MONTHLY FORECAST AND WARNING REPORT -- USSR-EE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100130025-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: April 23, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
NIC #02465-84
23 April 1984
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
National me igence Officer for USSR-EE
Monthly Forecast and Warning Report -- USSR-EE
1. Because of the potential importance of the issue, most of the
meeting was devoted to a review of unusual Soviet worldwide activities. The
NIO began by briefly reviewing recent Soviet activities: more intensive
military exercises within the USSR, the probable imminence of a major
campaign in Afghanistan, naval operations around Indochina, Berlin air
corridor restrictions, the dispatch for the first time of a carrier to Cuba
and the Gulf of Mexico, and the continuation of alarmist Soviet public and
private statements. He advanced four posssible explanations for these
actions:
A Each activity has its own rational, including in some cases
demonstration of Soviet resolve to act against US or other
adversary interests; but the Soviets have not purposely
enlarged or escalated activity in all areas to alarm or
intimidate.
B. Although each activity does have its own rationale, the
Soviets have enlarged and escalated activity to achieve an
alarming or intimidating effect, e.g., to create global
anxieties that could be turned politically against the US.
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-- C. The Soviets are raising the "noise/signal" ratio in
preparation for some specific threatening action in the future
requiring a degree of surprise; i.e., the real intent is not
to alarm the US but actually to desensitize the US to higher
levels of Soviet military activity.
-- D. The scale of activities observed is the product of
decentralized decisions, with less than normaal control at the
Politburo level; Soviet military authorities may be exploiting
the internal political situation for their own goals.
2. Some agency representatives felt that Soviet activity represented
an overall pattern intended to impress or intimidate the US and its Allies,
albeit with actions that have their own discrete rationales. Some
representatives, however, felt that the Soviet actions were unconnected and
that any apparent pattern was primarily in the eye of the beholder.
3. Participants then discussed the Soviet treatment of the alleged
threat of war. They found it comparable to some past Soviet campaigns (such
as in the 1920s and the late 1940s and early 1950s) when the Soviets had
played on the theme not so much out of genuine fear but for domestic or
external manipulative purposes. Despite the current war hype, recent Soviet
leadership speeches reveal not a fear of war but rather grave concern over
the long-term political and strategic implications of the US military
buildup. One participant, however, disagreed strongly. He felt that
so-called past Soviet war scares had been interpretations of the
international situation that were genuine even if they were not always
accurate. Similarly, today the Soviet leadership is alarmed both by US
rhetoric and by some US exercises (such as the unprecedented exercise of
three aircraft carriers in the direction of Kamchatka). A majority remained
of the view that the Soviet use of the war scare is almost entirely
manipulative.
4. In their review of Soviet exercises, analysts found that the
oft-used description "unprecedented" is meaningless since Soviet exercises
are not repetitive but grow in size and complexity as Soviet military
capabilities increase. In its own way, therefore, each year's series of
exercises is "unprecedented." This year's series has been no exception and
some of the exercises, such as the North Atlantic naval exercise and the
more recent missile activity, have been particularly impressive. But, so
far, the primary significance of the exercises has been what they reveal
about evolving Soviet doctrine and military potential. Analysts also
discussed Soviet reactions to Western exercises and judged that, with one
probable exception, the Soviet reaction pattern has not changed very much.
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5. The NIO closed the meeting by noting the new requirement for
tracking the more important issues raised at warning meetings. In response
to his request for agency suggestions for issues to be tracked, the Army rep
submitted a written list. All agencies were enjoined to produce similar
lists by Friday 4 May at the latest.
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Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100130025-0
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100130025-0
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100130025-0