INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE MADE ITS SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY (PURSUANT TO S. RES. 115, 86TH CONG.)

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00965R000300100002-5
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• Content Type: REPORT

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[COMMITTEE PRINT]
86TH CONGRESS l
2d Session J
JREPORT
No. -
ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
INTERIM REPORT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
MADE BY ITS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY
(Pursuant to S. Res. 115, 86th ~Cong. )
UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1960
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
IIUBERT H. IIUMPHREY, Minnesota HOMER E. CAPEHART, Indiana
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
WALTER L. REYNOLDS, Chief Clerk and Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL POLICY MACHINERY
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington, Chairman
gUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
J. K. MANSFIELD, Staff Director
ROBERT W. TUFTS, Chief Consultant
DOROTHY FosDICR, Professional Staff Member
GRENVILLE GARSIDE, Professional Staff Member
HOWARD E. HAUGERUD, Professional Staff Member
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The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was established
in the summer of 1959 for the purpose of making the first comprehen-
sive review of our national security policy process undertaken since
the passage of the National Security Act of 1947.
Its objective is to review the effectiveness of present policy machin-
ery and methods against the background of the changed perspectives
and problems created by the cold war and to make recommendations
for constructive reform where appropriate.
The subcommittee has devoted the first phase of its study to a
thorough and meticulous survey and analysis of the key issues in-
volved in organizing for national security. Toward this end, the
subcommittee has conferred with present and former Government
officials and students of the national security policy process. It has
engaged in correspondence with key authorities on particular subjects
being studied by the subcommittee. The staff has prepared several
background studies in cooperation with the executive branch and the
Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress.
this interim report represents a distillation of the main issues and
proposals before the subcommittee. During the present session of
Congress, the subcommittee plans to hold comprehensive hearings
which will focus on the problem areas covered in this report.
HENRY M. JACKSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery.
JANUARY 12, 1960,
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CONTENTS
Page
Foreword---------------------------------------------------------- III
1. The problem ------------------------------------------------ 1
II. Policymaking at the summit---------------------------------- 4
III. The key Departments: State and Defense---------------------- 7
IV. Resources for national security-------------------------------- 10
V. Science, technology and the policy process---------------------- 12
VI. "Think groups": What is their contribution?-------------------- 14
VII. Better policymakers------------------------------------------ 17
VIII. The role of Congress----------------------------------------- 19
IX. Public support----------------------------------------------- 20
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86TH CONGRESS
2d Session
REPORT
No. --
ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
Mr. --------------------- from the Committee on Government
Operations, submitted the following
REPORT
I. THE PROBLEM
THE STRATEGY OF FREEDOM
In the 14 years since the end of World War II the traditional dis-
tinction between peace and war has been obliterated by a contest
which knows no boundaries and no limits except those imposed on
world communism by expediency. The competition is total-it is
military, economic, scientific, political, diplomatic, cultural, and moral.
Conflict, whether it be hot or cold, is a great simplifier, reducing
issues to their fundamentals. And the essence of the present contest
is the age-old struggle between freedom and tyranny. Free men are
once again called to unite their strength to outperform tyranny.
The need on this, as on all other occasions when free men have been
challenged, is for a unifying purpose and a plan of action, for the vision
to see the threat as an opportunity and for the will to persevere.
Free men must defend the boundaries of freedom, and at the same time
work for an enduring world community of peace with justice.
Good leadership in this cause is indispensable. But standing by
itself, it is not enough. The cold war confronts us also with a criti-
cally important and enormously difficult problem of Government
organization. The policy road between Washington and an Embassy
officer in Laos, a military field commander in Germany, an information
officer in Panama, a technical assistance worker in India, or a scientist
in a top secret weapons laboratory is tortuous and long. Elaborate
and complicated mechanisms and processes are inevitably needed to
translate the national will into coherent and effective plans and pro-
grams.
The National Security Act of 1947, which created the Department
of Defense and the National Security Council, and which called for
"the establishment of integrated policies and procedures * * * relat-
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ing to national security," represents the last major revision of our
national security policymaking machinery. In essence, it codified the
experience and lessons of World War II.
Almost 13 momentous years, however, have elapsed since the
passage of this act. These years have seen the cold war become the
dominant fact of international life. They have seen the obliteration
of time-honored distinctions between foreign and domestic policy.
They have witnessed a multiplication of the resources required for
national security. They have created as many new demands on our
intellectual resources as upon our material wealth. They have: seen
science and technology move to the very center of the policymaking
stage.
The Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery was established
for the purpose of making the first comprehensive review of our
national security policy process undertaken since the discussion and
debate preceding the National Security Act of 1947. The subcom-
mittee's oa1 is to review the effectiveness of existing policymaking
organizations and methods against the background of the changed
perspectives and problems of the last 12 years, and to make such
recommendations for improvement of the policy process as are
appropriate.
Senate Resolution 115, authorizing this review, calls upon the
subcommittee to make studies concerning:
(1) The effectiveness of the present organizational struc-
tures and operational methods of agencies and instrumentali-
ties of the Federal Government at all levels in the formula-
tion, coordination, and execution of an integrated national
policy for the solution of the problems of survival with which
the free world is confronted in the contest with world com.-
monism
(2) 'the capacity of such structures and methods to
utilize with maximum effectiveness the skills, talents, and
resources of the Nation in the solution of those problems; and
'(3) Development of whatever legislative and other pro-
posals or means may be required whereby such structures
and methods can be reorganized or otherwise improved to
be more effective in formulating, coordinating, and executing
an integrated national policy, and to make more effective
use 'of the sustained, creative thinking of our ablest citizens
for the solution of the full range of problems facing the free
world in the contest with world communism.
This study is not concerned with questions of substantive policy as
such. It will not pass judgment, that is, on particular policy decisions
ix~s,de, im the cold war. Rather, it is concerned with whether existing
governmental machinery gives us the greatest possible likelihood of
devising and successfully carrying out integrated and effective
national, security programs.
The subcommittee assumes that we face a national problem, far
transcending either political party or any particular administration.
The President has ,assured the cooperation of his staff with the sub-
mixittee's work, and the study is being conducted throughout on a
seholarly, objective, and nonpartisan basis.
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A wise and courageous President, top executive branch officials
effectively discharging their responsibilities, a Civil Service correctly
interpreting and properly executing our policies, a Congress affirma-
tively and constructively playing its crucial role in the national
security policy process, a citizenry alert to the groat challenges of the
time and willing to make the sacrifices needed to meet them-these
are the preconditions of a strategy equal to the challenge.
Lacking these things, the organizational forms of policymaking will
be ineffective-no matter how closely they may conform to the
principles of sound management practice.
But to say this is not the same as subscribing to the mistaken
notion that "Leadership is all that matters" or ".All we need is 10
more bright people in Washington." This study is based on the
assumption that good national security policy requires both good
policymakers and good policy machinery. One cannot be divorced
from the other.
The agencies and departments of the Government involved in the
national security process deal with a total annual budget of almost
$50 billion. They call upon the assistance, directly or indirectly, of
millions of people. They work through literally thousands of inter-
departmental and interagency committees. Daily, they must make
and coordinate hundreds of different decisions having an important
bearing on national security. Obviously, good organization helps the
policy process, and poor organization hinders it.
Certain points seem fundamental in seeking ways and means of
improving the national security policy process.
First, paper changes in organization do not necessarily bring corre-
sponding changes in policy. It is easy, on paper, to draw organiza-
tional charts which have the virtue of symmetry and which conform
to management textbooks. It is much more difficult to propose
changes which will help policymakers in fact.
Second, one should not impose rigid or doctrinaire organizational
patterns upon the policy process. The principles of sound organiza-
tion are constant, but they can be applied in many ways and with
equal effectiveness. Policy machinery should be adaptable to the
style and work habits of our individual planners and decision makers.
Third, proposals for change should build upon existing organiza-
tional patterns and existing institutions, wherever possible. The
potential benefit of possible reforms must be measured against the
potential harm of disrupting established practices.
SUBCOMMITTEE ACTIVITIES
To date, the study has concentrated on identifying problem areas
requiring possible remedial action and on defining and developing
lines of constructive and practical reform.
The subcommittee has held more than 200 interviews with present
and former Government officials and students of national policy-
making. These interviews have ranged from discussions with
Cabinet officers of this and previous administrations to talks with
"Indians" in the middle and lower echelons of the Government.
In addition, the views of a. considerably larger group of authorities
have been solicited in writing.
49041-60--2
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In October, the subcommittee staff prepared a background memo-
randum identifying certain broad problem areas as meriting syste-
matic study. A large number of qualified officials and observers
were invited to comment upon the problems outlined.
Thereafter, a series of more detailed questionnaires, each dealing
with a particular phase of the subcommittee's inquiry, was prepared.
These specific memorandums have been sent to carefully selected
authorities possessing special competence and experience in the fields
involved.
`' The interviews held and correspondence received to date have
resulted in a large number of stimulating and useful suggestions.
The subcommittee has also profited greatly from two conferences
of unusual interest. In September, in connection with the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, the subcom-
mittee had the privilege of sponsoring a seminar on its study which
was attended by some of our Nation's most distinguished students of
the national security policy process. Iin November, the Council on
Foreign Relations was generous enough to make the subcommittee's
project the subject of one of its study seminars. Numerous fruitful
ideas emerged from both meetings.
Some dozen ranking authorities in various phases of the study have
been invited to become subcommittee consultants. This roster of
consultants will be enlarged as the inquiry proceeds.
The Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress has
completed a, bibliography of selected materials on the subject of
national security policy machinery. Certain background studies are
also being prepared by the Library of Congress and the executive
branch.
H. POLICYMAKING AT THE SUMMIT
By law and practice the President has the pivotal role in matters
of national security. He is responsible for the conduct of foreign
affairs; he is Commander in Chief; he makes the great decisions on
the budget. Increasingly his choices involve complex scientific and
technological questions. The range of matters on which he must not
only be informed but also provide leadership extends from agriculture
to the. zodiac.
The. integration of national policy-domestic, foreign, and mili-
tary-must take place, first of all, in the President's mind. The
consensus needed to support national policy depends largely upon
his powers of leadership and persuasion. The organization of the
executive branch for making and carrying out national policy should
therefore be designed above all to help the President with the heavy
tasks that world leadership has thrust upon him. The new demands
and dimensions of the office make it, a new Presidency, significantly
different from what it was in more quiet times.
Each :'resident will have his,own style of doing business-the prod-
uct of his nature and experience. Each therefore needs great freedom
to adapt his office and procedures to suit the peculiarities of his style.
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O A
THE NEED FOR POLICY INTEGRATION
Almost every leading civilian and military officer who served in
World War II concluded that the existing machinery was inadequate
for the formulation of overall national security policy. The National
Security Council, created by act of Congress in 1947, was one of the
answers to the complaints and frustrations of World War II policy-
makers.
The Council is charged with advising the President-
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and mili-
tary policies relating to the national security so as to enable
the military services and the other departments and agencies
of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters
involving the national security.
Although the National Security Council was created by statute,
and although there are certain statutory members on the Council, it
is an adaptable institution, which different Presidents have used in
diff erent ways.
Under the present administration, the National Security Council
meets more often and more regularly than before. The present admin-
istration created. the NSC Planning Board, chaired by a Presidential
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and consisting of repre-
sentatives of Assistant Secretary rank from the departments repre-
sented on the Council. It also created by Executive order the Oper-
ations Coordinating Board-
in order to assist in the effective coordination among certain
agencies of certain functions relating to the national security
and to provide for the integrated implementation of national
security policies by said agencies.
In addition, both a larger number and a wider variety of policy
questions now go on the NSC agenda than previously. Indeed, the
President has determined that-
he will * * * (1) not assign an area of national security
policy formulation permanently as the responsibility of a
department, agency, or individual outside the NSC mecha-
nism; (2) make decisions on national security policy-except
in special cases of urgency-within the framework of the
Council.
The style of operation has also changed. The burden of drafting
and redrafting policy papers now falls more on the Planning Board
and less on the departments and agencies. The format of the papers
has been regularized, and meetings appear to be conducted on the
basis of more precise agenda than formerly.
It is clear from the record that, while the NSC is a formal institu-
tion of government, it remains an institution for the President's use,
and its mode of operation must therefore reflect the President's
predilections.
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VIEWS ON THE NSC,
A wide variety of opinion exists concerning the role actually played
by the NSC in the policy process.
There is a general agreement that it serves certain useful functions:
It has been said, and not completely in jest, that "if there
were no NSC, we would have to invent one." Few quarrel with
the principle behind the establishment of the Council and the
necessity for some type of formal mechanism for coordinating
and integrating departmental views at the highest level of the
Government.
The NSC also serves as a useful forum for discussion at top
governmental levels. It gives the President an opportunity to
meet, at one time and in one room, with the heads of the major
national security departments and agencies. A two-way edu-
cational process between the President and his chief aides results.
The "debriefings" furnished by the participants after NSC
meetings are reportedly very useful tools of communication
between the President and the departments.
Many attach real importance to the existence of a written body
of policy papers and a written record of decisions.
There is also general agreement that the NSC has certain limitations
in its policy advisory role to the President:
The NSC confronts the same problems facing any inter-
departmental committee, with its built-in bias toward
compromise.
It can never substitute for vigorous thinking and planning
in the departments, especially the Department of State.
QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE
Many suggestions have been made for improving the NSC process:
One: Some bold that the Council tries to deal with too many, and
too wide a variety of policy problems. The argument goes that it
would be of greater usefulness if it concentrated its energies on a
relatively small number of policy questions of overriding importance.
Two: Another point of view is that the Council is not well equipped
to resolve such problems of great urgency and that it functions best
when treating more routine matters.
Three: Others maintain that, despite the efforts of the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the contrary,
the papers emerging from the process are still so compromised and
general as not to furnish clear-cut guidance for action.
Four: Others urge that the NSC process be n-.ore closely geared to
the budgetary process. It is held that the two now go forward
essentially independently of each other, and that budgetary decisions
taken outside the Council framework often negate or change the
intent of NSC policy papers.
Five: Still others propose various institutional reforms for
improving the policy process. Among the suggestions made are these:
Giving more formal recognition in NSC deliberations to the
primary role of the Secretary of State in national security policy
formulation.
Encouraging debate on more sharply defined issues by giving
departments or ad hoc task forces more opportunity to present
policy drafts directly to the NSC.
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ORGANIZING 1? 'OR NATIONAL SECURITY
Changing the composition of the NSC and the Planning Board
toward the end of giving greater weight to the views of the State
and Defense Departments.
Making greater use of "discussion papers" to encourage wide-
ranging and penetrating exploration of critical policy issues.
Substantially or modestly increasing the size of the NSC
staff, with particular reference to broadening the base of scientific
and military competence.
Improving the monitoring function of the OCB, by concentrat-
ing its activities on a narrower front of key problems.
Which criticisms, if any, are justified, and what form might remedial
action take?
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
WHITE HOUSE AND EXECUTIVE OFFICE
Some observers favor shifting the "center of gravity" in national
security policymaking away from the departmental and toward the
White House level. In essence, they would have the White House or
Executive Office staff play a much larger part in the detailed formula-
tion of policy. They argue that such a step is needed to overcome the
parochial views of the departments and agencies.
One leading expression of this viewpoint takes the form of proposing
a sizable national security planning staff at the Presidential level.
Critics of this suggestion argue that such a staff would be too far
removed from operating realities to produce realistic policies. They
also warn of the danger of downgrading the prestige of the operating
departments, and reducing the vitality of intradepartmental planning.
However, even if moves toward centralizing national security plan-
ning at the Presidential level are rejected, Presidents, of course, still
look to their staffs for help in national security matters. The increas-
ing complexity and broadened scope of Presidential responsibilities
in this field lead many to think that more staff assistance will be
needed, not less.
Some favor loose and informal arrangements in this area. Others
think it would be well to knit advisers together through formal
organization arrangements in the Executive Office.
The following questions seem in order:
One: What are the merits and shortcomings of moves to shift
the "center of gravity" in planning toward the Presidential level?
Two: What observations are appropriate concerning the prob-
lem of organizational arrangements for staff assistance in the
national security area?
III. THE KEY DEPARTMENTS: STATE AND DEFENSE
The Secretaries of State and Defense are the President's principal
civilian advisers in the field of national security policy. In addition,
they are responsible for running the two Departments of the Govern-
ment which play the dominant roles in formulating and executing this
policy. Any attempt to improve the policy process must therefore
devote major attention to the roles and relationships of these two
Departments.
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ORGANIZING. FOR, NATIONAL SECURITY
The Secretary of State is the President's principal adviser on foreign
policy; he is also the first officer of the Cabinet.
Just as we have a new Presidency, so also have circumstances con-
spired to create a new role and new responsibilities for the office of
Secretary of State. Today's occupant of that office needs to be far
more than a skillful practitioner of the arts of diplomacy. He needs,
a. wide-ranging knowledge of the relations between military and
foreign policies, of the uses and limitations of economic and military
aid of information, propaganda, and related programs, of the strengths,
an I weaknesses of our adversaries, of the dangers and opportunities in
countries around the world, and of the working of international in-
stitutions and of regional organizations.
Some, however, would now have the Secretary of State assume still.
additional. responsibilities in the formulation of national security
policy. They reason as follows: Outside of the President, the Secre-
tary of State is the official mainly responsible for formulatitng our
national security goals. It is less and less possible, however, to
divorce means and ends in security planning. The relationship be-
tween our political objectives and the military, economic, and other
capabilities needed to achieve them is increasingly intertwined.
Therefore, many seek ways and means of giving the Secretary of
State a more dominant role in overall national security planning.
Among the questions raised are these :
One: Are the responsibilities of the State and Defense Depart-
ments in national security policymaking now correctly defined
and divided? , If not, what changes are needed?
Two: Should the Secretary of State be formally charged with
more responsibility in connection with our defense posture and.
the defense budget?
Three: Should the Secretary of State be asked to testify in the
Congress concerning foreign policy implications of the defense
budget?
Four: Would it be desirable to create a "super Secretary of
State" who would be responsible for the overall direction of'
foreign affairs, and who might have under him additional. Secre-
taries of Cabinet rank for such areas as diplomacy, information,.
and foreign economic matters?
LIGHTENING THE NEGOTIATING BURDENS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
However the responsibilities of the Secretary of State raay be
defined, the problem of finding time to discharge them is formidable.
A generation ago, when the other burdens of this office were far less
onerous than today, a trip by a Secretary to an international confer-
ence occasioned headline news. But today, he is away from his desk
for long periods of time, making it extremely difficult for him to
shoulder his main responsibilities of advising the President and
directing the work of his Department.
Questions frequently raised are:
One: Would it be desirable to create a Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Cabinet rank, responsibile to the Secretary of State,
who could' represent the United States at foreign ministers'
meetings?
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ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 9
Two: Would any other arrangements help, such as appoint-
ments of Ambassadors at Large?
The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff must form a well-coordinated and smoothly working
team in both the planning and execution of national security policy.
Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of Inter-
national Security Affairs performs a major function in this complex
process of coordination. It has been described as "the Pentagon's
State Department."
Among its responsibilities it is charged with-
developing and coordinating defense positions, policies,
plans, anal procedures in the fields of international politico-
military and foreign economic affairs, including disarmament,
of interest to the Department of Defense and with respect
to negotiating and monitoring of agreements with foreign
governments and international organizations on military
facilities, operating rights, status of forces, and other inter-
national politico-military matters.
Communications between the services and State go through ISA.
Differences of viewpoint exist over the proper place of ISA in the
policy process. Some argue that it duplicates functions of the
Department of State and unnecessarily layers relations between State
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Those of this view would encourage
more direct relationships between State and the Joint Chiefs. On the
other hand, it is held important that the Secretary of Defense have
access to counsel in these problem areas from some source other than
the armed services themselves.
Among the questions which occur are:
One: What is he proper relationship between State and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff (and/or the Joint Staff of the JCS) ? Should
a representative of the Secretary of State participate in discus-
sions of the JCS when appropriate?
Two: Should a representative of the JCS sit with the Policy
Planning Staff of State (and/or other State Department groups)?
Three: Is the responsibility of ISA now properly conceived?
If not, what should it be?
Even those who favor shifting the "center of gravity" in national
security planning closer to the President would agree that the planning
function of the departments and agencies is still vital. Many would
go further and argue that the main burden of planning should and
must fall upon the departments. They say there can be no substitute
for the fullness of resources and the richness of.operating experience
formed only at the departmental level.
One point seems beyond argument. Today, effective national
security planning depends on intimate day-to-day contact between
--the diplomat, the soldier and his civilian colleagues, the scientist, the
- economist, and others.
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OR( ANIZLN(3 FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
10
Many believe that the planning process in State and Defense would
be improved by enlisting the talents of officials experienced in a wider
variety of fields than is now the case. They also seek ways of en-
couraging planning cross-fertilization through greater use of planning
teams whose members represent diverse viewpoints and backgrounds.
These questions follow:
One:. Should officials with more diverse backgrounds and
experience be brought into the policy planning process in State
and Defense?
Two: Is there need for a joint State-DOD-JCS Planning Staff?
Three: Can greater use be made of ad hoc interdepartmental
task forces on special issues of national security policy?
Many, while stressing the importance of an integrated national
security policy, see as limited the role of coordinating mechanisms
in achieving this end. They approach the problem through people,
and seek ways of developing policymakers with nonparochial view-
points and wide breadth of experience.
One proposal advanced calls for a joint career service embracing a
small and carefully selected number of military officers, and senior
career officials from the State and Defense Departments and related
national security agencies.
Proposals for such a service, although varying in detail, have certain
features in common. They see candidates for such a service being
selected at roughly the level of colonel or its civilian equivalent.
Those entering the service would serve tours of duty in a number of
different departments or agencies. They would be required to address
themselves to a wide variety of policy problems. They would be given
special opportunities for advanced training.
These questions follow:
One: Is the proposed joint career service practical and worth-
while?
Two: If so, how can it be administered so as to assure the
selection of outstanding individuals and their assignment to areas
where their skills can best be utilized?
Three: What special problems might arise in integrating mili-
tary officers into such a staff and how might they be solved?
IV. RESOURCES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
z~
A CENTRAL PROBLEM
'The generation past has seen a quantum jump in the demands
Which national security makes upon our national substance. The
list of legitimate claimants for these resources grows ever longer.
The problem is twofold : to allocate existing resources wisely and
to generate additional resources where necessary.
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS
1 The budgetary process-the decisive resource-allocating instru-
ment-lies at the very heart of national security planning and pro-
graming. Plans and policies, without dollar signs attached, are mere
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aspirations. It is the budgetary process which translates them into
actual programs.
There exists an enormous literature of comment on the budgetary
process as it relates to national security. Recommendations for
improvements of the process are as numerous and varied as criticisms
of past and existing practices.
Major questions raised include the following:
One: Should State and Defense (and perhaps other agencies
concerned with national security) participate fully in the initial
establishment of "budgetary guidelines" for national security
programs?
Two: Does the present length of the budgetary cycle dis-
courage timely initiation of important new programs and en-
courage the continuation of old programs after they have outlived
their usefulness? If so, what might be done to shorten the cycle?
Three: Should the budget be prepared in another form?
Some maintain that, in its present form, the budget conceals
policy alternatives of crucial importance rather than illuminating
them. Such reforms as a functional budget for the armed serv-
ices are proposed. Would this or similar changes be in order?
Four: Should there be advance preparation of alternative
budgets for all major national security programs? Some wish
to see one proposed budget at X dollars; another at perhaps 10
percent below this level; and still another at perhaps 10 percent
above. Such a procedure, they hold, would permit policymakers
to see more clearly, and sooner, what is sacrificed and what is
gained at various expenditure levels. Can and should this be
done?
Five: Should the NSC process be more closely related to the
budgetary process?
The larger our gross national product, the greater is our ability to
meet the various private and public demands on the economy.
Many now argue for a closer relation between national security
planning and economic growth.
Some say that our past and present long-term planning now fails
to reflect fully enough our capacity for continuing a "normal" rate of
economic growth. As a result, they contend, we sometimes deny
ourselves the opportunity to undertake important programs which
could be carried out without increasing the proportion of our gross
national product devoted to national security.
Others go further. They say that national security planning,
based merely on a projection of existing growth rates into the future,
does not take full advantage of our potential ability to meet national
security needs. They hold that long-term planning should be based
upon our ability to accelerate the rate of economic growth through
affirmative policies designed toward this end. Such forward plan-
ning, they believe, will enable us to fill such additional national secur-
ity requirements as may arise without endangering important domestic
programs or imposing undue burdens on the private sector of the
economy.
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R
Each year, in the opening weeks of the Congress, the President
submits to the legislative branch three reports of great importance
for national security. They are the state of the Union message, the
budget message, and the economic report.
Some now feel the need for a fourth annual report from the Presi-
dent-a Requirements and Resources Report. In broad outline, the
report would have five main elements:
One: It would contain a statement of our overall long-term
strategy for national security.
Two: It would present, as a " ackage," our overall long-term
requirements for foreign policy, defense, and domestic programs
affecting our world position, including a statement of program
..priorities.
Three: It would present, also as a "package," long-term pro-
jections of the resources needed to meet these requirements.
Four: It would relate both requirements and needed resources
to the Nation's present and future economic capacities.
Five: It would contain recommendations for corrective action
wherever future resources appear inadequate to meet our needs.
Advocates of such a report make these points: It would fill an
existing gap between the more general state of the Union message and
the more detailed shortrun budget message. The very process of
'preparing such a report in the executive branch would make for better
integration of national policy and might well bring new policy prob-
lems to light. Its "wholeness" would give the Congress valuable
perspective and yardsticks for measuring the desirability of individual
national security programs. Its appearance would stimulate more
intelligent public understanding, discussion and debate of national
security problems.
Would the presentation of such a report to the Congress be desirable?
V. SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,' AND THE POLICY PROCESS
PERSPECTIVE
A short generation ago, the concern of a President or a Secretary of
State or Defense with problems of science and technology was slight
and intermittent. Today, those in these same posts of responsibility
know scarcely a day in which they do not confront some technological
problem of overriding importance to the future of foreign and defense
policy.
The impact of science and technology upon our organizations and
processes for making national security policy has become as profound
as its. impact apon the tools of war themselves. Forecasts of techno-
logical developments heavily color all the plans of the soldier and his
civilian superiors. They likewise strongly contribute to defining the
realm of the possible in diplomacy-sputnik was a political as well as a
technological fact. Those concerned with the budgetary process
must reckon with research programs which can grow in a year or two
from, a tiny laboratory project involving a few scientists to a billion-
dollar engineering and production program.
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THE PACE OF TECHNOLOGY
Lying at the very heart of the problem is the ever-accelerating rate
of technological change.
The statesman of a century ago was given more than a generation
to adjust national policies to the change from coal to oil in the world's
navies. But today such adjustments must occur, in historical terms,
overnight. An example: National security planners had scarcely
begun to adapt policy to the fact of fission weapons in the world's
arsenals, when the vastly more destructive fusion weapon entered
upon the Scene.
While the pace of technological change has quickened, the cost of
failure to make appropriate policy adaptations has risen-exponen-
tially. Again, an example: Germany's failure to press the develop-
ment of radar before and during World War H.
As technological leadtime grows longer, the chances for second-
guessing grow fewer. Ten years may be needed to bring a sophisti-
cated weapons system from the birth of the concept to the delivery of
hardware. Crucial decisions, committing us to great expenditures
and to largely irrevocable policy courses, must be made at the very
beginning of the planning stage.
Every prediction, moreover, suggests a quickening of the pace of
change. Seen in the perspective of 1970, the problems faced by policy-
makers in 1960 may appear almost easy.
The years since World War II have seen repeated attempts to define
organizational patterns and policy processes which better integrate
science and technology with national security planning. The most
recent answers to the problem have consisted of a limited increase in
scientific staff support in State, a general upgrading of the prestige
and authority of the research and development function within the
three services and the Department of Defense, and bringing high-level
scientific advice directly into the White House.
BALANCE OF POWER PROJECTS
It is obviously vital that radical technological developments having
major effect upon the world balance of scientific and military power
be (1) speedily identified while still in the conceptual stage and (2)
rapidly pushed to the top-level decision makers.
Many bold that past and present organizational processes are not
adequate to accomplish this end.
One suggestion for reducing institutional "lag time" in these matters
calls for setting up special watchdog groups-exclusively charged with
"flagging" crucial technical programs at the earliest possible date and
then speeding them to the highest decision-making levels.
Would this or alternative steps be desirable?
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND MILITARY
PLANNING
Thee is growing awareness that scientific, military, and political
planning must go forward together. Some argue that our defense
planners, particularly at top civilian levels, have as a group not
apppreciated fully enough the future military implications of crucial
technical programs in the developmental state. It is also held that
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our research and development effort too often suffers from lack of
adequate guidance concerning weapons systems of maximum utility.
Some also hold that our foreign policy planners, as a group, have
not concerned themselves enough either with the future political con-
Se queiices of weapons systems in the laboratory state or with non-
military technical developments holding promise of great impact upon
foreign policy. Similarly, it is argued that our research and develop-
ment, programs wodld benefit from clearer guidelines concerning
pro ects which might best help further our foreign policy goals.
Certain questions appear important:
One: How, without straitjacketing technological development,
can State and Defense furnish those concerned with development
more useful guidance concerning the paths of technological ex-
ploration which might best enable us to further our overall
political and military objectives?
.Two : What institutional changes within the Department of
State might help give political policymakers a better understanding
of the impact of research and development projects on the future
of foreign policy?
'f'firee: What institutional changes within the Department of
Defense might help give senior civilian officials and military
officers a fuller awareness of the relationship between scientific
developments and defense planning?
Four : Would it be desirable, toward the end of closer joint
Scientific-political analysis and planning, to assign more scientists
to.,positions in political areas, i.e., the Policy Planning Staff in
State, or the Office of International Security Affairs in Defense?
Five: Would joint scientific-political planning at early stages
ip .the decision-making process also be promoted by assigning
more political and military planners to posts in technical areas?
,Six: Is there a need for raising the prestige and status of scien-
tific advice within the Department of State?
Seven: What is the best relationship between science and
technology in State and Defense, on the one hand, and scientific
advice at the Presidential level, on the other?
VI. "THINK GROUPS": WHAT Is THEIR CONTRIBUTION?
THE NEED FOR POLICY RESEARCH
The case for additional systematic policy research in the area of
national security policy is strong. In an earlier day-when foreign
affairs could be clearly distinguished from domestic affairs, when
science and technology were largely divorced from national security
planning, when diplomacy was a matter of personal dealings between
monarchs or their envoys, and when the problem of resource allocation
did not have today's pivotal importance-it might have been argued
that security planning required no more than the wit and wisdom of
a few policymakers. But that day is gone-forever.
;:Today, the .range of plausible policy alternatives confronting our
security planners is enormous. The problem of arriving at an optimum
balance of forces within the Military Establishment is vexing enough
i J,;itself. But it is relatively simple when compared to the difficulty
of..bjending political, military, economic, and scientific instrumental-
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ities into a coherent national strategy best forwarding our national
purpose.
The matter is altogether too complex to be solved by intuition, or
improvised "seat of the pants" policymaking. There is now wide
and growing recognition that the techniques of policy research-the
orderly formation, development, and analysis of policy alternatives-
can give the decision maker invaluable assistance.
The human and institutional resources in our country potentially
available for policy research are vast. They are to be found in
industry, universities, laboratories, and research centers. When
compared with this potential reservoir of nationwide talent, the
governmental resources now available for policy research are limited.
Unless one is to advocate a huge expansion of these in-house research
activities, ways must be found to tap and bring to bear upon policy-
making the full range and diversity of intellectual resources now
existing outside the Government.
The post-World War II period has seen growing use of semi-
autonomous policy research and operations analysis organizations by
the armed services. The Department of Defense receives comparable
assistance from the Institute for Defense Analyses.
For the most part existing research organizations have concentrated
on rather specific systems analysis or "hardware" problems. Is a
glow-firing aerial cannon of large caliber more effective than a rapid-
firing machinegun of smaller caliber? At what point does the price
of building greater accuracy into a missile begin to cost more than is
gained?
THE BROADER PROBLEM
Many now favor employing the techniques of systematic research
on a much broader range of national security problems. They would
draw far more heavily upon the resources of the social sciences, and
ombine them with the physical sciences to analyze a wide spectrum
of national security problems with complex political-military-eco-
nomic-psychological interrelationships.
Those who advocate increased policy research also stress its limita-
tions. They warn against confusing policy research with policy-
making. The former can play only an advisory role. Actual de-
cisions must be the responsibility of elected and appointed Govern-
ment officials.
Also, it should be apparent that policy research by itself, cannot
furnish answers to many of the truly crucial problems of national
security-problems such as the right size of the national security
budget or the right balance of our military forces. Research can
never take the place of final judgment.
PROPOSALS ADVANCED
Suggestions have been made for increased policy research in three
different areas--in the Government itself, in universities or study
centers engaged in projects under Government contract, and in semi-
autonomous organizations following the general model of the Rand
Corporation.
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The strengthening of existing, or the establishment of new, semi-
autonomous organizations has been a matter of particular interest.
The argument is made that many highly talented people who do not
wish to work directly for the Government might be attracted by
careers in such organizations. It is also held that the semidetach-
ment of such groups encourages fresh looks at policy alternatives,
promotes the development of novel ideas, and helps prevent depart-
mental or agency party-line thinking, while at the same time allowing
close liaison between policy researchers and policy makers.
Those of this persuasion do not, of course, propose that the Gov-
ernment delegate "thinking" to some outside group. They see
internal and external policy research reinforcing and. stimulating
each other.
. In this connection, however, some stress the danger of a double
standard in pay and prestige between such organizations and policy
research within the Government itself.
Specific suggestions made so far include the following:
A "White House Rand" making studies for the President's
national security staff and/or the National Security Council;
A "think group" for the State Department;
An organization jointly sponsored by State and Defense;
A group working for all the executive branch departments and
agencies concerned with national security;
A similar group responsible to the Congress.
Some wish to broaden the mandate and increase the resources of
existing organizations, such as the Institute for Defense Analyses.
Others to to create corupletely new groups. One school thinks in
terms of a relatively large research group; another argues for the
desirability of numerous smaller study centers in competition with
each other.
These questions appear relevant:
One: To the extent that the development of semiautonomous
policy research organizations is desirable, which departments or
agencies could best profit from their services? The State Depart-
ment? The National Security Council? State-Defense under
a joint sponsorship arrangement?
Two : Are there any special difficulties in using such organiza-
tions at the White House level?
'Three: Should we try to build on the resources of existing
organizations such as the Institute, for Defense Analyses, and
expand their charters?
Four:, Insofar as there is a problem of unequal standards in
pay and prestige between such organizations and policy research
within the Government, how can this best be handled?
use of policy research in important problem areas at universities
and individual study centers?
Six : What steps would encourage more productive policy
research within the Government, with particular reference to the
State Department and the Defense Establishment?
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VII. BETTER POLICYMAKERS
IMPORTANCE OF PEOPLE
In the making of national security policy, human talent is our most
precious resource. Good people can often triumph over poor organi-
zation, but poor people will defeat the best organization.
Every person engaged in planning and executing national security
policy has an indispensable contribution to make. The heaviest
responsibility, however, falls upon three groups of people: (1) the
political executive, (2) the senior career official, and (3) the younger
official of exceptional ability and dedication.
The political executive-who may be a Secretary, an Under Secre-
tary, an Assistant Secretary, or an official of comparable responsi-
bility-represents the policy of the administration in office. The
senior career official-who works at or near the top-provides the
necessary continuity in policymaking, and places at the service of
the administration in office his long experience in his particular field.
The younger official of unique talents brings freshness of view to the
policy process while preparing himself for future leadership.
The problem is this: how to attract better officials, how to train
them better, and how to retain them in Government service.
Almost all authorities agree that inadequate compensation is a
primary cause of our inability to secure and retain better key officials.
Few propose that governmental salaries be brought to industrial
levels, but almost all recommend a narrowing of the gap. They note
in passing that the gradual but steady rise in university salaries holds
forth the prospect that the salaries of key Government officials may
soon compare unfavorably with top positions in the academic
community.
What recommendations are appropriate to meet this problem?
TURNOVER AT THE SENATE CONFIRMATION LEVEL
It has often been argued that no corporation could prosper if its
top officers were changed as rapidly as those of the national security
departments and agencies. An example: Since the position of Secre-
tary of Defense was established in 1947 it has been filled by six different
men-each serving an average of 2 years. Eight men, each remaining
in office an average of a little more than 16 months, have served as
Deputy Secretary of Defense since that post was authorized in 1949.
Those concerned with this problem point out that the period of
education needed to familiarize top national security officials with
their jobs is at least as long as that required to discharge correspond-
ingly heavy responsibilities in industry. They also stress that this
period of familiarization will grow steadily longer as the problems
faced by governmental policymakers increase in complexity.
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ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL C
The major questions raised are:
One: As a general rule, how long should a person serve in a
top policymaking position in order to learn the job and begin to
make significant contributions?
Two: Should a nominee be asked by the appropriate Senate
committee to give assurance that he intends to serve at least
such a minimum period?
Three: Could a contribution be made by a "sense of the
Senate" resolution expressing concern with this problem?
Four: Would substantial salary increases be helpful? If so,
what level must be attained in order to make such action effective?
Five: How can a better climate be created in the business
community for their executives doing a "tour of dury" in
Government?
Six: Do the conflict of interest regulations prevent many out-
standing executives from serving in Government positions? If
so,"how can they be amended so that the individual is not unduly
penalized, while the Government is being protected?
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARIES
The argument is made that political executives, as a general rule,
simply cannot be expected to serve long tours of duty in the Govern-
ment. This fact, combined with the increased premium on continuity
of service as national security issues grow more complicated, leads
mazy to recommend a move toward the British system of permanent
under secretaries.
However, the counterargument is made that such a step would have
the drawback of making the governmental process less responsive to
the national will as expressed through elected officials and their top
aides. The further point is made that governments employing perma-
nent under secretaries have not fared better than our own in devising
wise national security policies.
One: Would permanent under secretaries be desirable in the
national, security field?
Two: If so, in what particular departments or agencies?
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN TRAINING
It is increasingly held that the intricate problems of national secur-
ityy planning require greater emphasis on formal training for military
Q$icers, and ,civilian officials throughout their careers. Existing pro-
grams toward this end show wide variations.
Military officers fare best. Many with the rank of colonel or its
equivalent spend roughly one-third of their service careers in schools.
They receive numerous opportunities for postgraduate study at uni-
versities. They rise through the elaborate system of service training
schools which culminate in the National War College and the counter-
part institutions of the three services. Participation in this formal
training program is a virtual prerequisite of promotion to higher rank.
Foreign Service and State Department officers fare next best.
They have limited opportunities for postgraduate training at univer-
sities. A small number of them attend the National War College and
other service schools. The Foreign Service runs three training pro-
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ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
grams on its own-the junior officers' orientation program, the middle
career course, and the senior officers' course. But the resources de-
voted to these programs are very modest when compared with expendi-
tures for training military officers.
The remainder of the civilians in the other national security depart-
ments and agencies fare poorest. Their opportunities for extensive
and systematic training are limited in the extreme.
The following questions arise:
One: Should a major effort be made to improve formal train-
ing at various levels for selected Foreign Service and other civil-
ian employees, including additional opportunities to attend uni-
versity graduate schools?
Two: If so, how might the executive branch and Congress best
concert their efforts to this end?
Three: Should opportunities be increased for cross-fertilization
of ideas and experience in joint p)litical-military-scientific train-
ing programs, including greater civilian participation in the var-
ious war colleges?
Four: Would it be desirable to establish some new study in-
stitution, perhaps sponsored jointly by State and Defense and
related agencies, offering training beyond the National War Col-
lege level for a limited number of senior officials?
. Many have raised questions concerning the present length of tours
of duty of military officers and civilian officials. They cite the pro-
gressively longer period required to master job requirements in many
fields, particularly where technical or specialist problems are involved.
They note approvingly the gradual trend toward longer tours of duty
but believe that further action in this direction is required.
What corrective action is in order?
VIII. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS
CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
In the American system of government the contribution of the legis-
lative branch to national security policy is indispensable. It sets the
broad framework for that policy; it votes the moneys needed to carry
it out; it provides the most important forum for debate of national
security issues.
Just as the executive branch has in the past adapted its organization
to new policy challenges, so also have congressional mechanisms
evolved to meet changing circumstances. This will no doubt be true
of the future also.
PROBLEMS OF CONGRESSIONAL ORGANIZATION
An immense body of recommendations exists concerning possible
improvements in the organization of Congress as it relates to national
security.
Most commonly, concern is felt over the fragmentation of Congress
in its methods for dealing with national security matters. It is
stated that Congress lacks mechanisms for dealing with national
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20 ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
security issues "in the round." Because of this, it is argued, Congress
misses an opportunity not only to clarify its own thoughts on the rela-
tionships between political, military, and economic factors, but also
to help guide its constituency on the interrelationship of these problems.
Numerous suggestions for improvement have been made. They
range from proposals for more frequent joint meetings of the Foreign
Relations and Armed Services Committees, to establishing permanent
National Security Committees in each House, or else creating a Joint
Congressional Committee on National Security.
A variant proposal calls for a Joint Committee on the State of the
Union, which would meet for only a few weeks at the beginning of each
session to consider the President's major first-of-the-year reports to
the Congress.
Many of those who favor some additional national security report to
the Congress, such as a Report on Requirements and Resources, draw
an analogy from the Joint Economic Committee and favor establishing
a nonlegislative joint committee to receive, study, and debate the
new national security report.
Some say that Congress should now take the initiative in reforming
its existing procedures and structure for dealing with national security
problems.
Others point out, however, that past changes in congressional
structure and practice have often tended to parallel corresponding
changes in the executive branch. They cite the instances of the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, and the Joint Economic Committee.
They note also that the establishment of the Department of Defense
was followed by the creation of the Armed Services Committees in
the Senate and the House.
IX. PUBLIC SUPPORT
In a democracy, it is the public which sets the limit of the possible in
national security policymaking. Effective policy requires more than
smooth-working machinery and excellent Government officials; it
demands public understanding and support as well
A cold war, which may persist for generations, makes peculiar
demands upon the public. It lacks the unifying stimulus of a hot war.
It calls for an undramatic, drawn-out effort with no predictable termi-
n,al date. ; It poses issues in which agreement on ends is often clouded
by debate over means.
Proposals for reform of the policy process must therefore be ;judged
by the additional yardstick of their contribution to fuller public
appreciation of national security problems.
0
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