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December 16, 2016
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June 13, 2005
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August 16, 1974
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LATIN AMERICA United StatAer:ri:ggrFotraR=se 4111011111101111111111111. 2 The change of administration in Wash- ington will have consequences for Latin America, including a better chance of re- solving the Cuba issue. The choice of Vice-President and the fate of General Vernon Walters are also significant for inter-American relations. The departure of President Nixon from the White House has been received with considerable satis- faction throughout Latin America, and with posi- tive joy by the Cubans who regarded the former President as 'a personal enemy of the Cuban revolution'. Rani Castro said that Nixon's resig- nation 'permitted serious hopes of a re-establish- ment of relations between Cuba and the United States'. The possibility of a solution to the Cuban question is 'perhaps the major implication for Latin America. Kissinger has long recognised the failure of the United States policy of embargo and blockade, but has been prevented from making any move on this question by Nixon (see Vol. Viii, No. 10). Kissinger should now be able to operate with reasonable freedom in Latin Ame- rica, without having to worry about Charles 'Bebe' Rebozo. Among Kissinger's first acts as President Ford's secretary of state was to send a warmly personal letter? (Rstirnado -Tony') to Panama's foreign minister Juan Antonio Tack, assuring him that the change of President would not affect the United States' determination to negotiate a 'new and modern treaty' for the Panama Canal. in fact, the question of Panama may prove tougher than the question of Cuba. Congress will not make it easy for Kissinger to make meaningful concessions to Panama, where there are still United States interests to be preserved; with respect to Cuba it is merely a question of recognising that the game is lost, some- thing Nixon never found easy. Under President -Gerald Ford, it is likely to be harder for Latin Americans to exploit the contradictions between the legislative and executive branches of govern- ment in the United States (see Vol. VIII, No. 141.. President Ford will be weaker than was Nixon' from 1969 to 1973, but at the same time he is, likely to be treated with greater sympathy and i understanding by congress. Ford is very much a man of congress, and in this respect will have! some of the advantages enjoyed by the late Pre- sident Johnson during his first term in the White, House following the assassination of Kennedy 1 There is no reason to suppose, of course, that the Ford administration will be less conservative in its outlook than 4ilift&Efrorritelage12005/07/01 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000700090028-5 sident will certainly be under pressure to deal with ATRYP8A-RDP91-00901R000700090028-5 inflation, and this could ' easily involve recession and confrontation with cartels of commodity-pro- ducing cOuntries. In fact, on fiscal questions Ford is probably More conservative than his predeces- sor; almost alone among senior members of con- gress, he always refused to lard his constituency with projects from the federal pork barrel. As far as Latin America is concerned, much hangs on the appointment of a Vice-President. Nelson Rockefeller remains anathema in almost every Latin American country as a result of his family's long involvement in the affairs of the continent. Almost anyone else would have a less , negative effect on inter-American relations. Another personal factor which could affect United States policy in Latin America is the fate of Gene- ral Vernon Walters, now deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and once mili- tary attach?n Brazil in 1964. General Walters acted as Nixon's interpreter on his disastrous tour of Latin America in 1958, and when he was ap- pointed to the CIA in March 1972 he was regarded as being `Nixon's man'. During the Watergate cover-up, John Ehrlichman described Walters as a *good friend of the White House'. There is considerable confusion and conflict of testimony as to wsbether Walters did or did not tell Patrick Gray --- acting director of the FBI ?to call off the investigation into laundered funds coming from Mexicci. on the ground that covert Cm operations ! might be jeopardised. Walters is not a career CIA man and his enemies may use the Watererate affair to be rid of him. This would place on the sidelines one of Brazil's 'best friends in the United States'. Walters' part in planning the 1964 military . coup is notorious and he has many close connec? tions with the Brazilian high command. Walters has been active in recent months in advancing the view that Brazil should follow Ar- gentina back to some form of constitutional rule. He visited Brazil at the end of July after going to Portugal (see last week's issue), and sought perhaps unsuccessfully ? to use his influence to bolster President Geisel's sagging political for- tunes. if Walters goes, there may be less direct pressure on the Brazilians in this respect, but KisSinger and Walters share the view that military governments on their own cannot provide the institutional stability Latin America needs. The governments of Argentina, Colombia. Mexico,. Peru and Venezuela are probably more in line with Kissinger's view of United States' interests than are the less stable regimes of Brazil and Chile. .1 7T-71 IcL LID ? 1,1 a ko WASHINGTO:'.; POST 8 AUG 1974 Approved For Relea,e 2005/07/91':Owk,-ffiFli-t999,91v, a 71 ??=. , ?1."1"?\ ? ; : sation. President Nix. mentioned that the loves ! gation of former Whi ? I House consultant and t. .I CIA employee E. 'Iowa ! Hunt in the Watergate ea I "wdll uncover a lot of thin. I You open that scab there's 1 hell of a lot of things a we feel that it would I vary detrimental to ha 1 , I this thing go any Furth ? 1 This involves the Cuba .i Hunt and a lot. of hen., ...... ?..i.. pa nky that we have nothin,g tne watergate. suspects, not; to do t,vith ourselves..." be expanded into unrelated ; 1 I.Then, 10 pages later in the matters which could lead to I I transcript, . the President disclosure .of their earlier! national seculty and. CIA ac, ; ; il added. almost in passing, , . tivities." 1 - . that Haldeman should tell . ' Haldeman testified ; the CIA: "Look, the problem I . is that this will open the I ther that he did not recall: I -whole, the whole Bay of , any discussion at any time ! 1 ! of a. sug,gestion to involve : Pigs thing and the President , the CIA in Watergate, mat- . just feels that, ah, without II ? ca pt into the details-- 1 t Li e.tc-pt as he described in I . 1 don't, don't lie to them to his testimony. I ing! the extent to say. there is no "In summary, the meet ! invcivement, but. just. say of June 23 with thn CIA was! . this is a comedy of -errors", held at the President's re- . ; witnout getting into it, the I quest in the interest of na- tional seenrity,": Haldeman: I - ' President believes that it is.. ! going to open up the .whole told. the senators. I Bay of Pigs thing up again." Haldeman testified in. ; ; As a result I- of that meet." much the same way before i with those-two fleeting the Senate !Water:tate coat- . Ing? . referenc.es- to the CIA, . mittee. He referred the corn- i I ve!,,v ; three p Min erjtery ks in .the mittee to t m 'ne statement lie 10! 0iv ; Haldeman met with CIA of- t, : Watergate cover-up case for had made bef ore the. Se na te ' ficials i.vith ;what he told the edge ?of what ; his testimony before. the Senai-.0 Anpropriations Sub-. APPrepriations Subcom nit- - .!!'-ii?i ''"?0 vi'i"!e involved in ! -Senate :`,--atergatie cornmit- tee as one c01-0-:aining . tee. concerning the payment : .c?17::f?ittee Wa3 a ''five'foldI' "ciensiderable detail"on his : inie no ixiason to behove : e: 'lie an mush cc 1) ; pu,T.ese: ? account or the mPeting with - White ; Watergate defendants. CIA oft coals and the reason iia.;:ilved and. no . The It,,atergate . soer[al asce.rtain .. -Clue, to whether there had been any reason, tirermeirre,. to7spok ! t!)ro r, seutor t.s. office 'mulel CI.\. Involvement in the In addition, he testified: (-..1?Ivev''hI5 a''' III1E,' '1'1 .11I/0,-r" ; not corereent . yesterday \V''I're:-I:'.-.' at air ; meeting, one of the I?" l'It''''thgal-j-ell ?r?`11 Lile ; about the possit i o to lify of any ! se." ascertain purposes of the rneeting, as . "Tw, . . future perjury . char:40S be- I ;whether the relation -be- assigned to me by the Presi- At ii....niner point in testi, it filed against Haldeman ! tween r-p, of: the "CiTater- I dent on the morning of Inc before the same for .1-ts senate tesuroorty gate participants and the in addition to ascer- ; -III-lid-elm" :rald, IIII;e about the June 23 meeting. 332:.-- oi'. Pig6 was a matter of tat ning whether. there was 1 S III ilelie ! DloweyPr, it is knouyn the . concern to CIA; n in . I any CIA involvement, v ihat we were actig the prosec.utors re-n: