WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT FOR LATIN AMERICA FEBRUARY 1984

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP91B00776R000100120007-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 19, 2009
Sequence Number: 
7
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 29, 1984
Content Type: 
MEMO
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PDF icon CIA-RDP91B00776R000100120007-1.pdf245.22 KB
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Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 ? errnrr National Intelligence Council NIC 01349-84 29 February 1984 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning FROM: John Horton National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report for Latin America February 1984 1. The following items were discussed at the Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 22 February 1984. 2. The holiday season in Chile was unusually active. From the leftist opposition, there were bombings, forest fires set, and attacks on police stations. There was also right-wing terrorism such as fire-bombings of churches. While the economy seems to be picking up, a peso devaluation is rumored, copper prices are low, and unemployment remains a critical issue. 3. We see prospects for a political confrontation in Chile in the next few months as better than 50/50. The National Workers Council (CNT) is planning a protest on 27 March, and a strike is being considered for April. The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) could also pull off some dramatic actions. May Day is an occasion for protests and 11 May -- the anniversary of the first Day of Protest in 1983 -- could provide the focus for violent demonstrations. Moreover, there will be the June anniversary of the copper workers strike. SECRET Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 ? SECRET 0 4. The following developments would indicate that a serious crisis is brewing in Chile. -- Major changes in the political parties law by President Pinochet. -- The resignation of Interior Minister Jarpa. -- The use of transitory articles rather than judicial procedures to deal with opposition political or labor activities. -- Verbal or physical attacks on the church, on rights, or on political activity. -- Widespread support for a national strike, cutting across class and regional lines. -- Firing of military personnel for political remarks. Guatemala 6. General Humberto Mejfa seems to be in a slightly stronger position, moving as he is toward elections. He has the support of the military, and there are few signs of unrest at senior and 'd levels- ?s known -- as usual -- of the junior ranks. e IMF Agreement could lapse because ax revenues are not as high as expected. This would create serious political problems for Mejia, but it looks as though he will hang on. Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 9 SECRET ? 7. There has been less violence on the part of the military in late 1983, but right-wing parties, with governmental personnel involved, did indulge in violence--probably beyond Mejia's control. In an unusual practice, the government has published lists of those they have detained and has even released some of them. With the election campaign coming on, an increase in violence can be expected. 8. The election is scheduled for 1 July, and how it will be perceived will be much affected by the level of violence. The elections for the constituent assembly will probably be honest, with the better organized right- wing parties--Sandoval's Movement of National Liberation (MLN) particularly-- being victorious. The more centrist parties are still disorganized and those more to the left are losing their momentum. Voting will be lighter in the western highlands, where the Indians are, and heavier in Guatemala City and in the eastern provinces. 9. Guerrilla activity continues its cyclic pattern. There were ambushes of government forces by the insurgents in December and January, but they seemed to run down about the third week in January. The Government dispatched forces to Peten which put the auerrillac them in dicarrav u rri a Army o the People (EGP) is f actionalize and the Communist Party (PGT) is split again. They are not likely to constitute a major threat to the government over the next six months. Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 M El Salvador 13. The statement of Guillermo Ungo that the FDR/FMLN would not oppose the elections is essentially meaningless. We expect the guerrillas to keep up their military activity. There probably will be some harrassment of voters and polling places on election day, but this will be incidental to their broader military campaign. An attack on a departmental capital in eastern 14. Attached are coordinated Intelligence Community estimates of government and insurgent force strengths in Central America and Cuba. Please note that subsequent to our session on 22 February, the total for the Salvadoran Army was increased to 27,300 (bringing the total active duty force level up to 40,000). A number of adjustments were made to the Cuban figures resulting in a total active duty force estimate of 280,000. The figures for total active duty military and security personnel (as well as the number of 15. For your information, due to a National Intelligence Council Conference the week of 19 March, the next Warning Meeting will be held on Wednesday, 28 March. Attachments: A. Government and Insurgent Forces in Central America Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 4P 4P GOVERNMENT AND INSURGENT FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA, February COUNTRY ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY AND ARMED SECURITY FORCES INSURGENTS Guatemala 43,000 Honduras 22,000 El Salvador 40,000 9,000 - 11,000 Nicaragua 49,000 Costa Rica 8,000 Cuba 280,000 * No active insurgency, but severa undred radical leftists probably are armed. Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 ? JGt,tCL I ~I ? MILITARY AND SECURITY FORCES IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND CUBA February, GUATEMALA Active Duty Personnel Army 26,900 Air Force 750 Navy and Marines 980 Mobile Military Police 3,000 National Police 9,500 Treasury Police 1,900 Total 43,030 Others Army Reserve 10,000 Air Force Reserve 200 Civilian Defense Forces 500,000* *Less than 5 percent have small arms. HONDURAS Active Duty Personnel Army 14,600 Air Force 1,300 Navy and Marines 850 Public Security Forces 5,000 Total 21,750 SECRET/ Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 ? ---?-- , I I ? EL SALVADOR Active Duty Personnel Army 27,300 Air Force 500 Navy 500 Treasury Police 1,800 National Police 5,500 National Guard 4,200 Total 39,800 Others Civil Defense Forces (a few thousand) Territorial Service (60,000 to 100,000 inactive reservists) NICARAGUA Active Duty Personnel Ground Forces 19,500 - 20,000 (Army and Ministry of Interior) Reserves 12,000 - 16,000 Militia 5,000 - 10,000 Air and air defense forces 1,750 Navy 500 Police 5,000 Total 43,750 - 53,250 Others Unmobilized Reserves (armed) 10,000 - 12,000 Organized Militia (unarmed) 9,000 - 11,000 Other Militia 30,000 - 40,000 COSTA RICA Active Duty Personnel Civil Guards 4,800 Rural Guards 3,200 Total 8,000 SECRET/ Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 4P 0 Active Duty Personnel Army (regulars) 110,000 - 120,000 Army (ready reserve) 110,000 - 135,000 Air Force and air defense forces 18,500 Navy 12,500 MININT 2,500.- 3,000 Police 12,000 Total 265,500 - 301,000 Others Militia 600,000 Youth Labor Army 100,000 Civil Defense 50,000 - 100,000 Border Guards 3,500 Police Auxiliary 52,000 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 W SECRET SUBJECT: Warning Report for DATE: 29 February 1984 DISTRIBUTION: 1 - DDI Registry 5 - NIO/W 1 - DC I 1 - DDCI 1 - EXDIR 1 - ER 1 - DDI 1 - DDO/EPDS 1 - DDO/PCS 1 - C/NIC 1 - VC/NIC February 1984 INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - NIO/AF - NIO/EA - NIO/GPF - NIO/NESA - NIO/AL (Low) - NIO/AL (Ford) - NIO/AL (Hutchinson) - NIO/USSR-EE - NIO/WE - NIO/SP - NIO/ECON - NIO/S&T - NIO/Counterterrorism - NIO/FDIA - SRP - SA/NPI - IPC/DDI - D/CPAS - D/OCR - D/SOVA - D/OIA - D/NESA - D/OEA - D/OSWR - D/NPIC - NPIC/PEG D00 Hqs NIC 01349-84 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1 ? SECRET ? SUBJECT: February 1984 Warning Report DATE: 29 February 1984 DISTRIBUTION: 1 - Department of State (Misback) 1 - NSA 1 - NSA 1 - Treasury Mulhn11and1 1 - DIA 1 - DIA 1 - DIA 1 - DIA 1 - DIA 1 - VP Hughes 1 - NSC (Menges) 1 - USMC (Call) 1 - ONI (Pallas) 1 - NAVOPINTCEN (Greene) 1 - USA (Porter) 1 - USAF (Silva/Kelbaugh) NIC 01349-84 Approved For Release 2009/08/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120007-1