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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 OS REGISTRY tov/tx-ig Vol. 134 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 1988 No. 23 Congressional Record United States of America PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 100th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION United States Government Printing Office SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS Washington, DC 20402 OFFICIAL BUSINESS Penalty for private use, $300 SECOND CLASS NEWSPAPER Postage and Fees Paid U.S. Government Printing Office (USPS 087-390) Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 United States of America Tortgressional Record PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 100th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION Vol. 134 WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, MARCH 2, 1988 No. 23 The Senate met at 10 a.m., and was called to order by the Honorable JOHN BaEdux, a Senator from the State of Louisiana. PRAYER The Chaplain, the Reverend Rich- ard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the fol- lowing prayer: Let us pray: If my people, which are called by my name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.?II Chron- icles 7:14. God of Mercy, we hear this glorious promise addressed to Your people with its unequivocal conditions. We pray for the church. Forgive its material- ism, its preoccupation with success?its love of comfort and wealth, its con- formity to the culture it so often criti- cizes. God of grace, help Your people to turn from their wicked ways?to obey Your command?to quit making scapegoats of government and educa- tion, the press and media. Deliver Your people from embracing the very secularism they protest so loudly. For- give Your church the sin for which she so easily judges others. Grant that Your people will take seriously the mandate "` ? ? seek first the Kingdom Of God and His righteousness ? knowing then the church will have her greatest moral and spiritual influence In the world around her. Help her to realize that her failure to conform to the Kingdom of God compounds con- fusion and decay in the world. Gra- cious Lord, remind Your people that You will keep Your promise to heal the land if they will meet Your condi- tions. In His name who is the way, the truth, and the life, we pray. Amen. Senate APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore [Mr. STENNIS]. The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter: U.S. SENATE, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE, Washington, DC, March 2, 1988. To the Senate: Under the provisions of rule I, section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable JOHN BREAUX, a Senator from the State of Louisi- ana, to perform the duties of the Chair. JOHN C. STENNIS, President pro tempore. Mr. BREAUX thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tern- pore. RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Under the standing order, the majority leader is recognized. ? THE JOURNAL Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Journal: of the proceedings be approved to date. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the time of both leaders be reserved for the time being at least. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. MORNING BUSINESS The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Under the previous order, there will now be a period for the transac- tion of morning business for not to exceed IO minutes, with Senators per- mitted to speak therein for not to exceed 5 minutes each. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Wisconsin [Mr. PROXMIRE]. WHY IS AN END TO THE ARMS RACE IMPERATIVE NOW? Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, if this Senator were given the power to have just one wish come true, I would wish that every Member of the Con- gress and every policymaker in the ad- ministration fully understand the im- plications of the fact that a superpow- er nuclear war is no longer an alterna- tive. Think about this for 1 or 2 min- utes. What would be the consequences Of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States? The answer is sure. It is certain. The answer is the total and I mean total destruction of both countries. Most of the population of both sides would be dead. Most of the rest would be dying. Our country would lie in utter ruins. So would Russia. There would be no chance for the miserable, few Ameri- can survivors to live in freedom. Ruth- less martial law would have to be im- posed for generations to come. Presi- dent Reagan certainly knows this. So does Secretary Gorbachev. Both have said that a nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. So what does it mean that a super- power nuclear war must never be fought? First, it means that no war, however limited between these two armed to the teeth nuclear powers must never take place. Why? Because there would be an overwhelming likeli- hood that in such a war nuclear weap- ons at some level, perhaps beginning with tactical nukes would be employed by whichever side considered that it was losing. Once the first nuclear weapon was fired by either superpow- er, the nuclear exchange would rapid- ly escalate to the finish. ? This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by a Member of the Senate on the floor. S1673 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1674 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 2, 1,988 Second, if in fact no war will ever be fought between the United States and the U.S.S.R., most of the colossal hun- dreds of billions of dollars of Military buildup on both sides is completely wasted. Both sides will need to main- tain a credible nuclear deterrent to forestall an attack from the other. But the enormous navies, armies, air forces of both sides will be unnecessary. Each superpower will have every reason to negotiate a far smaller military force for both sides. Third, none of this reasonable reduc- tion in sterile military expenditures can prudently take place without reli- able, mutual agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. ,The first object of such an agreement must be to establish and guarantee the credibility of the nuclear deterrent of each side. The United States must be confident that its nuclear deterrent could survive any attack or any de- fense by? the Soviet Union. Our coun- try must know?not hope, not assume, not guess. It must know that whatever attack the U.S.S.R. might launch, however relentless it might be our re- taliatory capability would survive and so would the will of our President to use it. The Soviet Union must have precisely the same confidence and the same will. The verification provisions of the INF Treaty sharply advance the prospects of negotiating exactly the kind of intrusive, detailed verification that military reductions on both sides would require. So why is it reasonable now to expect the superpowers to achieve something that has, never, been achieved in human history? Why at long last has the time arrived to nego- tiate an end to the arms race? The answer is that we have two crucial events occurring at the same time. First, we have the universal realization that a world war today?a superpower, war?would be totally destructive. Nei- ther nation could gain. Both nations would lose. Both would lose utterly. The second crucial event is that both superpowers are suffering deeply from the immense burden of the arms race. In America our deficits have become far and away our most intractable do- mestic problem. Our enormous Feder- al deficits can literally destroy our economy. Right at the heart of our huge deficits is our crushing military spending. In the Soviet Union the eco- nomic problems are worse, in fact, much worse. Their far less productive economy is staggering under the sub- stantially heavier military spending. The Soviets desperately need relief from this arms race. Secretary Gorba- chev and his Politburo thoroughly un- derstand this. So what are we waiting for? As I said at the beginning of this statement, if I were given one wish, I would wish that all Members of the Congress and all policymaking offi- cials of our Government understood the meaning of the fact that a super- power nuclear war is no longer an al- ternative. It means we are wasting hundreds of billions of dollars every year in building an ever more powerful military force. So is the Soviet Union. Arms control?as never before?is the only sane way to peace. It is also the only sane way to financial solvency. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The Chair recognizes the Sena- tor from Colorado [Mr. WIRTH]. REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE Mr. WIRTH. Mr. President, again, this morning, I want to share with my colleagues another excellent analysis of the conventional balance in Europe and our relationship with the Soviet Union. It is Andrew Hamilton's "Redressing the Conventional Balance," in Inter- national Security. Andrew Hamilton, a well-regarded Washington defense analyst, has stud- ied the issue of redressing the conven- tional balance in NATO's central region. He contends that NATO is within reach of a highly credible ca- pacity to defend itself successfully, but that currently, NATO's "margin of safety" is too narrow to ensure suc- cess. He seeks to demonstrate that NATO has the means with which to correct deficiencies in its defensive ca- pabilities, primarily by forming new operational combat units from avail- able trained military manpower. Hamilton criticizes two common measures of the European convention- al balance: Direct comparison of "raw resources," and such as GNP, riopula- tion, or defense spending; and, tradi- tional "bean counts" of primary weap- ons systems. He believes neither of these measures accurately meaningful- ly assesses relative military capabili- ties. According to Hamilton, one can derive more useful measurements of relative capabilities and combat effec- tiveness from three variables. These are first, the relative values assigned to different military formations and weapons, usually converted into some kind of division equivalent; second, the quantity of resources that each side is assumed to allocate to the central region; and third, the speed with which each side can bring these rein- forcements into battle. Hamilton pre- sents three different analyses based on data using these variables. Although these analyses produce somewhat differing estimates, Hamil- ton notes that when one converts these into assessments of NATO re- quirements, all three reach a consist- ent conclusion: "While NATO lacks a robust conventional defense today, the shortfall between capabilities and re- quirements is not insurmountable." This being so, Hamilton pessimisti- cally observes the current NATO plans for ground force improvements do not promise much relative progress by 1990. Assuming that NATO's ground force improvement plans are fully im- plemented by that time, Hamilton notes that in a crisis or conflict in which NATO mobilizes, its greatest gains will come during the first 2 weeks after mobilization. But by 90 days after mobilization, the Warsaw Pack will have neutralized earlier NATO gains. Hamilton contends that, prior to mobilization, the current con-fl balance is basically even, but that after mobilization, the pact pro- gressively gains until NATO is out- numbered by about 2 to 1. To determine NATO conventional defense requirements, Hamilton con- tends that one must -necessarily make critical assumptions regarding relative pact and NATO buildup capabilities, strategy, and tactical effectiveness. The more optimistic these assump- tions are, the less NATO must do to improve its relative position. Hamil- ton, however, is not very sanguine. He concludes that a, successful NATO de- fense would require relatively "ineffec- tive pact strategy and tactics" and an unfailingly "high degree, of NATO tac- tical effectiveness and efficiency." To correct this thin margin of safety and redress the imbalance, according to Hamilton, NATO must utilize extant trained military reserve manpower by reorganizing and arming it more wisely to exploit its combat potential. Hamilton asserts that NATO largely wastes this manpower in lightly armed and poorly organized reserve forces. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that a -summary of Hamilton's ar- ticle "Redressing the Conventional Balance" In the Summer, 1985, Inter- national Security, volume 10, be print- ed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ANDREW HAMILTON, "REDRESSING THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE" Two arguments are advanced in this arti- cle. First, .the NATO-Warsaw Pact conven- tional balance in Central Europe today is shaky but not beyond repair. NATO stands within striking distance of a high-confi- dence capacity to defend successfully, but does not yet have one: Current NATO con- ventional forces might be able to thwart a Pact attack, but their margin of safety is woefully thin and the possibility of a NATO defeat is quite real. A robust NATO defense would require at least 20 more "division- equivalents" beyond the roughly 52 divi- sion-equivalents that will be available two months after mobilization when present NATO modernization plans are completed around 1990.' Second, NATO conventional capabilities can be strengthened dramatically by equip- , ping and reorganizing available trained Eu- ropean military, manpower to form new operational combat units. (Most of these formations would be reserve units.) If this were done, the gap between NATO conven- tional forces and NATO requirements could be erased at a relatively modest cost. I use the term "division-equivalent" to refer 'to a Heavy Division Equivalent, defined below as a for- mation with the military capability of an average American heavy (armored mechanized) division. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 _ CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1675 THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE Two niisleading measures of the NATO- Warsaw Pact balance are commonly seen in public discussions of defense matters. First, the raw resources of NATO and the Pact are compared, without directly measuring their military capabilities. [Much compari- sons demonstrate that aggregate NATO eco- nomic strength and population far exceed those of the Pact, while NATO's defense spending and military manpower roughly match those of the Pact. However, such comparisons paint an unduly optimistic pic- ture because NATO has failed to distill an adequate conventional defense from this ample resource base. Second, NATO and Pact capabilities are often compared in "bean counts" of princi- pal weapons systems. The worldwide bal- ance of tactical air forces is about even but the figures for ground forces convey an im- pression of vast Pact material superiority of 2.6:1 in tanks, 2:1 in artillery and multiple rocket launchers and almost 2:1 in anti-air- craft guns and missile-launchers. Bean counts, however, also have short- comings as portraits of relative military ca- pabilities. They omit people and organiza- tions?an important omission in the case of ground forces, where people make up nearly three-quarters of the annual cost. NATO has as many men in its active-duty ground forces as the Pact, and ample trained re- serves. Bean counts also fail to show how the resources on each side might be concen- trated over time in the theater of interest, which most assessments agree is the West German border or, in NATO terminology, the "Central Region." A better method of estimate lies in direct- ly measuring the combat effectiveness of military formations, and the rates at which these formations can be deployed into a the- ater of war. Tables 3 and 4 are based on measures of this kind, and are derived from data describing three variables: (1) the rela- tive values assigned to different military formulations and weapons, usually convert- ed into some kind of division-equivalent; (2) the quantity of resources that each side is assumed to allocate to the Central Region; and (3) the speed with which each side can bring these reinforcements into the battle. . . Tables 3 and 4 present different balance estimates derived from such measures, giving a spread of views on the fighting power of the forces likely to be available on each side at different times during the first four months after mobilization. While di- verging somewhat from one another, all three estimates provide a better guide to NATO and Pact capabilities than the simple "bean count". Moreover, when these esti- mates are transformed into statements about NATO requirements, all three meas- ures point towards the same conclusion, sug- gesting that while NATO lacks a robust con- ventional defense today, the shortfall be- tween capabilities and requirements is not insurmountable. Each of these models estimates the strength of ground forces alone, excluding air forces, but in doing so all focus on the element of the overall theater balance that has caused the most concern. None of the three depicts the balance under the tradi- tional "worse case" of a fully mobilized Warsaw Pact army confronting an unmobi- lized and indecisive NATO, since this sce- nario seems relatively unlikely. Each of the three assumes that NATO begins mobilizing three days after the Pact begins. While differing in detail and in relative optimism about the balance, these three es- timates paint a broadly similar picture, as the force ratios in Table 3 show. The bal- ance is about even in peacetime, but after mobilization it shifts more or less rapidly in the Pact's favor until NATO is outnumbered by about 2:1. Moreover, the table shows that current NATO plans for strengthening ground forces do not promise much relative im- provement by 1990. My extrapolations from current plans show that while both sides will add a few Heavy Division Equivalents, the relative balance in 1990 at M+30 (thirty days after the Pact begins mobilizing) will not be greatly changed from today. The principal benefits to NATO from currently planned improvements all come within the first two weeks after mobilization and are primarily due to planned improvements in the peacetime standing forces in Europe and to the more rapid arrival of early U.S. reinforcements. In a comparison of details, the three esti- mates agree on some matters and disagree on others. In figures not presented in my tables, they agree that NATO will have about 30 divisions available in the Central Region on the day of mobilization (M-Day) or soon thereafter. By the end of two weeks, NATO will deploy a total of 43-47 divisions. The key issue creating this numerical spread is whether France would commit all of its available armored and mechanized di- visions to defend Germany or only the 5 di- visions of the First French Army (3 of which are stationed in Germany). During the next 75 days, NATO strength rises to a total of 49-61 divisions, with all of this fur- ther increase being supplied by American reinforcements. In comparison, the Warsaw Pact would deploy roughly 32 Soviet-style divisions on M-Day, and is expected to deploy some 56- 57 Soviet-style divisions by M+9 to M+10, rising to 110-120 Soviet-style divisions by M+60 to M+ 90. The key issues creating these numerical spreads lie in disputes over the rate of Pact buildup and the eventual size of the committed Soviet force. All three estimates agree, however, that the Pact would gain a substantial lead by M+60 to M+90. All three estimates also agree that the Pact gains its edge over NATO mobilizing reserve manpbwer to fill out skeleton units. While nearly 80 percent of the reinforcing Pact division formations require mobilization of reserves, this is true of only 40 percent of reinforcing NATO divi- sions: active duty units make up about 60 percent of the NATO reinforcements to arrive in the first two months. In sum, the current conventional balance in Central Europe is about even prior to mo- bilization and shifts more or less rapidly to the Pact's favor after mobilization, until NATO is outnumbered by about 2:1. Most of the improvement in the Pact's relative strength comes from skeleton units filled out with reserve manpower. NATO is not credited with a comparable ability to create additional combat power from its own man- power reserves during the first weeks after mobilizing. Anticipated changes in forces on both sides between now and 1990 will im- prove NATO's position in the early phases of mobilization but will not fundamentally alter the relative balance. ESTIMATING NATO'S CONVENTIONAL REQUIREMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE If the more pessimistic buildup curves for the Warsaw Pact and NATO shown in Tables 3 and 4 represent reality, the Pact- NATO force ratio exceeds 2:1 after about two weeks of mobilization. In that situation, most analysts would agree that NATO needs to add forces if it wishes to have a better than even probability of preventing a large- scale conventional attack from achieving a breakthrough in the Central Region, an event that would force N ATO to consider using nuclear weapons. The problem is to define how much needs to be added. The objective in adding forces to the NATO side is to improve the chances of de- terring conventional military threats and conventional war by making it appear to the Soviet leadership that a conventional attack probably would not succeed. From a strictly political perspective, equality of forces would appear to offer the best deterrent. fHlowever, equality of forces does not guar- antee deterrence and superiority does not guarantee victory. How much more force NATO needs to add depends on one's assess- ment of the strategy of Pact and NATO forces and of their relative quality. I have used two concepts to measure qual- ity. The first, and more significant, defines the local ratio of attackers to defenders at which the defense will have a better than even probability of defeating an attack. It is an estimate of the relative effectiveness of the two sides in employing firepower and maneuver to attack and defend terrain, and could be termed an index of relative tactical effectiveness. The second concept of quality estimates the fraction of available NATO "operational reserve"?divisions not committed to the first line of defense?which can actually be moved quickly to shore up those sectors of the front that are under heaviest attack. The second concept captures the effects of Imperfect intelligence, mobility constraints, and bad decisions, and could be termed a NATO efficiency index. Ulf one rejects the more pessimistic curves shown in Tables 3 and 4, and the more pessimistic estimate of NATO effec- tiveness, and also assumes a more risk- averse_Pact strategy and greater NATO effi- ciency, then one may conclude that NATO does not need to add any forces. As Table 3 shows, William Mako has estimated that the Pact may not be able to rapidly assem- ble large numbers of divisions manned mostly by reservists, and could take 90 to 120 days to get its fully mobilized 81 Ar- mored Division Equivalents (ADEs) into place. To summarize, Table 3 can be used with other assumptions to support irguments that NATO does not need to add divisions or that it needs to add as many as 45 HDEs, in order to have a credible defense posture. Thus, one's definition of a NATO require- ment depends heavily on one's assumption not only about comparative buildup rates but also about strategy, tactical effective- ness, and what I have called efficiency, which is a measure of ability to bring avail- able forces to bear where needed. While NATO's forces might hold today, their margin of safety is thin and successful NATO defense would depend not only on relatively ineffective Pact strategy and tac- tics, but also on a uniformly high degree of NATO tactical effectiveness and efficiency. In my judgment, the margin is too thin for effective conventional defense. USING EUROPEAN RESERVES TO MEET NATO REQUIREMENTS The NATO European allies can meet these requirements at relatively small cost, by reorganizing and arming the trained mili- tary manpower that is now largely wasted in lightly armed and poorly orgainzed reserve forces. Six European states contribute to the de- fense of the Central Region: Belgium, Bri- tian, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Together, they have a great deal of under-utilized trained military manpower in their reserves and in their lightly armed active-duty units. This man- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1676 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE power is now largely relegated to light combat units, most of which are not as- signed or committed to NATO, and which serve anachronistic functions such as terri- torial militia. Indeed, contrary to wide- spread belief, the European members of NATO probably have enough trained mili- tary manpower to more than double their present contributions to alliance ground forces in the Central Region, if this man- power were properly organized into regular NATO reserve formations. What is lacking is the requisite organization, equipment, training, and supplies to convert this man- power?NATO's wasted resource?into combat potential. European reserves clearly could supply more than enough manpower to create the 20 additional Heavy Division Equivalents that I suggest NATO requires to provide a robust defense in the 1990s. It is not impractical to create rapidly mo- bilized heavy combat formations from re- serves. The Soviet Union does it. Israel relies on such mobilization. Britian, Den- mark, the Netherlands, and West Germany all do so on a smaller scale. What I am sug- gesting is that these European allies, to- gether with Belgium and France dramatical- ly increase the capabilities of their remain- ing reserves, and some active duty units, in much the same way. The addition Of the requisite 20 armored and mechanized division-equivalents would absorb less than half of the very large pool of trained but under-utilized European mili- tary manpower. Indeed, the European allies appear to have the capability to field as many as 45 additional Heavy Division Equivalents if, as some analysts have argued., they restructure to take more ad- vantage of trained manpower, and use more civilians in support upon mobilization. The addition of these 45 HDEs would bring NATO fairly close to equality with the Pact at M +60. SUBSTITUTES FOR GROUND FORCES? Like the United States, the northern Eu- ropean allies will experience declining num- bers of 18-year-olds each year during the 1980s and early 1990s. Recent developments in precision-guided, conventional anti-tank submunitions (PGSMs) capable of wide-area coverage have persuaded some that these could be substituted for tactical nuclear weapons in NATO arsenals in sufficient number to compensate for the disparity be- tween Warsaw Pact and NATO ground forces in the Central Region. However, the costs and military benefits of what NATO cans "emerging technol- ogies" are highly speculative, involve long development lead times, and raise new arms control questions. At present, the emerging technologies are a major focus of European efforts to demonstrate movement towards more reliance on conventional weaponry. As time goes by, however, these weapons are likely to look less attractive as a unique so- lution to NATO's conventional weakness. In limited numbers they may help to deter short-warning attacks and also to force Pact planners to consider less concentrated, hence higher-risk, conventional attack op- tions. But while they may supplement added ground forces, they cannot provide a full substitute. Mr. WIRTH. Mr. President; I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant, legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able to proceed for 11 minutes as though in morning business. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Vermont. CHIEF GEORGE CONNOR Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, during the years I was growing up in Montpe- lier, we always knew that our very spe- cial community was protected because of the dedication and concern of Chief George Connor. Even though as youngsters we had the proper respect and awe of the chief of police, we also knew that he was a man who would stop and speak with each one of us and actually knew every single young- ster in Montpelier. Chief Connor was always a good friend of my mother and father and I know how often both my parents spoke of him. Because so many of us who grew up in Montpelier owe so much to him, I was pleased to see an article recently written about Chief Connor and I am sure his many friends have called him to talk about it. I would like to share it with my fellow Senators, and I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: GEORGE CONNOR REMEMBERS HIS DAYS ON THE FORCE (By Mame Ramey) George Connor, 85 of Montpelier, has in- fluenced his birthplace more than he might imagine. His life, or at least 40 years of it, has been spent keeping the peace in Mont- pelier. His parents and grandparents were of strong Vermont stock and he learned well the practicality needed for his lifestyle. Grandfathers on both sides of his family served in the Civil War. He recalls one of the gentlemen, his mother's father, was very tall and had a flowing white beard that touched the ground. In the winter he tucked it into his vest for warmth. The man, as did many of George's ancestors, lived well Into his nineties. George's father cut stone, outlived many of his peers and died at 88. He was an out- standing athlete. He gave boxing and wres- tling lessons and was a very good ball player?both batter and catcher. "They used to come from all over the state to drag him off to play," says George proudly. "They used his name in advertise- ments. My brother was good player too. Once father had to go to England to check out a surface cutting machine for granite. He went by boat and there was some legal hold up. Finally mother went over, three weeks it took, to join him. While he was there waiting for the okay to come home, he organized the first all American baseball league in England." George's mother born in Moretown. His grandmother made all the family bread without a recipe and her own mincemeat for March 2, 1988 pie. He says she never could show any of her 12 children how to do it and they never could pass their own good bread off as hers. "I remember that we were happy chil- dren," says George. "We made up our own games and had a good time. I think life was better back then when we farmed in Middle- sex." "I remember one year I shot a deer and tracked it from Middlesex to Waterbury Center," George recalls. "I was afraid some- one else was going to shoot it. It went right through a barnyard not six feet from the barn door where a farmer stood plucking a bird, maybe a turkey. He never saw it. As I was pointing out the tracks right next to him we heard two shots and someone else finished off my deer. I walked home through Middlesex Notch Road. I was so tired. I went by a farmhouse and the folks asked me what I was doing out on Thanks- giving day so I told them the story and how far I had walked. They were very friendly and had me come inside to rest and eat. After I did, I headed home and shot and killed a big spikehorn at dusk right within sight of my house. I took those nice people a hunk of that deer. "It was very different then. If a man took sick, all his neighbors chipped in to do his work and they did it just the way_he would. When the thresher came each year to do the wheat, it came to each farm and all the men and women worked together. I tell you, if the food wasn't good they wouldn't come back next time to help out. "About the time there was a shortage of wheat, my folks moved to Montpelier. My wife, Lillian and I stayed and farmed a while. She was 18 and I was 19. Then we moved to Montpelier. My folks ran a poor farm in Montpelier. There were people there who had had money and lost it and people who had never had it. My folks ran a good farm. All the food that went on the table was good and the very same food my family ate, not like some other places. "I sold the farm in Middlesex and went to work for Dad," says George. "I was waiting for a job in the Lane Shops. The pay there was good. Father had been on the police force twice but it didn't pay well and he didn't stay with it. I was trapping with a friend who had an automobile. We made over $200 a year which, in those days was enough to buy .a small farm. So things were pretty good. "We had been setting fox traps in springs and I remember it was a pretty dry fall be- cause it was hard to find springs for the traps. It had rained steadily all one day and we thought it would help with trapping. I started for home with the car and realized the water in the culvert was boiling. When I tried to cross it, the ear sunk in and got stuck. I got out and walked the rest of the way home. Every bridge was out. I couldn't get across the river to get to my-family so I borrowed a plank from a farmer and walked over, the water. The farmer thought I was crazy but my wife was on the other side. The next morning I walked back across and down to where I had left the car. Someone had pulled it with a team of horses so I got back into it and drove to town. "When I got to the city hall," says George, "there was a lawyer on the front steps named Deavitt. He asked me what I was doing for work and I told him I hoped to work in the Lane Shops soon. He said, 'No you won't. From now on you are a po- liceman.' I tried every way out of it but it was Marshall Law and there was nothing I could do. That was November 4, 1927. I re- tired from the force 40 years later in 1967 and had served for 15 years as the Chief of Police of Montpelier. I knew enough about Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1677 it I guess, they said use common sense and that is what I did. After a while the money got better. The people of Montpelier were very good to me. I had gone to school with many of them and I think it helped that they knew me. . ? "We used to work 11 hour shifts and every 15th day we got a day off. The men on the day shift got $27.50 a month but some of us worked special assignment and we were paid better. We got $1.25 a day. I didn't have any schooling for the job, but a local banker took me under his wing and talked to me a lot about common sense. I think I used it pretty good. One time I almost messed up. "I was standing on the corner and a car came around wobbling back and forth," he says. "I stopped the car and had the driver get out. He was staggering all over the place so I took him down to jail. The next morn- ing when I went to get him out, he was still staggering. I asked him if he was sick or something and he said no. He had two artifi- cial legs! I told his wife right away, I would go talk to the judge and get it straightened out but she said no. She Said he had been drinking heavily and they both felt he de- served what had happened. They had a pretty good sized boy with them and he drove home. "Back then you didn't get arrested for in- toxication unless you broke the peace. It was a serious offense to have on your record and it could keep you from getting a job. So unless you were making a lot of trouble, you didn't get arrested. We didn't have cars on the force then and I've carried quite a few men home on my back. I could always tell the drifters Would make trouble when they were drinking. They wanted to go to jail where it was warm and dry and where they would get food. For the first offense it was 10 days in jail, for the second it was 30 days, and for the third it was six months in Wind- sor State Prison. I always thought those men were better off because they would be in long enough to get dried out." In 1922, George married Lillian Holmes, whom he found out later, he had gone to kindergarten with. Lillian's father was from Maine and as a child she moved there while her father worked as a carpenter building houses. When the family got homesick they returned to Vermont. Later Lillian, who had two sisters, moved to Massachusetts with a married sister and worked in an office job for a time. The money was very good but she soon got homesick and returned to Ver- mont. George met her again at a dance and, thinking they "were fully grown," they soon married. They raised a son and daughter and were married for 64 years. "Lillian was very handy, "George says fondly. "She worked in a store some and she could make any kind of clothing and people would think it has come from the store. Back then, she had to wear uniforms made of 16-ounce serge. They were double-breast- ed-with a military color. They were brutal in the summer. One night, she didn't say any- thing to me but she moved all the buttons, opened up the neck and let the whole thing out. I didn't know if it would make trouble or not but I wore it to work. The chief took one look at it and said, 'That looks good.' He got permission to order open-collar, single- breasted coats. I'm sure we were the first in the state of Vermont to wear open collars. Later we even went to shirt sleeves in the summer." George's children both live in California and he has flown out to spend time with each of them. He now has six grandchildren and 12 great-grandchildren. He feels he has been blessed with a healthy and fortunate life. He never has been very sick except for the time as a child when he broke some ribs in a sleighing accident and the time a year ago when he fell and broke a couple more. He spends three days a week at the Montpe- lier Senior Center where he socializes and plays some serious pool. George thinks his good health is due to all of the exercise he gets and a very slow heart rate. His hobbies are hunting and fishing and although he couldn't pursue either this year, he plans to next. He is concerned about the obvious effort of acid rain on-the streams and ponds and isn't sure where he might find fish next summer but intends to look for them. NORIEGA HAS TO GO Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I come to the floor on a very serious matter this morning. Mr. President, I would like to take a look at a few facts about the turmoil In Panama. Panama is the main transshipment point for cocaine from Colombia coming into the United States. It is also the world banking center for laundering billions of dollars of drug money that comes from the poisoning of the youth of the United States. Gen. Manuel Noriega and his cronies have institutionalized corruption, put- ting Panama's military services, banks and even airfields at the service of drug traffickers. It is nothing less than the prostitution of an entire country. And their payoff? Kickbacks in the hundreds of million of dollars going into Swiss bank accounts and French villas. Yesterday, President Reagan signed an order penalizing Panama for failing to cooperate effectively in the fight against the drug trade. The United States Government gave Panama every chance?in fact, too, many chances for too many years a lot of us would say?to throw out its cor- rupt officers and officials. We waited and waited for Panama to find its na- tional honor and get rid of this common criminal, Manuel Noriega. I welcome President Reagan's action yesterday. But I am deeply concerned that he gave Noriega such a light tap in terms of real pressures on the Pana- manian economy. The President stopped short of im- posing the maximum penalties allowed under the law. In fact, the sanctions he imposed?cutoff of Panama's sugar quota and a 50-percent cut in United States aid?fall short of actions that we here in Congress had already legis- lated. 'Congress had directed that United States directors on international banks vote against loans to Panama. We ordered all economic and military assistance terminated, not just cut in half, but terminated, cut off entirely. We stopped the importation of Pana- manian sugar. And, we barred any funding of joint military exercises with the Panamanian military. Congress did this last year. The President drew back from ap- plying full trade sanctions, even though the law gave him the author- ity to do so. He apparently was not willing to be as tough as Congress al- ready had been. It was as if he found Noriega guilty of murder and then let him off with probation. This is not a time to pull punches. It is ironic that a President who de- clared war on drugs now refuses to use his power to punish a murderous mili- tary dictatorship that made its coun- try the hub of the South American drug trade. It is doubly ironic that this decision comes just days after General Noriega refused dismissal by the constitutional President, Eric Delvalle, after he staged a coup to oust the legitimate government and after he was indicted by two U.S. grand juries on Federal drug and racketeering charges. Mr. President, this administration talks tough on drugs until it is time to start being tough. Then it acts like its hands are tied. It is delighted to impose a complete trade embargo against Nicaragua and spend half a billion dollars of the taxpayers' money to overthrow the Sandinistas. But it cannot bring itself to institute even partial trade sanctions against a vicious military dictator who poses a far greater threat to this country than bankrupt Nicaragua. Drugs are pouring into this country from South America through Panama and Mexico. Efforts to eradicate co- caine at the source have failed. Drugs are killing thousands of young Ameri- cans every year. And what does the President say? That we have "turned the corner" on drugs. He seems to believe the "just say no" campaign is actually work- ing?when all the evidence is that we are in the middle of a nationwide drug epidemic. Remember that it was a courageous U.S. attorney in Florida who indicted Noriega on drug trafficking, not the Drug Enforcement Agency which cozied up to him for years. And it was our colleagues, Senators KERRY and D'AmATo, who held the hearings that tore the veil off the drug dealing by Noriega and his henchmen, not an administration that turned a blind eye until it could no longer be ignored. The Latin drug trade?not the ragtag Sandinistaa?is the most serious threat we face in our own hemisphere. There is no better place to demon- strate our resolve than to destroy the drug empire that is strangling Panama. The fight against drugs goes hand- in-hand with the fight for democracy in Panama. Last summer, thousands of Panamanians took to the streets and called for an end to oppression, an end to crime and corruption, and a return to democracy and the rule of law. They have had enough of seeing their country raped and pillaged by drug kingpins and power-crazed colonels. The United States shares the blame for this crisis. Until the evidence for Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1678 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --- SENATE his corruption just became overwhelm- ing, this administration was more in- terested in Noriega's support for the Contras through Oliver North than his subversion of democracy in Panama. The White House cannot have it both ways. It cannot claim it is carry- ing on a war against drugs while soft- pedaling the thugs in Panama who funnel the drugs into our schools and our streets. How can anyone argue against im- posing the strongest sanctions possi- ble? President Eric Arturo Delvalle, still in hiding in Panama, has called on the United States and the world's de- mocracies to levy tough sanctions on Panama as long as Noriega stays. General Noriega himself may be beyond pressure. But the colonels who keep him in power are not. We can show them just how painful things can get as long as Noriega is in, power. Sixty percent of Panama's exports come to the United States. The Presi- dent has the power to impose a 50-per- cent tax on those exports, to cut off preferential tariffs, and bar airline flights between Panama and the United States. The President could order an imme- diate cutoff of short-term loans by United States banks or other financial institutions to the government or Pan- amanian banks. This would have an obvious and severe impact on Panama- nian financial activity very quickly without harming United States banks unduly. Our banks are rapidly backing away from making these short-term loans to Panama anyway, and we would accelerate a process already un- derway. Even more draconian financial sanc- tions are possible, though we need to do more ?study to determine their impact before we make decisions. We do not want to harm ourselves more than Noriega or the power brokers who back him. Ultimately, if the colonels in Panama will not force Noriega to go quietly, the President could even impose a complete economic embar- go?just as he has done against Nicara- gua. Mr. President, I want to make a final point. Some political leaders, including, I am sorry to say, senior Members of this body from the other side of the aisle, have started talking about the United States abrogating the Panama Canal treaties. This is irresponsible, and plays right into the hands of Noriega and his gang. They are claiming that this is nothing more than a plot by the United States to get out of the treaties and take over the Canal Zone again. They are trying to pose as the nation- alist defenders of Panama's sovereign- ty over the canal. I urge all Senators and indeed all re- sponsible Americans to stop such talk. The treaties are permanent. We are not going to tear them up and go back to a ?dead past. The days when the United States could own a strip right through the center of another country are gone forever. Let us all join together for the common goal?kick out Noriega, re- store democracy to Panama, and save our children from the drug empire. You know, Mr. President, I spent 8Y2 years as a prosecutor. I know that if you want real law enforcement, you do not talk tough, you have to act tough. We cannot stop drug traffic in this country by just asking everybody to stand up and say, "Just say no." It has not worked in the past. It is not work- ing now. It is not going to work in the future. Let us stop it at the source. The quickest way to do that is to stop Gen- eral Noriega. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. BYRD, Mr. President, has morn- ing business closed? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. The Chair will respond that morning business is now closed. Mr. BYRD. I understand Senator KARNES wishes to speak in morning business. Mr. KARNES. Yes. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The Chair will recognize the Senator from Nebraska. Does he seek unanimous consent to extend the time for morning business? Mr. BYRD. No. I would object to that. How much morning business time re- mains? The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The Chair would advise the Sen- ator we have 30 seconds left for morn- ing business. Mr. BYRD. I do not want business to extend beyond 10:30. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. That request has not been made. Morning business was extended for 10 minutes. Mr. BYRD. I stand corrected. ORDER EXTENDING MORNING BUSINESS FOR 5 MINUTES Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that morning busi- ness be extended for 5 minutes. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so or- dered. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Nebraska, Senator KARNES. Mr. KARNES. Mr. President, I thank the leader very much for that accommodation. I appreciate that very much. (The remarks of Mr. KARNES will appear later in today's RECORD under "Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.") CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, is morn- ing business closed? March 2, 1.988 The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. We have 1 minute remaining under the unanimous-consent agree- ment. Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent morning business be closed. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. Morning business is closed. POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1987 Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask that the pending business be laid before the Senate. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The bill will be stated by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 1904) to strictly limit the use of lie detector examinations by employers in- volved in or affecting interestate commerce. The Senate resumed consideration of the bill. QUORUM CALL Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem? - pore. The absence of a quorum will be noted. Mr. BYRD. It will be a live quorum, Mr. President. As I indicated on yes- terday there will be a rollcall request- ing the Sergeant at Arms. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tern- pore. The clerk will call the roll to as- certain the presence of a quorum. The legislative clerk called the roll and the following Senators entered the Chamber and answered to their names: Adatns Breaux Byrd (Quorum No. 123 Ford Wallop Karnes Warner Leahy Wirth The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ADAMS). A quorum is not present. The clerk will call the names of the absent Senators. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move the Sergeant at Arms be instructed to request the presence of absent Sena- tors. I ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. CRANSTON. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Massachu- setts [Mr. KERRY], the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. MATSUNAGA], and the Sen- ator from Illinois [Mr. Simoril are nec- essarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Delaware [Mr. BIDEN) is absent because of illness. Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the the Senator from Kansas [Mr. DoLEl is necessarily absent. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE 8 1679 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there any other Senators in the Cham-, ber desiring to vote? The result was announced?yeas 67, nays 27, as follows: (Rollcall Vote No. 34 Leg.) YEAS-67 Adams Glenn Pell Baucus Graham Pressler Bentsen Grassley Proxmire Bingaman Harkin Pryor Boren Hatfield Reid Boschwitz Heflin Riegle Bradley Hollings Rockefeller Breaux Humphrey Roth Bumpers Inouye Rudman Burdick Johnston Sanford Byrd Names Sarbanes Chiles Kassebaum Sasser Cranston Kennedy Shelby Danforth Lautenberg Simpson Deschle Leahy Stafford DeConcini Levin Stennis Dixon McClure Stevens Dodd Melcher Thurmond Domenici Metzenbaum Trible Durenberger Mikulski Warner Exon Mitchell Wirth Ford Moynihan Fowler Nunn Armstrong Bond Chafee Cochran Cohen Conrad D'Amato Evans Garn NAYS-27 Gramm Hatch Hecht Heinz Helms Kasten Lugar McCain McConnell Murkowski Nickles Packwood Quayle Specter Synuns Wallop Weicker Wilson NOT VOTING-6 Biden Gore Matsunaga Dole Kerry Simon So the motion was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. A quorum is present. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the motion was agreed to. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I hope that Senators are ready to proceed with amendments on this bill. May I inquire if there are Senators on the floor who have amendments that they intend to call up? Mr. HELMS. I have one. Mr. BYRD. Mr. HELMS has one. Are there other amendments that will be called up? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. The majority leader is requesting that Members who wish to offer amendments please indi- cate at this time their intention. The Senator from North Carolina. The Senator from Wyoming. The majority leader. Mr. BYRD. I yield to the distin- guished Senator from Wyoming, the acting Republican leader; and ask unanimous consent that I might retain my right to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. The Senator from Wyoming, under the unanimous-consent request, is rec- ognized. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, the majority leader has asked about amendments on this side of the aisle. We have at least two of which I can inform the majority leader, an amend- ment of Senator COCHRAN and Senator NICKLES. So I can assure the majority leader that there are two amend- ments?three amendments, and the Senator from North Carolina. So we have three amendments here to show the majority leader we are anxious to do the business required. Mr. BYRD. I thank the distin- guished leader on the other side of the aisle. There will be a cloture vote on this measure tomorrow if it is not disposed of today. On yesterday, I introduced a cloture motion; there was-not an inclination at that time to call up amendments. Now, I hope that we could finish this bill today and thus vitiate the cloture vote for tomorrow. I also hope that we could take up the intelligence authori- zation bill. We only have today, Thurs- day, and a full day on Friday, and I would like to at least finish these two bills and take up the Price-Anderson legislation so that when the Senate re- turns from the break, the Senate will be on the Price-Anderson legislation. Now, I have indicated what I would hope to do, and I welcome any sugges- tions on the part of Senators that would help me to do what I have said I think the Senate needs to do. Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, will the leader yield? Mr. BYRD. Yes. First, let me ask if the distinguished acting leader has any suggestion or proposal that he would make at this time to assist the Senate in moving on that schedule ac- cordingly, if it can be done. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I would inform the majority leader that I think the aspect of the cloture vote does impel us to do our work, and we are going to do that. I think it would be good if the majority leader and I visited about what we visited about last night. I think perhaps we might be in a position to utilize the services of the new committee, the ad hoc com- mittee, for the referral of a sense-of- the-Senate resolution which could be discussed today, and I would like to visit with the majority leader about that. We have been asked to appoint one new member. I am ready to do that. That group would then deal with the rules issues that we discussed. Then we could go to a double track for the intelligence authorization and then get to Price-Anderson and be dealing with it and have it as the pending item of business when we return, because it is a very important piece of legislation. I think the scenario is appropriate, and I would respectfully suggest that, as Senator HELMS goes forward, the majority leader and I visit, and I think we can put this week's package togeth- er. Mr. BYRD. Very well. If the Senator will allow me to yield to Mr. JOHNSTON first. Mr. SIMPSON. Indeed. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader. Mr. BYRD. I yield, with the under- standing I retain my right to the floor, to the Senator from Louisiana. Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I thank the leader for yielding. As the leader knows, I am most anx- ious to bring up the Price-Anderson legislation, with only one caveat, and that is on Monday after the recess, our new Governor is being inaugurated, and our delegation wanted to be there and fly back that afternoon. There may be other aspects of the legislation which could be considered other than those that I am involved in that morn- ing, but I would not be available that morning unless ?there was no other way to do it, in which event I will probably cancel attendance at the in- auguration, but I hate to do that. Mr. BYRD. Yes. I fully appreciate .the Senator's situation and will be gov- erned accordingly. Mr. President, I wonder if I might make this proposal. In order to expe- dite, if I can, action on both this meas- ure, which is before the Senate, and the intelligence authorization meas- ure, and get action completed on those two bills this week and hopefully get into a position of taking up Price-An- derson for action following the recess, I wonder if Senators would give me consent that I might be able to main- tain the status quo position vis-a-vis the rules until later in the day, at such time as we may be able to give me con- sent to take up the intelligence au- thorization bill. What I am saying is I think now, so that Senators may understand, I am in position at this moment to move to take up the intelligence authorization bill. That would not require unani- mous consent. That would be a nonde- batable motion at this moment and will be for the next hour. I do not want to do that if I can get consent to take it up at any time today. I prefer that. But what I would like to do oth- erwise is move to take that up and have a vote on it. Of course, that vote would displace the pending business until tomorrow, at which time the clo- ture vote would occur and the Senate could vote for cloture on the pending business. I would like to proceed today either with the intelligence authorization matter or the pending business. But in any event, this would be one way of utilizing today not in a way that the Senate would be spinning its wheels. And with only Thursday and Friday left after today, unless today can be utilized beneficially and to the extent of making progress on both these measures, I am concerned that we may go out Friday without finishing action on one or both of these measures. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1680 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, would the majority leader yield? ? Mr. BYRD. Yes. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I real- ize that the procedures now could go forward on the nondebatable motion and the majority leader could go with what he wishes to go on, too. I would respectfully suggest that if he would withhold, I think I have about two Members here that I think consent could come from a little later in the day. I really do believe that. But after I visit with the leader about the other. proposal, there may be some material to deal with on the floor today. I can visit with him in his chambers after that. - Mr. BYRD. I certainly thank the distinguished Senator. I want to work with him. Mr. BOREN. Will the leader yield? Mr. BYRD. I hope that the Senate can make progress on the pending bill today, but I would not want to waste today.- Much of yesterday afternoon was wasted because we only have 2 days left this? week, and I hope we can -complete action on the pending busi- ness and on the intelligence authoriza- tion bill. -The chairman of the Intelli- gence Committee has indicated to me on yesterday that 'he and Senator COHEN . Would be ready at any time after yesterday to proceed to that bill. So what lam trying to do, let me say once again for the RECORD, is put the Senate in the position where it can complete action on .both those meas- ures and be ready to go .to Price-An- derson by the time the Senate goes ? out for the recess. Yes, I yield. Mr. BOREN. I thank the leader. I just want to state again that I be- lieve?and I talked with Senator COHEN about . this yesterday, and I talked with interested Senators on this matter; the intelligence oversight bill which was a committee product with strong majority on both sides of the aisle in favor of that bill, came out of ' committee by almost a unanimous vote?we are prepared as well to en- deavor to be ready at any point that the leader wishes to proceed to that. So we? will be prepared and ready if the leader decides to move forward on that legislation. I do not anticipate very many amendments in terms of volume that would delay consideration of that bill because it has been a matter that we have worked on in our committee for many, Many scores and scores of hours. Mr. BYRD. I thank the distin- guished Senator. my friend, the chair- man of the Intelligence Committee. ? Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, would the Senator yield "without of ? course' -losing his right to the floor? ? Mr. BYRD. Yes. ' ?,Mr. HELMS. May I inquire of the distinguished majority leader and the Republican leader if there are plans to proceed today with the General Burris nomination to the U.S Arnis Control' and Disarmanent Agency. I think that we should proceed unless there is some reason to not proceed. I do want to make a statement in that connection. But I have had repeated contact with the White House about this and other matters, and we have resolved all except one point which is not minor but I do not think we ought to delay the nomination of General Burns. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, may I say that Secretary Shultz spoke to me about this nomination last week, and I do hope-- Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I cannot hear the majority leader as near as I am to him. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senators will suspend. The Senate will be in order. Those Senators and others conversing will please take their seats or retire to the cloakroom. Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina ad- dressed a question to the majority leader. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I hope we can go to this nomination at some point today or certainly before the week is out. Secretary Shultz spoke to me about the nomination last week, ?and I would be yery happy to proceed on that matter at any time, if we can get clearance on it. Otherwise, we could move to it and dispose of that, hopefully, before the recess. I would like to add that to the list of items that I hope we can get done before the close of business on Friday. Mr. HELMS. Very well. I thank the leader. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I had heard some rumor to the effect that inasmuch as we have offered a cloture motion on the pending business, and that cloture vote will not occur until tomorrow, a good bit of today might be'spent in wrangling over the rules. I do not know whether there is any sub- Stance to that rumor or not. But I am not interested in spending today wran- gling over old bones. What I would like to do is get on with today's busi- ness and the authorization for intelli- ' gence. It is for that reason that I am asking now, and I ask unanimous consent be- - cause I want to have the opportunity to talk with the distinguished leader on the other side of the aisle, that I may yield the floor at this time, re- taining throughout the day the posi- tion that I maintain as of this moment; namely, the ability to move to make a motion to proceed to an- other matter on the Calendar of Busi- ness, that motion being nondebatable as of now and for the next 53 minutes. Also, at this moment, not only could I move to do that, which would tempo- rarily displace, if that motion carried, the pending business, but I would be In a position once the intelligence au- thorization bill was before the Senate to offer a cloture motion on it, and then I would have at this moment time remaining to 'move back to the March 2, 1988 pending business, and that again. would be a nondebatable motion. So I ask unanimous consent that I may yield the floor, and that the status quo situation in these respects may be continued until such time as. later in the day I could either take whatever action may appear to be the best at that time, or I waive the status quo.. This would allow me to have these conversations with the distin- guished leader on the other side. He would lose nothing, and nobody would, because I am in a position now of hold- ing the floor to move. Actually nobody loses any ?rights, under this matter. I would simply retain the rights that I have at this moment as the leader to act in the interests as I see of the Senate in moving forward on these two measures this week, plus the nom- ination. I yield, Mr. President, to the distin- guished acting leader. Mr. SIMPSON, Mr. President, that has been proposed as a unanimous- consent request. Reserving the right to object, and I just want to have it clearly said that the leader could do all of those things right now that he has discussed doing later. I think that is important for our people to realize that he could go to the nondebatable motion, the intelli- gence authorization, and I do not think we will have a bit of problem getting to that later today. have one person that has indicated some con- cern; and I think that will fall away and we can go to it from what,I under- stand. _ So I just want it to be certain that we all see that what he is doing by this unanimous consent is simply preserv- ing his procedural advantage of the moment which if we did not concur ? with the unanimous-consent agree- ment he could go ahead and de, anyway. I think that is important. I believe we can do some business today, and we will be in a position to do that. I think that after .we have a visit with the majority leader in his office, we will know a great deal more about the . progress of the day. At this point, I am well aware as to -what the majority leader could do at this moment, By agreeing' to this unanimous-consent request, it will ac- commodate that other Member, and we can go forward and allow, the ma: jority leader to preserve his position of the moment. I believe others may wish to speak.. Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? . Mr. BYRD. yield, without ? losing my right to the floor, to Mr. QUAYLE. First, let me thank the acting Re: publican leader. Mr. QUAYLE. Did! correctly under- stand the Republican leader to Say. .that he did not think that he wriUld raise an objection to the majority leader's request that he be in the same position later on? I had a difficult time hearing back here, with the noise. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15 : CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE I am trying to learn exactly what was said; because I will say, as one Senator who is somewhat interested in the bill?I can count noses and know where we are going?that there are a number of amendments on this bill that could or could not be called up. Senator HELMS has an amendment. The majority leader has the floor and has it in his power to move to do whatever he wants to. As one Senator, I would not like him to retain that throughout the day, because then it would not give some of us who may want to raise various issues an oppor- tunity to do so. He has the power to do that, if he wants to; that is his right. At least we would know what the re- mainder of today is going to be. I, for one, would not like to see him retain that status throughout the day. If the minority leader does not object, I would object to that status remain- ing throughout the day, because, it would not allow us, in the minority, to know how we are going to proceed throughout the day, and it would not be in the best interests of this Senator. I will object, if the minority leader does not, to allowing the status to remain throughout the day. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I share with my colleague from Indiana the fact that the majority leader can make that motion now, and we could lose all our status in this process, and the polygraph bill could then disap- pear and not come up again until we deal with it on cloture. What I am saying, and I think the majority leader will concur, is that we have three amendments?an amend- ment by the Senator from North Caro- lina, one by Mr. COCHRAN, and one by Mr. NicKLES. All those amendments, I assume, will be dealt with, without question, as the majority leader pro- pounds this unanimous-consent re- quest. We want to make progress on poly- graph. We have these three amend- ments. If there are others, I will imme- diately communicate them. I know of no other amendments. I know of no dilatory amendments. We are not in- terested in wrangling. We have serious concerns which I think can be resolved in a procedure that the majority leader and I have discussed, and I have discussed it with my Members. I think we all should realize that at this point, under the morning hour, we are a bit defenseless as to what could be done. Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, will the majority leader yield for an obser- vation? Mr. BYRD. Before the Senator re- sponds, may I say that I think the Senator raises a reasonable point. I do not think I should ask to retain this privilege throughout the day. I would be willing to limit it to a couple of hours. I am sure that I will be able to say within a couple of hours where we are going and whether or not Senators are going to be offering serious amend- ments to the pending business. All I am asking is that we get the business going and have serious amendments and not engage in extra- neous type of amendments. Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for an observation? Mr. BYRD. I yield, without losing my right to the floor. Mr. QUAYLE. I certainly under- stand the majority leader wanting to retain his right, whether it be all day or until 3 o'clock, to see what the flow of events is going to be. He certainly can move now. I would like to establish what the flow of events is going to be as soon as possible, and that means within 2 hours. If he wants to move the intelligence authorization bill, the majority leader can do so, and I will know that is the pending business. I do not want to pro- long what may happen throughout the day, because, depending on wheth- er we go to the intelligence authoriza- tion bill or stay on this bill is going to determine what I am going to do. The minority leader does, not know what is going to happen, under the 2- hour rule, and the majority leader has the power, established by precedent, to move to do that. If he makes that decision, the Senator from Indiana will make his decision on what he wants to do. That is why I will object to retaining that status by the majori- ty leader. I would like to know what we are going to do. I believe we can sit down during this 2-hour timeframe which expires at 12 o'clock. We have 45 min- utes to see if we can get an under- standing. I do not desire to go beyond that. The majority leader can make his decision, and then we can make our decision. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am happy that the Senator is ready to make a decision. Yesterday afternoon, I did not see a great inclination on the part of Senators to move this bill along. I ask unanimous consent that I may retain for 1 hour the status quo inso- far as the position I am in vis-a-vis the rules and precedents-1 hour. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request? Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I would like to clarify that. Would it be 1 hour past the hour of 12? Mr. BYRD. No. One hour from this moment. I have until 12. I am simply asking for an additional 15 minutes. That would give the assistant Republi- can leader and myself time to have our discussion. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I want to clarify another thing. I have assumed, as I have heard the majority leader propound the request, that the leader is not in any way using this ar- rangement to cut off amendments to the polygraph bill. Mr. BYRD. No. Mr. SIMPSON. I think that is im- portant. S 1681 I can now share with the majority leader that there is another amend- ment, by Senator BOSCHWITZ. So there are four amendments to be dealt with. That is important in doing our busi- ness. Perhaps my friend from Indiana has something further to add, but at this point I would not object to the unani- mous consent request for 1 hour. Mr. QUAYLE. Mr. President, reserv- ing the right to object?and I will not object, in deference to the majority leader and the minority leader?it is my understanding that the unanimous consent request is that the 2-hour rule expire not at 12 but at 12:15, which would allow time for discussion. Is- that correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is the understanding of the Chair, that it be until 12:15. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I will make it easier on all Senators, so that this discussion can be brought to a close. I ask unanimous consent that I be recognized at the hour of 12 noon and at that time my rights will continue as they are, or I can hold the floor until then, or I can move now. Mr. QUAYLE. Reserving the right to object on the first unanimous con- sent request-- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Indiana. Mr. QUAYLE. With respect to ob- jecting to that, in deference to the ma- jority leader and the minority leader, extending it 15 minutes, I will not object. But I will put the Senate on notice that if there are further re- quests to extend that, I will be con- strained to object, so that we will know what the order of business will be by 12:15. Mr. BYRD. I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Has the majority leader withdrawn the first request or is it still pending? Mr. BYRD. I guess I would withdraw the second request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The second request is withdrawn. The first request, which was unanimous consent to extend the period until 12:15?is that request to be propounded by the majority leader? Mr. BYRD. That is the request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. BYRD. I will also ask unani- mous consent to be recognized at 12:15. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the two requests of the majority leader: ',hat the time be extended to 12:15 and that the majori- ty leader be entitled to recognition at 12:15? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank all Senators. I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator yields the floor. The Senator from North Carolina-. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1682 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM BURNS AND ABM TREATY Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I thank the Chair. In further reference to the colloquy between this Senator and the distin- guished majority leader concerning the nomination of General Burns, to be Director of the Arms Control and Dis- armament Agency, I would like for the record to show that I have been in direct consultation with General Powell and others at the White House about this nomination and about mat- ters related thereto. Now, General Burns appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, and I would emphasize that he testified freely and frankly about the problems facing arms control in the near future. General Burns is an able man, and I support his nomination to be head of ACDA. ACDA, however, Mr. President, has a great deal of other problems which have gone unresolved for far too long, for months on end. There are three reports long overdue which are of significant importance to this Senate in the consideration of the INF Treaty. The Senate cannot responsibly pro- ceed to markup and have discussion of the INF Treaty without having the in- formation in these reports, all of which are mandated by law, I might add. So technically speaking, the law is being violated by the protracted ab- sence of these reports. Moreover, ACDA is under investiga- tion by both the FBI and the GAO for serious breaches of national security. My office has received detailed infor- mation about the shredding and burn- ing of several bags of documents from the offices under investigation. My discussion with the White House has been to ascertain where the White House stands and to make sure that the White House understands where I stand, because this incident casts a shadow over ACDA's role in the INF negotiations, which I hope General Burns will remedy. Now, as to the reports which I men- tioned, they are as follows: First is the third 5-year review report on Soviet ABM Treaty compli- ance which was due last October. The second is the report required under section 52 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act which we call the Pell amendment report. The required report is on Soviet and United States compliance with arms control treaties, and that report is 1 month overdue al- ready, or more. And the third is a report required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, section 37, which we refer to as the Derwinski amendment report and that report was due months ago. But not a peep out of ACDA. That is what the discussion between this Senator and the White House has been about, and there is going to be a lot of discussion from now on, and an amendment which we will have pend- ing in just a few months will deal with that. It is time for them to get off the dime. These reports are highly signifi- cant, Mr. President. The third 5-year review must decide whether there have been any material breaches of the ABM Treaty. In my judgment, and in the judgment of many other Senators, the seven re- ports which the President has sent to Congress show conclusively that there have been material breaches of the ABM Treaty by the Soviet Union. That is no secret around this place. We all know it, whether we acknowl- edge it or not. The difference, however, is that the 5-year review must be conducted at the standing consultative committee with the Soviets themselves, and, oh, Mr. President, that is the hangup. There is a tendency among so many down in the State Department not to ruffle any Soviet feathers. Some call it appeasement. Some call it get along, go along. Well, this is the first time the ad- ministration must actually confront the Soviets in an international forum with these material breaches which the President of the United States has reported to us, but not a peep out of the administration. They are too busy encouraging the euphoria about a seri- ously flawed INF Treaty. Now, of course, the consequences of such a confrontation have a bearing not only on the INF Treaty, but upon all ongoing negotiations. The Pell amendment report must certify United States and Soviet com- pliance with arms control treaties. That is what the amendment which is now law requires. And the Derwinski amendment, as we call it around this place, that report must report on the verification of proposed treaties, in- cluding the INF Treaty. Now, up to this point, in addition to the telephone conversations between General Powell and me and others, I have a letter from General Powell to the effect that the Pell amendment report will be submitted to Congress by March 14 and the Derwinski amendment report by March 8. This is good progress, and I feel that we have made some headway, and I appreciate the cooperation of General Powell and others. But General Powell's response on the third 5-year review is somewhat less than satisfactory, and I was candid with the general about it. He knows how I feel, and I think I know the spot he is in. But that does not matter. What matters is that compli- ance was due last October, not this coming October, and there is a great dragging of feet because they do not want to ruffle the feathers of the Soviet Union. The general, General Powell, stated that he felt the United States has until next October to complete that review, and I will get to it in just a March 2, 1988 minute, but the United States does not have that luxury. The United States was required to have it last October, not this coming October, and I will get to that in short order. I told the general we will just have to agree to disagree agreeably, but that he was engaging in a strained in- terpretation of treaty law which has no legal precedent in an effort to delay the review and the report for more than a year. I think it makes no sense to proceed with any treaty, including the INF, until this 5-year review is accom- plished, but that is the problem. All the warts will be visible in terms of the Soviet Union's duplicity, its violation, its flagrant violations of the ABM Treaty, not to mention all other trea- ties down the line dating back to 1920. I have confidence that General Powell and others will act in good faith on this. I have confidence that he will consult their attorneys and ask them what the language means, and I have confidence that their attorneys will tell him, "This was due last Octo- ber; Senator HELMS was right." And that is why I mentioned to the majority leader earlier that I personal- ly, as one Senator, hoped that the Senate would proceed to the nomina- tion of General Burns and get this gentleman confirmed. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that my letter to the President, bearing the date of February 22, be printed in the RECORD, followed by the letter from General Powell, dated Feb- ruary 25. There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC, February 22, 1988. The PRESIDENT, The White House, Washington, DC. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The nomination of Maj. General William Burns to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is now on the Senate Calendar awaiting action. General Burns testified forthrightly and fully at his nomination hearing and appears to be an excellent nominee. While I am willing to do anything of a reasonable nature to expedite confirmation of General Burns, I am obliged to state that I am convinced that it would be counterpro- ductive to debate General Burns' nomina- tion-at a time when ACDA appears to be in non-compliance with its legal obligations?a situation that clouds the current hearings over the INF Treaty. I have received reports from witnesses that large quantities of documents were shredded late last week in ACDA offices under investigation by the FBI and GAO. There is an Implicit confirmation of these reports in that today an order was issued that no documents should be shredded. I am apprehensive that this order was issued too late. Moreover, there are three reports mandat- ed by law which are overdue. All three have important bearing on the INF Treaty, and it will be difficult to mark up the treaty intel- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1683 ligently unless they are received in a timely fashion. These reports include: (1) The Third Five Year Review report on Soviet ABM Treaty compliance (three and one-half months overdue); (2) The Arms Control and Disarmament Act Section 52 (Pell Amendment) report on Soviet and U.S. compliance with arms con- trol treaties (one month overdue); (3) The Arms Control and Disarmament Act Section 37 (Derwinski Amendment) report (months overdue). It is essential that the GAO be given an opportunity to comment upon the docu- ment-shredding before General Burns as- sumes his post; it is also essential that the three reports be delivered to the Senate in a timely manner. I want to be cooperative, and if the above matters can be dealt with, confirmation of General Burns can be expedited. Sincerely, JESSE HELMS. THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, DC, February 25, 1988. DEAR SENATOR HELMS: Your letter of Feb- ruary 22 to the President raises several issues in connection with the Senate confir- mation of the pending nomination of Major General William F. Burns to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am pleased to note that your con- cerns are not related to General Burns' per- sonal qualifications for the position which, obviously, we both agree are excellent. With regard to the three reports you ad- dressed, the report required by Section 37 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act will be forwarded to the Congress not later than March 8. The report on compliance with arms control treaties, the so-called Pell Amendment report, will be submitted to the Congress no later than March 14. We believe that the third ABM Treaty review should take place consistent with Ar- ticle XIV of the ABM Treaty. Under that provision, the parties have until October of this year to accomplish such a review. We have informed the Soviet Union that ar- ? rangements for the Treaty review, to occur prior to October 1, will be made through diplomatic channels. With respect to reports of documents being shredded at ACDA that might be re- lated to a GAO review, General Burns has given his personal assurances that, if con- firmed, he looks forward to cooperating fully with the GAO and the FBI as they conduct ongoing investigations. I hope you agree with our judgment that General Burns should be confirmed as soon as possible, so that we may have the benefit of his leadership in dealing with the arms control issues that lie ahead. Your support in expediting General Burns confirmation would be deeply appreciated. Sincerely, COLIN L. POWELL. POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1987 The Senate continued with consider- ation of the bill S. 1904. AMENDMENT NO. 1488 (Purpose: To encourage the United States to end its present violation of the ABM Treaty) Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send to the desk an unprinted amendment and I ask that it be stated. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from North Carolina (Mr. HELMS) proposes an amendment numbered 1488. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further read- ing of the amendment be dispensed with. Mr. KENNEDY. Reserving the right to object, I inquire of the Senator from North Carolina if I may have a copy of the amendment., Mr. HELMS. That is a fair proposi- tion. Mr. KENNEDY. I did not get a copy of the amendment. Mr. HELMS. I assure the Senator will have it in his hands within 10 sec- onds. I thought it already had been done. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I object. The amendment is a short one. I will object. Mr. HELMS. No, it is not a short amendment. I am going to explain it. Mr. BYRD. It is a short one to read. I was just objecting to the calling off of the reading of the amendment. Mr. HELMS. That is fine. I will be glad to have it read. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: Add at the end of the bill the following new section: "Ssc. . (a) Findings. (1) The Senate finds that the Treaty Be- tween the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, With Associated Protocol, (hereinafter the "ABM Treaty" or the "Treaty") in its Arti- cle XIV, Paragraph 2, reads as follows: "Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty." (2) The Senate further finds that such Treaty entered into force on October 3, 1972, and that the third five-year anniversa- ry date specified by Article XIV, Paragraph 2, for the conduct of the review contemplat- ed therein was October 3, 1987. (3) The Senate further finds that, as a fundamental principle of the canons of legal construction, a specified number of years after a specific and determinable date means and can only mean the specified an- niversary of such date and not any time during such year as may follow such date. (4) The Senate finds further that had the Parties to the ABM Treaty intended other- wise then Article XIV, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty would have read "During the fifth year after entry into force of this Treaty," but it does not so read. (5) The Senate finally finds that the Par- ties to the Treaty have not met as required by Article XIV, Paragraph 2, because the United States of America refused or neglect- ed to meet on the date required, to wit: Oc- tober 3, 1987, and that the United States, five months later, still fails or neglects to meet or even to establish a date for meeting. (b) Taking account of the findings of this Section, it is the sense of the Senate that the United States is violating the ABM Treaty.". (Mr. HEFLIN assumed the chair.) Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, now I will explain what you have just heard read by the clerk, although I know the distinguished Chair understands the amendment as it has been read. A number of months ago, Mr. Presi- dent, our distinguished colleague from Arkansas, Mr. BUMPERS, alluded in this Chamber to a possible American viola- tion of the ABM Treaty. At that time, I asked the able Senator from Arkan- sas if he would specify the violation he had in mind. The ensuing discussion on the floor resulted in Senator BUMP- ERS never identifying the violation and, frankly, I did not pursue the matter. We left it right there. Now I find myself in the somewhat interesting position of concurring with the view of the Senator from Arkan- sas, Mr. BUMPERS, that the United States has in fact engaged in a viola- tion of the ABM Treaty. It probably is not the kind of violation that the Sen- ator had in mind, although it may be. I do not know what he had in mind. In any event, as the amendment states, article XIV, paragraph 2 of the ABM Treaty reads as follows?and the actual text is important, Mr. Presi- dent. Without understanding what the treaty actually says, some Senators, understandably, might be misled by the glib arguments and obfuscation of the State Department lawyers. Now the provision that I referred to, article XIV, paragraph 2, reads: "Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and as 5-year intervals there- after, the Parties"?and that means the Soviet Union and the United States?"the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty." That is article XIV, paragraph 2 of the ABM Treaty. All right. Mr. President, the term "entry into force of this treaty" is a legal specification of a date certain. It does not mean about such-and-such a time. It does not mean we will slip it further down the road a year or 6 months or 30 days. It means what it says. The joint committee print entitled "Legislation on Foreign Relations" on page 69 states categorically that "The ABM Treaty"?and I am quoting?"en- tered into force on October 3, 1972." Now, bear that in mind: October 3, 1972. That is when this treaty entered Into force. So it follows, as Sam Ervin used to say, at least to those who are able to read and understand the English lan- guage, that "5 years after" October 3, 1972, is obviously October 3, 1977, and that the date of the two succeeding 5- year intervals after that date, October 3, is?guess what??October 3, 1987, not 1988, unless they have changed arithmetic since I have learned it. So that is the hangup between the Senator from North Carolina and the White House and the State Depart- ment and on down the list. They are trying to say that October?no, they do not even say that. They say the 1st of October of this year. That is not what the treaty says. In other words, they are engaged in an interpretation that is contrary to the plain meaning of the English language used. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1684 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 2, 1988 So that report is long overdue right now and to delay it until the 1st of Oc- tober of 1988 just will not wash. Maybe I ought to spell it out in Eng- lish. A year is the length of time it takes the Earth to orbit the Sun. We read all about that on February 29. In practical usage, it is either 365 days or 366 days in a leap year. Either way, it is fairly precise. You can get down to where that orbit is 365 days and 6 hours or 365 day and 4 hours and 37 minutes, or whatever. But we are talking about what a year is in terms of the language in the ABM Treaty, which is being violated by the United States of America right now. Maybe the Russian version of a year is different, but I doubt it. Regardless, we are, according to the rules and pro- cedures of the Senate, bound by the English version, I suppose. And the English version is certainly unambig- uous. Mr. President, the point is this. On October 3, 1987, last year, the parties, meaning the Soviet Union and the United States of America, did not, in compliance with the treaty, conduct a review of the ABM Treaty, nor did they even begin such a review. Nor did they even set a date for beginning such a review. And that, as I say, is the hangup between the administration and this Senator. I think I have been trying to support this administration. The President and I have been very good friends for a long time. That does not enter into it. But I refuse to be a yes-man to the U.S. State Department when they start playing fun and games with what a treaty says and what it means. On October 3, 1987, there was no option under the terms of this treaty but to begin to conduct a review of the ABM Treaty with respect to violations by the Soviet Union and by the United States, if any. But the two parties, the Soviet Union and the United States, did not move a peg. They did none of those things; none. And it was because the United States?not the Soviet Union?it was because the United States did not want to do it. Or they had this big deal going. Mr. Gorbachev was coming over here, smile and con- duct his PR campaign and get out of his car on Connecticut Avenue and wave to the people and everybody said: "Hooray, hurrah; peace is at hand." Not quite. Some, in fact, may believe that the United States wished to avoid this be- cause the administration would have been required, no option about it, to protest at least one material breach of the ABM Treaty by the Soviet Union. There is a widespread belief that the administration may not have wished to discuss a material breach of one treaty, meaning the ABM, amidst all of this PR hype, public relations effort, on behalf of the INF Treaty. Maybe they assume that the American people are stupid and cannot handle the truth and therefore they will not share it with them. But I hope that is not the case. But this much is clear, Mr. Presi- dent: At the insistence of the United States, 5 months have elapsed since the day on which the meeting was re- quired under the terms of the treaty to begin and that failure on our side? this is not Soviet duplicity, this is State Department duplicity?that fail- ure stripped of all the legal blue smoke and mirrors provided by the lawyers down in Foggy Bottom in that vast bureaucracy is, in fact, quite simply stated, a clear violation by the United States of the ABM Treaty. So, Senator BUMPERS was right, last October. I was wrong. I did not believe he knew about any ABM violation by the United States. So to a certain extent I may be eating a little crow here. But I am not sure that is the vio- lation that Senator BUMPERS has in mind. One further word and I shall con- clude. I am sure my friend from South Carolina, a distinguished and able lawyer, will agree the Constitution re- quires the President to see that the law is faithfully executed. The Consti- tution makes a treaty supreme law, which binds all Americans including even, or perhaps particularly, the President of the United States. The President surely agrees that he should obey the law and without delay direct that the required meeting occur imme- diately. Not just sometime this year; not by October 1 of this year; but im- mediately. That is what the treaty says and the treaty is the supreme law of the land. I say again, Mr. President, that has been the hangup between the White House and me and the State Depart- ment and me. They can be cavalier about which laws they obey and exe- cute if they wish. But as long as I am here, they are not going to get by with it. Thus the pending amendment. I simply propose to encourage the ad- ministration to move along and no longer delay in confronting the Soviet Union with their violations of the ABM Treaty. That is all it does. The violations by the Soviets are far more dangerous to world peace than our procedural violations. I will say again that the failure to abide by that provision of the treaty no doubt falls under the general category of appease- ment and compromise, rather than one of deliberate falsification. But either way, it is time for the State De- partment to get off the dime and comply with the IBM Treaty. Mr. President, the reason that I called up this amendment is I want the Senators to understand what is going on. I did not draw the amend- ment to any particular bill but, of course, it could have been offered to any one of several measures and I guess the polygraph legislation may have been the best choice that I made, because the amendment would not be at all amiss in that context, since the question is truth in treaties. Mr. President, having said all that, and I apologize to the distinguished manager of the bill for taking so much time, I am going to end by withdraw- ing the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator has a right to withdraw the amendment. Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair, and I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CONRAD). Without objection, it is so or- dered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I hope the Senators who have amendments to the bill will show a disposition to call them up today. Up to this point, I have seen no indication on the part of Senators to call up serious amend- ments to the bill. A cloture motion will, of course, be voted on tomorrow. But in the mean- time, this is valuable time to spend on the bill. Mr. President, does the Senator from Indiana have an amendment he wishes to call up at this point? Mr. QUAYLE. I have a number of amendments concerning the poly- graph bill, and if we go ahead on the polygraph bill today, I would probably call up some amendments. Mr. BYRD. The Senator does not wish to call up one right at this moment? Mr. QUAYLE. No, I have no desire to call one up right at this moment until we find out what will be the order of business today. Mr. BYRD. All right. Mr. President, we have spent almost 24 hours?it soon will be, I guess?on this bill. RECESS Mr. BYRD. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess for 10 minutes to give me an opportunity to talk with the Republican leader. There being no objection, the Senate, at 12 noon, recessed until 12:10 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassem- bled when called to order by the Pre- siding Officer [Mr. CONRAD]. Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, if the Chair will indulge me momentarily, and protect my rights to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader's rights are protected. Mr. BYRD addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1685 Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote on the polygraph bill occur and final pas- sage of the polygraph bill occur no later than 9 o'clock p.m. today, provid- ed further that no nongermane amendments be in order, and that no motions to commit with or without in- structions be in order. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. SIMPSON addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The acting minority leader. Mr. SIMPSON. I believe that I would defer to my colleague from Indi- ana who is one of the floor managers and active participants with this legis- lation. And I do so at this point. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield for the reservation by the Senator from Indiana. I do not have to yield for that. Mr. SIMPSON addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader has yielded to the Sen- ator. Mr. BYRD. No. The Senator can re- serve the right to object. I maintain the floor. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, re- serving the right to object, the proce- dural aspects a this matter are that the majority leader has every right under the rules to request a nondebat- able motion to go forward with the intelligence authorization. There is nothing to preclude that or prevent discussion of that. If we were to go forward with the polygraph legislation, and we are ap- parently ready to 'do that, we have ger- mane amendments that are thought- ful and address the bill, and those are ready to be presented. But they have not yet been presented to this time. And I would hope that my colleagues would have come here with the pur- pose of amending, knowing full well that cloture has been requested, and will be performed tomorrow 1 hour after convening; that they would have come forward with the amendments. At this point, I inquire of the majori- ty leader. The time for the vote cer- tain, together with the remaining part of the request that no nongermane amendments be in order and no mo- tions to commit or recommit be in order, that the purpose of that, vis-a- vis the cloture procedure tomorrow, would be what? Mr. BYRD. The purpose of the re- quest, as I have made it, is to rule out amendments we know nothing about, have not seen, could range from the points of the compass from north to south, and the Senate would dispose of this bill today. The cloture vote on tomorrow would be vitiated. Of course, I could not go to the intel- ligence authorization bill except by unanimous consent unless I find myself in the position such as I am in right at this point, in view of the fact that the Senate has been on this bill almost 24 hours, it will soon be 24 hours, has made no progress whatso- ever, there has been very little debate on it other than debate on nonger- mane amendments, nongermane amendments were called up, and were withdrawn with no progress at all. I am sure there are Senators who have germane amendments but they have not been to the floor and called them up. Today is a good day, it is Wednesday, to get some business done. I am in a position right now to go to the intelligence authorization bill, and I would not require unanimous con- sent to go to it, if I could do that within the next 5 minutes. Hopefully the Senate would complete action on that bill today. From what I have heard said, it is believed by the manager, the chair- man, I believe we can complete action on that today, and tomorrow the Senate will automatically vote on the cloture motion on the polygraph bill. So in that way I could be sure that at least the Senate would spend these 3 days on these two bills, and hopeful- ly we could finish both bills in those 3 days. But if I throw away the next 5 minutes, I then lose my privileged po- sition that I am in at the moment of moving to the intelligence authoriza- tion bill and having that motion not debatable after which I would have unanimous consent to go to it, and one Senator could block that. It is for these reasons that I feel constrained to go to the intelligence authorization bill now unless we can get a unani- mous consent request that action be completed on the polygraph bill by no later than 9 o'clock p.m. tonight, that there be no nongermane amendments, and I would have to add to that now the request that upon final disposition of the polygraph bill the Senate pro- ceed to the consideration of the intelli- gence authorization bill, else I will have lost the privileged status that the situation is in right now. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, is the majority leader asking unanimous con- sent that at the completion of the polygraph measure, we go immediately to the intelligence authorization bill? Mr. BYRD. Yes. I am hooking that to the first request, that the Senate complete action on the polygraph bill no later than 9 o'clock p.m. today; that no nongermane amendments be in order; and that no motion to commit, with or without instructions, be in order. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I re- spectfully say that I must object to that. I know that the majority leader could go tomorrow to the same posi- tion and have a nondebatable motion tomorrow, with procedures tonight that would assure that. I am still ready to produce amend- ments that are germane to the poly- graph bill, but I know that he is on limited time, and I will not transgress. I think we will have to go forward as the majority leader would wish to go forward at this point. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, how much time do I have before morning hour is closed? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Three minutes remain. Mr. BYRD. I ask to proceed for 2 minutes. That will leave me 1 minute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, let me change the request. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate complete action on the poly- graph bill today; that there be a final vote on passage no later than 9 o'clock p.m. today; that no nongermane amendments be in order to the bill; that no motion to commit or recom- mit, with or without instructions, be in order; provided, further, that on to- morrow, during the morning hour, I be permitted to be- in the position that I am right now, of making a nondebata- ble motion to proceed to the intelli- gence authorization bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I re- serve the right to object. Mr. QUAYLE. A couple of people have said to me that on amendments, with a time certain tonight, we would move to polygraph. If the majority leader wants to move to intelligence after polygraph, this Senator will not object to that. I have a number of amendments to offer and will probably offer them at some time. They are ger- mane to the bill. A couple may not be germane in a postcloture-type situa- tion, but they are with respect to preemployment screening. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, are my rights being preserved? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes. Mr. QUAYLE. They are germane to preemployment screening. So I would not object, if it is the desire of the majority leader to move the authorization bill after we dispose of the polygraph bill, whether it is to- night or tomorrow. I could not give a time certain tonight. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The 2 minutes have expired. Mr. BYRD. I have 1 minute remain- ing. Mr. President, this thing is so in- volved from the standpoint of parlia- mentary procedure that I do not have the time to describe the position I have to be in on tomorrow and what I have to do to get into that position. I ask unanimous consent that I may preserve the status quo, vis-a-vis my position and the nondebatable motion I could make, for 10 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the dis- tinguished acting Republican leader has indicated that on tomorrow, I could be in the same position to make a nondebatable motion. I might or I might not be. One Senator can block me from getting into that position. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1686 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE March 2, 1988 Mr. President, how much time do I have remaining? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Five minutes and twelve seconds. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished acting Republican leader, who is doing everything he pos- sibly can to help to resolve this matter in a way that will see the Senate com- plete action on the polygraph bill in a very reasonable length of time, with- out nongermane amendments, and allow the Senate to go to the intelli- gence authorization bill and, hopeful- ly, to complete action on that before the break. I thank the distinguished acting Republican leader for his ef- forts. He wishes some additional time so that he can make some contacts. I ask unanimous consent that my privileged status in this situation be preserved for an additional 20 min- utes, that the status quo remain the same for 20 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I believe that if I were to yield the floor now and someone put in a quorum call and the quorum extended beyond the point of my 20 minutes, I would lose my privileged status to move to take up the intelligence authorization bill. Am I not correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator is correct. 15-MINUTE RECESS Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate stand in recess for 15 minutes. There being no objection, the Senate recessed at 12:30 p.m. until 12:45 p.m.; whereupon, the Senate reassembled when called to order by the Presiding Officer [Mr. CONRAD]. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The majority leader is recognized. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I yield to the distinguished acting -Republican leader for whatever he wishes to say or whatever he may wish to propose. We have had some discussion now. I think we all understand the desire on the part of myself that the Senate complete action on the polygraph bill and the intelligence authorization bill before the Senate goes out for the break, and hopefully get on the Price- Anderson bill. I am not suggesting the Senate complete action on that bill before the Senate goes out, but, at least, upon its return, it would be on that measure. But, insofar as the intelligence au- thorization bill and the polygraph bill, which is the pending bill, are con- cerned, we had our recess and I would be interested in knowing what the dis- tinguished acting leader is in a posi- tion to indicate at this point, based on his conversations. ?Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I have visited with my colleagues on this issue. Some have been deeply involved in this for many months. I believe that the law of the land is?and you can propound this or we can do it in the form of a gentlemen's agreement which we did quite successfully the other evening. I was pleased with the results of that. We never varied from our agreement one whit, and that was a long, long evening, as I recall. So we would then proceed with our business on the polygraph legislation today. We have several amendments. We would go to that immediately upon the arrival at an agreement. We would keep people working here this afternoon doing the Senate's business. We would vote cloture tomorrow in the a.m., as set by the majority leader. We have amendments of Senators QUAYLE, NICKLES, GRAMM, WALLOP, MCCONNELL, KARNES, SYMMS, COCH- RAN, and BOSCHWITZ. As I am able to determine, all of those are subject to reasonable time agreements. But, in any event, we know that clo- ture is tomorrow and that we have business to do. Then, after the cloture vote tomorrow, should it be invoked, we would go and give consent to go then to the intelligence authorization legislation tomorrow. That should not be terribly contentious from what I understand here. Then the majority leader could go forward and lay down or begin to address Price-Anderson before we go out for the recess. I can say that I am not aware per- sonally whether all of the amend- ments are totally germane, but I do not know of any that are detonating devices. I do not know of those here. I believe that the purpose of the Senate will be served. We will debate and we will have another item of business to go to and be prepared to go to that to- morrow. That is the general outline. We can develop that further as to motions or activity or protection as you wish. Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, I am happy to enter into a gentlemen's un- derstanding with the distinguished acting Republican leader. I have en- tered into those understandings with him before and he has always kept them to the letter. He has had suffi- cient discussions with his colleagues on his side of the aisle to know what he is talking about and to know what can be counted upon. I think that the proposal as he has outlined it ?here is perfectly agreeable to me. It would be as follows: That the Senate continue on the polygraph bill today; there are Senators on that side of the aisle who are ready to call up amendments; that the Senate will debate those amendments, act on them during the afternoon. We will have the cloture vote on tomorrow. Upon the disposition of this legisla- tion, which will undoubtedly be clo- tured on tomorrow, the majority leader would be given consent to pro- ceed to the consideration of the intelli- gence authorization bill. So there would be no question about getting it up. And that upon the disposition of that bill, as I understand it, the major- ity leader would be able to take up?I assume we are talking about consent; I have as many problems on my side as there are on the other side on that bill; maybe more?that I could have consent to take up, at least go to, Price-Anderson before the Senate goes out for the recess. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, two inquiries: that under this proposal the amendments to the polygraph meas- ure would be germane to the subject matter of the bill and not any type of postcloture germaneness test as we do our business today, would that be agreeable? Mr. BYRD. Yes. That is agreeable. Mr. SIMPSON. And that at the time of going toward Price-Anderson that it would be the House bill that we would be dealing with? Mr. BYRD. It would be the House bill. Mr. President, the gentlemen's agreement is fine with me. I do not intend to try to lay that in stone. As I say, I do not care to attempt to lay the details of this understanding into cement. Because the gentlemen's un- derstanding is fine with me, absolutely fine with me. But I wonder if I can get unanimous consent that upon the dis- position of the polygraph bill and the intelligence authorization bill, that there would be no objection to my going to the House Price-Anderson bill? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I-- Mr. BYRD. With the understanding that action would not occur on that measure this week. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I think I need to?we should resolve the issue of germaneness today as we debate precloture; that it will be regu- lar order of amending and debating and that there be ordinary rules of our procedure, with regard to that? Mr. BYRD. In other words, there may be nongermane amendments called up today? Mr. SIMPSON. There might be, but I am told it might be a question of judgment; that they are not truly non- germane such as dealing with Contra aid or something of that nature; but they might be something with regard to employee testing or something of that nature. Mr. BYRD. Yes. That is understood. Mr. QUAYLE. Will the Senator yield? Mr. BYRD. I yield. Mr. QUAYLE. At least my amend- ments that I intend to offer will be generally germane. They may not be germane on the postcloture situation, but they will be germane to the discus- sion of the bill. But, however, I would hope that we operate under the regu- lar order that if another Senator wants to offer something that is non- germane that he has, or she, perfectly has that right before cloture is in- voked? We have not restricted the Senate's?we have not imposed any re- strictions on the Senate's nongermane rules? Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1687 Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the Sena- tor's understanding is correct as far as I know. Senators may call up nonger- mane amendments today under the understanding, but I think the inten- tion of the acting leader, and col- leagues on this side, is to, as well as possible, keep it in the general con- fines of germaneness today. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, the purpose of the exercise is to have a debate on polygraph, so I hope that those who want to have an honest debate on polygraph will visit with those who have nongermane amend- ments that do not really deal with polygraphs so that the debate can be had as it should be had on a very seri- ous issue. Mr. BYRD. All right. Mr. President, I am satisfied on all four corners of the understanding. I ask unanimous consent, however, that upon the dispo- sition of the polygraph bill, the Senate proceed to the consideration of the in- telligence authorization bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BYRD. Now, Mr. President, I think we have reached a good under- standing and it will be my intention, may I say to all Senators concerned, that upon the disposition of the intel- ligence authorization bill I will do ev- erything I can to proceed to the con- sideration of the Price-Anderson legis- lation. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, that would be a clarification; that is upon disposition of the intelligence bill re- garding whether it is in agreement or final passsage, if it should get into contention, we will still go forward with the Price-Anderson, House ver- sion? Mr. BYRD. Yes. That is absolutely correct. So all Senators on both sides are aware of the intentions of the majori- ty leader insofar as these three meas- ures are concerned. I thank the acting leader. I thank the distinghished Senator from Massa- chusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] and the Sena- tor from Utah [Mr. HATCH]. - Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The acting minority leader is recognized. Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I want to thank very much Senator QUAYLE for his assistance. He is a spir- ited advocate of his position and I re- spect that greatly and because of his persistent advocacy we have reached a result which will bring us to debate on the polygraph bill, which is something we all wish to do and the American public will want to hear that debate. I thank the majority leader for his un- usual courtesies and extreme patience with me in my role as acting leader; and the Senator from Massachusetts who, I know along with our ranking member, Senator HATCH, do very much want to finish this bill. We have ar- ranged the path to do that and I thank him sincerely. I thank the Sena- tor from South Carolina for his cour- tesy. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. DASCHLE). The Senator. from South Carolina is recognized. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I know that many Members of this body are concerned about the potential for polygraph abuse. There certainly is the possibility that examiners could use the tests to ask inappropriate or embarrassing questions to examinees. We don't want to see these things happen and, in fact, want to see such practices stopped when and if they do occur, However, the question I ask is whether the Congress of the United States is the appropriate legislative forum for addressing these questions. As I have said during previous meet- ings of the Senate Labor Committee, I strongly believe it is not. I believe that the Constitution of the United States clearly grants jurisdiction over this issue to the States. Moreover, I believe that the States have proven they are much better to deal with the complex- ities of this issue and to develop the best legislation to meet the needs of their citizenry than the Congress. PRINCIPLE OF FEDERALISM As you know, I am deeply devoted to the principle of federalism. This is the fundamental issue before us today. We may differ on whether the polygraph works. We may disagree on whether use of the polygraph should be al- lowed in the public sector and denied to the private sector. Moreover, we may disagree on the best way to pro- tect the rights of individual citizens who are asked to take polygraph ex- aminations. However, I don't believe we can dis- agree on whether we should be guided by the Constitution, and in particular the principles of the 10th amendment to the Constitution, in our delibera- tions about new legislation. One of the axioms of American con- stitutional law is that Congress has only powers that are delegated to it by the Constitution, or reasonably im- plied from those so delegated. When Edmund Randolph, a delegate from Virginia, proposed the Virginia plan in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, it contained a principle by which the powers of Nation and State could be divided. It stated: ? " The national legislature ought to be empowered . . . to legislate in all cases to which the separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States-may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation. This outlined a principle rather than a method of allocating powers, and as a principle, it was approved by the Constitutional ? Convention. Two months later, the convention gave these instructions regarding national powers to those who would be formu- lating the text of the Constitution: The national legislature ought to possess the legislative rights vested in Congress by the Confederation; and, moreover, to legis- late in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also in those to which the states are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by individual legislation. Acting upon this instruction, the committee reported back to the con- vention the specific enumeration of the powers of Congress found in arti- cle I, section 8. The committee, adher- ing, as did the entire convention, to the principle of delegated powers, thus gave to the new Congress all of the powers then believed to be described in the article of instruction. Further- more, it provided, in article V, a means by which those powers could be al- tered when necessary. PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY I fear we have a tendency to disre- gard this principle that was so central to the formulation of our Constitu- tion. Yet it is fundamental to the pres- ervation of individual liberty and to preventing the consolidation of over- whelming governmental power. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention were well aware of the abuses which flowed from the absolute coalescence of power in one govern- mental authority. Fresh from their ex- perience with tyranny, they conceived a government of limited and delegated powers. Their prime concern was that the people maintain their sovereignty. In order to accomplish that, power was first divided between the people and the government, reserving to the people the control of the power allot- ted to the government. This power was then divided between the Federal and State 'governments. These parts, in turn, were -split up among the coordi- nated legislative, executive, and judi- cial bodies. Through these safeguards, they be- lieved they would be able to prevent a highly centralized government which historically have been fatal to civil lib- erty. CLOSER TO THE PEOPLE According to Thomas Jefferson, lim- iting government to its proper sphere was the very essence of republican government; and an important ele- ment was assuring strong and viable local governmental authorities. To Jef- ferson, local governments were closer to the people, and consequently, more safely trusted than the national Gov- ernment. I speak out about federalism so often because I believe firmly this is a central principle in maintaining a whole system designed to secure limit- ed Government and individual liberty. COMPETENCE OF THE STATES The people of the States created our National Government and in so doing, delegated to it specific powers relating to matters they felt were beyond the competence of the individual States Our founders trusted the States to govern the affairs of their citizens unless there was an overriding need for uniformity in national policy. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1688 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE I believe that governing the poly- graph industry is not beyond "the competence of the individual States," and I see no need for uniformity in na- tional policy. In fact, I believe this issue requires the diverse approaches of State-by-State legislation that are being developed to meet the different needs of the citizenry of our various States. As Members of the U.S. Senate, it is incumbent upon us to protect and ensure the proper balance of power be- tween the States and the Federal Gov- ernment. This legislation has the op- posite result. It is an intrusion into an area never delegated to the Federal Government. STATES PRODUCE BETTER LEGISLATION The wisdom of the framers is evi- dent today through the application of their arguments to the issue before us. The principles of federalism are not just abstract concepts. I believe we are much likely to get a more precise body of polygraph law that is much more responsive to the needs of our citizenry if the law is developed on a State-by- State basis. QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED S. 1904 simply does not and could not address the many complex issues that should be explored regarding polygraph regulation. Questions in- volving the merit of preemployment testing verses incident-specific testing. Issues such as the diverse body of opinion concerning the validity of polygraph testing and how to maxi- mize the chances of? obtaining the most accurate results when the tests are given; and basics such as detailing and enforcing protections for examin- ees' rights. However long and hard we might work to try to develop the perfect bill, I believe we would always fail. I do not believe that the Congress of the United States ever could or should write legislation that would adequate- ly address all of the subtle and com- plex issues involved in the polygraph debate. We do not have the authority to do so, even if we could. We are bound by the Constitution to allow the States to resolve these questions. They, and not the Federal Govern- ment, clearly are empowered to govern regarding this issue. Because the State government pro- vides a better and closer ear to hear the voices of individual citizens, the States will be better enforcers of the legislation they do develop. They will more quickly find out how it is work- ing and be able to follow up with amendments that assure that their laws continue to be responsive to the needs of their citizens. REASONS FOR STATE AUTHORITY As many of you know, the adminis- tration strongly opposes the ban on polygraph testing contained in S. 1904. I received a letter from Assistant At- torney General John Bolton, who out- lined some of the reasons for the ad- ministration's opposition. In it, he also underscores the administration's strong support for the principles of federalism. Mr. Bolton outlined a number of reasons why States are the appropriate functional jurisdiction for regulating the polygraph industry. I would like to relate some of those rea- sons to you today. The first is accountability. State gov- ernments, by being closer to the people, are more able to be responsive and accountable to the needs and de- sires of their citizens. Second, participation. Citizens are better able to be involved in develop- ing legislation at the State level, re- sulting in a clearer sense of their actual needs, which in turn are reflect- ed in the legislation they help to de- velop. Third, diversity. The citizens of dif- ferent States may well have different needs and concerns. If this matter is left to the individual States, a much richer, more diverse, and more appro- priate body of law will be developed. If the Federal Government sets the policy, public policies must conform to a low common denominator in order to cover everyone with the same umbrel- la. Fourth, experimentation. The States, by providing diverse responses to various issues, allow us to test many different approaches to solving public policy problems. One State may seize a novel idea that no one in Washington would have thought of but which is a fitting solution to a particular prob- lem. Without this well-spring of crea- tivity, our lawmaking would become stale and sterile. And that leads me to a fifth point, containment. If experiments in public policy are not successful, they can be tremendously damaging if imposed on a national scale but , much less so at the State level. As Mr. Bolton points out, "While the successful exercises of state regulation are likely to be emu- lated by other States, the unsuccessful exercises can be avoided." In fact, the heated debate among sci- entists and scholars about the validity of the polygraph is evidence that this Issue has not been resolved to the point that any national policy could be formulated. POLICY UNIFORMITY There are clearly issues where there is a need for national policy uniformi- ty. We must have a uniform foreign policy if we are to effectively deal with other nations. If our foreign policy were dictated by the 50 States instead of by the Federal Government, our ef- fectiveness in the world arena would be severely diluted. Further, the need for an efficient transportation system argues strongly for national rather than State regulation of our airline, maritime, and rail systems. There are other examples of things that the Fed- eral Government is better equipped to handle than the States, but polygraph law is not one of them. March 2, 1988 The States are actively engaged In- assuming this responsibility. Thirty- two of the fifty States have some kind of license or certification requirements for polygraph examiners. Forty-four of the fifty States have laws governing the use of the polygraph in the work- place; and 33 of the 50 States have ad- dressed this' issue legislatively since 1980. STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS For example; the State of Massachu- setts addressed this issue as recently as 1982. The law bans most polygraph testing and requires polygraph exam- iners in private practice to be licensed. Utah has required polygraph exam- iners to be licensed since legislation was passed in 1973. The laws in the home States of the other Members of this body reflect the richness and diversity of law that our States are developing. Alabama has required since 1975 for a polygraph examiner to be licensed. This law was revised as recently as 1983. In Arkansas an examinee must be told the test is voluntary and State li- censing is required. Florida requires a State license. Georgia requires questions to be pro- vided in advance in writing, and pro- hibits questions on race, religion or politics. Louisiana has a license requirement, as well as Mississippi. New Mexico prohibits questions on sexual affairs, race, creed, religion, union affiliations or activity unless agreed to by written consent. Virginia requires a license and prohibits ques- tions similar to those prohibited by New Mexico. Mr. President, as I have already mentioned, 44 States have laws gov- erning the use of polygraphs in the workplace. I urge my colleagues to ex- amine this chart, before voting on this issue. STATES SHOW "COMPETENCE" I believe that this chronicle of State law presents the case more effectively than any argument I can make of the States' ability and willingness to regu- late or ban the administration of poly- graph tests. Only the States have the power and the ability to develop a body of polygraph law that will ad- dress the many complexities this issue presents. If polygraph abuse is a prob- lem in one State, then that State has the option of outlawing its use there. But other, States may find that it is a tool that is being used responsibly and that it is contributing to the stability of the companies operating there. If so, those States have the option of regulating it to protect citizens from abuse, as so many have done. Mr. President, S. 1904 completely undermines the solutions fashioned, through their legislative process, by the people of these and other States. When the Federal Government threatens to overrule the States on issues that are clearly in their pur- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15 : CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 March 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1689 view, it is no surprise that some are hesitant to tackle tough questions if they fear it will be negated by unnec- essary Federal intervention. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE In my opinion, Mr. President, we did not have ample opportunity to hear from the States when we conducted our hearings on this issue earlier this year. I believe that we could have learned a great deal by hearing testi- mony from a representative group of State officials who have had experi- ence with administering polygraph laws. Instead, we heard from only one State official, Attorney General Robert Abrams of New York who ? asked for Federal legislation because he has been unable to get a State law passed in New York. I must say that as a former Governor, it was displeasing for me to see a statewide elected offi- cial appear before the Labor Commit- tee petitioning the Federal Govern- ment to take over a responsibility that clearly belongs to the States. EXPERIENCE OF STATES Testimony that we did not hear, but should have, was submitted to the Labor Committee in writing by the former Secretary. of State from Flori- da, Mr. George Firestone. Mr. Firestone has had ample experi- ence administering polygraph law in Florida, and he indicated his belief that polygraph regulation works. He said that he believes the public has a right to privacy and that that right should be protected. However, he said his experience proves it is possible to protect those rights without prohibit- ing polygraph testing which, he said, "has consistently proven that its merit to society outweighs its risk." His experience also shows that, with proper regulation, the abuses we are concerned about can be virtually elimi- nated. There are more than 500 fully licensed polygraph examiners in Flori- da, conducting more than 300,000 tests annually. State law requires that each examinee be told he or she can file a complaint if there are any impropri- eties. Yet only one validated complaint had been filed against an examiner in the year before Mr. Firestone submit- ted his testimony to the committee. RESPECTING DIFFERENCES I also believe that the Florida expe- rience underscores another important point that I made earlier. In discussing States rights, I indicated that there may be differences in the States that require them to have different regula- tions. Mr. Firestone gave us a perfect example: He said that Florida is a par- ticularly transient State where tradi- tional background investigations are frequently impossible to perform. Fur- ther, it also has a large immigrant population. Proponents of a polygraph ban say that background investigations and reference checks are a suitable substi- tute for polygraph testing. However, they are not always possible. Mr. Fire- stone pointed but that in Florida? and, of course, in many other States? the use of the polygraph actually allows residents to establish them- selves in the work force. It is not the employment barrier that polygraph opponents so often claim but rather an opportunity for employment that might not otherwise be available. Mr. Firestone said that the poly- graph provides the business sector with an objective method of minimiz- ing risk to itself and to the public by assuring the integrity of potential em- ployees. It benefits all of us when those who are qualified to work can-find jobs. EXONERATING THE INNOCENT Further, State officials have argued their citizens should have access to the polygraph because it often serves to protect the jobs of employees who may be working in an area where theft occurs. There are many instances every day in American business and in- dustry where a crime is committed and several employees are implicated. Without the polygraph, the employer may have felt it necessary to dismiss all of them. However, when he has access to polygraph test results, the person who committed the crime can more easily be determined?and the innocent employees exonerated, in- stead of fired. Whether we agree that this works or not is not the issue. The Issue is whether or not local policy- makers believe it does. Those who be- lieve this is a useful tool for that pur- pose have the constitutional authority to allow their citizens to use it. Many States have found it can be especially effective when they enforce their own sets of standards, restrictions, and practices regarding the polygraph. If the Congress were to outlaw poly- graph testing in the private sector, as S. 1904 would require, the Federal Government would be barging into an area where it has neither the jurisdic- tion nor the ability to adequately reg- ulate. The consequences could be to intrude on the legitimate right of local authorities to manage their own af- fairs. REGULATION, NOT PROHIBITION The legislation that we are consider- ing here today would have far reach- ing and sweeping affects on American businesses, on employees and prospec- tive employees, and on the body of polygraph law that is being developed by the States. Before we take such a major step, I believe we are obligated to develop a much more substantial hearing record than we have so far. There are many who feel that regula- tion, and not prohibition, is the key to protecting our citizens. I believe we need to learn much more about the successes and failures of the States' experience with regulation and bans on polygraph testing. We would need to have good reason to strip polygraph regulation from the purview of the States, especially since they have developed a significant body of law already on this issue. STATES ARE BEST REGULATORS OF SERVICES It traditionally is the purview of the States to regulate commerce within their boundaries. They have mecha- nisms to certify that those who deliver health care services to residents are qualified to do so. They oversee insur- ance and real estate brokers, utility companies, doctors, lawyers, and den- tists, to name just a few. The States are equipped to regulate the services offered by polygraph eX- aminers as well. Assistant Attorney General Bolton also has addressed this issue. He said: Polygraph misuse may be more appropri- ately deterred by restricting the conditions under which polygraphs are administered rather than prohibiting their use altogeth- er. The states are better equipped to make' those determinations. OTHER PROTECTIONS Mr. President, besides existing State law, other mechanisms are in place to address the issue of polygraph abuse in the private sector: namely, the col- lective bargaining process and the courts. The courts provide an appropriate forum for redress for any citizen who feels his or her rights have been vio- lated. American workers have additional protection from polygraph abuse through the collective bargaining process. Mr. William Wynn of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union has said that 90 percent of the union's collective bargaining agree- ments prohibit polygraph testing. Labor and management have the tools to find their own solutions in conjunction with existing State law on polygraph testing. This system allows even more fine tuning than State law alone. I recognize that there may be abuses In the polygraph industry, and I urge the industry and the States to correct these deficiencies. However, under our constitutional system, not every prob- lem has a Federal solution. If a Feder- al solution is desired, but not constitu- tionally available, then there is a pro- vision for amending the Constitution wherein these additional powers can be granted. THEORY OF NATIONAL POWER In spite of the conclusive evidence to the contrary, it has sometimes been urged that the framers intended that Congress should haVe the power to deal with any truly national problem, whether that power is delegated to it or not. It was this theory of national power which was presented to the Supreme Court in the case of Kansas versus Colorado in 1907 by President Theo- dore Roosevelt's Attorney General. The Supreme Court's decision on this issue was very clear, and reads in part: The proposition that there are legislitive powers affecting the nation as a whole which belong to, although not expressed in, the grant of power, is in direct conflict with Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 S 1690 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE March 2, 1988 ? the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a gov- ernment clearly appears from the Constitu- tion, independently of the Amendments, for otherwise there would be an instrument granting certain specified things made oper- ative to grant other and distinct things. This natural construction of the original body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain by the 10th Amendment. This amendment . . . disclosed the widespread fear that the national government might, under the pressure of a supposed general welfare; attempt to exercise powers which had not been granted. With equal determi- nation the Framers intended that no such assumption should ever find jurisdiction in the organic act, and that if, in the future, further powers seemed necessary, they should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending the act. It read: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." It is incumbent upon us to respect and abide by these constitutional prin- ciples. In conclusion, I would like to make just one further point that I believe further emphasized the wisdom of our Constitution in reserving authority to our states. DOUBLE STANDARD If S. 1904 were to pass, it would es- tablish a double standard in which the public sector would be allowed to use the polygraph for employee screening and incident investigation. However, the private sector would be much more limited in its use of the poly- graph. How would we explain that to our constituents? The Federal Government, and espe- cially its national security agencies, apparently feel they need access to the polygraph to conduct their busi- ness, and they have access to it. Whether individual citizens or busi- nesses need the polygraph to conduct their business is not a matter for the Federal Government but rather one for local governments to decide. If they decide it is not in their citizens' best interest to allow use of the poly- graph, then they can outlaw it. That ban would not set up the national double-standard that S. 1904 would perpetuate. I urge my colleagues to consider these issues during the debate today. Perhaps the constitutional question is abstract and not pertinent to contem- porary political concerns; but the Senate of the United States has a solemn obligation to uphold the Con- stitution of the United States. This legislation, in my opinion, violates that obligation. I urge my colleagues to join with me in opposing S. 1904 and allowing our local governments to continue to do their job in exploring and debating this issue and developing their own body of legislation. Now, Mr. President, a very able lawyer from Richmond, VA, Mr. David E. Nagle, has made an analysis of this bill, the benefit of which I would like to give the Senate. This is a letter that Is written to Mr. Powell A. Moore, of Ginn, Edington, Moore & Wade, 803 Prince Street, Alexandria, VA 22314. Mr. Nagle says: DEAR MR. MOORE: As an attorney who rep- resents management in employment litiga- tion, I am frequently called upon to advise employers regarding the lawful use of the polygraph in the workplace. I have accord- ingly kept abreast of efforts to secure feder- al legislation restricting employers' rights to conduct such tests. Pursuant to your re- quest, I have reviewed Senator Kennedy's bill, S. 1904, and offer the following com- ments. Even before it was formally introduced, Kennedy's bill was touted as a compromise measure, one that would resolve the endur- ing battle over polygraph testing. It was supposed to be a trade-off--the elimination of pre-employment and periodic examina- tions, in exchange for allowing testing in in- vestigations into employee misconduct. In fact, the bill as drafted will virtually eliminate all polygraph testing in the work- place. The circumstances in which testing can be conducted are so limited, the expo- sure to litigation is so substantial, and the penalties for violations are so severe, that I suspect the vast majority of employers have no alternative but to abstain from all test- ing. While I recognize this as the objective of the bill's patron, I fear many of the bill's current supporters are unaware of the true character of this legislation. The issues raised here are complex, and in-depth analysis would be preferred, but the reasons that the bill fails as a compro- mise fall into three categories. I. The bill does not provide an employer with a meaningful opportunity to utilize polygraph testing as part of an investigation into employee misconduct. First, the bill does not allow testing in the course of investigations into drug use or drug sales on the premises, into allegations of sexual harassment, or many other mat- ters relating to unsafe and/or criminal con- duct on the job. Second, in those limited subject areas where testing may be allowed, the employer must establish "reasonable suspicion" with respect to any employee tested, then file a formal report of the incident or develop a lengthy internal statement (a copy of which is given to the suspect) setting forth the basis for the suspicion. It is this aspect of the bill, when viewed in conjunction with the risk of litigation and harsh penalties, that may lead employers investigating misconduct to discharge all employees in a group of suspects, rather than raise the issue of polygraph testing. If the polygraph is effectively made unavail- able to help clear the innocent, or to help identify the guilty, the "protection" afford- ed employees under this legislation is of du- bious value. Investigations into misconduct may be resolved In a non-discriminatory manner?through discharge of guilty and Innocent alike. Third, even in those situations where the employer is able and willing to accept the legal risks associated with testing to further its investigation, the suspect employee cannot be required to take the polygraph, and neither the test results nor a refusal to submit to a test can serve as the basis for discipline or discharge without additional supporting evidence. An employer who does not utilize the polygraph needs no evidence to terminate an individual under the prevailing doctrine of employment at will, but under this bill, when an employee is found deceptive on a polygraph (or refuses to submit to a test) then an employer must have additional sup- porting evidence. A discharge that fails to meet this vague standard subjects the em- ployer to harsh penalties. II. The restrictions and requirements are so ambiguous as to be certain to result in much litigation. While some aspects of the bill are compa- rable to many state laws limiting areas of in- quiry and imposing examiner licensing re- quirements, other provisions go much fur- ther. For example, the bill prohibits the asking of questions "in a manner that is de- signed to degrade, or needlessly intrude" upon the examinee. As noted above, a dis- charge on the basis of polygraph test results Is unlawful without "additional supporting evidence"?but there is no guidance as to what will be sufficient. III. An employer acting in good faith and attempting to comply with the law might well be found in violation. The penalties for non-compliance are so severe that few em- ployers will be willing to exercise their right to use polygraph in ongoing investigations. Virtually all employers (even those who have never used polygraphs) would be re- quired to post a notice to employees regard- ing this law; failure to post resulting in fines of 6100 per day. Any other violations of the law can result in civil penalties of up to $10,000. There are no comparable penalties imposed for violations of our most signifi- cant employment laws, e.g., the National Labor Relations Act, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, or the Equal Pay Act. Furthermore, an individual can bring a private civil action under this bill, and if an employer is found to have violated this law, the person may be awarded "employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of lost wages and benefits" as well as other "legal and equitable relief as may be appro- priate"?perhaps opening the door to awards for pain and suffering, embarrass- ment, and punitive damages. To keep the wheels of justice rolling, of course, prevail- ing parties recover their costs and attor- neys' fees as well. In summary, as currently drafted, the bill does not do what its sponsors claim, but in- stead effectively eliminates employers' right to utilize polygraph testing in the investiga- tion of misconduct, and the preservation of safety and property in the workplace. I fear that many of those who innocently and sin- , cerely endorsed the notion of "compromise" have, in fact, been duped. If this bill is passed into law, I see no alternative but to advise my clients to eliminate all polygraph testing from their workplace. Finally, if an explanation of my creden- tials is in order, I have published one law review article and several pieces in journals regarding polygraph in the workplace. I have lectured on this subject in 9 states to some 25 groups of employers, polygraph ex- aminers, and university students, and I have served on the Virginia Polygraph Advisory Board since 1985 when I was appointed by Governor Robb. Thank you for this opportunity to explain my concerns with this proposed Piece of leg- islation. I sincerely, hope you will be able to shed sufficient light on the true impact of this bill to bring about its defeat. If there is any other way in which I can be of assist- ance, please do not hesitate to contact me. I remain, Sincerely yours, DAVID E. NAGLE. Mr. President, as I say, Mr. Nagle is a very able and prominent lawyer from Richmond, VA. I think his analy- sis clearly sets out the situation. Mr. President, there are many orga- nizations that oppose this bill. I will Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15: CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/15 : CIA-RDP91B00390R000500460011-3 Mach 2, 1988 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ? SENATE S 1691 read a letter from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Washington, DC, February 11, 1988. Hon. STROM THURMOND, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. DEAR STROM: The U.S. Chamber of Com- merce, on behalf of its approximately 180,000 members, respectfully urges you to oppose S. 1904, the Polygraph Protection Act of 1987. S. 1904, introduced by Senator Kennedy (D-MA), would prohibit most private em- ployers from using the polygraph for the purpose of screening prospective employees. Employers have found the polygraph to be an invaluable tool for deterring workplace crime and identifying security risks among job applicants. It helps to protect the finan- cial health of ? American business and the health and safety of customers, employees and the public; therefore, limiting its use is not in the best interest of the American public or business. The polygraph has proven its worth in as- sisting defense agencies in guarding nation- al security; business should also have access to it. Congress has repeatedly overwhelm- ingly endorsed its use for this purpose. On June 16, 1985, the House of Represent- atives voted 331-71 in favor of an amend- ment allowing the Department of Defense to increase the polygraph screening of per- sonnel with access to sensitive information. On July 7, 1985, the Senate voted 94-5 to agree to the conference report containing a polygraph program. On May it, 1987, the, House voted 345-44 for an 'amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization bill, offered by Con- gressman Bill Young of Florida, establish- ing a permanent polygraph program for na- tional defense agencies. On November 19, 1987, the Senate 'voted 89-6 to agree to the conference report containing a permanent polygraph program. Current employee theft raises the cost of goods to consumers by as much as 15 per- cent and continues to escalate. The Drug Enforcement Administration, which has en- dorsed polygraph use in employee-screening programs, estimates that one million doses of drugs are stolen each year from drug re- tailers, wholesalers and distributors. One employer, Days Inn of America, testified at a Congressional hearing during the 99th Congress that the use of polygraph has helped to reduce its annual losses from more than $1 million to $115,000. I want to repeat that last statement, Mr. President. One employer, Days Inn of America, testi- fied at a Congressional hearing during the 99th Congress that the use of the polygraph has helped to reduce its annual losses from more than $1 million to $115,000. Crime in America is a serious, pervasive concern. Day care centers must be able to pre-screen prospective employees to prevent incidents of child abuse. Nursing homes must know if their sick and often helpless patients are at risk of death. Public utility companies, chemical plants, airlines and railroads are only a few examples of the in- dustries that need to be able to screen pro- spective employees to help avoid public dis- asters. The rights of employers to use the poly- graph to protect their employees, their assets and themselves must be preserved. The Chamber respectfully urges you to oppose S. 1904, the Polygraph Protection Act of 1987. Enclosed you will find a list of the business and trade associations who oppose S. 1904. Sincerely, ALBERT D. BOURLAND. Mr. President, the list which the Chamber of Commerce has attached opposing this bill is a most imposing list. I would like for the Senators to? listen to this list. U.S Chamber of Commerce (Washington, D.C.). Alabama Hotel & Motel Association (Montgomery, Alabama). Alabama Retail Association (Montgomery, Alabama). American Hotel & Motel Association (Washington, D.C.). ? American Polygraph Association (Alexan- dria, Virginia). American Rental Association (McLean, Virginia). American Road & Transportation Build- ers Association (Washington, D.C.). American Society for Industrial Security (Arlington, Virginia). American Supply Association (Chicago, Il- linois). American Trucking Association (Washing- ton, D.C.). APCOA, Inc. (A Member of the National Parking Association)-(Cleveland, Ohio). Association of Oilwell Servicing Contrac- 'tors (Dallas, Texas). Automotive Parts & Accessories Associa- tion (Lanham, Texas). Automotive Wholesalers Association of Tennessee (Nashville. Tennessee). Bishop, Cook, Purcell & .Reynolds (Wash- ington, D.C.). Bowling Proprietors Association of South- ern California (Burbank, California). California Jewelers Association