THOUGHTS ON THE SOVIET INTERNAL CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00551R000100080008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 25, 2014
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: September 28, 1989
• Content Type: REPORT

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FORM. 101 USEPREv.ous
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THOUGHTS ON THE SOVIET INTERNAL CRISIS
Elements of Crisis
If present political, social, and economic trends continue
in the USSR, it is highly likely that a sharp discontinuity
will occur, either some form of reversion to repressive rule
or some form of social revolt threatening system overthrow.
Either one of these results could generate the other. The
factors and trends which comprise this crisis situation are:
Interethnic strife and communal violence
Polarization of reform and anti-reform attitudes in the
society and elites
Rising rates of crime and threats to person and
property
Economic deterioration with the imminent possibility of
a currency collapse leading to wider economic
disruption
Total collapse of belief in or even deference to the
hitherto official ideology
Rapid erosion of the political and administrative
authority of the party apparatus
The emergence of other, but disorganized, power centers
A mounting anxiety about the crisis throughout large
elements of the Soviet population
Erosion of Gorbachev's popularity
It is possible that Gorbachev's Power within the leadership,
so far unchallenged by any organized faction (and very much
amplified by the cadre moves at the September Plenum), plus
the emergence of alternative bases of power, such as the
Supreme Soviet, popular fronts, strike committees, could
constitute the elements of a new political order that could
evolve out of and supercede the presenK7cir-i. But this has
to be a process lasting years. In the meahtime, amid the
general erosion of system legitimacy and effectiveness, two
of the above factors threaten to force sharp turning points
within months:
A currency collapse could turn the current consumer
crisis into a general economic collapse through
barterization of the economy, strikes, and shutdowns of
vital industries, transport, energy, and food
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distribution. This could generate either social
revolution or a reactionary coup to avert it.
The clear determination of the native Baltic
populations to press for full independence could force
Gorbachev to use harshly repressive measures or cause
his replacement-by a leadership willing to. If
tolerated, Baltic secession would probably lead to
similar moves in other republics eventually
precipitating the crackdown.
What is alarming about these crisis trends is the rate at
which they are intensifying. There are no obvious reasons
why they should be expected to stabilize or turn around on
their own. No good news looms on the horizon. The coming
winter will intensify consumer hardships and difficulties in
various economic sectors. Nationalist agitation seems
likely to grow in boldness despite Kremlin warnings; the
Ukraine is now coming alive with it. The political
turbulence has already produced a potential charismatic
challenger to Gorbachev outside the leadership, Yeltsin.
Sooner or later one would seem likely to emerge, closer to
the levers of Kremlin power.
Yet all these apocalytic developments do not make the
collapse of perestroika literally inevitable. It is still
possible that threatening trends could stabilize, leaving a
turbulent but not rapidly deteriorating situation. Avoiding
the currency collapse and somehow getting a little upturn in
some economic area could avert the economic disaster. The
Baits are determined to press for full independence and no
amount of pleading for "moderation" can persuade a
reasonable man that they do not have the right to it or that
this is not the best time to seek it, whatever the risks.
The worst can be avoided, however, if Moscow simply manages
to avoid overreacting to declaratory challenges and prevents
its own reactionary elements from fomenting communal
violence between the local and Russian populations.
East Europe
In short, it is healthy that the naive confidence about
Gorbachev's prospects of only a few months ago has been
replaced by fuller appreciation of the grave obstacles faced
by any serious reform in the USSR. But we should not go to
the other extreme of cultivating a new fashion of pessimism.
The principal problem for US policy as it confronts all
this, however, is not contingency planning, but simply
planning and policy development for what is patently taking
place: The rapid erosion of the Soviet communist order as
we have long known it. This is not a "what if" predicament;
it is staring us in the face. Here developments in East
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Europe are in every way as important as those in the USSR,
perhaps more so.
It is fair to say that things have progressed to the point
where, almost no matter what happens in the USSR, the Soviet
power position in East Europe, hence in Europe and the
World, is irretrievably undermined. By now it would take
massive military measures by the most reactionary regime in
Moscow to put humpty-dumpty back together again, and even
then he would not be the same. Poland and Hungary are
rapidly leaving the communist world. Czechoslovakia and
East Germany can not long resist the political tides.
Although the Polish and Hungarian reform process could fail
in many political and economic respects, this would be very
unlikely to recreate orthodox satellites of Moscow on the
old model. If the Warsaw Pact survives, it will likely be
as a hollow shell. Without viable communist dictatorships
to back up, Soviet military deployments in East Europe are
not a practical means of political control.
All this puts back on the agenda the issues of German
unification, the historic squabbles of the East European
nations, and how to define and meet legitimate security
concerns without allowing some nations, especially but not
only the Russians, to tyrannize over others. All this
faces the US and its allies NOW. It is not a contingency.
The task of designing a stable post-Yalta world can only be
constructively addressed, however, if the process of
democratic reform of the political and economic life of East
Europe succeeds. Failed reforms that lapse into traditional
nationalist authoritarianism will only make matters far more
dangerous and difficult. Hence the urgency of supporting
Polish and Hungarian reforms NOW.
Articulating a "vision for Europe" -- a task the President
thought he'd taken care of this past spring and summer -- is
still on the agenda. The US cannot dominate the discussion
as it did in the past; but neither can it leave everything
to the Europeans or the course of events.
The Baltics
The most pressing Soviet contingencies for planning are also
so pressing that they are almost not contingencies, but
current predicaments. They are the two crisis precipitants
mentioned above: a) a Baltic confrontation with Moscow, and
b) a general economic collapse triggered by the fall of the
ruble overhang.
A calendar of events already on the books, e.g., elections,
referenda, and local parliamentary agendas, has a high
potential for precipitating a Baltic-Moscow crisis during
the next six months or so. Because Gorbachev himself
remains in a politically strong position within the
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leadership, he is likely to be in charge of Moscow's crisis
management in the near-term. From the beginnings of the
current nationality crisis, Gorbachev has tried to be a
compromiser, showing sympathy for the aspirations of the
non-Russian populations and eagerness to use their energies
on behalf of reform, while admonishing, sometimes sternly,
that the integrity of Union be respected ultimately.
Although Baltic popular and communist leaders know the need
to proceed carefully, the Baltic populations are
increasingly determined to strive for full independence,
believing that now is the best time and that any residual
ties to Moscow condemn them to political, economic, and
ecological decadence and dependence. The September Plenum
has probably not helped, but made matters worse. Gorbachev
offered homelies, not solutions. His warnings and
historical references will probably only anger the Baits and
prove no more intimidating than similar fulminations from
Gorbachev personally in July and the Central Committee in
August. And the ouster of Chebrikov and others indicates
that the conservatives are weaker than ever, thereby
probably emboldening the secessionists.
These conditions assure that a crisis over the Baltics will
occasion great strain in the United States, as we try to
decide how to apportion between two deserving but
incompatible objects of our sympathy -- Gorbachev and the
Baltic people -- as well as two competing values, reform in
the USSR as a whole and outright self-determination.
Congress and all manner of publics, including Baltic-
Americans, will get in the act.
The Intelligence Community is likely to come under greater
pressure to produce definitive judgments before the fact
than it faced in the run up to Tienanmen Square. But the
problems will be similar: We shall be asked, as we were
about Deng, what is Gorbachev, a beseiged reformer trSiing to
save the Soviet Union through compromise or a closet
imperialist/colonialist? We shall be asked, as we were
about the Chinese students, to help form judgements about
the virtue of the Baltic political agenda: Is it rational
self-liberation; or irrational and destabilizing
nationalism? And we shall be asked to cast insight into
Kremlin intrigues and to explain military activities that
might pressage a crackdown.
A Moscow-Baltic confrontation could last a long time, as the
parties both exchange combative declarations and seek ground
for compromise. If it were only up to Gorbachev and the
Baltic populations, a compromise of at least temporary
duration would likely be found, even though the ultimate
issues are not subject to real resolution. The flies in the
ointment are party reactionaries in both Moscow and the
Baltics, on one hand, and some elements of the Russian
population in the Baltics on the other. For the very
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purpose of provoking a violent crackdown that would unhorse
perestroika and probably Gorbachev himself, both of these
spoiler parties would seek to inspire communal violence (as
they did this summer's strikes over the Estonian language
law).
Economic Collapse
The contours of a sharpened economic crisis in the Soviet
Union are less obvious than those of a crisis over regional
nationalism. They could be illuminated, however, by some
focused analysis, which ought to be commissioned now. '
It is quite possible that economic disaster could strike
while Gorbachev is in power and not result in his removal.
This would leave the US facing challenges as to what it is
willing to do to help him. Rescuing the Soviet economy in
any time frame is beyond the collective resources of the
West. But we could well confront a situation compelling
actions within our power for purely humanitarian reasons.
Such a situation would arise were the Soviet food supply
system to completely break down. How that might happen and
what we could do to alleviate the threat of famine, suffered
by people in the USSR already twice in this century, would
be well worth some prior study.
Gorbachev Opts For Repression of Nationalism
Through removing Chebrikov, Shcherbitskii, and other
conservatives at the September Plenum Gorbachev has bought
himself more time, some would say to continue destabilizing
the USSR, others would say to make perestroyka work. In any
case, the odds of his ouster through a Kremlin plot are now
reduced once again. The military and the KGB are not likely
to move against him on their own, without a unified and
legitimizing Politburo invitation (although this is d tricky
question we have to keep close tabs on).
With a stronger Kremlin hand, Gorbachev may now be in a
position to push the economic reforms which have the
prospect in the long run of easing the economic crisis. He
may be in a better position to compromise the nationality
crisis. But real solutions to the manifold problems of the
system are no more visible after than before the September
Plenum. This Plenum increases the likelihood that showdowns
with local nationalism or an economic collapse will befall
Gorbachev himself rather than some successor.
This makes a Gorbachev move toward repression of nationalist
ferment a more likely contingency during the next year than
his overthrow. The odds are probably less than even at this
point, but still considerable (say 30%). Were such a move
to occur, it is likely to lead to fairly extensive violence
among ethnic groups (e.g., Armenians versus Azerbaidzhanis),
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which is already commonplace in the Caucasus and Central
Asia, but also to much more violence between Russians and
anti-Russian ethnics, and between the latter and the police
and the military.
Moscow's repressive measures would start with an increase in
rhetoric intended to-warn and intimidate the ethnics. This
would be followed by selective arrests of popular front
leaders labeled as "extremists", intended to intimidate and
to get activists out of action. Given the atmosphere in the
USSR today ?.contempt and hatred for central authorities, a
sense that populist action can get results, and a belief
that it's "now or never" for independence or secession --
plus the widespread availability of arms, modest repressive
measures are unlikely to work and will lead to escalating
violence. Conditions similar to those of Northern Ireland,
already being approached in the Caucasus, could appear in
the Baltic, in Central Asia, and possibly in the Western
Ukraine. Moscow would be compelled to use force more widely
and brutally than ever in recent memory within Soviet
borders.
Thus, this "contingency" conjures an image of many Tienanmen
Squares around the Soviet Union. Such a development would
have inevitable impact on US-Soviet and East-West relations.
Public and congressional reactions would probably force
a freeze of most diplomatic and government-sponsored
economic undertakings, at least until the large
political implications of a Gorbachev-led crackdown
became clear.
There would be considerable tension and disarray within
NATO about where and how to take retaliatory steps.
The US would be forced to take an explicit position on
whether the Baltic countries have a right to
independence or whether Moscow has a right to coerce
their continued membership in the Union.
There would be an increase of refugees and defectors
coming out of Soviet border regions and an increase of
arms smuggling into those regions.
Having observed the power of TV coverage in the China
case, the Soviets are likely to bundle Western newsmen
forcibly out of areas of violence.
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