GORBACHEV'S REFORM PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00389R000500030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 23, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/23: CIA-RDP91B00389R000500030001-3
SESSION NAME: HPAC
SCANNED: 2.3 I./I AY Eiq M PR
INDEXED: 2.1-4 MAN, p,c4
CHECKED: 2L4 rn A?e
DATABASE: Ce)r- ,,orc_ionc..11..r.c^e-y-ri__ 2.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/23: CIA-RDP91B00389R000500030001-3
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/23: CIA-RDP91B00389R000500030001-3
OCA 88-3344
23 June 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Reform Program
1. On 23 June the House Foreign Affairs Committee's
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East received a briefing
on Gorbachev's reforms in the Soviet Union and their prospects
for success. Dous MacEachin, Director of the Office of Soviet
25X1 Analysis, and Assistant NIO for the USSR provided
the briefing w ic was given at the Secret level in room H-139
25X1 the Capitol.
25X1
2. Members present at the briefing included:
Rep. Lee Hamilton, (D., IN)
Rep. Stephen Solarz, (D., NY)
Rep. John Miller, (R., WA)
Rep. Ben Gilman, (R., NY)
Rep. Bob Dornan. (R., CA)
3. Staffers attending the session included:
Mike Van Dusen
Hillel Weinberg
Dan Finn
Katherine Wilkens
Stanley Roth
4. Mr. Hamilton was most interested in the recently
concluded party conference and what it meant for Gorbachev's
ambitious reform agenda. Before analyzing this event,
Doug MacEachin offered some brief introductory remarks on the
problems confronting the Soviet leadership and the political
strains resulting from Gorbachev's activist approach. The
impetus for change in the Soviet Union could be traced back to
the mid-1970's when it became obvious that the economy could
not finance a massive military build-up while at the same time
providing an adequate material base to ensure the quality of
life. During the Brezhnev years the leadership pursued a
strategy of muddling through, shortchanging both the consumer
S9K?T
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and the investment sector. Yet, by the early 1980's, economic
inefficiencies and low growth rates had become too ,serious for
the leadership to ignore. In one of his last speeches,
Brezhnev warned his military that they would essentially have
to do more with less.
5. Gorbachev first attempts to deal with the economic
crisis in the Soviet Union were hardly reformist, depending
almost entirely on a human factors campaign directed from the
center. When it became apparent that this tinkering with the
Stalinist model was not sufficient, Gorbachev moved in the
direction of political reforms as a prelude to real economic
25X1 reform.
25X1
6. Assistant Nb/USSR, echoed much of
Mr. MacEachin's presentation, indicating that much of the
Soviet leadership was in agreement on the need for economic
reform but that they disagreed as to the scope and pace of this
change. Gradually Gorbachev has abandoned his early package of
measures to fix the economy in favor of a more radical
solution. This new approach has apparently hastened the
political estrangement of Gorbachev from his former second
secretary, Ligachev, who supports a more conservative approach
to economic change. With the convening of a party conference,
Gorbachev hopes to generate political support for economic
reform. Beyond removing the most conservative elements of the
party apparatus, Gorbachev is obviously looking to the
25X1 Conference to lay the basis for needed political reform
25X1
7. At this point, the members began their questions.
Representative Hamilton was
identification of Gorbachev
asked how this squared with
Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
somewhat bothered by the
as a "democratic reformer" and
his continued espousal of
Both Mr. MacEachin and
indicated that Gorbachev was willing to open debate within
Politburo and consider other measures such as multi-candidate
elections and limitations on terms for party officials,.
Mr. Solarz asked about growth rates in the Soviet Union and
examples of where Gorbachev's policy directives have proven
controversial with the rest of the leadership. Examples
mentioned included reexamining Soviet history and the excesses
of the Stalin regime and the modification of traditional
ideology. Mr. Miller asked the presenters if they believed
that the Soviet Union had given up its goal of ideological
25X1 world domination, suggested that Gorbachev no
longer believes the USSR must function as a role model! for the
rest of the world while still believing that it is a superior
system to capitalism. Mr. Hamilton was bothered by the notion
that we seemed to be saying the Soviets were less militarily
confrontational than in the past. At this point, Mr. Solarz
the
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interjected a helpful distinction between intentions and
capabilities. The speakers agreed while there has been no
diminution in Soviet capabilities there has been something of a
change in their intentions. The briefing ended shortly after.
House Affairs
Office of Congressional Affairs
OCA/HA/MSN: sgb (27 Oct 88)
DISTRIBUTION:
Original - OCA Record
1 - MSN Chrono
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/23: CIA-RDP91B00389R000500030001-3