REAGAN'S NEW SWEETHEART

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91-00901R000700060089-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 17, 2005
Sequence Number: 
89
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 1, 1981
Content Type: 
NSPR
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91-00901R000700060089-1.pdf157.48 KB
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.STAT Approved For Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-0090 NEW 3T,L TFSMAN 1 Januar,r 1981 w eethe,art RABAT An important new-liaison is flourish- ! ing between the United States, and Morocco. The Americans are prepared to supply King Hassan with weapons to enable him to escalate the'fighting in the Western Sahara again-st'the Polisario.In return, the CIA is stepping up.its strength in Rabat, as a useful base for covert operations in the Maghreb and Western Africa. During 1981, the Reagan administration sent a very unusual number of high-level officials to Morocco.' General Vernon Walters, Deputy Director of the CIA between 1972 and 1976 and now a roving ambassador for the State Depart- ment, visited Rabat in March and again in Otto- ber_and December. Lannon Walker, then acting Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, was there at the same time in March. Francis West; Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of in- ternational security and military sales, made tivo visits, one of them in November at the head of a delegation of 23 military advisers and experts. Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense; arrived in midsummer. Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, the current deputy actor of the CIA; ma e. a secret visit to Rabat not long after:` In December the.Secretary of.' 'Defense, Caspar Weinberger, met with the King in Fez. And he was 'followed, on 19 December; by Senator Charles Perry;:-Republican Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Presenting his credentials to King Hassan in November,. the new US Ambassador Joseph .Verner Reed Jr., a Chase Manhattan Bank official and Long-time friend of the King's,,declared: 'The United States will do its best to be helpful in every area of need that may arise. Count on us.' This represents-a significant shift in US policy since President- Carter's days. As Morris Draper, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, testified before a Congressional committee last March, Carter's policy had been `neutral as re- gards the final status of the West Saharan tern. tory', taking the view that'a military solution to this conflict is neither possible'riordesirable'. - Morocco has enjoyed unusual access in Wash ington since Reagan's election: Two key officials in the Reagan' team - General 'Walters and Robert Neumann (a former ambassador to Mo- rocco and director of the State Department in the transition period which followed the elec- tion) - were associated- with: DGA Interna- tional, a Washington firm that had lobbied the Carter administration and Congress' to supply Morocco' with 108 M-60 tanks, together with other weaponry and surveillance equipment suited for Saharan conditions. Carter would only go so far as to supply 20 F-5 fighter aircraft and CLAUDIA WDIGHT investigates the North African connection Two developments have facilitated the change in US policy. One was King Hassan's announce- ment to the OAU summit in Nairobi that he would accept a referendum on Moroccan sove- reignty in the contested Saharan territory. His offer ruled out direct talks with the Polisano and the terms of the referendum are unlikely to satisfy them; however, the gesture was good enough for.the-Reagan team 'who have ap- -ptauded it- publicly as a legitimate, means of settling the dispute, and welcomed it privately as? j a device for confirming Hassan's military occu-1 pation of the old Spanish territory_ The second, development was the Polisario's October victory at the battle of Guelta Zem .mour. In a surprise ..attack, the Polisario des- troyed the 2,000-strong Moroccan garrison in the town, captured a great deal of equipment and downed five Moroccan planes.. Hassan?'s army was forced to'retreat northwards behind the wall of sand, ditches, barbed wire and mine- fields that has been under construction for just over a year. (The wall encloses the phosphate- rich centres of the Western Sahara that make the sand worth fighting over.) The` United Staten and Morocco have since claimed that SAM-6 missiles and Soviet-built T54 and.T55 tanks were used against Morocco in the battle, King Hassan has alleged that 'Non-African specialists' were fighting alongside the Polisario. Libya and the Soviet.Union have been blamed for supplying the missiles and tanks. The Libyans deny supplying the Polisario with the SAM-6, and the French"in Morocco confirm that the aircraft at Guelta.Zemmourcould have- been brought down ? by- less sophisticated. weapons.. The Soviet tanks that may have ap= peared at the battle were almost certainly,cap- tured two years ago frgm the Moroccan army itself: they originally.came from Egypt. Wafer-, thin though the allegations may be, they provide public justification. for the American decision to step up the supply of arms tq Morocco. According taAmerican officials, the delivery of M60 tanks, initially scheduled for 1984, is to be accelerated and new equipment for defence against ground-fired missiles and night fighting are also to be shipped soon. Assistant Secretary West promised in?early November to consider despatching radar-detection and jamming equip- ment for the Moroccan airfotce..And a month ago, he offered a substantial increase in military advisers to train pilots and troops for the war. At least a dozen US military advisers have already been spotted wearing Moroccan uniform in Smara and Al Auin in the war zone: Polisario. officials in Algiers say 'they 'are operationg ground-to-air communications and radar,' in- six OV-10 survelliance planes. But within'days of taking over in January 1981; General Haig announced that the tank sale would eo ahead. @presentativesof the Reagan administration in Morocco recently expressed confidence to inc that the war would be won. They have certainly. dropped any pretence of neutrality. As far as the 'Reagan administration is concerned, the Polisa- rio 'don't exist'- they are just mercenaries,- Mauritanians and Algerians'. The war itself is seen 'simply as an extension of Libyan ambitions to destabilise American allies in the region.- The CIA is thought to be increasing the size of its station in Morocco to compensate for its losses elsewhere. In 1979 it lost its Libyan post after the embassy withdrew and in July 1981 Norman Descouteaux, CIA chief in Algiers, was exposed by the Algerian authorities and ex- pelled. Covert Action Irfor nation Bulletin in Washington has identified three senior agents in Morocco. The latest, Joseph Pettinelli, arrived last February. David Wilson and Arthur Nimer Jr were spotted in Casablanca and Rabat two years ago; both are known to have had prior experience of Qaddafi's Libya. ? ? ? .. There is little doubt that the increased CIA! activity in Morocco is aimed at Qaddafl, the,] other major target being Angola. III Morocco 1 last March Jonas Savimbi of Unita had talks vath General Walters, Lannon Walker and two CIA' men. from Rabat. The new arms flow to Mo- rocco for the Sahara enables the Reagan Admin- istration to evade Congressional prohibitions still in force against covert aid to Unita. Arms ; intended for Savimbi are to be passed to Mo-! rocco legally and transferred while Washington 1 looks the other way. As long as the White House can convince doubters in Congress that 'Soviet, surrogates' such as the' Libyans are behind the. Polisario, the Saharan conflict vill remain a use- ful front for covert operations of this kind.:-. D'?! Initially, this was on condition,~?at the to ~ would note be used. in the S al~ r Release 2005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901 R000700060089-1 ~r; Moroccan officials say they will accept no res- trictions on their deployment and the Americans