BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 15, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 05086-87
15 December 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
2. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
n
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
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NIO/W
15 December 1987
EAST ASIA
PHILIPPINES: Attacks on Americans
The October killings of three US servicemen--almost certainly by
Communists--have serious implications for the United States. In a climate of
increasing anti-US sentiment, the assassinations have raised the level of
political violence. The shootings apparently were designed to create greater
instability by demonstrating the inability of the government to respond
effectively to internal disorder and by driving a wedge between the US and the
Aquino government. The killings may have been intended to test the nature and
extent of both governments' responses to attacks on Americans. If there is no
effective response, those who could profit from killings could conclude that
the benefits of more American deaths are greater than the risks. The
Communists already have targetted higher ranking official US personnel for
assassination, possibly in connection with this week's ASEAN summit. There is
also an increasing danger that non-official Americans will be attacked; there
is no practical means of protecting the some 120,000 Americans scattered
throughout the Philippines.
PHILIPPINES: What's Next?
President Aquino's political authority continues to be tenuous.
Meanwhile, the Communist New People's Army is stepping up attacks on economic
targets. Continued guerrilla successes, aided by splits within the military,
will accelerate political polarization and encourage opponents of Aquino to
increase their efforts to organize a broad coalition that can force her from
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office. Communist and non-Communist politicians have criticized US policy and
alleged American violations of Philippine sovereignty. It would be difficult
to exaggerate the potential damage to both Philippine and US interests of a
continuation of the politicians' anti-Americanism. At present, the most
likely beneficiaries are the New People's Army and other insurgent movements.
LATIN AMERICA
PANAMA: Noriega Strikes Back
The Noriega regime appears to be preparing to curtail Panama's military
relationship with the US and challenge longstanding US base rights; this
strategy could lead to a unilateral abrogation of the 1977 Canal Treaties and
demands for immediate transfer of the canal to full Panamanian sovereignty.
The most striking indication of such intent was the 24 November National
Assembly resolution calling for the government to suspend visas for US
military4)ersonne1 and begin negotiations for the removal of USSOUTHCOM. The
resolution follows a series of media provocations this fall including forgery
of a State Department letter purporting to assure a US Senator that troops
would remain in Panama after the year 2000 and allegations that the US planned
to overthrow the Panamanian government. Noriega apparently believes that the
best tactic to defeat Washington's perceived intent to remove him is to
escalate the anti-US rhetoric and pose as a defender of Panamanian
sovereignty. Congressional resolutions calling for suspension of US aid
unless a civilian government replaces him have strengthened Noriega's intent
to play his anti-US card. Noriega's bluster--including as yet minor new deals
with the USSR and Libya--may only be intended to force Washington to back
off. Loss of control by Noriega could lead to a reckless confrontation,
possibly including Panamanian attempts to seize control of the canal.
CHILE: A Question of Democracy
General Pinochet's determination to stay in power may precipitate a new
crisis next year. Although his popularity has risen sharply and a recent poll
indicated that 37 percent of the populace would vote "yes" in the 1988
plebiscite which would keep him in power, he seems unlikely to reach the 50
percent needed for its ratification. To boost his chances, Pinochet is
pressing the reluctant junta to move the plebiscite from September to July,
when fewer, more supportive, voters are likely to be registered. He could
dangerously alienate the generals by pushing too hard for an early election,
while a July vote would threaten the legitimacy of the plebiscite and increase
political polarization, reinforcing the spiral of extremist violence.
HAITI: Descent into Anarchy
A newly scheduled 17 January election is unlikely to assure either order
or General Namphy's promised transition to genuinely democratic government by
February. Street violence and anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the
safety of US citizens--officials and tourists alike.
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SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
ROMANIA: Impending Crisis
President Ceausescu's personality cult, managerial incompetence,
repression, and yet more severe living conditions point to a crisis, possibly
by late winter when consumer supplies are lowest. The regime recently
stiffened austerity measures that in recent years have lead to thousands of
malnutrition and exposure-related deaths, and laid off still more workers
whose entire livelihoods--including housing and meals--are linked to their
jobs. The measures have sparked new unrest. In the worst incident, in Brasov
on 15 November, up to 10,000 workers and sympathizers sacked the local Party
headquarters and city hall, and called for Ceausescu's ouster. This time,
security forces' (Securitate) responses were muted and the crowd dispersed on
its own. The regime may be able to defuse individual troubles and get through
the winter, but major endemic problems and hatred of Ceausescu make more,
possibly violent unrest beyond control of the Securitate all but inevitable.
Imminent upheaval also could embolden disaffected government, security, and
party officials to overthrow the ailing, 73-year old Ceausescu. Depending on
the scale and type of crisis, Moscow may find opportunity or need for military
intervention.
YUGOSLAVIA: Multiple Troubles
Endemic Yugoslav problems are deepening. The likelihood of widespread
violence in Kosovo is greater now than at any time since the 1981 riots as
Serbs and Montenegrins have mounted frequent demonstrations against the
Albanian majority in Kosovo. Yugoslav Army troops already have been harassed;
recently four soldiers were killed by a disgruntled Albanian recruit. Such
incidents may spark an escalating cycle of reprisal and reaction that could
overwhelm local security forces. As a precaution, federal authorities have
sent federal police and troop reinforcements to Kosovo. Problems are
exacerbated by the fragmented Serbian leadership in Belgrade, which has become
blatantly Serbian chauvinist--a trend that could accelerate centrifugal forces
throughout the federation. Meanwhile, the federal government is weakening and
regional economic disparities are growing. Belgrade also has worsening
international payments problems and little prospect that it can solve them
soon.
POLAND: Long-term Problems
Poland faces long-term economic and political problems--exacerbated by the
regime's humiliating defeat in the 29 November "reform" referendum--that defy
resolution and probably will keep political tensions high for the foreseeable
future. The economy and debt troubles are unlikely to turn around for years
and could trigger a new round of popular unrest. The government announced
sharp price hikes for basic goods and services before the referendum, and
hoarding already had begun. Government determination to proceed with even a
slower pace of price increases could spark another marked upsurge in wildcat
strikes. New, more radical groups, well connected to Western politicians and
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?
the Western press, are calling for confrontation with the regime and expulsion
Of the Soviets. Church/state negotiations still are stalemated over
longstanding contentious issues. Meanwhile, as the referendum vote
dramatically demonstrates, the populace remains sullen and skeptical of the
government, reform, and the Polish version of Soviet glasnost. Regime efforts
to reach national reconciliation have been badly damaged.
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures. Growing
economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's glasnost campaign
and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling effects on the aging East
European leaderships. Prospective succession dilemmas, particularly in
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are adding to the potential for instability.
Sharply lower living standards projected for 1988 will test Hungary's reform
experiment and the patience of the people. A wild card is popular reaction to
Gorbachev's political reforms. He appeals both to younger party functionaries
and apolitical persons seeking greater personal freedoms. Over the long haul,
the unintended erosion of party unity and greater popular demands are
destabilizing and could lead to system-shaking unrest.
NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
Iranian attacks against US naval vessels in the Gulf or eastern
Mediterranean and on American personnel elsewhere are likely. President
Khameini has declared that Iran will take "decisive retaliatory action", and
a ac s on ol an ar or aci 1 le o . OP ? on
tankers by fighter aircraft; they are unlikely to be discouraged by the
apparent recent failure of a Silkworm attack on Kuwaiti oil terminal
facilities and may redouble efforts to neutralize Kuwait. They also are
strengthening air defenses in the southern Gulf and reinforcing their Gulf
islands with tanks--suggesting that the Iranians expect to do something that
will provoke a US military response. Iran's political strategy evidently aims
to influence US congressional and public opinion in a way that will oblige the
Administration--on the Lebanon precedent--to withdraw US forces from the Gulf.
Meanwhile, the danger of planned or accidental attacks by Iraqi aircraft
remains. New Saudi assertiveness is likely to accelerate escalation following
any Iranian attacks against the Saudis. As hostilities in the Gulf escalate,
the Gulf Arabs will become more demanding of US support.
IRAN/LIBYA: More Naval Threats
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon may present a special
kind of threat to US and allied maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea
even thouah
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SYRIA/USSR: New Military Cooperation
Syria's apparent agreement to allow construction of a Soviet-controlled
naval base at Tartus will give the Soviets their only actual base in the
Mediterranean, reducing the need to transit the Bosporus for repairs and
replenishment, and potentially increasing the Soviet challenge to NATO's
southern flank. Syria's decision, in return for $500 million in debt
forgiveness, a submarine, and coastal defense vessels, reflects the severity
of Damascus' economic woes and could be a harbinger of new Soviet bases in
Syria of ,greater military significance. The Syrians have resisted requests
for bases in the past, but are behind in payments for arms and may have felt
they have little choice now if they wish to continue to receive advanced
Soviet military hardware. Chronic Syrian economic troubles and the oil
price-related financial problems of their key Arab benefactors like Saudi
Arabia, and more adroit Soviet bargaining under Gorbachev, may give Moscow
still more leverage in the future.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
Islamabad probably has the capability to produce a nuclear device within a
few days to a few weeks of a decision to do so. The Pakistani nuclear program
enjoys widespread domestic support, and external pressures against the nuclear
program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from maintenance of the nuclear
option. This has triggered problems with US aid for Pakistan and could lead
the Pakistanis to a more independent course. It also has prompted Indian
reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions in
the subcontinent.
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Imperialism?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's adoption
of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
an infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian) insurgency
before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi continues to
increase its troop strength, which now numbers some 32,000. In addition to
introducing a force larger than the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians have
obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri Lankan state and to a
virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka. It is not yet
clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing dominance over Sri Lanka,
but active guerrilla warfare by Tamil fighters against the Indians and over
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310 combat fatalities will complicate plans to withdraw and make a long stay
more likely; the Indians themselves already are talking of a three year
presence. This could presage an extended period of warfare and turmoil.
IRAN/IRAQ: Developments on the Ground
A high level of activity in Iranian rear areas, new mobilizations, and the
massing of troops and supplies suggest that Iran will launch a large-scale
offensive against Iraq soon. The Iraqi military recall of reservists born in
1945--and placing reservists born in 1943 and 1944 on standby status--indicate
Iraq is becoming increasingly hard-pressed to replace casualties. Extensive
Iranian use of chemical weapons would exacerbate Iraq's problem. No matter
the military outcome of a new offensive, the potential for sudden collapse of
either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military results.
Latent civilian and military opposition to Iraqi President Husayn, combined
with lack of success on the battlefield, popular weariness with heavy
casualties, and no end to the war in sight, could with the right catalyst
produce a sudden governmental change. Meanwhile, in Iran, the death of the
popular Ayatollah Khomeini could lead to major instability within any
successor government given massive, continuing battle casualties and the
deprivation of the populace.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya may recently have received
additional chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran. A chemical agent
production plant appears structurally complete but not yet operational. We
should be prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile
in Libya against Chad. Military forces in southern Libya have received
chemical treatment kits.
IRAN/IRAQ: Chemical/biological Weapons
Iranian chemical warfare capabilities are growing and Tehran recently has
demonstrated a willingness to use chemical munitions on the battlefield.
Although Iraq is the most likely target, Iran may also decide to attack US
interests ashore or afloat. US Naval vessels would be hard to attack but
could quickly be contaminated by CW agents traveling through ship ventilation
systems. causina devastatina effects.
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warfare, to use biological weapons on the battlefield.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is continuing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to border conflict. In May, Iran conducted a raid inside Turkey
followina two Turkish raids aaainst Kurdish targets in Iran.
Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that
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ranian irregulars captured while infiltrating intended to attack Iraq's
pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is seriously
straining Turkish-Iranian relations. A recent Kurdish attack in Istanbul--the
first in a major city since 1980--could boost pressures on Prime Minister Ozal
to launch more preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps in Iran.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
President Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time.
In the absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with
an ever-deteriorating economic situation, any successor could become
overwhelmed with key issues, leading to governmental instability and sudden
change.
WESTERN EUROPE
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: Continuing Tension
Another crisis may be brewing despite warm public comments that could
presage a Greek/Turkish summit to discuss differences. Allegedly with Greek
government encouragement, the Greek Cypriots have received 30 French AMX-30
tanks for their National Guard and may soon buy 30 more. The buildup in
offensive weapons could become a red flag goading the Turks to react. The
Greeks also appear to be reorienting military forces more to oppose Turkey
than to defend against a possible Warsaw Pact attack. The NIO/Warning
believes that, given the background of contentious issues between the Greek
and Turkish governments such as rights to the Aegean seabed and militarization
of the islands, direct confrontation is possible. Rumors of future joint
Greek-Bulgarian military exercises will heighten tensions further.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
ETHIOPIA: Impending Famine
Ethiopia faces a worse famine than in 1984-85, when almost 10 million
people were in danger of starvation. Drought, two rebellions, and government
policies have created food shortages of major proportions. The government has
raised its request for emergency food aid about 50 percent to 1.4 million
tons. Migrations toward Sudan already threaten large scale feeding and
shelter problems there as well. In both countries, distribution of food to
affected areas is seriously hindered by warfare between rebels and government
forces.
NIGER: Government in Transition
New President All Saibou's position is insecure and he may be a
transitional leader. The Nigerien armed forces are divided and many officers
believe that Saibou lacks ability; senior officers are jockeying for position
while younger ones want someone from junior ranks. Popular support also
appears thin. Protracted instability could make the country especially
vulnerable to Libyan meddling and territorial predation.
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