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November 25, 1985
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AppOQy9t0lp Release2 /Qember% DP91-00901 R000600410004-6 ON PAGE h1L Spy Case Intensifies Security Questions at C.I.A.. By STEPHEN ENGELBERG Special to The NW York Time Failed a Polygraph Test Administration officials say the charges against Sharon M. Scranage, a ? C.I.A. clerk who pleaded guilty in Sep- tember to identifying covert agents in Ghana, arose when she tailed a routine polygraph test administered by the agency. Additionally, the C.I.A. was also responsible for initiating the inves- tigation of Mr. Chin, officials said. "Having been one of those who has pushed for improved counterintelli- gence," Mr. Leahy said, "I am not going to say: You beefed it up, you caught some spies, and now I'm going to beat you about the head and shoul- ders for that.' " Mr. Leahy said it was too early to speculate on any possible damage Mr. Chin may have caused. Administration officials said that analysts at the For- eign Broadcast Information Service re- ceive reports from the C.I.A. and other agencies. Such documents, Adminis- tration officials said, in the hands of hostile intelligence services, could be useful in understanding general trends in the Government's approach to a country. The reports do not include the identi- ties of covert agents gathering infor- mation, the officials said. But they cau- tioned that in some instances, a careful reading of a document would allow a hostile intelligence service to deduce that a particular piece of data could only have come from one source. Investigators have not yet specified what sort of security clearances Mr. Chin held, but the Federal Bureau of Investigation did say in a statement Saturday that he was a naturalized American Citizen. According to former C.I.A. officials, it is unlikely that a naturalized American citizen would have been granted one of the higher- level security clearances. The C.I.A.'s approach to counterin- telligence has long been a matter of concern to some critics in Congress. Wyoming Senator Malcolm Wallop, at Republican, has contended that the agency is insufficiently sensitive to the question of whether a double agent has penetrated upper levels of the agency. The agency has never ruled out the possibility that such an agent had gained access to its secrets, but its offi- cials have given little credence to Mr. Wallop's assertions. A senior Administration official said that it was almost inevitable that some hostile intelligence service would suc- ceed in penetrating the agency. ' never occurred to me that there weren't spies in the agency," the offi- cial said. "We have propounded this myth, and it has been a useful myth, but it's still a myth, that somehow Americans are not vulnerable." Noting that thousands of intelligence agents direct their efforts against the United States, the official said, "It shouldn't surprise anyone that there are spies within the United States Gov- ernment." The issue is an important one for an intelligence service, former C.I.A. offi- cers say, since the recruitment of agents in the field depends on a guaran- tee that their identities will be kept se- cret. This year's round of espionage cases involving C.I.A. employees began with Miss Scranage, who was a clerk in the agency's station in the Ghanaian capi- tal, Accra. She admitted to the authori- ties that she had given classified infor- mation to her Ghanaian lover. Later this year, a Soviet intelligence officer, Vitaly Yurchenko, defected and helped the F.B.I. develop espionage charges WASHINGTON, Nov. 24 - The ar- rest of a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst on charges of spying for the Chinese has raised new ques- tions about security at the C.I.A., whose standing in Congress and within the Reagan Administration has been damaged by security breaches and public reverses. Administration officials said that the analyst,- Larry Wu-Tai Chin, had ac- cess to relatively low-level classified material in his job at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, an arm of the C.I.A. But intelligence spe- cialists said the significance of the case was that an employee may have evaded the agency's security proce- duses. - which' include regular poly- grkph, or lie-detector, tests - for three decades. Additionallyr, an affidavit filed Satur- aay by Federal investigators says that Mr.' Chin was able to take classified material from his workplace by hiding it lP his briefcase and clothing. William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, has in recent months been confronted with increas- ing criticism from- Congress and the White House ever several well-publi- cized incidents These include a Soviet intelligence officer who defected to the West and then returned to Moscow after holding two news conferences denouncing the agency; a former C.I.A. officer who was charged with spying for the Soviet Union, anda former agency clerk who admitted passing secret information to officials in Ghana. ',"There are a lot of strange occu reiices here that at least show people were not on the ball," an Administra- tion official, who spoke on the conditions that he not be identified, said in a re-i cent interview. "Obviously there's' great concern. It's not like the agency is not getting a lot of money and sup- port." Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Ver- mont Democrat who is vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on In- telligence, said the string of public em barrassments is taking its toll on mo- rale at the C.I.A. "Some in the agency are reeling from it, and are feeling very, very de- fensive," Mr. Leahy said. "They shouldn't be. The C.I.A. is still the best intelligence service in the world. They should realize that every major intelli- gence service is going to have some things go wrong. Unfortunately the things that go right aren't made pub- lic." Mr. Leahy, who has previously called for improvements in the agen- cy's security procedures, said that some of the recent cases against C.I.A. employees had been initiated by the agency Sm" M. Turner, President Car- ter's rector rat intelligence, said today he believed the agency's se- curity procedures were lax when he took over the post in 1977. He asserted that "considerable improvements" had been made under the Carter Ad- ministration, but said, "I wouldn't want to profess I thought it was where it should be." Mr. Turner said that the recruitment of an information-service employee by a hostile intelligence service was not an especially serious breach of security. F.B.I.S. is not the heart of the C.I.A.," he said. "It is pretty largely an unclassified organization. That is why I take a less than cataclysmic view of this." But Mr. Turner said it was "terri- ble" that it took three decades to un- cover the case. "Whether the data is significant or not," he said, "anyone who is passing information like this should be caught in less than 30 years." against Edward Lee Howard, a former. C.I.A. officer who had been dismissed. According to Administration offi- cials, Mr. Howard had helped Soviet in-. telligence agents uncover an American agent, A. G. Tolkachev, who had been providing the C.I.A. with sensitive de- tails about Soviet weapons research. Just this month, Mr. Yurchenko, whose defection had been touted by the C.I.A. as a coup, announced his return to the Soviet Union. The Administra- tion is still trying to determine whether he actually defected and then changed his mind or was a Soviet plant. Some former C.I.A. officials have suggested Mr. Yurchenko's case is part of a pat- tern of mishandling defectors. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410004-6 Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R0 HUTCHINSON NEWS (KS) 14 November 1985 rat ONLY Ex-CIA chief leery of dealings in Nicaragua By Duane Schrag The Hutchinson News The CIA's involvement in Nica- ragua is hurting its image and ulti- mately could hurt the organization, according to the man who ran the agency for four years. "I am not in favor of what the CIA is doing in Nicaragua myself," the former agency head, Stansfield Turner, said Wednesday during a press conference in Hutchinson. He said covert action - in- fluencing events without the public knowing it - is really foreign pol- icy, not intelligence. And what is happening in Nicaragua is hardly covert anymore. "It's the most open, overt, covert action ever known," he said. Turner was the last speaker in the 1985 Dillon Lecture Series and spoke to an audience of 1,200 people at the Sports Arena. Turner's government career be- gan in the Navy, culminating in his being named admiral of the Second Fleet and commander-in-chief of NATO's Southern Flank. He took over as director of the CIA at a time when the agency was under fire for its role in such activities as Watergate and covert action in Chile. The CIA took a terrible buffet. ing from the media and the public and it hurt," he said. He took steps to make the agency more accountable to the public and Congress, which he thinks has strengthened the CIA. Turner called the changes revolutionary. One was the creation of a congres- sional committee that reviews CIA activities. Over the long run, we can't have good intelligence in our country un- less we have some accountability," he said. Turner used the recent leak of sensitive information as an ex- ample. President Reagan was out- raged when the Washington Post published an article alleging that he signed an order that involved a plot to assassinate Libyan leader Moam- mar Khadafy. "It leaks because it's a very con. troversial activity," he said in re- sponse to a question about the leak. "That's the price we pay for having oversight. Some people think the price is too high. I don't." Our democracy, combined with, our superior technology, gives us the edge in the espionage battle, he said. He stressed the importance of democracy in intelligence. "It's on our side because we have the better ideology," he said. "De- mocracy must balance secrecy." During his four years as head of the CIA, Turner admitted he never did find himself trapped in a Swiss chalet with a mysterious blonde. "Being the chief of intelligence really isn't much like being Double Agent James Bond 007," Turner said. But intelligence is an exciting profession, he-added. Stansfield Turner emphasizes a point during his lecture at the Hutchinson Sports Arena Wednesday. Turner headed the CIA for four years. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410004-6 Approved For Release 20YT2/'UA-0901 R000O 4 ARTICLE APPEARED 6 November 1985 ON PAGE.. . . INTERNATIONAL Congress to Study CIA Handling of KGB Official's Re-Defection WASHINGTON-Members of the House and Senate Intelligence committees. say their panels plan to conduct lengthy inves- tigations of the Central Intelligence Agency's handling of the surprise re-defec- tion of Vitaly Yurchenko, a former KGB official. CIA officials held a round of briefings with lawmakers yesterday explaining that Mr. Yurchenko, former deputy chief of the KGB's North American desk, was in this This article was prepared by John J. Fialka, David Shribman and Rob- ert S. Greenberger. 9 city's crowded Georgetown area Saturday evening to have dinner with CIA agents at a small French restaurant, Au Pied de Co- chon. He excused himself and then appar- ently walked or was taken a few blocks up the street to the newly built Soviet com- pound. 'You've either got a defector who was allowed to just walk away under circum- that, before the din- 9'' W111 ner, Mr. Yurchenko Vilaly Yurchenko appeared to be de- pressed. There was some speculation that the depression may have been related to Mr. Yurchenko's relationship with a woman who reportedly lives in Canada. CIA officials indicated during the brief- ings that they were still unsure whether Mr. Yurchenko voluntarily went to the So- viets or whether he was, somehow, recap- tured by Soviet agents waiting for him in the busy Saturday night crowd. Meanwhile, U.S. officials debriefed Mr. Yurchenko one more time at the State De- stances I can't ac- cept or you have a double agent planted on the U.S.," said Sen. Patrick Leahy (D., Vt.), vice chair- man of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "No matter what, some- thing is wrong." Senatecommittee members were told partment last evening and determined he had decided to leave the U.S. under his own free will and that he did not appear to be drugged. Mr. Yurchenko left the State Department in a jubilant mood, holding his hands above his head prize-fighter fashion for waiting television crews. Asked whether he was going to return to Russia, he said: "Yes, home." CIA Screening Process Senate committee members said one of the facets of the strange Yurchenko case that they want to examine closely is how the CIA determined that he was a credible defector in the first place. "It's safe to say we're going to want some of the specifics of the screening process," said one Senate committee member, referring to psycho- logical tests and lie-detector examinations that the CIA says it used on Mr. Yur- chenko. The CIA's debriefing of Mr. Yurchenko, who had an overview of the heavily com- partmentalized KGB operations in North America, had been expected to take more than a year, according to Reagan adminis- tration sources. Periodically, information taken from Yurchenko debriefings was served up at closed hearings to Intelli- gence Committee members as proof that the CIA was getting an unprecedented windfall of new spy information. Yesterday, several congressmen said they had been suspicious all along about Mr. Yurchenko's testimony. "We're not ex- perienced in this. We're laymen," said Sen. William Cohen IR., Maine, "but something struck us as not being right. They (the CIA) reassured us, but there were lingering doubts." `Everybody Was Skeptical' "Everybody was skeptical," said Sen. Leahy. "The stuff seemed either we were awfully, awfully lucky or he (Mr. Yur- chenko) was too good to be true. Now it turns out it was too good to be true. The feeling here is that the CIA was had, and not only the Congress, but the White House had better ask some very serious ques- tions," "It's not a goof-up, it's not a great trag- edy. It's like someone giving you a bag of candy and taking half of it back," said Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman David Durenberger ,R., Minn.). And not everything Mr. Yurchenko gave his interrogators turned out to be candy. While his ability to reveal Edward L. How- ard-a former CIA agent who allegedly gave the Soviets secrets about U.S. opera- tions in Moscow-was touted on Capitol Hill, the Howard case wasn't particularly sweet for the CIA. One problem was that Mr. Howard ap- parently was given advance warning about CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation interest in him and managed to escape ar- rest. Another was that Mr. Howard had been fired from the CIA in 1983 in a man- ner that had reportedly left him so angry that he threatened to disclose U.S. secrets to Moscow. A third problem was that Mr. Howard was given sensitive information on U.S. spies in Moscow during what should have been a two-year period of probation and basic training in intelligence. Adm. Stansfield Turner, director of the CIA during the Carter administration, said he changed an old CIA rule that required agency officials to minimize firings and to simply move agents who had "gone sour" to less sensitive positions until their prob- lems could be addressed. The change, ac- cording to Adm. Turner, was made to de- crease the danger of moles, or high-level enemy agents within the agency. Adm. Turner said be wonders how a trainee like Mr. Howard could have ac- quired sensitive information in the first place. "There's something screwy about that," he said. The White House still seemed to be in a state of shock over the surprise re-defec- tion of Mr. Yurchenko, but an administra- tion spokesman insisted it would have little effect on this month's summit meeting in Geneva. The Yurchenko matter was discussed during the White House's morning briefing, but only as another item," one aide noted. The aide said he didn't expect the incident to spill over into domestic poli- tics, adding: The American public be- lieves you can't trust the Russians from here to the door anyway. This just under- scores that.'' Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410004-6 A ri ed For Relea Ifbb 1I2 Ib 9 ~1 ~~~~0 41?Y 6 November 1985 Summit: in search of mutual benefit exchanges were taking place would be an inhibiting fac- tor and could open the door to more complex arrange- - later. At first, simple and straightforward agree- N his speech to the United Nations on Oct. 24, Presi- dent Reagan proposed that he and Mikhail Gorbachev talk at the coming summit about five areas where the United States has legitimate grievances about Soviet behavior: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. The President, we had as- sumed, was looking for a way to score points in the pub- lic-relations campaign leading up to the summit. What- ever the President's motives, we can only hope that he doesn't expect to make any progress in these areas in two days at Geneva. I . ff,. Mr. Gorbachev is bound to see this move by the Presi- dent as an effort to play the summit as one would play in a zero-sum game, that is, a game in which one side wins and the other loses. Considering all that Reagan has said about Nicaragua, it is difficult for Gorbachev to believe that the President has in mind agreeing to any significant re- sidual Soviet role or influence there. It appears that the President is attempting to win in all five regions by easing the So- viet Union out of all these countries; for Mr. Gorbachev such developments cer- tainly would be losses. Although these regional issues must be tackled one day, in the reopening of se- rious discussions with the Soviet Union the. US should concentrate on areas ment could be built around the interests the two countries share in curbing international terrorism. Recent events in Beirut have likely brought home to Gorbachev that the USSR, as well the US, is vulnerable to terrorists. Perhaps the silver lining in this Beirut cloud is that the kidnapping of Soviet citizens may increase his willingness to collaborate against terrorism. Reagan and Gorbachev could agree to create an 'International Air- port Inspection Agency. "The agency's function would be to send teams of inspectors to check security procedures in international airports. The inspectors would attempt to board airliners with concealed weapons. If they suc- ceeded at an airport more than once in a 30-day period, the airport would be considered insecure. That would trigger an obligation on the part of member countries to The US should concentrate on areas where its interests and those of the USSR do not compete directly.... where both could benefit from agreement. where US interests and those of the Soviet Union do not compete so directly. Why not first look for areas where we could both benefit from reaching agreement? At least three nonzero-sum games could be played. The most obvious is arms control, where both are in- terested in reducing costs and increasing stability. Here the two leaders could move quickly by agreeing to an easily verifiable ban against the testing of ballistic mis- siles. Such an agreement would signal that neither leader was interested in continuing to develop the capability for a surprise nuclear strike at the other. Another area of mutual interest is the inhibiting of nu- clear proliferation. Neither the US nor the USSR has any reason for wanting Libya - or even Argentina, Brazil, Pakistan, or South Africa - to get the bomb. Reagan and Gorbachev could easily agree at Geneva to form a joint commission to pool intelligence about which coun- tries are developing nuclear weapons and how. Each na- tion would, of course, have a few pieces of intelligence that could not be shared lest doing so would ;expose a. source. Still, just the fact that the world knew that such By Stansfield Turner prohibit their airlines from using the air- port for the next 30 days. It's important that the criterion for pe- nalizing an airport would be absolutely objective - either the inspectors got aboard an aircraft with a weapon or they did not. Since the member nations would have pledged to adhere to the results of the inspection, they could ward off pres- sures to make exceptions when the air- ports of their friends were ruled unsafe. The threat of having airports placed out of bounds for 30 days would create pres- sure on nations to curb international terrorism. In none of these examples of nonzero-sum arrange- ments would either the US or the USSR be placing any- thing at risk if the program failed. Both have so many nuclear weapons in excess of need that a moratorium on testing one brand of them, ballistic missiles, could hardly denude us, even if we subsequently had to start produc- tion and testing. Because neither nation wants anyone to join the nuclear club, giving away information about pro- liferation wouldn't hurt us, even if it did no good. The President has committed himself to exploring the five tough zero-sum situations he laid before the UN. Let's hope he also makes a major effort in areas where the mutual benefit is so clear that Gorbachev will be hard pressed not to agree. If we can open the door a little in the nonzero-sum areas, it will be easier to slip in the tough zero-sum ones at a second summit. Stansfield Turner, author of "Secrecy and De- mocracy - The CIA in Transition, " was director of central intelligence from 1977 to 1981. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410004-6 proved For Release 2005/W V l 1- l AWP91-00901R00060 5 November 1985 STANSFIELD TURNER Guest columnist Go for public interest, not what feels good McLEAN, Va. - Should the Stansfield Turner, former di- government have settled its es- rector of central intelligence, pionage charges against John wrote Secrecy and Democra- and Michael Walker with a cy: The CIA in Transition. plea bargain rather than a con- viction? The benefit of the plea er public psychic satisfaction bargain is that John Walker when criminals do not receive has promised to talk. The value the punishment they deserve. of this lies in four areas: ^ And, closely related, some ^ Walker's testimony will would contend that leniency in help the government convict this case simply reinforces a the sole remaining accused ac- widespread tendency to lenien- complice who has not yet come to trial, Jerry Whitworth. ^ Not having to take these two Walkers through the court process reduces the risk of hav- ing to disclose more secrets in order to gain a conviction. ^ Walker's description of his contacts with Soviet intelli- gence from beginning to end can be valuable in helping de- feat Soviet spying in the future. ^ Knowing in some detail just what information this spy ring gave away will help assess where we stand. In all four areas, much will depend on how clean Walker comes and how good his mem- ory is. Our people will attempt to corroborate what he says through informers, defectors, and all manner of intelligence techniques. Walker knows that if he does not measure up well, that word will get to his and his son's parole boards. On the other side, there are three disadvantages: ^ The deterrent impact on others not to follow in Walker's footsteps is lessened by the evi- dence that, in even as traitor- ous a business as spying against your country, the government may accede to giving less than maximum punishment. ^ There will also be the less- cy in our entire judicial system. The arguments on both sides are reasonable ones. In my view, the scale tilts markedly on the side of the plea bargain. The potential gains for our intelligence outweigh the add- ed deterrent from giving long- er sentences. The possibility of a minimum of eight to 10 years in jail before parole must be a considerable deterrent, and the Walkers have no guarantee that they will serve only the minimum time. Any added protection that our country could gain for its codes and submarines outweighs the psy- chic satisfaction of seeing more punishment meted out. And, we should not fall to act in the country's best interest in this case because the judicial system is faulty in others. Reasonable people will dis- agree. What is important is that the citizen make up his mind based on as objective an evalu- ation of the pluses and minuses as possible. There is no fixed rule that maximum punish- ment is always the best answer for our society, even when the crime is heinous. To reject what logic tells us is in our best interest in favor of a purely emotional response would be unfortunate, indeed. Approved For Release 2005/12/14: CIA-RDP91-00901R000600410004-6