EAST ASIA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100120023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 1, 2008
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: January 25, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/12/01 : CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120023-3
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
NIC #00574-84
25 January 1984
FROM : David D. Gries
National Intelligence Officer for East Asia
SUBJECT : East Asia Warning and Forecast Meeting
During the 20 January 1984 East Asia Warning and Forecast meeting
representatives of the Intelligence Community discussed and made forecasts
concerning the following subjects:
I. Malaysia and Mahathir's Future
Having weathered the constitutional crisis over royal prerogatives, Prime
Minister Mahathir is now faced with a scandal stemming from irregular loans
made by Bank Bumiputra. The investigting commission report, which is expected
to take six months to prepare, will be a major determining factor for
Mahathir's future. Barring unforeseen revelations during the investigation,
Mahathir, at worst, will be "scorched but not burned."
II. President Reagan's Trip to China
Chinese relations with the United States are showing a growing
sophistication. With the success of the Zhao visit to Washington, relations
have grown in tone and substance. It would take a major unforeseen event to
disrupt the President's planned trip. Chinese internal politics can be
volatile and the passing of Deng, for instance, could throw open issues such
as the Sino-US relationship. However,. Chinese leaders seem to desire to show
continuity in foreign affairs, which leads us to conclude that a cancellation
of the President's trip is very unlikely.
III. Thailand and the Financial Crisis
Thai foreign trade is in serious trouble because of increased imports and
decreased exports. This deterioration in the balance of trade has doubled the
trade deficit causing serious balance of payment problems. To counter this
the Thai government has raised the interest rates and moved to limit credit.
Other possible solutions could be to borrow to finance the payment problems or
to devalue the currency. Prime Minister P.rem has threatened to resign if
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there is a devaluation. The key indicator for gauging Thai success in
correcting this situation is whether the export market improves.
We note that the Thai debt is one half that of the Philippines. They
have not been borrowing additional monies and it would take 4-5 years of
continued problems coupled with inept management to bring them to the point of
serious financial jeopardy. We expect them to weather this current short-term
balance of payments problem without major difficulty.
IV. North Korean Proposals for Negotiation Leading to Confederation of
the Koreas
We expect this process to move slowly, particularly in view of the
Rangoon bombing. China will probably opt to stay in the background and try to
dampen any radical North Korean initiatives. The Soviets will watch but play
no role unless their interests (influence with North Korea) appear
threatened. We expect no significant progress during the next six months.
VI. Sino-Soviet Negotiations in 1984: Prospects
The atmosphere before the start of negotiations appears clouded, with the
Soviets accusing China of favoritism towards the US, however both sides see
the utility of the talks. The Soviets have shown increasing concern because
of Premier Zhao's recent successful trip to the US. Nevertheless, we expect
no major improvements from these negotiations but continuation of the dialogue
may yield modest results.
VII. Interagency Production
Next month's Warning and Forecast Meeting will be on 22 Februar 1984 at
1400 hours in room 7E62. Please phone attendance intentions to
and have your clearances verified to us by your Security
Office by COB 17 February.
David D. Gries fellL
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SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/12/01 : CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100120023-3