QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR ADMIRAL TURNER'S CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00901R000600370006-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 14, 1977
• Content Type: MF

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14 February 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/IC
DDI
DDO
DDS&T
DDA
D/DCI/NI
General Counsel
Inspector General
Comptroller
Assistant to the Director
Assistant to the Acting Director
FROM: George L. Cary, Legislative Counsel
SUBJECT: Questions and Answers for Admiral Turner's
Confirmation Hearings
1. On shorter notice than we might wish, we ask you to review
the attached questions and answers prepared in the Office of Legislative
Counsel for consideration by Admiral Turner as he prepares for his
confirmation hearings.
2. We ask that you give us your responses, comments and
coordination by noon on 15 Febru.ar so that we may have the final
submission ready to go Ze Admiral by the evening of 15 February.
3. If you have problems with this, please call
4. Thank you for your forebearance.
=rJgislative Counsel
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11 February 1.977
For the Turner Confirmation Hearings:
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS
CM's Draft
ggesti.on: Red liberally before beginning to (-.,dit; some
subjects not covered in rersy-)onse to one ques-
tion may be covered in another.
Four general sections:
1. Personal q eotions, for most of which he may best
provide his own answers.
2. Questions on Intelligence generally
3. Questions relating to CIA
/+. Questions relating to the Congress
To keep in mind: I tried to-z write for the admiral., not
so much for CIA.
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Why do you feel that you are qualified to assume the responsibilities of
Director of Central Intelligence?
If requested by this Committee, on'the basis of conflict of interest,
will you divest yourself of any assets?
Do you see any potential conflict of interest in your serving as DCI
and your holding any of your present financial interests?
A. Your predecessor has stated that the Director of CIA must be
someone who has the trust and confidence of and direct access to the
President. Reports have indicated that you and President Carter were
not even acquainted while at the Naval Academy, and your careers have
certainly diverged since then. What would encourage this Committee to
believe that you have the trust and confidence of, and direct access to,
the President?
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. What is your concept of your role as Director of Central Intelligence?
Especially with respect to responsibilities to the so-called Intelligence
Community? (See attached paper on "Role of DCIrr)
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Published reports have indicated that your military
colleagues have admired your skills as a manager, skills
surely required by the person in the position of the
DCI. Would you describe your managerial experience?
How much of this included managing significant numbers
of non-military people?
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Accepting that any of us would be reluctant to refuse a
call to office from a President, you are clearly risking, and
perhaps taking yourself out of consideration ford higher Naval
commands. Did President Carter make any commitment to you
about further Naval assignments after a period of service as
the DCI, or did he otherwise discuss your longer professional
future with you? Would any such hopes that you may have for
higher Naval command tend to inhibit you in your performance
of the DCI's job?
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Will your Naval background present problems for you in taking an
objective position on important matters such as relative US and Soviet
Naval strength, the strategic balance of forces, etc. , about which you
wrote recently in Foreign Affairs? Will your Naval past cause any problems
for you in dealing with the other military services, and with civilian agencies,
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After years in the Navy, responsible primarily to your Naval
superiors, do you feel %ualified to take over an almost entirely
r-'"
civilian organization, and one that operates under the constant scrutiny
of the Congress, the press, and the American people?
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Ethics is an important matter, these days and always. ! I.s there anything
in your past which could conceivably cause embarrassment to you, to the
President, to the Congress and this Committee, or to the CIA, should you
be confirmed as DCI and then kawt the item brought to public attention?
A
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After more than 30 years in the Navy, you are no doubt comfortable
working with military officers. Do you intend or anticipate bringing more
military persons into positions of authority in the CIA or the Intelligence
Community staff? Would you engage to advise this Committee before making
such appointments?
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A
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In your Foreign Affairs article, page 346,. you stress the problems
of perception and misperception of another country's military strength.
In assessing potential adversaries of the U.S., one would extend the
matter of perceptions of strength or weakness to political, economic,
social and other elements of a potential adversary's life and vitality as
well. How would you as DCI make sure that U.S. perceptions of the
USSR, Communist China, and other potential adversaries were clear,
accurate, honest, and timely, not just for the President but for the
Congress and the people as well?
ANSWER: The short answer to the question is: by doing the job
of DCI as well as I can. I would apply to the CIA and the Intelligence
Community what I recently wrote from my command of NATO's Southern
Region: ..the last quarter of the century will make even stiffer
demands for superior flexibility, capability and initiative. In an
environment where change is the norm, we must learn to adapt more
rapidly to evolving political situations and military circumstances. We
are seeking greater effectiveness from the assets we have on hand,
attempting to use all of our resources more efficiently in combined
effect and to simplify even further our command and control functions. 1/ (v''
Everything that I would do as DCI would be guided by the objective
of providing the best intelligence to the President in a timely manner,
while keeping this Committee and the Congress appropriately informed, It
would be for the policy-makers to keep the U.S. public advised in most
instances, I would think.
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In your Foreign Affairs article, you comment as follows on
detente: "Detente has been misinterpreted by some as a license to drop
national security issues entirely, except when pursuing the transfer of
funds from defense to areas of social and economic concern ` Does that
indicate that you oppose the policy of detente, that you have little faith
in the effort to reach a peaceful accommodation with Soviet Union? And
are you against trying to meet social and economic needs which cry out
for solutions in this country and go the heart of the whole purpose of
the United States?
ANSWER: The answer is no to both questions. Let me emphasize
that as DCI I would not be a policy makerl bxrt-h-belie e~at-th
be no substi e for some kind o peaceful accommUdat orrb t"ween-the-H3
,,-only be achieved when both-co
onix': That car
elieve it serves their separate fair interests . If the CIA and the
Intelligence Community do their work well, they provide the basis for
the judgments of our US policy makers on detente and the needs of our
defense establishment. And it is from a basis of such informed judgment
that the policy makers can then decide how best to meet what, as I noted
in my article, I fully agree are "pressing social needs." For the policy
makers, it is a question of balance. Good intelligence provides the
irreplaceable element in determining that balance. My purpose as DCI
would be to help insure the highest quality of that irreplaceable element.
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Referring again to your Foreign Affairs article and the matter of US
military strength as compared with the Soviets': In response to the question:
"Who's ahead, Admiral?", you asked two questions in turn: "What do you
mean by 'ahead"', and "How far ahead will suit you, for foreign policy pur-
poses?" How do you answer those questions now?
Answer: I would leave those questions for others to answer, if I may. The
matter of what "ahead" may mean and how far ahead will suit the US is clearly
for the President and the Congress to answer. As DCI, I would try to insure
that the CIA and the Intelligence Community provide the best answers they can
to the question of how `strong`he forces of potential adversaries are, and what
trends of research and development and strategy and tactics they may be under-
taking or contemplating.
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You know, Admiral, that we civilians are traditionally wary
of career military men in high government office. Sometimes such officers/
used to the order and discipline and perquisites of the military life, seem
to show an impatience or insensitivity with the arguments and the confusion
and disorder that sometimes accompany the civilian processes of this
society and this government, including those of the Congress and the
Intelligence Community. In an editorial signed by you in the January-
February 1974 issue of the Naval War College Review, on the first
anniversary of the return of our prisoners of war from Vietnam, you
note that: "Past fixations on Vietnam and the resultant antimilitary
domestic turmoil have abated. The 'public' has proven to have a short
attention span..,.." I'm bothered by what might appear to be a rather
cavalier attitude on your part toward the 'public'. Would you give us
some clarification? For example, do you think the 'public' has a short
attention span relative to the Soviet Union, or the CIA?"
ANSWER: Let me reassure you, Senator, as best I can that I
fully respect the problems and values of the civilians of this country and
government. In the best traditions of the United States, I am, after all,
a civilian in uniform My'comments in the editorial were made out of my
deep conviction that the brave POWs of Vietnam, one year after their return
to the US, should be accepted and esteemed among us in terms of their
future, as they themselves wished. I noted in the editorial that the
year that had passed since their release had seen great changes in the
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orientation of public attention. Such changes are probably generally
true on most issues over time and reflect the useful process in this society of
getting on with the future and its promise while remembering, but not
dwelling in a disabling way,, on the past I think that the US public
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has shown a sustained and healthy appreciation of the Soviet Union and its power
since the Second World War, and I think that is most appropriate. For
the CIA, I would hope that the public, and the Congress, would appreciate
that the problems and mistakes of the past are gone but not forgotten,
and I pledge that they would not be repeated under my tenure as DCI.
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In'your Foreign Affairs article on page 346, you make some
critical comments about presentations and pronouncements made in
connection with the budget process of the Government, suggesting
there are distortions of actual Soviet strength and Western
strength: "...the formidable qualities of the threat are stressed;
the available means to counter it perhaps slighted." You urge care
in public discussions of these matters. Does that mean that you
think that the military and others appearing before the Congress
deliberately distort projections made to the Congress and the
people for budgetary purposes, and that you want to solve the
problem by eliminating such public discussion?
ANSWER: No, indeed. I support the fullest public disclosure
on relative Soviet and US military strength compatible with US security
interests. I think this Committee will appreciate that the sensitivity
of the information~'Y~T*h_r-riit]ae dito_~esl_s~r ~'
suggests some of it must come to the Congress in
confidence, at least in its details, rather than be published and
disputed generally./ My point in the article was that we must exercise
care so that the American people and our allies, and most of all our
potential adversaries do not perceive the rhetoric accompanying budget
pleas as an actual reflection of US strength and apprehensions. Such
misperceptions could lead to very serious distortions of our real and
relative strength vis a vis the adversary, and you cannot base policy
decisions and public opinion on distortions. There the peril is both
obvious and indeed grave and one we would all agree on.
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Do you belong to any organization, clubs etc. which have
:;restricted imembership?
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All CIA employees take a polygraph interview when they enter on
duty with the Agency. Would you volunteer to do the same?
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 'Pe rl rQMdcFAt:ptp&'P iRQOiV/slAgC-A:Pt9IPrxl Q j WO& in you
Foreign Affairs article is that "the Soviets' big advantage is in their option
to launch a preemptive strike... An attack could be launched with virtually
no warning from point-blank range." (Page 350). Though you were writing
about a Soviet ship attack on our ships, the possibility of preemptive Soviet
attack could come in other forms as well, most ominously a first missile
strike. You then add -- and this is of particular-significance for this Com-
mittee -- that "The timeliness and quality of intelligence estimates..." will
in part determine whether or not the Soviets can successfully carry out such
a preemptive strike. What would you, as DCI, insist upon at CIA and in the
Intelligence Community to help insure against the possibility of such a pre-
emptive Soviet strike?
Answer: The Committee will appreciate that, as a Naval officer, my whole
help this country
professional career has been devoted to trying to e prepared for any even-
tuality. Intelligence -- accurate foreknowledge and careful assessment of a
potential adversary's capabilities and intentions -- is the essential first element
of such preparation. As DCI, I would endeavor to guarantee to the President,
the Congress, and the American people the highest skills in timely acquisition
and analysis of information and the highest honesty and integrity of judgment
of which the dedicated people in the Intelligence Community and I myself are
capable.
If the US intelligence process succeeds, there will be a minimum of mis -
perception for.our policy makers and our people. If our misperceptions are at
a minimum, the US will project itself in a way to help insure minimum mist-
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perception by potential adversaries. And therein lies our best hope to
avoid foolish or frightened action by an adversary, including a possible
effort to make a preemptive first strike against the US.
For the sake of the security of the United States and the rest of the world,
the CIA and the US Irtelligence Community may not fail. As DCI, I would do
what I could to make sure that they did not fail.
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QUESTION: You have been quoted as saying that you would rather make
50 decisions of which 30 were right than make 25 decisions, all of them
right. That suggests you would, accept a 40 percent rate of failure.
Can the CIA,. the President, and the country really tolerate a 40 percent
rate of failure in the performance of its-Director of Central Intelligence?
Should it? 1%1iy not make fewer, and bettor, decisions?
ANSWER: Let me assure this Committee that I appreciate the concern
that that quote may have evoked. In my years of Naval service, I have
always tried to preserve and encourage in making my decisions; when I
felt that I had to remove someone or something, I tried to replace it
with something better, something fairer. I have tried to make no
mistakes in the big decisions. No man is infallible; and as this
Committee knows, to make no decision is actually to make_a decision.
I`quite agree that the lhCI cannot have a 40 percent rate of failure of
decision. I would want to assure you that while I would try to be decisive,
I would never ignore the good coiimander's first hij)erative: to be prudent.
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QUESTION: In your Naval service, you have worn two command hats
from time to time. Hoa comfortable dill you be wearing the twin command
hats of the Director of Central Intelligence, with overall responsibility
for the Intelligence Community, and the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency? Should one man .,ear both hats?
ANSWER: I appreciate that there are differences of view on this
matter. For myself, I would reserve judgment until after I had had
an opportunity to see how well. the two hats fit, and how well others--
particularly the President- -felt that 1, or any DCI, look with them on.
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QUESTION: What is the proper role of a secret intelligence
organization in an open society?
ANSWER: Organizations which must operate in secret contravene the
spirit of an open society to a degree, yet it is an inconsistency which
nearly all Americans recognize as essential. It is one that is well
established in the field of national defense, for example. The remedy
to the inconsistency is to insure that intelligence agencies are
accountable to the established institutions of Government. The agencies
must act strictly within their charters, and cannot operate so as to
abridge or in any way infringe on the constitutional rights of Americans.
My pledge as DCI would be to have the CIA and the Intelligence
Community adhere faithfully to this charge under my direction.
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QUESTION: 1What relative roles should civilians and the military
have in producing intelligence?
ANSWER: Both civilian agencies and military organizations have
important roles in the intelligence process.
Generally speaking, the military forces have special intelligence
requirements that are related to their operational missions. This means
that the Department of Defense must have its own intelligence capability
with respect to both collection and analysis of foreign military information
relating to national defense.
Coordination mechanisms have evolved over the years to try to
avoid unnecessary duplication and to assure full coverage.
Coordination process in the substantive area is probably most
important in the production of National Intelligence Estimates. The
positions in these estimates are those of the DCI; they are arrived
at by a process, managed by his National Intelligence Officers, "during
which the positions of all civilian and military intelligence agencies
are considered fully. When agreement cannot be reached on the position,
the DCI judges to be the soundest, either civilian or military agencies
may take exception in the estimate itself.
This process allows the policy makers to make their decisions
based on national estimates which fully cover all sides of the issues
involved. It is the best assurance that estimates are not slanted
or biased either in favor of the military or the civilian agencies.
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What is your position as to releasing the budget figures of CIA and
the Intelligence Community?
Answer: My predecessors, I understand, have been against publishing
the budget, and I gather that the weight of opinion in the Intelligence Community
and at CIA is still against budget disclosure. I would like time to consider
this problem and to assess what impact disclosure might have before responding
to this question.
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groups to operate in the U.S., often against U.S. interests?
necessity of liaison arrangements and the propriety of permitting these
privilege of unharassed CIA operations abroad. What is your view of the
foreign intelligence services in the U .S . Changes have been made that
CIA allows these services a free hand in the U.S. in exchange for the
There has been much recent discussion of activities of ''friendly"
with any foreign intelligence services which violate U.S. laws.
Justice Department and FBI. In my view, there can'be no agreements made.
represent, this is an internal security matter, properly the preserve of the
foreign, intelligence agents in the U.S., regardless of the country they
policy aims and U.S. law. With -regard to the question of operations of
maintaining such liaison arrangements. in consonance with American foreign
capability. Significant information can often be obtained through liaison
with friendly intelligence services, and I will support the practice of
I have stated that I believe in the necessity of a strong intelligence
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Are better laws necessary to protect intelligence secrets?
Answer: The National Security Acr't?.piaces on the DCI the responsibility to
protect intelligence sources and methods. Without such protection, no
intelligence service can function. I understand that at the moment, no legal
sanctions are provided to the DCI to carry out this responsibility, and that
over the years, serious damage has been done to our foreign intelligence effort.
as a result of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence sources and methods.
I 'understand that legislation was proposed in the last Congress which would
strengthen existing law in this area. I would strongly support such legislation.
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What changes need to be made in the National Security Act of 1947?
Answer: I would ask the Committee's understanding that I defer responding
to this question until I, if confirmed as DCI, have an opportunity to get
better-acquainted with the CIA and the Intelligence Community a.nd to get
the advice of the President, the NSC, the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, and other elements of the Executive Branch.
I understand that questions have been raised about such matters as the
clarification of the role of the DCI vis a vis the Intelligence Community, and
the broadness and vagueness of some of the language defining the functions
and prohibitions placed on the CIA. I understand that this Committee has
established a subcommittee to work on the matter of intelligence charters, and
I would look fcyard to working with the subcommittee on any changes that might
appropriately be made in the statutory authorities of CIA and the Intelligence
Committee.
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QUESTION: I%hat are the strengths and weaknesses of E.O. 11905?
ANSWER: Again I would request that the Co mlittee permit me to
defer comment to the Congress uitil, if confirmed, 1 have an opportunity
to imierse myself in the business of the DCI and to consul.t with others
in the Executive Branch.
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What would be your test for when a covert operation should be
undertaken?
The test presently embodied in law is "important to the national
security. ".
I am not sure whether any hard and fast verbal formula is possible
or even desirable in this area. It should be recognized that the President
must be guided by the national interest of the United States and has primary
responsibility for carefully weighing the relative importance of these interests
against the possible risks involved.
X Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
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Is it really necessary for the United States to conduct covert action?
ter, ,. ,. _. m.,R? ~?r -r r- ,t, .y,,
sh~bra i?-~~?
Answer: I believe it is necessary for the U. S. Government to maintain a
covert action -capability, to try to accor grtish objectives which the policy-
makers determine should not be attempted in a public way. But I would
encourage the use of covert action only where vital American interests are
involved, only where prior determination has shown that an overt program
could nqt appropriately accomplish the same purpose, and only where the
covert action operation had an acceptable chance of success and the risks
of the consequences of failure were also acceptable.
I would insure that the President was fully knowledgeable of the covert
action and supported it.
I would also refer you to the statement of Secretary of State Vance on
covert action, made at his confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee on January. I fully endorse the Secretary's
statement.
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grounds that we must use them because the Russians do.. They
have embraced. all of the black arts of covert operations. -
bribery, false propaganda, physical coercion, abduction, inciee
even attempted assassination of-foreign leaders.
I don't know how we can be true to our own values as a
country and continue to believe that it is our right to use
such methods; though again, I recognize that in extremity a
nation must do what is needed to assure its own survival..
But we are not discussing cases of extremity, and the habit
of the past has been to intervene in these ways in the affairs
other lands, even when the objective was purely technical
Now I would like your own view on this. if method is
the essence of whether or not we do adhere to our professed'-.
values as a nation, what are your views and what will be your
policy as Secretary of State when it comes to decisions with
respect to secret interventions in the affairs of other lands?
M.r. Vance. I am very happy to give my views on this.
Let,me say by way of background that these kinds of
covert actions have long been going on in the government. The
were going on when..I was in the government,. and I was. part
of the oversight committee at one point in connection with
these. So I have thought long and carefully about.this subjec
I have come to'the conclusion that covert actions -- and
T ApprovectgF r Ks-h eleasty V81FRW'P IA-PB~ifa A0&&06 6&jgence on
i the one- part and covert actions against othercountries,e,and
1
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I am talking about the latter ~-- I am convinced that covert
action against other countries should be carried out only
in the most extraordinary circumstances and that the procedu
should be set up so that if there is a proposal to carry out
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,. the National
committee of the senior Cabinet officers, to include the
a covert action, that that first has to be passed upon by a
Security Advisor, and importantly in my judgment, the
Attorney General of the United States.
I feel very strongly that the Attorney General of the
United States should participate in the decision-making proce
by which the decision is arrived at which goes to the Preside
of the United States.- I think then that the President of the
United States himself should sign off in writing saying that
he believes this to be vital to the national security and so
endorse the carrying forward of this extraordinary circumstanc
I then feel that notice should be given in advance to
that they can-.reflect their views to the President if they
the appropriate committee or committees of the Congress so
x think that it is very likely that if the congressional commi
aic~ v IcFoP M de AQ9p /I WIL4 i A tRELP(~ 1 R1FI_OROtOO3700e06 ou as we
have great. concern fnr wha+- ; ,-,
that regard because I think that splits the responsibility.
I do not believe that the Congress should have a veto in
disagree with the proposal.
 22
24
havApf Mad FRrg rxeOxO, O - . would then. go forward with the operation.
Finally, I believe there should be an adequate monitorin
system so that once a covert action is approved, one keeps on
top of it to determine what.is happening, how it is proceeding
and whether it should be terminated.
Unfortunately experience in the past has shown that thes
develop a life of their own and once started are hard to turn
back.
Senator Church. I am very much reassured by-;.Your-.r
answer, Mr. Vance. I think it reflects conclusions that were
reached by my own committee investigating the intelligence
services . Now that the Senate is possessed of a permanent
Intelligence Committee, I think what you have said is in line
with the prevailing view on that committee, and indeed, in the
.Senate itself, where the decision was taken to establish
that prevention..
My time is up. Let me just end with this comment..
When you establish a test, the one you have suggested,
that covert operations be undertaken only in the most extra-
ordinary circumstances, it is well to keep in mind that.. in our
kind of society, sooner or later, as long as we are a free
society, the covert operation is going to come=into ' servjce in
some.line. It has not met.so exacting a standard. Once it
surf ppro etd Fo?geleg.fe'Y6b5hn144 IkIkD l-O gOhO'0O 3 b6 putation c
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this competitive evaluation concept and do you think it would be usefully
results of the two groups were quite different . What do you think of
normally tasked with preparing such estimates. I understand the
team approach to preparation of the NIE on Soviet strategic forces,
whereby a group of outside experts was assembled to evaluate all
available intelligence and reach conclusions independently from those
--3I': The Intelligence Community recently authorized a competitive
utilized for other estimates?
by the National Security Council, and I would be reluctant to comment on
the efficacy.of the concept prior to the results of the full-scale review of
this participation of outsiders in the estimating process are to be reviewed
innovative. approaches in all areas of CIA's performance. The results of
the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates. I hope to encourage
The competitive team approach was an. innovative development in
this erperiement.
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Would you explain the procedures that &e followed under the provisions
of Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, with respect
Answer: As I understand it, the Special Coordination Committee of the
National Security Council is charged with reviewing proposals for covert
action. Upon the recommendation of the Committee, a proposed covert
action goes to the President for decision. If the President finds that the
proposed activity is important to the national security, he approves it.
When the activity involves a release of funds from the CIA's Reserve,
the Office of Management and Budget is notified and a withdrawal approved.
After the President has made his finding, relevant Congressional
committees are notified of a new finding; and at the earliest convenience
of each committee, the Director of Central Intelligence briefs its members
on the nature and scope of the covert action.
As you are aware, this currently involves briefing four Senate committees
(Foreign Relations, Appropriations, Armed Services, and the Senate Select
Committee on Intel ligenc4,alid three committees of the House of Representatives
(Appropriations, Armed Services, and International Relations),
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What role do you feel that the Congress should have in covert action?
Answer: I fully support the current requirement under Section 662 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment,
that the Congress through certain designated Members be kept advised of
covert actions in a timely fashion. There are some elements of such oversight
that I understand have been of concern to the CIA and the Intelligence Community
in the past, and I would hope to consider these with this Committee if I am
confirmed as DCI.
One point is the numbers involved in the Congress: now seven committees,
with soine,55 Members, are being advised. I do not question the integrity of
any individual Member; I would be concerned about wide dissemination. of
sensitive information on U. S. policy and plans, as a reflection of the intel-
ligence officer's continuing concern that the fewer who know, the more secure
is the information.
I would note in passing the suggestions of the Murphy Commission favoring
that Section 662 be amended. to require reporting of covert actions to a Joint
Congressional Committee on National Security.
I would also note the Murphy Commission's recommendation to omit
any requirement that the President personally certify to the necessity of a
particular covert action activity. I appreciate that there may be problems with
associating the I-lead of State so formally with such activities; I wonder if there
is, indeed, no reasonable alternative.
But I know that the Congress has considered these matters, and I would
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hope to consider them f urer with the President and t e ong~ess if I. am
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What would you do if the President were to ask you to carry out an
order which you believed was illegal or wrong?
Answer: I fell confident that the days of improper requests made of CIA
are behind us; at least I hb-pe that they are.
If I were asked to order CIA to do something that I considered illegal or
wrong, I would point out to the requester that the request was improperin
my view, and why. I would attempt to obtain the withdrawal of the order. If
unsuccessful, I would decline to follow it and would resign.
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What is your concept of the objective of the CIA?
The intent of Congress in creating the Central Intelligence Agency
was to establish a focal point in Government whereby intelligence from
all producing agencies would be coordinated, correlated, evaluated, and
disseminated to the upper echelons of Government for the formulation of
national security policies. This centralization would assure that all
information vital to the formulation of such policies was provided.
Further, under the direction of the President and the National Security
Council, the Agency would carry out such other duties as deemed
necessary in the national interest.
The objective of the Agency is to meet national security requirements
as fully effectively and efficiently as possible utilizing all intelligence
assets and resources of Government. The Agency must be unaffected by
any considerations which would in any way result in biased and unobjective
intelligence reporting.
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You began your assignment as President of the Naval War College
by asking the question: "What is the objective in having a War College?"
Many have asked the same question about the CIA in the past few years,
with Chile, Watergate, assassinations, poison dart guns, etc., in mind.
Will you ask that question?
ANSWER: Every commander knows there is no substitute for good
intelligence. As a consumer of intelligence for 30 years, I have a profound.
respect for its irreplaceable value and essentiality. The CIA is the
central instrument for providing intelligence to the United States. There
should be no doubt about its objectives: to provide the best intelligence
possible to the President, and to carry out, to the best of its ability the
requirements place upon it by the President.
At the same time, as a newcomer to the CIA and the Intelligence Community,
I would look carefully at the way the objectives are met, and suggest
and make such changes as seem appropriate to meeting them better.
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QUESTION: In an editorial signed by you in the Naval War College
Review of July-August 1974, you stated that "a key element in the mutual
deterrence that has existed between the United States and the Soviet
Union for the past quarter century is the subtle communication of
intentions and capabilities to each other." What do you see as the
CIA's role in this process? CIA has its spies abroad, it undertakes
covert action programs, it puts out various kinds of propaganda, all
of which may be taken as signals by the USSR--rightly or wrongly-- of
U.S. intentions and capabilities. Aren't the spy business and the strong-
arm action that we try not to acknowledge two ways to send confusing,
if not false signals? Don't we do better to let the President and the
Secretary of State send the signals?
ANSWER: Conveying signals of our intentions and capabilities to
a potential adversary is a delicate thing, as this Committee well
appreciates. Any activity which the CIA were to take in this area
would be done so only at the express direction of the policy-makers,
the President and his policy representatives.
The collection of intelligence abroad is essentially an on-going
process, whatever a country's policies at the moment may be, and should
be done with maximum discretion and minimum reflection of any kind of
policy decision. The success of covert action activity, by definition,
depends in large measure on the ability to hide its relationship to
the sponsoring country; its implications for communicating intentions
and capabilities must be carefully thought out and accepted before it
is undertaken. That is one good reason why proposed covert action must
have the approval of the highest authority in the Executive Branch of
this Government, and why I fully support the Hughes-Ryan Amendment
calling' ~rol gf8f epo3q.Wt13/t~riq enqa1I0M 0RPs00 Os0%19 covert action.
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QUESTION: The CIA has taken some hard criticism in the last few
years. A recent newspaper article quoted an unnamed friend of yaps as
saying that you are not very good at "stroking! Does the CIA perhaps
need some "stroking", for a change, and will you be able to do that?
ANSWER: I have some understanding of the criticism directed
at the CIA in recent years and some appreciation of the impact of
such criticism on the efforts of any organization and any group of
people. I also have some understanding of the devotion and hard work
and array of skills and talents and energy which the CIA's people
reflect.
As DCI, I would, of course, look at the CIA in terms of improving
ways of doing things, for that is a part of the job of the DCI and
I would judge that the Congress and the Committee, like the President
would automatically except that of the DCI.
But I would also try to do. it with a full understanding of the
human implications of change.. Also, I have always welcomed advice and
ideas from people at all levels of my organizations. I sought the
insights of Naval lieutenants when looking at the War College, and I
would seek the insights of GS-07s and GS-09s in any changes I might
contemplate at the'CIA.
If that is "stroking", then I am ready to do some in the future,
as I have tried to do in the past.
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QUESTION: You shook the Naval. War College from top to bottom during
your tenure as its President from 1972 to 1974, and apparently shook up
a lot of people in the Navy and outside in the process. You yourself
have described your action as a "blitzkrieg". Should we brace ourselves
for the same kind of shaking of the CIA?
ANSW R: I would wish this Committee and the CIA to know that I am
not in favor of change for its own sake; I am in favor of change for,
the sake of the mission to be accomp1..shed and the people who serve and
are served. I hope that no one would fear the consequences of the
deliberate process I would bring to any consideration of change. I would
seek and welcome suggestions, from this Committee and the Congress as
wel.l_ as from all other responsible sources.
BACK P: I would like to commend my activity at the Naval War
College to you as an indication of the way I try to work. I wrote
about this in the August 1974 Second Annual Report of the College. In
the changes I directed, I tried to.reflect purpose, progress, and
promise. I also acknowledge problems and mistakes. All this is in the
article.
I would like to emphasize for this Committee and to reassure
the people of the CIA that I know that the CIA is complex as the College
was not; that I would have much to learn about the CIA before I would
be in a position to fairly recommend changes; and that.I would not
suggest and institute changes unless I were personally convinced that
the new forms and new procedures and new ideas would truly improve upon
the work and product of the CIA as it is now.
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I would also like to emphasize that although I personally became
convinced that a basic reorientat.on` in the Naval War College's program
was in the best interest of both the Navy and the individual Naval
officer student, the decisions and action taken were graced by the
advice of many others and the approval of my Naval superiors. I would
insure the same for any changes I might propose at the CIA.
To those who may find evidence of impatience in my work at the
College, I would note that I had only a predictable two years or so to
initiate change, and I felt I personally had to provide the maximum
impetus for it. I made some decisions that seem arbitrary--but that,
of course, is always a consequence of making decisions.
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,~,- Do you agree with Secretary of State-designate Vance that U.S.
Ambassadors abroad should get anything they request from CIA Station
Chiefs?
Chiefs of the Country Team in their Embassies, to be kept as fully informed
I fully support Presidential directives designating Ambassadors as
differences over what an Ambassador might be told, I would participate -.
protection to their sources and activities. Should there ever be
as possible. Station Chiefs have the duty to afford the most careful
in the decision myself.
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How-will you insure that abuses that have occurred in the past will not
happen again in the future? How will you make sure that you will know what
is going on in the CIA?
Answer: The best way to avoid the possibility of abuses is to have an effective
system of command and control. I have always favored and worked for this
in the Navy, and would continue to.do so as DCI. I would continue the policy
of recent DCIs in urging employees to bring to my personal attention activity
which they believe is inappropriate or illegal.
Though I am necessarily not well-acquainted with current Agency practices,
I understand that the functions of its Inspector General and its General Counsel
have been expanded to help guard against abuses. Also, I support the kinds of
internal and external oversight mechanisms which were created in Executive
Order 11905.
'iThere is no question that vigorous oversight and supervision are essential
in an intelligence organization. But I would also urge upon this Committee that
there is a danger of smothering initiative and incentive which must be avoided.
As DCI, I would try to help reach the delicate balance necessary to insure
the kind of soundly-managed and controlled but imaginative and energetic
intelligence system which this country must have.
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What is your position on past CIA practices such as assassination
plots and drug testing on unsuspecting people?
Answer: It is quite clear that some past activities of the CIA were improper
and ill-advised, at best. My understanding is that clear instructions pro-
hibiting most of these activities were issued within the Agency before they came
to public attention, and that none is now being practiced.
I would do all within my authority to insure that those programs and
activities which were undertaken by the CIA under my direction as DCI were
fully within the law of the United States, giving full respect to civil rights and
rights of privacy.
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Are CIA personnel overseas adequately protected? If not, what can
be done to improve this situation? Do you support bills which would provide
criminal penalties for disclosure of information leading to the identification
of CIA employees under cover, such as have already been introduced?
Answer: This country must afford the best protection it can give to the dedicated
men and women it sends abroad to eng .ge in foreign intelligence activities.
Since most of them must not be openly identifiable as intelligence personnel
if they are to be professionally effective as well as properly protected, I
would be most concerned about the nature and protection of the cover arrangements
under which they work and live. I would like to defer comment as to how
cover might be improved pending my confirmation and study of the problem.
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Is the CIA cooperating with the House Select Committee on Assassinations?
Answer: I would say first that as DCI I would pledge full cooperation of
the CIA and the Intelligence Community with the inquiries of duly-constituted
Congressional Committees, consonant with my responsibilities to the President
and for the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
I understand that CIA officials have met with Mr. Sprague and others on
the Committee staff at Agency initiative to explain CIA records systems and
to prepare for their investigation, and that the CIA is ready to continue cooper-
ating as appropriate to the Committee's purposes.
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QUESTION: You are familiar with the public controversy over the
recent estimate of Soviet military strength and intentions and the A and
B team versions. Are you in favor of such competitive analyses by CIA
professionals and outsiders? What is the effect on the morale of CIA
analysts to have outside experts looking over their shoulders and
perhaps second-guessing them?
ANSWER: I would like to reserve judgment on the matter of
inviting outsiders to participate in the estimate process until I have
had more opportunity to evaluate the recent experience of the A and
B teams. I understand that Mr. Bush felt there was merit in the
exercise, both before and after it was conducted and despite the
publicity which followed. I do think that the results of such estimates,
and any differences which arise, should remain a matter of confidence
within the Government pending release by the consumer--the President.
Casual or deliberate public revelations of differences by those who
disagree with the main thrust of the findings will probably kill the
process. As for the attitude of the CIA toward outside participation,
I would expect the Agency analysts as good professionals to participate
wholeheartedly in what is designed to try to give the policy-makers
a better appreciation of the subject at hand, and I have no doubt that
they would do so.
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Are you in favor of making public the names of journalists, academics,
. or others who have cooperated with the CIA?
Answer: I believe that every American has the right to voluntarily cooperate
with his Government. Therefore, I do not believe it would be proper for the
CIA to release such names. I believe that this is a matter of individual privacy.
I understand that the CIA has already adopted a policy of not entering
into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time news correspondent
or stringer accredited by a U. S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio
or television network or station.
I also understand that the Agency has several kinds of relationships with
scholars and academic institutions. These include paid and unpaid. consultations
between scholars and CIA research analysts, and contacts with persons who
travel abroad. They also include contracts for scientific research and develop-
ment work and for research in the social sciences on matters related to foreign
affairs, but these contracts are only made with the approval of a corporate officer
of be institution involved.
I believe that such relationships should continue to exist on a co'rapletely
voluntary basis. I think it is entirely consistent with academic freedom and with
the free search for truth for an individual to want to assist an agency of his
Government in providing the best possible assessments for the policy-makers.
I would be most reluctant for the CIA and the Intelligence Community to give up
important links with academic institutions and personalities.
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What are your views of the CIA's reported. activities in Micronesia?
Answer: I understand that this Committee has held executive session hearings
on the press reports of such activity. I don't think it would be appropriate for
me to discuss this in open session.
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Question: The GAO does not audit the expenditures of the CIA.
'` Are you willing to allow GAO to conduct audits of CIA
activities?
constraints.
Congress pertaining to the control and distribution of GAO.
documents and reports, or the extent-to which they are
available to the membership and staffs. Any worthwhile GAO
study would necessarily cover some very sensitive activities
which would require careful protection.. I have'no preconceived
ideas about it but, in principle, I should think something
could be worked out with both Houses of the Congress whereby
GAO documents and reports could be rude available to the duly
constituted oversight Committees within some mutually agreeable
That is a question I will certainly look into. I am not
thoroughly acquainted with the rules and procedures of the
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Should Government classification of information be governed by
statute or Executive order? Why?
The essential point is that whatever classification system is
adopted must afford sufficient protection for sensitive information.
Under the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central
Intelligence is made responsible for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. The continued success of our foreign collec-
tion programs rests on this protection. Executive orders and court
decisions concerning secrecy have recognized this statutory responsi-
bility and have granted the Agency a degree of latitude and flexibility
to mold its security programs to assure the protection of intelligence
sources and methods. Any statutory classification program must grant an
equal degree of protection, and must be administratively workable..
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Do you feel that CIA classifies more information than needs to be classified?
If so, what might be done to reduce the amount of information that is classified?
Answer: I think that the point is to try to achieve a proper balance between
classified and unclassified information so that the national security is not
endangered and that the public is informed. As DCI, I would carefully
review Intelligence Community programs to identify those activities which
require continued protection and those where a broader disclosure will not
be harmful. I. .understand.that with the issuance of Executive Order 11652
regarding classification and declassification, the CIA has been able to reduce
by 50 percent the number of materials classified. I would assess classi-
fication procedures and strive toward the maximum dissemination possible
consistent with national security requirements.
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Low morale has been described as a principal problem of the CIA.
If you are confirmed as DCI, what assurances can you give this Committee
and the people of the CIA that you will be able to raise their morale?
.Answer: None. I can only try. And I shall.
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The Congress had made it clear that it will henceforth take a
continuing critical look at the CIA and the Intelligence Community, and
this Committee is witness to that determination. Naval officers, like
intelligence chiefs, are not always fond of Congressional criticism. How
will you get along with us?
ANSWER: I will get along with the Congress as well as I can, and
you permit me. I do not anticipate fundamental clashes, though our views
as honest and honorable men may differ. As I said in my article in Foreign
Affairs: "We live in an open society. The press probes. Congress
investigates. Searching questions are good, if not always comfortable,
for the soul. Such dialogue works in its abrasive way. Professional opinion
is pressed hard on the technical military issues; civilian opinion has to
think hard on matters of national policy; and from this interaction arises
the consensus essential to the support of whatever level of naval forces
is selected." (Page 353). So it is with intelligence.
We are all engaged in the common endeavor of the nation's
business, -- indeed, perhaps its survival. As DCI, I would be at all
times responsible to the President, but also would try at all times to be
responsive to the Congress.
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QU1STION: What do you perceive to be your responsibilities to
the Congress as Director of Central Intelligence if you are confirmed for
that position?
ANSWER: It would be my policy to be as responsive as possible
to the Congress.
I would respond to the best of my ability within whatever oversight
framework the Congress considers suitable and seek to develop a good
working relationship between the Congress and both the CIA and the
Intelligence Community.
I recognize, for instance, that arrangements for budget authorization
and review of Intelligence Community funding needs are still in the
process of development, and I would work to assure that the Congress
gets the kind of budget information that it requires.
I would also make every effort to meet congressional needs for
substantive information, consistent with my responsibilities to the
President and to tho National. Security Council for the provision of
intelligence on policy problems currently under consideration.
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QUESTION: 10hat is your opinion as to the effectiveness of congressional
oversight of CIA over the years?
ANSWER: The effectiveness of the congressional oversight is ultimately
a matter for the Congress itself to judge. However, it appears to me that
the Congress is now exercising' conscientious and thorough oversight through
designated committees.
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U
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QUESTION: What is your view of the degree to which Congress should
oversee intelligence activities?
ANSWER: Congress has far-reaching legislative oversight and
appropriations responsibilities under the Constitution. Appropriate
committees of Congress must have knowledge of intelligence activities so
that they can exercise these fundamental responsibilities. I would be
ready to work wholeheartedly with Congress in this regard.
I think the American people want strong and effective congressional
oversight that imposes clear accountability on intelligence organizations,
while at the same time preserving the effectiveness of the U.S. foreign
intelligence effort.
Because of the sensitivity of much of the information involved,
I would hope that the Congress may decide to concentrate its oversight
activities to the extent feasible and limit requirements that I provide
the same sensitive information to a sizeable number of different
conunittees.
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 QUESTION: l\'hat policy would you follow in providingg information
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to the Congress and in keeping the Congress informed?
ANSc\ER: I clearly recognize that the Congress must be adequately
informed in order to make proper and informed judgments in matters of
legislation and oversight. Committees must acquire required information
within their jurisdiction to carry out these responsibilities. Information
provided by the Executive to the Congress which requires protection
under statute or Executive order must, however, be handled accordingly
by the Congress. Further, the Congress exercises its prerogative of
nondisclosure through executive sessions and other closed meetings.
Similarly, the Executive must exercise its prerogatives of nondisclosure
in matters of executive privilege and clear statutory mandates.
I trust that an atmosphere of comity and understanding will allow
a.mutual resolution of this problem and avoid confrontations. The
national interest must always be the paramount consideration.
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QUESTION: You made the follow~Tingstatement in. your article in
For. e i_ _gn Affairs of January 1977 on the U.S.-Soviet Naval balance,
p. 339: "Great wasteful wars have broken wit in our century partly
because of misperceived comparisons of armed forces." You also are
on record as an advocate of net assessments of relative force strength.
Would you as DCI pledge to give the Congress and the American people
candid and continuing information on this vital and difficult matter of
relative U.S. and Soviet military strength?
ANSWER: I understand the Connni.ttee's and the Congress' concern
for net assessments, and would hope to provide them as it is within the
charter of the CIA and the Intelligence Community to do so. The
Committee will appreciate that CIA's interest is and must be in the
strength of foreign military forces, not U.S. military strength, which
may limit my opportunity to give you the answers you seek. In many
instances, indeed, the only appropriate source may be the President.
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