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December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 13, 2009
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July 6, 1983
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Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 BOO776ROO0100010001-9 0 '0 S E C R E T The Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505 NIC #4899-83 National Intelligence Council 6 J u l y 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence FROM David Y. McManis National Intelligence Officer for Warning SUBJECT NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June 1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached. 2. Comments on warning situation. a. USSR (1) The Soviets probably will intensify their anti-INF campaign in the next three months through further threats and inducements. West Germany will remain the pr incipal target of Soviet i The as Germans might be "forced" to harass transit an communications between West Germany and West Berlin. (2) Moscow probably will refrain from blatant threats during Chancellor Kohl's visit in early July, calculating that the most effective way to induce his government to change its support for adhering to the present INF deployment schedule is by stimulating public and political opposition in West S E C R E T Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 BOO776ROO0100010001-9 Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 S E C R E T (3) Recent Soviet comments on the nature of intended countermeasures against the U.S. are consistent with current assessments that the USSR is unlikely to introduce land-based missiles in Cuba or base missile submarines at Cuban ports. Officials of the USA Institute implied in early June that the Soviets would reposition missile submarines or deploy cruise missile ships along the U.S. 200-mile territorial waters limits, but they ruled out deploying missiles to Cuba or Nicaragua. b. Middle East (1) Syria's maneuvers to secure firm control of the PLO as an instrument of Syrian policy will have far-reaching consequences in Arab politics. It will substantially strengthen Syria's position in Lebanon, particularly if the Syrians bring the northern port of Tripoli under their control, and reinforce Syria's capacity to intimidate Jordan and Saudi Arabia into supporting its policy toward Israel and an Arab-Israeli settlement. (2) Syria's reported intention to instigate disturbances in Tripoli as part of a plan to bring the city and its surrounding area under firm control may be a prelude to the creation of a separatist government in Lebanon headed by former president Franjiyah, former primer minister Karami, and Druze leader Junblatt. Formation of a Syrian- controlled regime would be intended in part as a reaction to the Lebanese parliament's ratification of the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement and, more ominously, as a harbinger of Syrian moves to destabilize the Gemayel government and eventually to overthrow it. (3) Although neither Syria nor Israel intends to initiate major hostilities in the next three months, Syrian moves to subvert the Gemayel government or intensify Palestinian attacks on Israeli troops in Lebanon would force the Begin government to respond with political pressures to counter Syrian interference in Lebanese politics and perhaps with reprisal strikes against Palestinian and Syrian forces in Lebanon. The fragmentation of the PLO and the possible removal or assassination of Arafat will strengthen the S E C R E T Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 S 'PC R E T influence of radical P military operations LO factions advocating Lebanon and generate against the Israelis Lebanese Christians terrorist attacks onin and on modeate rab .S. targets in the M U Euope. iddle Eastrand West and Wester c. Chile Pinochet The authority y and stability of the tested in the next probably will be severely demonstrations in May months. ie July, Opposition y and June will beotest in Jul to Pinochet renewed a s a rowing steadily in the last has been g result of Chile's economicar and a half Economic growth declined crisis. 14 and t h i s trend has led b u s i n e s s ini ne l ast associations t major year, the governmento join labor union sn s austere economic POpposing (Z) Pinochet' olicies. changes in s response to demands for five-year-oledcosntoamic policy, an end to the of political of emergency, legalization Paries elections befo retthe' and presidential in 1989 will determinePresident's term expires If Pinochet's efforts to course in Of events. Opposition forc timidate es fail, and divide revert to harsh re he will be inclined to -pressive measures a ainst the middle ~> (3) If fu t r her anti_ result a in violenovmenrtes cerntherr e w pwould ouldts forces chance of a the de that could rapidl split in the armed and stimulate military y undermine the r Pinochet. Y Pressure to re e9ime place (4) The Soviets have respond* by instructing the Chilean ed to events abandon its polic Coommmmuun nist Part roader y of armed stru y to rivals Political alliances with igle ts Bts and seek evolutiincluding the Movement left- of the wing oderates y Left. Chilean Political ir are concerned that the he are e gaining the most from Communists te unrest eadershipest organized forhundergrounbdecause S E C R E T Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 d. Central America (1) The chances of a Sandinista military response to incidents in which Honduran forces have fired into Nicaragua are increasing. The Sandinistas claim that the insurgents would be unable to hold territory without Honduran military support. Ongoing Soviet and Cuban military deliveries and the apparent augmentation of Cuban advisers may embolden the Sandinistas to escalate military pressures duras. Attachments: NIO/AF NIO/EA NIO/NARC NI0/LA NIO/NESA NIO/USSR-EE NIO/WE Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9 ? SUBJECT: NIO Monthly Warning Assessments: June Distribution: Copy 1 - DCI (w/atts) Copy 2 - DDCI (w/atts) 3 - Executive Director (w/atts) 4 - SA/IS/DCI (w/o atts) 5 - Executive Registry (w/atts) 6 - DDI w/atts) 7 - DO (w/atts) 8 - DO w/atts) 9 - C/NIC (w/atts) 10 - VC/NIC (Mr. Meyer) (w/atts) 11 - VC/NIC (Mr. Waterman) (w/atts) 12 - D/AG 13 - NIO/AF 14 - NIO/AL 15 - NIO/EA 16 - NIO/GPF 17 - NIO/LA 18 - NIO/NESA 19 - NIO/E 20 - NIO/SP 21 - NIO/USSR-EE 22 - NIO/WE 23 - NIO/AG 24 - D/CPAS 25 - D/OCR 26 - D/SOVA 27 - D/EURA 28 - D/ALA 29 - D/OIA 30 - D/NESA 31 - D/OEA 32 - D/OGI 33 - D/OSWR 34 - C/COMIREX 35 - C/SIGINT Com. 36 - C/HRC 37 - SRP 38 - SA/DDI/CS 39 - NIO/W 40 - A/NIO/W 41 - SA/W 42 - NWS 43 - NIO/W Chron 44 - Warning Reports File (w/atts) 45 - DDI Registry (w/atts) NIC #4899-83 6 July 1983 (w/o atts) Approved For Release 2009/08/13: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100010001-9