WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR LATIN AMERICA FEBRUARY 1984
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100120007-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
11
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 19, 2009
Sequence Number:
7
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 29, 1984
Content Type:
MEMO
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National Intelligence Council
NIC 01349-84
29 February 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: John Horton
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Latin America
February 1984
1. The following items were discussed at the Warning and Forecast
Meeting held on 22 February 1984.
2. The holiday season in Chile was unusually active. From the leftist
opposition, there were bombings, forest fires set, and attacks on police
stations. There was also right-wing terrorism such as fire-bombings of
churches. While the economy seems to be picking up, a peso devaluation is
rumored, copper prices are low, and unemployment remains a critical issue.
3. We see prospects for a political confrontation in Chile in the next
few months as better than 50/50. The National Workers Council (CNT) is
planning a protest on 27 March, and a strike is being considered for April.
The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) could also pull off some dramatic
actions. May Day is an occasion for protests and 11 May -- the anniversary of
the first Day of Protest in 1983 -- could provide the focus for violent
demonstrations. Moreover, there will be the June anniversary of the copper
workers strike.
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4. The following developments would indicate that a serious crisis is
brewing in Chile.
-- Major changes in the political parties law by President Pinochet.
-- The resignation of Interior Minister Jarpa.
-- The use of transitory articles rather than judicial procedures to
deal with opposition political or labor activities.
-- Verbal or physical attacks on the church, on rights, or on political
activity.
-- Widespread support for a national strike, cutting across class and
regional lines.
-- Firing of military personnel for political remarks.
Guatemala
6. General Humberto Mejfa seems to be in a slightly stronger position,
moving as he is toward elections. He has the support of the military, and
there are few signs of unrest at senior and 'd levels- ?s
known -- as usual -- of the junior ranks.
e IMF Agreement could lapse because ax revenues are not as high
as expected. This would create serious political problems for Mejia, but it
looks as though he will hang on.
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7. There has been less violence on the part of the military in late
1983, but right-wing parties, with governmental personnel involved, did
indulge in violence--probably beyond Mejia's control. In an unusual practice,
the government has published lists of those they have detained and has even
released some of them. With the election campaign coming on, an increase in
violence can be expected.
8. The election is scheduled for 1 July, and how it will be perceived
will be much affected by the level of violence. The elections for the
constituent assembly will probably be honest, with the better organized right-
wing parties--Sandoval's Movement of National Liberation (MLN) particularly--
being victorious. The more centrist parties are still disorganized and those
more to the left are losing their momentum. Voting will be lighter in the
western highlands, where the Indians are, and heavier in Guatemala City and in
the eastern provinces.
9. Guerrilla activity continues its cyclic pattern. There were ambushes
of government forces by the insurgents in December and January, but they
seemed to run down about the third week in January. The Government dispatched
forces to Peten which put the auerrillac them in dicarrav
u rri a Army o the People (EGP) is f actionalize and the
Communist Party (PGT) is split again. They are not likely to constitute a
major threat to the government over the next six months.
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El Salvador
13. The statement of Guillermo Ungo that the FDR/FMLN would not oppose
the elections is essentially meaningless. We expect the guerrillas to keep up
their military activity. There probably will be some harrassment of voters
and polling places on election day, but this will be incidental to their
broader military campaign. An attack on a departmental capital in eastern
14. Attached are coordinated Intelligence Community estimates of
government and insurgent force strengths in Central America and Cuba. Please
note that subsequent to our session on 22 February, the total for the
Salvadoran Army was increased to 27,300 (bringing the total active duty force
level up to 40,000). A number of adjustments were made to the Cuban figures
resulting in a total active duty force estimate of 280,000. The figures for
total active duty military and security personnel (as well as the number of
15. For your information, due to a National Intelligence Council
Conference the week of 19 March, the next Warning Meeting will be held on
Wednesday, 28 March.
Attachments:
A. Government and Insurgent Forces in Central America
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GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA,
February
COUNTRY
ACTIVE DUTY
MILITARY AND ARMED
SECURITY FORCES INSURGENTS
Guatemala
43,000
Honduras
22,000
El Salvador
40,000 9,000 - 11,000
Nicaragua
49,000
Costa Rica
8,000
Cuba
280,000
* No active insurgency, but severa undred radical leftists probably are armed.
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MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA
February,
GUATEMALA
Active Duty Personnel
Army
26,900
Air Force
750
Navy and Marines
980
Mobile Military Police
3,000
National Police
9,500
Treasury Police
1,900
Total
43,030
Others
Army Reserve
10,000
Air Force Reserve
200
Civilian Defense Forces
500,000*
*Less than 5 percent have small arms.
HONDURAS
Active Duty Personnel
Army
14,600
Air Force
1,300
Navy and Marines
850
Public Security Forces
5,000
Total
21,750
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EL SALVADOR
Active Duty Personnel
Army 27,300
Air Force 500
Navy 500
Treasury Police 1,800
National Police 5,500
National Guard 4,200
Total 39,800
Others
Civil Defense Forces (a few thousand)
Territorial Service (60,000 to 100,000 inactive reservists)
NICARAGUA
Active Duty Personnel
Ground Forces 19,500 - 20,000
(Army and Ministry of Interior)
Reserves 12,000 - 16,000
Militia 5,000 - 10,000
Air and air defense forces 1,750
Navy 500
Police 5,000
Total 43,750 - 53,250
Others
Unmobilized Reserves (armed) 10,000 - 12,000
Organized Militia (unarmed) 9,000 - 11,000
Other Militia 30,000 - 40,000
COSTA RICA
Active Duty Personnel
Civil Guards 4,800
Rural Guards 3,200
Total 8,000
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0
Active Duty Personnel
Army (regulars) 110,000 - 120,000
Army (ready reserve) 110,000 - 135,000
Air Force and air defense forces 18,500
Navy 12,500
MININT 2,500.- 3,000
Police 12,000
Total
265,500 -
301,000
Others
Militia
600,000
Youth Labor Army
100,000
Civil Defense
50,000 -
100,000
Border Guards
3,500
Police Auxiliary
52,000
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W SECRET
SUBJECT: Warning Report for
DATE: 29 February 1984
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - DDI Registry
5 - NIO/W
1 - DC I
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - DDO/EPDS
1 - DDO/PCS
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
February 1984
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
- NIO/AF
- NIO/EA
- NIO/GPF
- NIO/NESA
- NIO/AL (Low)
- NIO/AL (Ford)
- NIO/AL (Hutchinson)
- NIO/USSR-EE
- NIO/WE
- NIO/SP
- NIO/ECON
- NIO/S&T
- NIO/Counterterrorism
- NIO/FDIA
- SRP
- SA/NPI
- IPC/DDI
- D/CPAS
- D/OCR
- D/SOVA
- D/OIA
- D/NESA
- D/OEA
- D/OSWR
- D/NPIC
- NPIC/PEG
D00 Hqs
NIC 01349-84
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SUBJECT: February 1984 Warning Report
DATE: 29 February 1984
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Department of State (Misback)
1 - NSA
1 - NSA
1 - Treasury Mulhn11and1
1
- DIA
1
- DIA
1
- DIA
1
- DIA
1
- DIA
1
- VP Hughes
1
- NSC (Menges)
1
- USMC (Call)
1
- ONI (Pallas)
1
- NAVOPINTCEN (Greene)
1
- USA (Porter)
1
- USAF (Silva/Kelbaugh)
NIC 01349-84
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