STATEMENT BY JOHN J. CORSON, MANAGEMENT CONSULANT, MCKINSEY AND COMPANY, MEMBER, GAITHER COMMITTEE, BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, CHAIRMAN MAY 13, 1960

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000300090026-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 30, 2003
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: May 13, 1960
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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FOR RELEASE:
10:00 A.M.
May 13, 1960
STATEMENT BY
JOHN J,CORSON,
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANT, McKINSEY AND COMPANY,
MEMBER, GAITHER COMMITTEE,
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY
Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman
May 13, 1960
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My name is John J, Corson. I am a Director of the firm of
McKinsey & Company, Inc. For approximately ten years I was a Federal
civil servant; throughout the Last ten years I have been engaged in the
practice of management consulting as Manager of the Washington Office
of McKinsey & Company, Inc. During that decade I have been retained
to study the operations of more than a score of Federal agencies. During
this period, too, I have served with citizens advisory committees on five
occasions. It is out of these experiences that I venture to respond to the
questions your staff has asked that I discuss with this Subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to contribute, as best I can, to your con-
sideration of the important problem of attracting competent leadership for
the formulation and execution of national security policies.
The persistent Cold War has attached large new importance to
the old problem of how to get better men to serve in key positions in the
Government. Prior to World War II the failure to find able people meant
less efficient services by a relatively small government. Today, failure
to get and keep the ablest people in the key jobs of our Federal Government
risks the devastating prospect that this country - the American people -
will come off "second best" in the Cold War,
The totalitarian societies we face - Soviet Russia and Red
China - have in the key posts of their governments the ablest individuals
their society produces. In our kind of society imagination, enterprise,
and unflagging drive are rewarded most generously in business and in
the professions; in a "democratic free enterprise" society, a large
proportion of the ablest people serve in commercial activities. Our
long run success in the Cold War makes essential our finding improved
ways of bringing and keeping a greater proportion of the ablest of our
citizens into positions of leadership in the Federal Government. Experi-
ence over the past seven years in recruiting for and retaining high talent
in the governmental posts where national security policies are formulated
and executed demonstrates, with dangerous clarity, the difficulties our
Government encounters.
1. These critically important governmental posts have been
filled by a succession of able individuals who serve, on the average, two
years or less. In short, the men responsible for aiding the President to
formulate and carry out this Government' s national security policies
are a very transitory group.
2. All too often the individuals who agree to serve in this area
bring to their jobs substantial competence, but little acquaintanceship
with the intricate problems they must resolve.
3. The career civil servant - upon whom these political executives
must rely to supply the familiarity with these problems that they lack - is
often seriously handicapped. He has grown up in the department he
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represents; he is expected to support "the position" of that department.
Neither his status in the department nor the breadth of experience equips
him to challenge the "departmental line, " to formulate new, imaginative
and venturesome proposals which his political superior might accept
or reject.
Turnover iz KeyNptionalSfc$irity Posts
To demonstrate the rapidity of the succession through these key
executive posts, let me specify the positions to which I refer, The
"first team" for national security in our Government includes, in
addition to the President and Vice President, the incumbents of eight
positions, They are the: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary of the Treasury, Director of
the Budget, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Director
of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.
Upon the decisions of the incumbents of these positions, the
security of this country, and in considerable part, the Free World
rests. And in these eight posts, a total of 23 men have served during
the Eisenhower Administration. On the average, each individual has
served less than 21/2 years, from the date of swearing in until resignation.
During this period three men have served as Secretary of
Defense and two as Secretary of State, another two as Secretary of
the Treasury and still another two as Chairman of the AEC. Four men
have filled the position of Director of OCDM. In the position of Director
of the Budget, four men have served, as have four others in the vital
position of Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs.
There is, it can be said, a "second team" for national security.
This group includes a total of seven vitally important additional positions.
The "second team," If you will, includes these positions: Deputy
Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of State, Under Secretary of
the Treasury, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning, Director of
the International Cooperation Administration, and Director of the U.S.
Information Administration.
In these seven positions, 27 men have served during the Eisenhower
Administration, The average length of service has been less than two
years,
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Some of the individuals who have served on both the first and
second teams have come to their jobs with prior experience in national
security affairs. The present Secretary of Defense did, as did the
present Deputy Secretary, But it can be questioned if either of the
previous Secretaries of Defense, and at least half of the 50 men that
have occupied these posts had had experience either in the intricate,
interrelated problems of international affairs, military management,
intelligence operations, foreign aid, and the development of unprecedented
weapons systems, or in the practical problems of getting things done
within the Federal Government. Experience as a banker in Boston or even
as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy simply does not provide the underr
standing of national security problems that is required if the individual,
who is to serve only a short time, will be off to a "running start."
In his testimony before your Subcommittee some weeks ago,
Mr. Robert A. Lovett, the distinguished former Secretary of Defense,
said:
"It takes a long time for an able man, without previous
military service of some importance and experience in
government to catch up with his job in this increasing
complex department, At a guess, I would say he could
pay good dividends to the government in about two years,
Meanwhile, of course, he is becoming a more valuable
asset each day. To lose him before, or just as he
becomes productive is manifestly a serious waste of
the effort that went into his training."
What Mr, Lovett said as to the Department of Defense applies
with even greater force to the posts that I have suggested make up the
key positions in the field of national security. If we accept Mr. Lovett' s
conservative estimate of two years as the minimum break-in period,
simple mathematics tells us that the Government has a practical
personnel problem in the national security field.
F*neri.enc,e in Re ation to Problems
My second point highlights the basic scarcity in this country of
individuals with the large executive talents required, with the qualities
essential for political leadership, and with an understanding of
national security affairs.
Some men can be found who have acquired in business, experience
especially relevant to the jobs they go into, e.g., as Assistant Secretary
of Supply in a military service or as head of an industry division in the
Department of Commerce. But few Presidential appointees bring to
these jobs, in addition to substantial personal talents - and surely I
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am not questioning their large abilities - real experience in the complex
problems this country faces in the field of national security and a knowledge
of what it takes to operate effectively in Government in Washington.`
My observations from the sidelines over a score of years convince
me that a majority of business executives are both uncomfortable and
unsuccessful in top level policy-making posts. There are many exceptions
to this generalization; you know of businessmen such as Marion Folsom
who have been outstandingly successful. But generally, they are unaccus-
tomed to, and sometimes resentful of, the interest of the legislative
branch in administrative affairs. They are unfamiliar with the necessity
for clearance and coordination with numerous other departments. They
are irritated by public scrutiny of their actions and by the rigid controls
exercised over the recruitment of personnel, the budgeting of funds, and
the procurement of supplies and equipment. In many instances, the
The Task Force Report on Personnel and Civil Service of the Second
Hoover Commission supports this view. The report states (p. 40):
"I. The combination of abilities required is relatively rare,
At the topmost level these men require both well-developed executive
ability and well-developed qualities of political leadership. That is,
a man must be able to direct, control, and even inspire a large
organization which has formidable functions, and he must also be
able publicly to discuss the Government' s business with Congress,
interested parties, and the public in a way that makes simply very
complex matters, meets hostility (foreign as well as domestic)
and wins confidence, He must make decisions on matters of great
importance for the future as well as the present welfare of the country.
His foresight must equal the hindsight of a host of critics, both
amateur and professional, who are free to be as narrow in their
point of view and time perspective as they care to be. The rules
of the game of national politics allow no margin for error, and
the American political world has not yet perceived the point that
' magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom,'
To lead the life of a poLiticaL executive of high rank amidst the
asperities of American politics is a test of toughness, of intelli-
gence, and of devotion to the public interest."
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recruitment of outstanding business executives for these posts is both
unfair to the individual and of little advantage to the executive branch.*
When placed in a post in the national security field, the
individual' s newness to Government is multiplied by the uniqueness and
complex interrelatedness of the problems that arise in assuring the
security of this country or of our allies.
They Capacities o. Career en
It is often said that the top career civil servants provide the
experience and continuity to compensate for the "here today, gone tomorrow"
Presidential. appointee., There is much of truth In this statement. The top
career servants in the Federal Government are able and too- little- appreciated
men. But they can only substitute for the political executive in the most
limited sense. The latter remains the key source of administrative leader-
ship, the Presidential representative with the responsibility for governing.
Secondly, we must recognize that the career civil servant has been bred
from within, and his experience, over a period of ye ars, is often confined
to one department or agency, Such experience tends to ixrbue him with a
departmental viewpoint and to entrap him within a narrow perspective.
The large na j.. rity of these men and i mer ire able, conscien-
tious public servants, tai:: existing means for b:-oaden..i -~-y their skills and
their perspective;., are n=j.tire'y too limited. Such undo: cstarnding as they
have of complicated prcblerns of public policy, of the in?':errelationships
' Writing in the early days of the Eisenhower Administration, Robert
Bradford, a dis,.inguished corporate attorney in Boston an:!. one time
Governor of M Assaeizusett; rioted that:
"...business executives, taking over important government
posts, are finding, as the professors found before them in the
early days of the New Deal, that success in politics Is an art which
draws on qualities not necessarily to be applauded or even desirable
in the classroom or the industrial plant. The- element of compromise
plays a highly important part in political decisions, as does the
balancing of interests and the necessity of persuading others to
agree with your point of view rather than cramming your decisions
down their throat. With the best of intentions and with the highest
degree of efficiency, a government cannot be run Like a business,
nor should it be."
Harvard Bj sine}s,s, Review, November-December, 1953, pp. 33-41.
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between the vast complex of government activities, of the impact of
their decisions an others, they have acquired on their own initiative,
As an employer, the Federal Government does too little to broaden the
career man' s viewpoint and his experience.
Nowhere is this problem better illustrated than in the State and
Defense Departments. The career man with a rounded understanding of
foreign political affairs, of intelligence operations, of military manage-
ment, and of economic development, and of the relationship between
all four is altogether too rare.
Pq ible pJu tens
Your Subcommittee has already suggested a number of possible
solutions to the problems I have discussed. Let me suggest three or four
points where, in my opinion, some action is needed.
1. We must discard our informal, haphazard system of recruiting
top political executives. The responsibility is now divided between the
White House and department heads on a most informal basis. Under
existing practice, if any attempt is made to search out the right man
for the job on a systematic basis, this is an exception to the general rule
of leaving it to chance. A central recruiting office of some sort, preferably
tied to the Executive Office of the President, seems a necessity if we are
to be more successful in getting into Government abler people for
critically important jobs.
2. We must find ways of acquainting outstandingly capable men
in business, in the universities and elsewhere with the problems of
national security and thus building up a reservoir to which Government
can turn. Service on advisory boards or commissions serves to provide a
few of the needed introductions to these critical problems, Active partici-
pation in private groups like the Committee for Economic Development
or the Council on Foreign Relations supplies some understanding to others. B
But more is needed - and I urge consideration of how we can acquaint
more of our ablest citizens with the se problems.
3. We must develop the kind of career service that wilt produce
more broadly-trained career executives, The proposal for a Joint Career
Service between State and Defense set forth in your interim report is a
step in the right direction. In my view, the concept of interchanging
career personnel between departments to vary their experience and
broaden their viewpoints must be carried still further.
4. We must accept frankly and fully the necessity of utilizing
as executives in key jobs men drawn temporarily from industry who will
continue to be compensated by their private employers. I make this
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