
are talking here in some cases of very sensitive relationships, generally involving
the reputations, means of livelihood, or even the lives of individuals, and some-
times the future stability of governments. Second, revelation of detailed in-
formation would greatly facilitate efforts of our adversaries to hinder the
effectiveness of our intelligence apparatus either by direct operations against us
or by encouraging other governments to take steps to limit or destroy our
capabilities.
There seems to be little basic disagreement with this view as regards the
details of our intelligence operations. However, many acknowledge these points
but argue that the public has a right to know the overall size of the intelligence
budget and that a decision to reveal only overall size cannot possibly endanger
any specific operations. Thus, the term "open budget" has generally come to
symbolize the desirability of revealing only the Intelligence Community budget
total without further detail.
This argument is often based on the belief that the public will be better able
to make a judgment that the size of the Intelligence Community budget is
appropriate to American needs if the overall size of the budget is made known.
In the last analysis, however, I doubt that wide knowledge of only a budgetary
total will significantly increase the public's ability to reach a judgment as to
whether the overall program is a reasonable one. The principal reason for this
is that, without further detail and understanding of the various programs which
make up the budget, few significant conclusions can be drawn about the appro-
priateness of the funding level or the programs provided for within it. An
illustration helps make this point.
Suppose that the only information publicly available about the U.S. Defense
budget is that it totals $100 billion, without any additional detail as to the size
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of, our strategic weapons programs, our R&D effort, the size of our standing
military force structure or the military assistance program, or the portion of the
budget which is essentially administrative support as opposed to a capability for
action in an emergency. I doubt there could be much effective public discussion
of the implications of this hypothetical $100 billion budget without such detail,
and this lea-is to my next point.
Revealing; just the budget totals will, in our view, create enormous pressures
to reveal further budget figures which cannot by themselves be considered to be
terribly sensitive (for example, the cost of certain support activities) but which,
when added together and subtracted from the total budget figure, will define
with some precision of the remaining sensitive operation and research and devel-
opment portions of the budget. This is likely in our view because revealing just
the totals will put all of us in the difficult position of arguing for appropriations
without being able to explain why we are supporting what we are recommending.
This seems likely to lead to demands upon us to declassify those "nonsensitive
portions of the budget which can be discussed.
At this point, the essential question is "why are we concerned?" In answer to
this, I would like to make one basic point. The details of many of our activities
cannot be publicly acknowledged if the programs we are authorized to carry
out are to he carried out at all. It is my view that the more steps we take to re-
veal aspects of the budget which are relatively non-sensitive, the harder it will
be--both within the Intelligence Community and the rest of the Executive
Branch, and, in Congress---to maintain the secrecy necessary for those programs
and activities which are terribly sensitive.
In the last analysis, the question always becomes "where do you draw the
lirce?" Natural public curiosity, coupled with great public sensitivity to any rev-
elations about intelligence activities, and the attendant pressures we feel would
fall upon any floor manager in Congress who took a bill to the Floor but had to
tell his colleagues that he could not explain any of the details of his proposal,
al( argue-to us-that there are enormous dangers inherent in taking the first
step.
C. An argument against annual disclosure of the aggregate budget figure of any
element of the intelligence budget is that publication will allow our adversaries
to determine the program changes in specific U.S. Intelligence capabilities, such
as a major allocation for the development of a new technical collection system.
Question. What is your response to the argument?
Answer. While there. is no real concern about disclosure of the aggregate budget
figure to the loyal American public, there is serious concern that disclosure of
the total, or of any element, of the intelligence budget will provide a direct and
sihnificant advantage to adversary intelligence services. Any advantage we grant
freely to adversaries should be weighed carefully against the contribution free
disclosure will make to an informed public opinion. Disclosure will be meaning-
ful only to those who are interested in further analysis ; who have the inclina-
tion and wherewithal to put other information with it. Informed people know
what the inflation rates have been, and they know how much the legislative pay
increases are for Government employees. It is relatively simple to apply this
kind of knowledge to increases in budget figures from year to year. Add to this
information some additional data such as knowledge about buildings occupied,
square footage of space in those buildings, numbers of cars in parking lots, and
other similar incidental data, and it is not difficult to produce a pretty fair
computation of numbers of people employed. The same kinds of analyses can
identify quite readily and accurately the amount of the total budget devoted
to other than fixed costs. Access to the financial pages of the daily newspapers
throughout the country and ibscriptions to technical journals provide a vast
store of information about business activity in all fields of endeavor. Add to
this the presumption of knowledge about which corporate enterprises are working
on classified contracts, and it is not too difficult to identify where increases in
intelligence budgets are going and what they are being used for. Concerted efforts
by adversary intelligence services against targets narrowed down through this
general kind of analytical process can result in the specific identification of new
technical collection systems.
We doubt, for example, that the U-2 aircraft could have been developed as an
effective collection device if the CIA budget (or the total intelligence budget)
had been a matter of public knowledge. Our budget increased significantly dur-
ing the development phase of that aircraft. Had that knowledge been supple-
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mented by information from newspapers or technical journals that funds were
being committed to a major aircraft manufacturer and to a manufacturer of
sophisticated photographic materials, the correct conclusion would have been
relatively easy to draw. The U.S. manufacturers involved would have become
high priority targets, and it is reasonable to assume that a Soviet capability to
destroy high altitude aircraft would have been developed earlier than it in fact
was. While there is no similar situation pertaining today, we cannot say with
certainty that one will not arise again in the next few years.
IX. CIA INTERNAL INSPECTION AND REGULATIONS
A. Existing procedures require that CIA's General Counsel review activities
which raise questions of legality. Some potentially sensitive clandestine activi-
ties are reviewed by the CIA's General Counsel who is placed in a somewhat
contradictory position of both reviewing the particular activity and facilitating
CIA's overall mission.
Question 1. Would you support a requirement that potentially sensitive clan-
destine activities such as those alleged to have taken place in Micronesia be
reviewed for legality by the Attorney General of the United States?
Question 2. What threshold would you establish to trigged such a review?
Answer. I believe the Attorney General generally should be consulted, but I
question the wisdom of a statutory requirement for consultation. Further, it
would be extremely difficult to define the activities which would require a re-
quest for the Attorney General's opinion. Accordingly, I would not favor a statu-
tory requirement.
B. At present the General Counsel is required to refer to the Department of
Justice allegations regarding activities by CIA employees that violate Federal
law.
Question. In order to assist the Committee in its oversight role, will you
instruct the General Counsel to notify the Committee when and if such re-
ferral takes place?
Answer. This question, in substantially similar form, was asked by Chairman
Inouye during Mr. Knoche's confirmation hearing. Mr. Knoche agreed at that
time to instruct the General Counsel to notify the Committee of such referrals
and later clarified this commitment in a letter to Chairman Inouye dated 21 Janu-
ary 1977, which states in pertinent part :
With respect to matters reported to the Attorney General involving pos-
sible law violations, the Agency's General Counsel will prepare and submit to
the Committee Staff Director, quarterly, a written statement indicating the
number of previously reported possible offenses closed out during the pre-
ceding quarter by a Department of Justice decision to prosecute or not prose-
cute, together with a brief description of the circumstances, without however
identifying the potential violators. These statements would. also indicate
the number and type of possible offenses reported for the first time during
the proceding quarter.
C. Executive Order 11905 directs heads of intelligence agencies or departments
to "ensure that Inspectors General and General Counsels of their agencies have
access to any information necessary to perform their duties . . ." At present, CIA
regulations require that the Inspector General and General Counsels have access
to all information necessary for the performance of their respective duties, but
these regulations can be withdrawn or modified at any time by the Director.
Question 1. Should the General Counsel and Inspector General be assured, by
statute, of access to all Agency information necessary for their work?
Answer. I do not believe that such statutory provisions are necessary to en-
sure that the Inspector General and General Counsel of CIA have access to
all information necessary to perform their duties. Both of those officers now have
such access under CIA regulations and it is my firm intention to see that they
continue to have it. This is consistent with and in implementation of Executive
Order 11905, Section 6 (c) (3) which states :
"Ileads of intelligence agencies or departments shall:- (3) Ensure that
Inspectors General and General Counsels of their agencies have access to
any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by paragraph
(b) of this Section" (which describes the responsibilities of Inspectors
General and General Counsels).
Question 2. Will you notify this Committee if either of these officers is denied,
on your authority, access to CIA information?
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Answer. As stated above, I have no intention to deny either officer access to
f'1A information which lie needs.
1). One of the most effective tools of the Inspector General is the component
xurvey--an in-depth study of a particular segment of the CIA, such as the
Office of Current Intelligence.
Question. Will you instruct the Inspector General to notify this Committee
of the scnedule of component surveys and to brief the Committee as to the
general findings of each?
Answer. I am concerned by the possible implications and consequences of any
commitment on my part to provide the Committee with all findings of the
Inspector General. Such findings, made confidentially to pie, are important
management tools which help me carry out my responsibility to keep CIA
an effective organization. Should the present system be changed to broaden
the closet v held disseminations of the Inspector General's findings, there would
be a tendency for Agency personnel to be less forthcoming with the Inspector
4 eneral, and there could develop in the long run, a tendency for the style and
frankness of the Inspector General's presentations to become inhibited.
Therefore, I prefer not to instruct the Inspector General of CIA to notify the
Committee of the schedule of component surveys and not to brief the Committee
as to the general findings of each.
1+7. Since 1973 the Director of Central Intelligence has regularly issued a cal!
to CIA employees to report to him any activities which raise questions of legality
and propriety.
Question. Do you think that this call is sufficient to create an incentive
structure that will in practice bring forth reports of questionable activities?
If not, what measures are you considering to ensure your ability to be apprised
of questionable activities?
Answer. I would like to have time to examine the question as to whether the
incentive structure will in practice bring forth reports of questionable activities.
I have been informed that the response to. Director Schlesinger's call for infor-
mation on questionable activities in 1973, and subsequent requests, brought forth
voluminous and uninhibited responses. The Inspector General reports that he
has received good cooperation during his compliance surveys. It is also my
early iunoression that personnel are anxious to avoid activities which might
bring further disapprobation to the Agency. But I know you will understand
when I say that I would like to be in the job somewhat longer before I assess
the command and control situation. If problems exist, I shall expeditiously find
solutions to them. As a person who has long served in command capacity, I
place high importance on discipline and compliance with law, regulation and
ethical standards.
F. It has been suggested that CIA employees having access to secret intelli-
gence might misuse that information for personal profit. At present, managerial
level employees must disclose their financial holdings so that a determination
can be made as to whether or not there is any conflict of interest. In addition,
Section 203 of. Executive Order 11222 provides that employees may not "engage
in. directly or indirectly, financial transactions as a result of, or primarily
relying upon information obtained through their employment."
Question 1. Will you take steps to ensure that this provision is enforced vis-a-
vis CIA employees'
Answer. Yes. There are now in existence regulations within CIA which aim
to control employee activities which could pose conflict of interest problems
or permit private prolit to be made on the basis of insights gained on the job.
Come of these regulations are being strengthened as the result of a recent
Inspector General examination of the problem. Perhaps other steps can be
made if the Agency finds a problem along these lines developing.
Question 2. Will you notify the Committee of what steps you have taken?
Answer. Yes.
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PERSONAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION PROVIDED
BY THE NOMINEE
The Select Committee on Intelligence submits a two-part question-
naire and financial disclosure statement to each nominee for the posi-
tion of Director of Central Intelligence and the present statutory
position of Deputy Director. Part I appears below and consists of
responses to questions relating to personal background, qualifications,
and general financial arrangements.
Part II consists of specific financial data, which the committee
requested in part because the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
allows the Director of Central Intelligence exceptional discretion over
the disbursement of funds. Part II is available for public inspection
at the offices of the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Admiral Turner placed his investments and securities in blind
trusts drawn under guidelines established by the administration.
Copies of the trust agreements were provided to the committee and are
available for public inspection.
(87)
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PERSONAL BACKGROUND, QUALIFICATIONS, AND
GENERAL FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS
TURNER, Stansficld
(Last) (First)
(Other)
Address (I ist current residence and mailing address: Commander in Chief,
Allied Farces Southern Europe, Box 1, FPO NEW'170R1Cb 4524-(Offizier
Villa Nike, Via Scipione Capece, 8, Naples, Italy (Residence)
Position to which Date of
nominated: Director of Central Intelligence nomination: February 7, 1977
Date of birth: 1 DEC 1923 Place of birth Chicago, Illinois
(Day) (Aionth) (Year)
liarital. status: Married Full name of spouse (including any
-------- T'atriOOId Busby Turner: at time of marriage
former navies used by spouse): Patricia Busby Whitney (widow)
Nave and z. t;es
of children: Daughter:, Laurel Echevarria, 31
Dates Deyrces Metes of.
Insti tuts n attended r?cei ved degrees Amherst College 1941-1943 Doctorate June 1976
--Bachelor of
IT. S. Naval Academy_ 1943-.1946 Science June 1946
Oxford University -Master oT- - ------`
Oxford, Englahd 1947-1950 Arts Feb 1950
Harvard Business School raCa'aYL?'a?--A-d-
Boston, Mass. Feb-May 1966 vanced Management Pro-
Ko-._ lllam__s C_o_ll_eg-e --dram
~+er Willi -Y.onorary
Itrtsful. Rhode Island No Attendance Doctorate may 1976
tennis and awards: l.ist below all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees,
rni iiLary medals, honor:u-y society memberships, and any
:,rher special rccuf,ni Lions for outstanding service or achieve-
Rhodes Scholar: Holnorary-Doctorate ~j Degree, Amherst Collef
Am rs, ~-h1 *.tc, iilt~o~ ai'I 1. nd; gthree i~oh P1.
\Vi) tams o.le e, ustoY, It Lose s mdtrce erLon o
Merit Medals; One Bronze Star Medal-with Combat'/
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.,'ember;hip;; List bclow all m,?mbershiins and offices held in professional, fraternal, I siness, scholarla.
civic, charitable and other orjanizalions.
Once livid
ti aryl
council on Foreign Relations None
New Y0rk, NewYorli __-.__-_ _
t~ I ternaiiolial Instltpte for None
Strategic Stud Les, London - ne -
U~7 S. N',ival ~Ip stitule None
Annapo~s, Mary an c~
U.S. Naval Academy Alumni
Asso., Annapolis, Maryland _ None
Association of American None
Rhodes Scholars
Employment record: List below all positions hold since I,i Fh cc hoot, I oc tedi eg the
title or description of job, name of employer, location of work,
and dates of inclusive employnicnt.
U. S. Navy: 1943-Date
Midshipman, U.S. Naval Academy: 1943-1946
Naval Officer, 1946-Date
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List any o.nrnrnrr, in or dur:.t ,'Si,' ~.... 'with Federal, State, or Iocrd eovemun?ms, in
;audio,, dnv 5Cvisory, eonull:vrve, h,rnurary or other par4tm:o service v positions.
U.S. N-/: 1946-Date
,abiishcd
sect ,, s. List he Ili lee, r,uhlishers and dotes of books, articles, reports or other p. Wished materiel'.
yell been writt:`n.
"' he Navat BBalance: Not Just a Numbers Game"
(Foreifn Affairs mapa nine, Winter 1977)
ip.5. Naval institute. rocertdin t's Sommer 1973)
-'rt he unlr?d SfaCec-.f: a'Stia#eFic-Crossroa3s
(U, S. NL,eet Institute Proceerlincs, December 1972)
a ll~li_::on;
and , ctivil it fist all :neml "T, and ol6rrs bold in or financial contributions and , 'vices rondnrod to
.III y-,olihcal nnrtie:, or election committees during the last ton years
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Qualifications: State fully your qualifications to serve in
t ems position to which you have been named.
My qualifications for the position of Director of Central
Intelligence derive from my thirty years of government service
as a naval officer. In that service I have been a frequent
user of intelligence at successively higher levels of command.
I have also been a manager of sizeable assets, ranging from
individual ships to NATO's Southern Command with over 800,000
men from five nations. I believe that those experiences enable
me to place national intelligence in proper perspective and
to exercise the leadership and managerial skills to cope with
a program of the magnitude of the DCI's.
Potential Conflict of Interest
Please describe any employment, investment, association,
or activity which might create, or appear to create, a conflict
of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.
As far as it can be foreseen, state your plans after
completing government service. Please state specifically any
agreements or understandings, written or unwritten, concerning
employment after leaving government service, in particular
concerning agreements, understandings or options to return to
your current position.
My plans are to continue on active duty in the United States Navy.
Upon camplctinn o7 niyintenOed-posT{ton. TwTIl-lio ava lSfe-i'o~=
reassignment as desired by the President and the Secretary of
-'W eEci~s c, -I hoc-755~tf ~~i6 :r[,*reairrt:nt o-r~mcte~-standirrgr, either----
written or unwritten, concerningemployment after I leave active
- mItltary survfetr- -- --
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Describe the financial arrangements you have made or
plan to make, if you are confirmed, in connection with severance
from your current position. Please include severance pay, pension
rights, stock options, deferred income arrangements, and any
and all. compensation that will or might be received in the future
as a result of your current position or your past business or
professional relationships.
Tl ere will be no financial arrangements made in connection
with severance from m current silian. TmtencTto remain
on active duty and there is no severance pay involved. Pension
rigf.ts are those authorized anyone with my length of military
service.
Please list below all corporations, partnerships, foun-
dation,, trusts. or ocher entities toward which you have fiduciary
obligai.ions or in which you hold directorships or other positions
of trust.
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Have you been an attorney for, or a representative or
registered agent of, a foreign government, or any entity under
the control of a foreign government? In your present position
are you formally associated with individuals who are attorneys
for, or representatives or registered agents of, foreign govern-
ments or entities? If the answer to either or both questions is
year, please describe each relationship on a separate sheet.
Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of
interest that may be disclosed by your responses to the above
items.
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irre you wii1 inC to nppror arri ioatify lwlor'e any dut/ con:: tit I Itcd
,,,.mni Licr ni i.lre Congress on ,iich occuei.oiis as you may be rcoconnbly
cqucsted to do so? Yes
r. r.? yru wi iiin;: to prov idc cur -h 1nfonnntion a. is requested by
:uclr cuimnillces? Yes
..r , you ever b-, canvictod (includ 'nC pi cn r, of guilty or nolo
,:,ntcmicrei of uny criminal vii,Lution other than in minor truffle
11Clutcl
N.
Please advi:- the Comoiitl.ce of nnv odditional iinforvcr Lion, rev, -ruble
nr un fn v,-n-.r i,Ie, which you reel. r,h?u Ld b^ eoncidercd iu caiaiection
rith your no.,. i. n~ticn.
NI
rlro s,? prnvi,ie the Co,rJnitLcr? with lire flaunts and current nddrenr-cs
-.f hive ind I, idua Js whom you t,e Lievc ors ii a position to coudncrit
Ripon your girt ii l'i cut ions 1'or ton' office to which you have teen
,aini_nn tcd .
'S--ter John Chafce,
United States Senate
Washington, o.C. 20310
Ro;.r Admlr:ri "M" Staser Holcomb, USN
iiiice ,t Inc Secretary of Defense
The Pen [neon
:r:;hington, u.C. 20301
A,tmiral 0. R. 7,umwalt, Jr., U.S. Navy (Net)
r,043 North 41st Street
Sr.im uted, Virginia 22207
bit. ilay its:. Manning
3'resident, CouneiJ on Foreign Relations
58 liaF]. r 8th Street
iScw y.,, N,ew York 10021
Tire Honorahie Paul Ignatius
J6;0 Fordham Road
!aashinhlt on, I).C.- 2UU16
!'he undcrsifned certicies that the information contained herein
is uric and correci.
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LETTERS TO CHAIRMAN INOUYE FROM CIA GENERAL
COUNSEL ANTHONY A. LAPHAM, FEBRUARY 17, 1977,
FEBRUARY 18, 1977, AND APRIL 11, 1977.
FED 18 10 21 All '77
The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
In connection with his nomination to be Director of Central Intelligence,
Admiral Stansfield Turner has provided me with a list of securities and
other financial assets owned by him and his wife. Admiral Turner has no
minor children.
All securities owned outright by Admiral or Mrs. Turner will be
transferred to one or more blind trusts. I am advised by Admiral Turner's
personal counsel that the trust instruments are expected to be executed
at an early date and that these instruments will satisfy the criteria des-
cribed by Mr. Lipschutz, Counsel to the President, in a letter of 7 February
to Admiral Turner, a copy of wv4ich is enclosed. I will advise you when
that has been accomplished.
As Admiral Turner has indicated in his answers to the Committee
questionnaire, his mother, Wilhelmina Turner, is a beneficiary of a trust
established by his grandmother. We are advised that upon the death of
Wilhelmina Turner, this trust terminates and its assets would be distributed
to either Admiral Turner and his father or, in the event the Admiral's
father has predeceased his mother, then to Admiral Turner alone. Technically,
this situation may not create a possible conflict of interest. However, I am
discussing with the Admiral, and with his personal counsel, steps that
might be taken to either deny to the Admiral, during his term of service
as Director of Central Intelligence, any information as to the securities
held by the trust, or to otherwise eliminate any possibility of conflict of
interest. Admiral Turner, as the questionnaire indicates, now knows what
securities the trust holds.
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Admiral Turner also owns the limited partnership interest identified
in the confidential statement (net worth) already provided by the Admiral
to the Committee. I have no reason to believe that this asset creates
any possibility of a conflict of interest. However. I am discussing this
matter witiz the Admiral and his personal counsel and I will advise you
by 22 February should these discussions indicate that this asset creates
a conflict possibility.
Under the circumstances, it is my opinion that the financial interests
of Admiral Turner and his family create no conflict of interest that would
stand in the way of his nomination to be Director of Central Intelligence.
Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel
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The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In my letter to you yesterday, I indicated that I would communicate with
you by February 22 concerning the limited partnership interest identified
in the confidential net worth statement furnished the Committee by Admiral
Turner only if my discussions with the Admiral and his personal counsel
indicated that that interest does create a conflict possibility. Notwithstanding
that statement, I am glad to inform you that I have had those conversations
and I am satisfied that that interest does not create a conflict possibility.
Sincerely,
c1
Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
11 April 1977 Arr? 13 3 R? ?-~'71
Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C. 20510
In my letter to you of 17 February 1977, I stated that I would advise you
when arrangements had been completed regarding the transfer of securities
owned by Admiral and Mrs. Turner to blind trusts. These arrangements
have now been completed and I enclose for your information copies of the
executed letters of instruction by which this has been accomplished. In addi-
tion, I have enclosed copies of the executed letter of instruction and the trust
agreement by which Admiral Turner has placed beyond his control his inter-
ests in the trust established by his grandmother, which also was described in
my letter of 17 February. These arrangements have been structured in accor-
dance with criteria prescribed by the Counsel to the President to insulate
Presidential appointees from any potential conflict of interest during their
governmental service.
Anthony A. Lapham
General Counsel
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