LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING DECEMBER 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000100150005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 24, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA:
FROM:
NIC 07157-84
24 December 1984
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
Acting Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
December 1984
1. The Warning Meeting of 19 December 1984 addressed recent and
potential developments in Chile, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
Chile
2. State/INR holds that Pinochet's declaration of a state of siege
on 6 November, coupled with his adamancy in dealing with opposition
parties, portends further delays in the transition to democracy.
-- The state of siege has not curbed the violence; indeed the
violence has grown worse.
-- The radical leftist opposition has become more than just a
collection of terrorists; it is now an armed insurgency.
-- Pinochet's support within the military Junta may be wavering.
-- Time is working against US interests, because the more the
transition to democracy is delayed, the greater the
likelihood of serious instability.
3. DIA representatives take issue with at least two of INR's
arguments. Most analysts at this meeting agree with DIA.
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-- They maintain that Pinochet's support from the military high
command remains firm.
-- The armed opposition is not yet an insurgency and has serious
vulnerabilities. For example, one of.the groups, the MIR,
iaCK signiticant popular suppor .
El Salvador
5. There is general consensus that the FMLN has adopted a harder
line in negotiations with the government. Yet its capabilities to engage
in large-scale combat operations remain low.
Militarily the FMLN seems to be emphasizing urban terrorism,
attacks on less well-equipped and less well-commanded
Salvadoran army units, attempts to disrupt the coffee harvst
in Western El Salvador, and perhaps an occasional attack on a
departmental capital.
Meanwhile the government may undergo serious internal strains
in the next few months. Duarte may come under pressures of
various kinds from the military over his attempts to promote
Lopez Nuila to General and possibly make him Minister of
Interior. Moreover, the military will have to decide whether
its future leadership will be dominated by pragmatists like
Blandon or hardline rightists such as Bustillo.
SECRET
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Nicaragua
7. There is general consensus that the Contras are unlikely to
collapse in the next three months.
-- DIA holds a somewhat lower numerical estimate of the Contras
than CIA: 11-12,500 in the FDN; 600-1200 in ARDE and
Pastora's group; 350-550 in MISURA; up to 350 in MISURASATA.
-- DIA agrees with CIA that the trend line in FDN strength in
recent months has been upward.
-- DIA judges, with more certainty than CIA analysts, that the
ARDE/Pastora forces have nearly fallen apart, and that the
burden of combat in the south will have to be borne by the
FDN.
-- The Contras are getting more external support than
anti t
8. There was also a general consensus that the military balance
between the Sandinista armed forces and the Contras is now tilting in
favor of the Sandinistas.
-- The Sandinistas are becoming more efficient at coordinating
combat operations and effectively using the newly-arrived
equipment.
-- On the other hand, the size of Sandinsta armed forces is not
increasing greatly, partly due to casualties, but more
clearly because of draft evasions and desertions--some units
are suffering a desertion rate of over 40 percent
SECRET
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SUBJECT: Warning Report for Latin America NIC 07157-84
DATE: 24 December 1984
DISTRIBUTION:
1 - Department of State (DeWitt)
1 - Department of State/INR/IC/RD
(Suzanne D. Kuser, Room 6845)
1 - NSA
1 - NSA
1 - Treasury (Mulholland)
1 - DIN
1 - DIA
1 - DIA
1 - DIA
1 - DIN
1 - DIA/
1 - DIA
1 - DIA
1 - Vice residen s Office Hughes
1 - NSC (Menges)
1 - USMC (Call)
1 - ONI (LeBauve)
1 - NAVOPINTCEN (Greene)
1 - USArmy (Brown)
1 - USAF (Silva/Kelbaugh)
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SUBJECT: WARNING REPORT FOR LATIN AMERICA NIC 07157-84
DATE: 24 December 1984
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - EXDIR
1 - ER
1 - DDI
1 - DDO/EPDS
1 - DDO/PCS
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - DDI Registry
1 - NIO/W
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/AL (Low)
1 - NIO/AL (Ford)
1 - NIO/AL (Hutchinson)
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - NIO/Europe
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NIO/ECON
1 - NIO/S&T
1 - NIO/Counterterrorism
1 - NIO/FDIA
1 - SRP
1 - IPC/DDI
1 - D/CPAS
1 - D/OCR
1 - D/SOVA
1 - D/OIA
1 - D/NESA
1 - D/OEA
1 - D/OSWR
1 - D/NPIC
1 - NPIC/PE
1 - IIIA
(Room
4E58 HOS)
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150005-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150005-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/25: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000100150005-0