(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000300080006-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2003
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: MISC

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I. THE PROBLEM
The Strategy of Freedom
In the fourteen years since the end of World War II the
traditional distinction between peace and war has been oblit-
erated by a contest which knows no boundaries and no limits
except those imposed on world co munism by expediency. The
competition is total -- it is military, economic, scientific,
political, diplomatic, cultural, and moral.
Conflict, whether it be hot or cold, is a great simpli-
fier, reducing issues to their fundamentals. And the essence
of the present contest is the age-old struggle between freedom
and tyranny. Free men are once again called to unite their
strength to outperform tyranny.
The need on this, as on all other occasions when free
men have been challenged, is for a unifying purpose and a
plan of action, for the vision to see the threat as an oppor-
tunity and for the will to persevere. Free men must defend
the boundaries of freedom, and at the same time work for an
enduring world community of peace with justice.
Good leadership in this cause is indispensable. But
standing by itself, it is not enough. The cold war confronts
us also with a critically important and enormously difficult
problem of government organization. The policy road between
Washington and an embassy officer in Laos, a military field
commander in Germany, an information officer in Panama, a
technical assistance worker in India, and a scientist in a
top secret weapons laboratory is tortuous and long. Elaborate
and complicated mechanisms and processes are inevitably needed
to translate the national will into coherent and effective
plans and programs.
The National Security Act of 1947 which created the
Department of Defense and the National Security Council and
called for the establishment of integrated policies and pro-
cedures... relating to national security," represents the last
major revision of national security policy-making machinery.
In essence, it codified the experience and lessons of World
War II.
Twelve momentous years, however, have elapsed since the
passage of this Act. These years have seen the cold war become
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the dominant fact of international life. They have seen the
obliteration of time-honored distinctions between foreign and
domestic policy'. They have witnessed a multiplication of the
resources required for national security. They have created
as many new demands on our intellectual resources as upon our
material wealth. They have seen science and technology move
to the very center of the policy-making stage.
The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was estab-
lished for the purpose of making the first comprehensive review
of our national security policy process undertaken since the
discussion and debate preceding the National Security Act of
1947. The Subcommittee's goal is to review the effectiveness
of existing policy-making organizations and methods against
the background of the changed perspectives and problems of the
last twelve years, and to make such recommendations for improve-
ment of the policy process as are appropriate.
Senate Resolution 115, authorizing this review, calls upon
the Subcommittee to make studies concerning:
"(1) The effectiveness of the present organiza-
tional structures and operational methods of agencies
and instrumentalities of the Federal Government at
all levels in the formulation, coordination, and exe-
cution of an integrated national policy for the solu-
tion of the problems of survival with which the free
world is confronted in the contest with world com-
munism;
"(2) The capacity of such structures and methods
to utilize with maximum effectiveness the skills, tal-
ents, and resources of the Nation in the solution of
those problems; and
"(3) Development of whatever legislative and
other proposals or means may be required whereby such
structures and methods can be reorganized or otherwise
improved to be more effective in formulating, coordi-
nating, and executing an integrated national policy,
and to make more effective use of the sustained,
creative thinking of our ablest citizens for the solu-
tion of the full range of problems facing the free
world in the contest with world communism."
This study is not concerned with questions of substantive
policy as such. It will not pass judgment, that is, on par-
ticular policy decisions made in the cold war. Rather, it is
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concerned with whether existing governmental machinery gives
us the greatest possible likelihood of devising and success-
fully carrying out integrated and effective national security
programs.
The Subcommittee assumes that we face a national problem,
far transcending either political party or any particular ad-
ministration. The President has assured the cooperation of his
staff with the Subcommittee's work, and the study is being con-
ducted throughout on a scholarly, objective and nonpartisan
basis.
A Philosophy of Approach
A wise and courageous President, top Executive Branch
officials effectively discharging their responsibilities, a
Civil Service correctly interpreting and properly executing our
policies, a Congress affirmatively and constructively playing
its crucial role in the national security policy process, a
citizenry alert to the great challenges of the time and willing
to make the sacrifices needed to meet them -- these are the pre-
conditions of a strategy equal to the challenge.
Lacking these things, the organizational forms of policy-
making will be ineffective -- no matter how closely they may
conform to the principles of sound management practice.
But to say this is not the same as subscribing to the
mistaken notion that "Leadership is all that matters" or "All
we need is ten more bright people in Washington." This study
is based on the assumption that good national security policy
requires both good policy-makers and good policy machinery.
One cannot be divorced from the other.
The agencies and departments of the government involved
in the national security process deal with a total annual budget
of almost $50 billion. They call upon the assistance, directly
or indirectly, of millions of people. They work through lit-
erally thousands of interdepartmental and interagency commit-
tees. Daily, they must make and coordinate hundreds of different
decisions having an important bearing on national security.
Obviously, good organization helps the policy process, and poor
organization hinders it.
Certain points seem fundamental in seeking ways and means
of improving the national security policy process.
First, paper changes in organization do not necessarily
bring corresponding changes in policy. It is easy, on paper,
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to draw organizational charts which have the virtue of symmetry
and which conform to management textbooks. It is much more
difficult to propose changes which will help policy-makers in
fact.
Second, one should not impose rigid or doctrinaire
organizational patterns upon the policy process. The principles
of sound organization are constant, but they can be applied in
many ways and with equal effectiveness. Policy machinery should
be adaptable to the style and work habits of our individual
planners and decision-makers.
Third, proposals for change should build upon existing
organizational patterns and existing institutions, wherever
possible. The potential benefit of possible reforms must be
measured against the potential harm of disrupting established
practices.
Subcommittee Activities
To date, the study has concentrated on identifying problem
areas requiring possible remedial action and on defining and
developing lines of constructive and practical reform.
The Subcommittee has held more than two hundred inter-
views with present and former government officials and students
of national policy-making. These interviews have ranged from
discussions with Cabinet officers of this and previous admini-
strations to talks with "Indians" in the middle and lower
echelons of the government. In addition, the views of a con-
siderably larger group of authorities have been solicited in
writing.
In October, the Subcommittee staff prepared a background
memorandum identifying certain broad problem areas as meriting
systematic study. A large number of qualified officials and
observers were invited to comment upon the problems outlined.
Thereafter, a series of more detailed questionnaires,
each dealing with a particular phase of the Subcommittee's
inquiry, was prepared. These specific memoranda have been
sent to carefully selected authorities possessing special com-
petence and experience in the fields involved.
The interviews held and correspondence received to date
have resulted in a large number of stimulating and useful
suggestions.
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The Subcommittee has also profited greatly from two con-
ferences of unusual interest. In September, in connection with
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
the Subcommittee had the privilege of sponsoring a seminar on its
study which was attended by some of our nation's most distin-
guished students of the national security policy process. In
November, the Council on Foreign Relations was generous enough
to make the Subcommittee's project the subject of one of its
study seminars. Numerous fruitful ideas emerged from both
meetings.
Some dozen ranking authorities in various phases of the
study have now been invited to become Subcommittee consultants.
This roster of consultants will be enlarged as the inquiry pro-
ceeds.
The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of
Congress has just completed a bibliography of selected materi-
als on the subject of national security policy machinery.
Certain background studies are also being prepared by the
Library of Congress and the Executive Branch.
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6
II. POLICY-NAILING AT THE SUMMIT
The New Presidency
By law and practice the President has the pivotal role
in matters of national security. He is responsible for the
conduct of foreign affairs; he is Commander-in-Chief; he makes
the great decisions on the budget. Increasingly his choices
involve complex scientific and technological questions. The
range of matters on which he must not only be informed but also
provide leadership extends from agriculture to the zodiac.
The integration of national policy -- domestic, foreign,
and military -- must take place, first of all, in the President's
mind. The consensus needed to support national policy depends
largely upon his powers of leadership and persuasion. The organ-
ization of the Executive Branch for making and carrying out
national policy should therefore be designed above all to help
the President with the heavy tasks that world leadership has
thrust upon him. The new demands and dimensions of the office
make it a new presidency, significantly different from what it
was in more quiet times.
Each President will have his own style of doing business the product of his nature and experience. Each therefore needs
great freedom to adapt his office and procedures to suit the
peculiarities of his style.
The Need for Policy Integration
Almost every leading civilian and military officer who
served in World War II concluded that the existing machinery
was inadequate for the formulation of over-all national security
policy. The National Security Council, created by Act of Con-
gress in 1947, was one of the answers to the complaints and
frustrations of World War II policy-makers.
The Council is charged with advising the President "with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military
policies relating to the national security so as to enable the
military services and the other departments and agencies of the
government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving
the national security."
Although the National Security Council was created by
statute, and although there are certain statutory members on
the Council, it is an adaptable institution, which different
Presidents have used in different ways.
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Under the present Administration, the National Security
Council meets more often and more regularly than before. The
present Administration created the NSC Planning Board, chaired
by a Presidential Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, and consisting of representatives of Assistant Secre-
tary rank from the departments represented on the Council. It
also created by Executive Order the Operations Coordinating
Board "in order to assist in the effective coordination among
certain agencies of certain functions relating to the national
security and to provide for the integrated implementation of
national security policies by said agencies."
In addition, both a larger number and a wider variety of
policy questions now go on the NBC agenda than previously. In-
deed, the President has determined that "he will...(l) not
assign an area of national security policy formulation perma-
nently as the responsibility of a de rtment, agency or indi-
vidual outside the NSC mechanism; (2) make decisions on national
security policy .-- except in special cases of urgency -- within
the framework of the Council."
The style of operation has also changed. The burden of
drafting and redrafting policy papers now falls more on the
Planning Board and less on the departments and agencies. The
format of the papers has been regularized, and meetings appear
to be conducted on the basis of more precise agendas than
formerly.
It is clear from the record that, while the NSC is a
formal institution of government, it remains an institution
for the President's use, and its mode of operation must there-
fore reflect the President's predilections.
Views on the NSC
A wide variety of opinion exists concerning the role
actually played by the NBC in the policy process.
There is general agreement that it serves certain useful
functions:
-- It has been said, and not completely in jest,
that "if there were no NSC, we would have to
invent one." Few quarrel with the principle --
the establishment of the Council -- or the
necessity for some type of formal mechanism
for coordinating and integrating departmental
views at the highest level of the government.
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-- The NSC also serves as a useful forum for dis-
cussion at top governmental levels. It gives
the President an opportunity to meet, at one
time and in one room, with the heads of the
major national security departments and agen-
cies. A two-way educational process between
the President and his chief aides results.
-- The "debriefings" furnished by the participants
after NSC meetings are reportedly very useful
tools of communication between the President
and the departments.
Many attach real importance to the existence of
a written body of policy papers and a written
record of decisions.
There is also general agreement that the NBC has certain
limitations in its policy advisory role to the President:
-- The NSC confronts the same problems facing any
interdepartmental committee with its built-in
bias toward compromise.
-- It can never substitute for vigorous thinking
and planning in the departments, especially
the Department of State.
Questions in Dispute
Many suggestions have been made for improving the NSC
process:
One: Some hold that the Council tries to deal
with too many, and too wide a variety of policy prob-
lems. The argument goes that it would be of greater
usefulness if it concentrated its energies on a rela-
tively small number of policy questions of overriding
importance,.
Two: Another point of view is that the Council
is not well equipped to resolve such problems of great
urgency and that it functions best when treating very
routine matters.
Three: Others maintain that, despite the efforts
of the Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs to the contrary, the papers emerging
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from the process are still so compromised and general
as not to furnish clearcut guidance for action.
Four: Others urge that the NSC process be more
closely geared to the budgetary process. It is held
that the two now go forward essentially independently
of each other, and that budgetary decisions taken out-
side the Council framework often negate or change the
intent of NSC policy papers.
Five: Still others propose various institutional
reforms for improving the policy process. Among the
suggestions made are these:
-- giving more formal recognition in NSC delib-
erations to the primary role of the Secretary
of State in national security policy formu-
lation.
-- encouraging debate on more sharply defined
issues by giving departments or ad hoc task
forces more opportunity to present policy drafts
directly to the NSC.
-- changing the composition of the NSC and the Plan-
ning Board toward the end of giving greater
weight to the views of the State and Defense
Departments.
-- making greater use of "discussion papers" to
encourage wide-ranging and penetrating explor-
ation of critical policy issues.
-- substantially or modestly increasing the size
of the NSC staff, with particular reference to
broadening the base of scientific and military
competence.
-- improving the monitoring function of the OCB,
by concentrating its activities on a narrower
front of key problems.
Which criticisms,, if any, are justified., and what form
might remedial action take?
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National Security Polite-Making Arrangements in the White
House and Executive Office
Some observers favor shifting the "center of gravity" in
national security policy-making away from the departmental and
toward the White House level. In essence, they would have the
White House or Executive Office staff play a much larger part
in the detailed formulation of policy. They argue that such a
step is needed to overcome the parochial views of the depart-
ments and agencies.
One leading expression of this viewpoint takes the form
of proposing a sizeable national security planning staff at the
Presidential level. Critics of this suggestion argue that such
a staff would be too far removed from operating realities to
produce realistic policies. They also warn of the danger of
downgrading the prestige of the operating departments, and
reducing the vitality of antra-departmental planning. However,
even if moves toward centralizing national security planning at
the Presidential level are rejected, Presidents, of course,
still look to their staffs for help in national security matters.
The increasing complexity and broadened scope of Presidential
responsibilities in this field lead many to think that more staff
assistance will be needed, not less.
Some favor loose and informal arrangements in this area.
Others think it would be well to knit advisers together through
formal organization arrangements in the Executive Office.
The following questions seem in order:
One: What are the merits and shortcomings of moves
to shift the "center of gravity" in planning toward
the Presidential level?
Two: What observations are appropriate concerning
the problem of organizational arrangements for staff
assistance in the national security area?
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III. THE KEY DEPARTMENTS: STATE AND DEFENSE
Roles and Responsibilities
The Secretaries of State and Defense are the President's
principal civilian advisers in the field of national security
policy. In addition, they are responsible for running the two
departments of the government which play the dominant roles in
formulating and executing this policy. Any attempt to improve
the policy process must therefore devote major attention to the
roles and relationships of these two Departments.
More Responsibility to the Secretary of State?
The Secretary of State is the President's principal ad-
viser on foreign policy: he is also the first officer of the
Cabinet.
Just as we have a new Presidency, so also have circum-
stances conspired to create a new role and new responsibilities
for the of ice of Secretary of State. Today's occupant of
that office needs to be far more than a skillful practitioner of
the arts of diplomacy. He needs a wide-ranging knowledge of the
relations between military and foreign policies, of the uses
and limitations of economic and military aid., of information,
propaganda, and related programs, of the strengths and weak-
nesses of our adversaries, of the dangers and opportunities in
countries around the world, and of the working of international
institutions and of regional organizations.
Some, however, would now have the Secretary of State
assume still additional responsibilities in the formulation
of national security policy. They reason as follows: Outside
of the President, the Secretary of State is the official mainly
responsible for formulating our national security goals. It is
less and less possible, however, to divorce means and ends in
security planning. The relationship between our political
objectives and the military, economic, and other capabilities
needed to achieve them is increasingly intertwined. Therefore,
many seek ways and means of giving the Secretary of State a
more dominant role in over-all national security planning.
Among the questions raised are these:
One: Are the responsibilities of the State and
Defense Departments in national security policy-making now
correctly defined and divided? If not, what changes are
needed?
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Two: Should the Secretary of State be formally
charged with more responsibility in connection with our
defense posture and the defense budget?
Three: Should the Secretary of State be asked to
testify in the Congress concerning foreign policy impli-
cations of the defense budget?
Four: Would it be desirable to create a "super-
Secretary of State" who would be responsible for the
over-all direction of foreign affairs, and who might
have under him additional Secretaries of Cabinet rank
for such areas as diplomacy, information and foreign
economic matters?
Likening; the Negotiating Burdens of the Secretary of State
However the responsibilities of the Secretary of State may
be defined, the problem of finding time to discharge them is
formidable. A generation ago, when the other burdens of this
office were far less onerous than today, a trip by a Secretary
to an international conference occasioned headline news. But
today, the Secretary is away from his desk for long periods of
time, making it extremely difficult for him to shoulder his
main responsibilities of advising the President and directing
the work of his department.
Questions frequently raised are:
One: Would it be desirable to create a Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsible to the
Secretary of State, who could represent the United States
at Foreign Ministers' meetings?.
Two: Would any other arrangements help, such as
appointments of Ambassadors-at-Large?
State-Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff Relations
The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff must form a well coordinated and smoothly
working tears in both the planning and execution of national
security policy.
Within the office of the Secretary of Defense, the office
of International Security Affairs performs a major function in
this complex process of coordination. It has been described as
"the Pentagon's State Department."
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. The Problem ....?..w...w.....w.........,