MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR NOVEMBER 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 22, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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22 December 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for November 1987
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia has shown surprising resiliency in the face of worsening
economic conditions and ethnic rivalries, but the capacity of the system to
survive more serious challenges is increasingly suspect. The departure of
Prime Minister Mikulic--through resignation or removal due to the
deteriorating economy--would further undermine political cohesion and invite
heightened ethnic conflict over a successor government. Kosovo remains the
most worrisome flashpoint; an eruption of violence could trigger an escalating
cycle of repression and reaction, ultimately overwhelming local police units
and federal reinforcements. Should the Serbian republic leadership push for
tougher reprisals, a major constitutional crisis could ensue.
This review reflects consideration of inputs generated at warning meetings
conducted by the National Intelligence Officers with Community representatives
from all areas. As such, it represents a Communit -wide review but it is not
a formall coordinated Communit roduct.
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Iran/Iraq/Persian Gulf
Iran is preparing an offensive that could come as soon as early January,
probably in the southern front region from Dezful to Al Faw. Both sides are
likely to use chemical weapons in new fighting. Chemical munitions probably
will not play a decisive role in the outcome of battle, however, except in the
event that Iraqi forces are surprised by a conventional attack; in that case,
Iranian use of chemical weapons--against headquarters, for example--could have
a significant reinforcing effect. In the Gulf, Tehran is likely to keep
pressure on Arab supporters of Iraq but try to avoid an act that provokes a
major response by the US. The Intelligence Community agrees that Tehran is
not showing genuine diplomatic flexibility. Iran has had little success in
recent months in advancing its basic objectives, raising the possibility that
frustration may lead Tehran to major new efforts, including an especially
large ground offensive or a broader confrontation with the United States in
the Gulf.
Ethiopia
' Prospects are for an even worse famine in Ethiopia than in 1984-85 and
population movements have begun months earlier than previously expected.
Ethiopia has raised its request for emergency food aid by about 50 percent to
1.4 million tons. The civil war has seriously hampered food distribution.
Sudanese President Sadiq has said that Sudan already has all the Ethiopian
refugees it can accept.
Angola/South Africa
Fighting is likely to continue in southeastern Angola for several weeks
despite the start of the rainy season. South African forces probably will
withdraw by Christmas, but they could remain with UNITA forces to beseige
Cuito Cuanavale. South Africa's announcement of its intervention embarrassed
UNITA leader Savimbi--who had denied any South Africa involvement--but is
unlikely to cause a rift with UNITA. Pretoria probably wants to punish
Angolan forces to forestall an offensive next year and convince Luanda to
abandon efforts to defeat UNITA militarily.
Chad/Libya/Sudan
Chadian forces are likely to attack the Libyan garrison at Aozou airfield
in coming weeks and we probably will receive no further warning. Undelivered
Stinger missiles are not essential for an attack and President Habre probably
knows that he is losing the "logistics race" with Libya. If Chad does not
attack by yearend, the military balance will begin to swing in favor of
Libya. Unintended fighting may erupt between Chadian and Sudanese forces
along their increasingly tense border. However, Habre probably will not
follow through on promises to aid Sudanese insurgents despite his anger that
Khartoum is permitting Libyan forces to transit western Sudan.
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Panama
The cutoff of US aid to Panama is unlikely to shake General Noriega's
resolve to stay in power, but could convince many in the military that the US?
intends to renege on the treaty and remain after the year 2000. The ruling
party and the military probably will rally around Noriega in the wake of an
aid cutoff and blame the US for any negative impact on the economy. While
trying to preserve the Canal Treaty, Noriega almost certainly will make life
more difficult for US personnel and may force reductions in intelligence-
related activities. NIO/War.ning notes that Noriega's bluster and
barbs--including as yet minor new deals with the USSR and Libya--may only be
intended to force Washington to back off. However, Noriega may boost support
for opponents of the US elsewhere in Latin America, heighten his anti-US
rhetoric, and possibly move to close US installations in Panama. Loss of
control by Noriega could lead to a reckless confrontation, possibly including
Panamanian attempts to seize control of the canal.
Philippines
The ground rules for terrorist attacks for all factions in the country
have changed. Because there appears to be no penalty for killing Americans,
factions of all persuasions may be emboldened to target US personnel.
Communist Party turmoil and lack of response to the 28 October killings
suggests the Communists will strike again. Factionalism within the Party also
could lead to terrorist actions without central authorization. Over the next
six months, CIA estimates a 50 percent chance of additional incidents
involving US personnel. American property is increasingly likely to be
attacked. NIO/Warning notes that the danger applies in varying degrees to
most of the approximately 120,000 Americans scattered throughout the
Philippines.
2. Trend Commentary:
Iran is ready to use terrorism, in conjunction with military and
diplomatic measures, to intimidate its adversaries. The Iranian terrorist
threat to US interests is high in the Persian Gulf, Pakistan, and, to a lesser
extent, Europe and West Africa. The Intelligence Community does not believe a
major attack is imminent, however, and it is unclear when Tehran will choose
to play its terrorist card in earnest. Iran may wait until it judges that its
military measures in the Gulf are exhausted or stymied; it may delay until the
US lowers its guard. The longer Iran waits, the better prepared it will be to
conduct effective attacks. The Intelligence Community doubts that Iran sees a
need to attack in the US proper in light of the many vulnerable US targets
overseas.
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USSR/Afghanistan
Most of the Intelligence Community believes that the Soviets have not made
the hard decisions necessary to leave Afghanistan. In the view of a majority,
the Soviets want to both get out and leave behind a Communist regime. Most
analysts, nonetheless, are more inclined than in the past to conclude that
Soviet policy is evolving; a minority project that Moscow will eventually
settle for less than a Communist-dominated regime when it leaves. The Soviets
may decide that a Communist dominated goverment is not essential to their
interests. Analysts agree that the Soviets will have to sacrifice the Afghan
Peoples Democratic Party if they are to get a political solution. Although
the Soviets. are not in danger of being driven out under the gun, NIO/USSR
believes they may be putting themselves on the road to withdrawal from
Afghanistan.
Ethiopia
Government officials are sincerely offering limited regional autonomy and
are seeking talks with Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents, but a breakthrough
toward peace talks is unlikely in the next two to three months. Over the
longer term, however, the provisions might entice Eritreans to talks, and
significant autonomy for the Ogaden might help improve relations with Somalia.
Mozambique
RENAMO insurgents are taking full advantage of the rainy season to regain
territory in Mozambique, interdict key transportation routes, and stage more
attacks on Zimbabwe. Foreign workers will be in greater danger. Maputo will
remain secure but the northwestern suburbs probably will be subjected to more
bloody ambushes. Zimbabwe is withdrawing troops to protect its eastern
border, leaving the Mozambican Army even less able to cope with the insurgency.
Portugal
The Portuguese government in committed to a mid-term review of the US
basing agreement, but is still weighing its options as to how to proceed.
Prime Minister Cavaco Silva could opt either for low-key informal discussions
or a more formal renegotiation; he criticized the Socialist coalition for
failing to drive a hard bargain the last time around. Most Portuguese leaders
support the security relationship with the US, but they generally believe the
US could do more for Portugal than it has done. Cavaco's lack of negotiating
experience could introduce uncertainties into the process; a recent New York
Times interview may also have persuaded him that standing up to the US plays
well at home.
Honduras
The Intelligence Community agrees that Honduran policy toward the
Nicaraguan rebels is shifting as Tegucigalpa calculates that US commitment to
the insurgents is ebbing. The Hondurans are concerned that they will have to
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contend with thousands of armed men flooding back into Honduras in the wake of
a cutoff of US military assistance. If the Hondurans calculate that the US
will no longer support the insurgents, they may close the support bases to
avoid blame for failure to comply with the Central American peace agreement.
Nicaragua
The insurgents continue to maintain the military initiative. The
Intelligence Community notes, however, that they depend heavily on their
ability to deliver supplies from storage sites in Honduras to units in
Nicaragua, which depends on continued Honduran cooperation and the
maintenance of current aircraft. The resupply effort probably would
deteriorate with a cutoff of US aid. It also is vulnerable to the
Sandinistas' improving air defense network. With stores on hand, the rebels
probably could fight at current levels for three months regardless of
continued US or Honduran support.
Colombia
The terrorist threat to Americans in Colombia is high and is unlikely to
diminish due to the ongoing deterioration of the security situation. The
recent creation of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinator--a guerrilla
umbrella organization--raises the possibility of better coordination of
insurgent attacks, including ones on US interests.
3. NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of warning concern:
General Pinochet's determination to stay in power may precipitate a new
crisis next year. Although his popularity has risen sharply and a recent poll
indicated that 37 percent of the populace would vote "yes" in the 1988
plebiscite that would keep him in power, he seems unlikely to reach the 50
percent needed for its ratification. To boost his chances, Pinochet is
pressing the reluctant junta to move the plebiscite from September to July but
he could dangerously alienate the generals by pushing too hard for an early
election. A July vote would also threaten the legitimacy of the plebiscite
and increase political polarization, reinforcing the spiral of extremist
violence.
Haiti
A newly scheduled 17 January election is unlikely to assure either order
or General Namphy's promised transition to genuinely democratic government by
February. Street violence and anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the
safety of US citizens--officials and tourists alike.
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Romania
President Ceausescu's personality cult, managerial incompetence,
repression, and yet more severe living conditions point to a crisis, possibly
by late winter when consumer supplies are lowest. The regime recently
stiffened austerity measures that in recent years have lead to thousands of
malnutrition and exposure-related deaths, and laid off still more workers
whose entire livelihoods--including housing and meals--are linked to their
jobs. The measures have sparked new unrest. In the worst incident, in Brasov
on 15 November, up to 10 000 workers and sympathizers sacked the local Party
headquarters and city hail, and called for Ceausescu's ouster. This time, the
security forces' (Securitate) responses were muted and the crowd dispersed on
its own. The regime may be able to defuse individual troubles and get through
the winter, but major endemic problems and hatred of Ceausescu make more,
possibly violent unrest beyond control of the Securitate all but inevitable.
The threat of imminent upheaval also could galvanize disaffected government,
security, and party officials to overthrow the ailing, 73-year old Ceausescu.
Depending on the scale and type of crisis, Moscow may find opportunity or need
for military intervention.
Iran/Gulf Arab States/U S:
Iranian attacks against US naval vessels in the Gulf or eastern
Mediterranean and on American personnel elsewhere are likely. President
Khameini has declared that Iran will take "decisive retaliatory action"
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e enses in a sou ern an rein orcing their Gulf islands with
tanks--suggesting that the Iranians expect to do something that will provoke a
US military response. Iran's political strategy evidently aims to influence
US congressional and public opinion in away that will oblige the
Administration--on the Lebanon precedent--to withdraw US forces from the Gulf.
Meanwhile, the danger of planned or accidental attacks by Iraqi aircraft
remains. New Saudi assertiveness is likely to accelerate escalation following
any Iranian attacks against the Saudis. As hostilities in the Gulf escalate,
the Gulf Arabs will become more demanding of US support.
Syria/USSR
Syria's apparent agreement to allow construction of a Soviet-controlled
naval base at Tartus would give the Soviets their only actual base in the
Mediterranean, reducing the need to transit the Bosporus for repairs and
replenishment, and potentially increasing the Soviet challenge to NATO's
Turkish flank. Syria's decision, in return for debt forgiveness, a submarine,
and coastal defense vessels, reflects the severity of Damascus' economic woes
and could be a harbinger of new Soviet bases in Syria of greater military
significance. The Syrians have resisted requests for bases in the past, but
are behind in payments for arms and may have felt they have little choice now
if they wish to continue to receive advanced Soviet military hardware.
They also are strengthening air
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Chronic Syrian economic troubles and the oil price-related financial problems
of their key Arab benefactors like Saudi Arabia, and more adroit Soviet
bargaining under Gorbachev, may give Moscow still more leverage in the future.
India/Sri Lanka
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's adoption
of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
aan infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian) insurgency
before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi continues to
increase its troop strength, which now numbers some 32,000. In addition to
introducing a force larger than the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians have
obtained .Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri Lankan state and to a
virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka. It is not yet
clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing dominance over Sri Lanka,
but active guerrilla warfare by Tamil fighters against the Indians and over
300 combat fatalities will complicate plans to withdraw and make a long stay
more likely; the Indians themselves already are talking of a three year
presence. This could presage an extended period of warfare and turmoil.
Libya/Chad
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya has received chemical
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for ad h~mi 1 nts Tread in stock ile in Lib a a ainst
Chad.
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Iran/Iraq
Iranian chemical warf are capabilities are growing and Tehran recently has
demonstrated a willingness to use chemical munitions on the battlefield.
Although Iraq is the most likely target, Iran may also decide to attack US
interests ashore or afloat. US Naval vessels would be hard to attack but
could quickly be contaminated by CW agents traveling through ship ventilation
systems.
This suggests that Iraq may
be willing, for the first time in the history of warfare, to use biological
weapons on the battlefield.
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