EAST ASIA NORTH KOREA: MOBILIZATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
T
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
March 15, 2013
Sequence Number:
35
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 3, 1987
Content Type:
MISC
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9.pdf | 389.37 KB |
Body:
?
TO SEC-REP- 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25X1
EAST ASIA
NIO/W
3 June 1987
NORTH KOREA: Mobilization
North Korea has been taking unprecedented steps since March to place at
least portions of its economy under military administration.
explanation to South Korean political
developments, are not yet clear. NIO/Warning notes if P'yongyang is
significantly changing its war preparedness, its intentions during the next
6-9 months to follow through will be strongly influenced by its perception of
US resolve to defend South Korea as evidenced by US political and military
actions.
SOUTH KOREA: Stacking the Deck
President Chun's replacement of most of his cabinet will not placate the
increasingly broad-based opposition to his government and Chun's control over
choice of a successor this year. The potential for a major upheaval mounts.
Missteps by either Chun, military hardliners, or provocateurs within the
ranks of the political opposition could bring a breakpoint at any time.
Should key military leaders view Chun as losing control, they probably would
move to overthrow him, but we probably would receive little additional
warning. Any breakdown in public order will encourage North Korea to
consider mounting destabilization operations and foment anti-government riots
and sabotage.
PHILIPPINES: Tiger by the Tail
Opposition efforts to undermine the Aquino government will continue, and
the need is more urgent than ever for President Aquino to begin making
political and economic reforms that are imperative to stem communist
insurgency and move toward participatory democracy. Terrorist activities in
urban areas, which may include the targetting of American interests, and
other evidence of a bolder insurgency will further increase strains between
the military and Aquino's administration.
TOP ,SE-elfg
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1
20A1
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECREIr 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25x1
LATIN AMERICA
ARGENTINA: Walking a Tightrope
The deal President Alfonsin struck to quash April's Army
rebellions--exempting many military offices from prosecution--ultimately will
hurt his domestic popularity. More opportunities for overambitious Army
officers to create serious trouble for the Alfonsin presidency appear likely,
as Alfonsin implements his agreements to the military.
CHILE: Intransigence
The Pope's April visit has galvanized the moderate opposition's campaign
for free elections. Even senior military officers appear more responsive to
this effort, but Pinochet appears as determined as ever to maneuver to remain
in power past 1989. A concerned Pinochet's actions to maintain control may
precipitate a new crisis of confidence over his leadership within the armed
forces and fuel momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Storm Warning
The recent vote on a new constitution--in preparation for presidential
elections--represents an important step on the road to a democratically
elected government in Haiti. However, the faltering economy--Haiti's
greatest threat to democratic institutions--continues to worsen, and
unemployment remains above 50 percent. Proposed US reductions in Haiti's
export quota of brown sugar to the United States will increase strains on the
Haitian economy. Should these conditions continue to be inadequately
addressed, Haiti's increasingly volatile situation could erupt into violent
upheaval which would reverse the gains thus far achieved. Sporadic incidents
of anti-Americanism probably will grow.
JAMAICA: Hard Times Aid Manley
Political tensions remain high, and economic woes are deepening. As
national elections approach, Manley's chances of winning the election,
despite being temporarily sidelined by illness, are increasing.
MEXICO: Political Crisis?
Acute economic problems, austerity measures, and corruption will continue
to generate widespread popular and business dissatisfaction and prompt
sporadic civil disturbances, especially in the northern states.
NICARAGUA/HONDURAS: Continuation of Hostilities
Nicaragua continues to Maintain a limited presence inside Honduran border
regions, thereby keeping pressure on the Honduran government to restrict
rebel activities. Honduras is likely to seek concessions and further
TflP crrorT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/03/15 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25x1
reassurances of support from the US, as Managua steps up activities aimed at
embarrassing Tegucigalpa. NIO/Warning notes that the potential for
Sandinista forces inside Honduras to fire on US military personnel continues.
SURINAME: Quagmire
A year of insurgent military and economic attacks by Brunswijk's
200-person forces have not significantly eroded Bourterse's grip on power.
The recent announcement of a new constitution and dates for a referendum and
general elections are means to perpetuate the military in power.
Governmental collapse remains possible.
WESTERN EUROPE
BERLIN/USSR/GERMANY: New Initiatives
.The Soviets and East Germans appear to be intensifying efforts to
undermine Allied unity on arms negotiations and/or sensitive Berlin issues.
Proposals for easing military confrontation in Europe and reducing the risks
of suprise attack are designed to undercut the credibility of traditional
NATO and pro-US policies and hasten the trend toward independent European
accommodations with Moscow. During this anniversary year of Berlin, further
Soviets probes designed to challenge the status of Berlin are likely.
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: Troubled Waters
Greek-Turkish tensions in the Aegean continue to flare, and new military
developments in Cyprus provide further flashpoints for conflict. Efforts by
the Greek Cypriot government to procure tanks and other weapons; a
significant increase in the number of Turkish tanks on Cyprus; and Turkish
moves toward formalizing partition of the island are all new irritants that
could trigger confrontation. Each side apparently believes the US can
prevent war--an attitude that may encourage recklessness and lack of
restraint, which could trigger sudden confrontation through miscalculation
and escalation.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN/USSR: Mounting Soviet Pressure
The Soviets are escalating pressure on Pakistan.
there have been 425 bombing and airspace violations this year,
both deeper and more deadly than last year's reported 750 violations. Soviet
deployment of electronic countermeasures aircraft to the border for the first
time may presage even more agressive air violations. Meanwhile, the Soviet
subversion campaign to destabilize Pakistan continues, with stepped up
efforts in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province.
Tnix UTPFT
6. Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: ClA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25X1
EGYPT: Prospects for Instability
In the face of acute economic deterioration and increasing activity by
religious activists, President Mubarak will be hard-pressed to maintain
control during implementation of the newest IMF program. Extensive protests
and labor strife that would threaten Mubarak's hold on the presidency. At
the same time, the stability of the Egyptian government and its relations
with the US and Israel depend on Mubarak who is a constant target for
assassination by external and internal foes. Further violence against US
personnel remains likely.
INDIA/CHINA: Border Clashes
Although India consciously avoided an immediate showdown with China last
week, continued improvements in both Chinese and Indian military readiness
and hardened diplomatic positions make clashes almost inevitable.
and
recent moves by both sides suggest efforts to prepare for more serious
operations. Chinese initiation of hostilities would be calculated to cause
New Delhi to withdraw from last summer's encroachments, but India's inclusion
of the disputed area into a new state, and domestic focus on the situation,
will make it tough for Gandhi to compromise.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
Islamabad already has the capability to produce
a nuclear weapon within a few days to a few weeks. This appears to have
triggered another Indian reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that
will further fuel tensions in the subcontinent. Nb/Warning notes that we
should be prepared for the eventuality of a weapons test in the subcontinent.
IRAN/IRAQ/GULF ARAB STATES: Damn the Torpedoes
The war at sea has reached a new level of seriousness. Iraq's attack on
the USS Stark increased the already high risk--given errors in target
acquisition and discrimination--of further attacks on American or Soviet
combatants on escort duty in the Gulf.
Kevoiutionary Guard patrols in the northern Gulf, furthermore, appear to be
closely monitoring US ships movements, and Tehran may now judge the benefits
of attacking a US-flagged vessel to outweigh the risks of retaliation.
TOP SFCPFT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25x1
IRAN/IRAQ: Internal Developments
Political stakes in the war are high. The potential for sudden collapse
of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military
results. Military and civilian opposition to Husayn continues. In Iran,
differences over conduct of the war reportedly have sparked unprecedented
discontent from a war-weary populace in several cities. Khomeini seems to
have lost control of the power struggle among his successors, and his death
could trigger chaos.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurds Weighing In
. Continued Iranian support and manipulation of the Kurds, coupled with
increasing insurgent activity in the Kirkuk oil region, are drawing Turkey
closer to the conflict in the region. Despite Baghdad's scorched-earth
policy throughout Iraqi Kurdistan--razing 300 villages--Kurdish attacks
originating from Iraq will continue. Turkish warnings to Iran concerning
Tehran's meddling in the Kurdish problem are serious and have the potential
for worsening Turkish/Iranian relations.
LIBYA: Debacle
Although the Libyan public probably does not yet fully appreciate the
extent of Qadhafi's failures in Chad, popular backlash against Libyan defeats
seems certain to grow. The political and psychological repercussions of
these debacles may not reach their full effect for several months, but
Qadhafi's chances of retaining power will lessen in the face of public
discontent and continued plotting in the military officer corps.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time. In the
absence of a named successor, new pressures in Lebanon, and an ever-
deteriorating economic situation, the chances of a sudden change of
government grow.
TUNISIA: Increasing Instability
Bourguiba's campaign to suppress all political opposition escalated
recently with the crackdown on Islamic fundamentalists. Far from ensuring
smooth succession, however, the regime's efforts are drastically increasing
discontent and may well destabilize the country during the succession crisis
when it comes. The Libyan threat almost certainly will increase in the
post-Bourguiba period, and Algeria too may try to influence the succession
struggle.
TOP SFTPFT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25x1
SUB-SAHARA AFRICA
ANGOLA: Prospects for Clash with South Africa Continue
The risk of direct South African-Soviet/Cuban clashes continues as the
Angolan government contests ground in UNITA-controlled territory.
NIGER/LIBYA: Libyan Activities
Niger is unable to control its northern border, and Libya seeks to assert
a questionable territorial claim over the longer term. Ultimately Qadhafi
would like to topple President Kountche, whose recent health problems have
highlighted the problem of succession. Increased Libyan meddling and
subversion--spurred by Qadhafi's ire at French and US assistance to Chad--can
be expected as Qadhafi escalates activities in Africa and as uncertainty over
the succession takes hold.
SOMALIA/ETHIOPIA: Tense Border
Border tensions are high, and Ethiopia may participate in shallow
cross-border raids into northern Somalia in support of Somali dissidents at
any time. Mogadishu consequently has looked to the US for reassurance in the
form of more military aid--and may eventually threaten to abrogate the 1980
bilateral access agreement if new military aid is not forthcoming--but
Somalia's dire financial situation is likely to make it only a matter of time
until US legislation, the Brooke Amendment, forces a cutoff of US security
assistance. Siad is likely to make additional overtures to Moscow in order
to offset cuts in US military aid.
SOUTH AFRICA/FRONTLINE STATES: Confrontation
Conservative electoral gains have exacerbated domestic polarization and
undermine the influence of moderate blacks and whites who seek compromise.
In ruling by emergency decree and stifling legitimate dissent, the government
has acknowledged its authority can be perpetuated only by force. Externally
Pretoria's increasingly coercive measures against the Frontline States afford
greater opportunities for both the West and the East to capitalize on the
Frontline States' heightened sense of vulnerability. The Soviets already are
exploiting the situation, especially with Zimbabwe, to make inroads into the
region.
SUDAN/LIBYA/ETHIOPIA: Precarious Tenure
In the face of new rebel successes in the south, Ethiopian air incursions
into Sudan, continued Ethiopian support to Sudanese insurgents, and
reductions in US aid, further coup plotting to topple Sadiq seems certain
from discontented military officers. Sudanese efforts to oust Libyan
intelligence personnel from western Sudan are certain to increase Qadhafi's
subversive efforts in Sudan.
TflP crrprr
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1
TOP SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9 25X1
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
Dissent is increasing throughout much of Eastern Europe. To various
degrees, the present governments are under new pressures:
Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign, have had unsettling effects on the aging East
European leaderships. Prospective succession dilemmas, particularly
in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are adding to the potential for
instability.
Pressures also are great in Romania, where the continuing debt and
liquidity crises have exacerbated already abject living conditions.
Civil unrest is increasing, and as conditions worsen, the Soviets
will be in a position to exert even more pressure than before.
In Yugoslavia, dissatisfaction over government wage policies is
high, and unusual union organized strikes in Croatia may portend a
major challenge to federal authority. If Belgrade implements its
plan for stringent austerity measures this year to combat raging
inflation--now over 100 percent a year--a serious political upheaval
could erupt that would threaten the federal Executive Council's
authority and trigger open defiance from public authorities.
USSR: Massive Need for Hard Currency
The Soviets face substantial reductions in hard currency earning from oil
this year at a time of increasing need for imports for modernization. Moscow
increasingly will: rely on Western credit markets; squeeze oil supplied to
Eastern Europe to try to barter it on the international market; sell more
gold; and try to promote new exports--arms, vehicles, metals, and shipping
services--at bargain prices to gain needed hard currency.
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/15: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300020035-9
25X1
25X1