LETTER TO EDWARD P. BOLAND FROM WILLIAM J. CASEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00135R000500830008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: June 22, 1983
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2008/02/01: CIA-RDP91 B001 35R000500830008-9
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83-1411/A
2 2 JUN 1983
The Honorable Edward P. Boland
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
At the hearing of your Committee on 16 June 1983, there was a question
from you about Sandinista military. strength. I believe that you had the
impression that we had come up with new information about this strength. In
December 1982 we furnished your Committee a Special National Intelligence
Estimate entitled "Prospects for Escalating Hostilities Between Nicaragua and
Honduras." There has been no change in this Estimate.
The Sandinista military has an active duty strength of about 25,000,
including mobilized reservists and militiamen. The Intelligence Community is
in agreement on this figure. The number of Sandinista troops on active duty
probably continues to increase, and we periodically will reassess the figure.
We are less certain of the total strength of the reserves and militia,
but we estimate. the total of these forces is between 60,000 - 80,000. The
Sandinistas have claimed numbers as large as 120,000, but this probably
includes many who are not in organized units and have received little or no
training.
As early as December 1982, the Intelligence Community estimated that some
.10,000 - 12,000 of the active duty personnel were deployed in the north
opposite Honduras. At that time, we estimated active duty strength at 21,000
and total reserve and militia at over 40,000, but we cautioned that these
numbers are growing. Since then, we have continued to report the mobilization
of more militia and reservists to fight the insurgents, as well as the
deployment of more armor and artillery units to the Honduran border.
Across the border from the Las Trojes area of Honduras, where the two
journalists were killed on 21 June, the Sandinistas have some three to four
thousand troops in the Jalapa Valley. These are organized in six or seven
battalions, and they are probably a mixture of regular troops, reservists, and
militia, with such weapons as mortars, machine guns,"and grenade launchers.
Sandinista artillery is deployed north of the town of Jalapa.
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Concerning the total capabilities of the Honduran and Nicaraguan forces
on the ground, the Sandinistas have a clear advantage in numbers and in
weapons, with tanks, armored personnel carriers, howitzers, and rocket
launchers, although they are inferior to the Hondurans in the air. The
Hondurans have 11 Super Mystere aircraft and 11 A-37 attack aircraft. You are
aware from our briefing of your Committee that MIG-21 aircraft assigned to
Nicaagua are in Cuba at this time. If these were brought into the picture,
the Sandinistas would have a clear advantage over the Hondurans.
Sincerely,
77@4?''^ ~ "ey
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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