BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030006-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 04917-87
1 December 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
2. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
?????"
John W. Bird
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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NIO/W
1 December 1987
LATIN AMERICA
PANAMA: Noriega Strikes Back
The Noriega regime appears to be preparing to curtail Panama's military
relationship with the US and challenge longstanding US base rights; this
strategy could lead to a unilateral abrogation of the 1977 Canal Treaties and
demands for immediate transfer of the canal to full Panamanian sovereignty.
The most striking indication of such intent was the 24 November National
Assembly resolution calling for the government to suspend visas for US
military personnel and begin negotiations for the removal of USSOUTHCOM. The
resolution follows a series of media provocations this fall including forgery
of a State Department letter purporting to assure a US Senator that troops
would remain in Panama after the year 2000 and allegations that the US planned
to overthrow the Panamanian government. Noriega apparently believes that the
best tactic to defeat Washinton's perceived intent to remove him is to
escalate the anti-US rhetoric and pose as a defender of Panamanian
sovereignty. Congressional resolutions calling for suspension of US aid
unless a civilian government replaces him have strengthened Noriega's intent
to play his anti-US card. Noriega's bluster may only be intended to force
Washington to back off, but failure of the bluff could propel him into a
reckless confrontation leading to Panamanian attempts to seize control of the
canal.
CHILE: Intransigence
General Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain
in power beyond 1989. Having carried out a major reshuffle of the army and
forced critics into early retirement, Pinochet now seems determined to run as
a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's actions to maintain control may
precipitate a new crisis of confidence over his leadership within the
rank-and-file armed forces and middle class, fueling momentum for decisive
change before 1989.
HAITI: Descent into Anarchy
After cancellation of the violence-ridden 29 November election, military
rule is unlikely to assure either order or General Namphy's promised
transition to civilian government by February. Street violence and acts of
anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the safety of US
citizens--officials and tourists alike.
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EAST ASIA
PHILIPPINES: Attacks on Americans
The October killings of three US servicemen--apparently by
Communists--have serious implications for the United States. In a climate of
increasing anti-US sentiment, the assassinations have raised the level of
political violence. The shootings apparently were designed to create greater
instability by demonstrating the inability of the government to respond
effectively to internal disorder and by driving a wedge between the US and the
Aquino government. The killings may have been intended to test the nature and
extent of both governments'responses to attacks on Americans. If there is no
effective response, those who could profit from killings could conclude that
the benefits of more American deaths are greater than the risks. There is a
great danger, therefore, that more Americans will be targeted; there is no
practical means of protecting the some 120,000 Americans scattered throughout
the Philippines.
PHILIPPINES: What's Next?
President Aquino's support continues to weaken. Meanwhile, the communist
New People's Army is stepping up attacks on bridges, possibly signaling a
shift in tactics toward sustained attacks on economic targets. Continued
guerrilla successes, aided by splits within the military, will accelerate
political polarization and encourage opponents of Aquino to increase their
efforts to organize a broad coalition that can force her from office, possibly
by the end of the year. Communist and non-Communist politicians have become
involved in a competition of criticizing US policy and alleged American
violations of Philippine sovereignty. It would be difficult to exaggerate the
potential damage to both Philippine and US interests of a continuation of the
politicians' anti-Americanism. At present, the most likely beneficiaries are
the New People's Army and other insurgent movements.
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
Iranian attacks against US naval vessels in the Gulf or eastern
Mediterranean and on American personnel elsewhere are likely. President
Khameini has declared that Iran will take "decisive retaliatory action." An
Iranian has for an attack
frigate,
US ship with 100 small boats. The Iranians continue to plan attacks on oil
and harbor facilities of Gulf Cooperation Council states and on tankers by
fighter aircraft. They also are strengthening air defenses in the southern
Gulf and reinforcing their Gulf islands with tanks--suggesting that the
Iranians expect to do something that will provoke a US military response.
Iran's political strategy evidently aims to influence US congressional and
public opinion in a way that will oblige the Administration--on the Lebanon
precedent--to withdraw US forces from the Gulf. Prime Minister Mousavi
summarized the strategy when he warned that the US should
withdraw "rather than go any farther down into tne quagmire it has created for
itself." Mousavi predicted that, "However long the US may linger in the Gulf,
it will eventually pull out and let the (Gulf) states bear the consequences of
their hostility toward Iran." The danger of planned or accidental attacks by
Iraqi aircraft remains. New Saudi assertiveness is likely to accelerate
escalation following any Iranian attacks against the Saudis. As hostilities
in the Gulf escalate, the Gulf Arabs will become more demanding of US support.
IRAN/LIBYA: More Naval Threats
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon may present a special
kind of threat to US and allied maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea
The
encountered a mine off southern Lebanon alleged
to be similar to those used recently in the Persian Gulf while Lebanese found
three others; a Revolutionary Guard commander claimed at about the same time
that his contingent already had laid near Tyre. In addition, Libya
may try to lay mines off the Suez Canal. In all cases, the minelaying is
likely to be covert. It may be difficult to prove responsibility, because we
cannot count on catching those minelayers red-handed.
SYRIA/USSR: New Military Cooperation
Syria's apparent agreement to allow construction of a Soviet-controlled
naval base at Tartus will give the Soviets their only actual base in the
Mediterranean, reducing the need to transit the Bosporus for repairs and
replenishment,/ and potentially increasing the Soviet challenge to NATO's
southern flank. Syria's decision, in return for $500 million in debt
forgiveness, a submarine, and coastal defense vessels, reflects the severity
of Damascus' economic woes and could be a harbinger of new Soviet bases in
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Syria of greater military significance. The Syrians have resisted requests
for bases in the past, but are behind in payments for arms and may have felt
they have little choice now if they wish to continue to receive advanced
Soviet military hardware. Chronic Syrian economic troubles and the oil
price-related financial problems of their key Arab benefactors like Saudi
Arabia may give Moscow still more leverage in the future.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
few days to a few weeks of a decision to do so.
enjoys widespread domestic support, and external
program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from
option. This has triggered problems with US aid
the Pakistanis to a more independent course. It
reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that
the subcontinent.
The Pakistani nuclear program
pressures against the nuclear
maintenance of the nuclear
for Pakistan and could lead
also has prompted Indian
will further fuel tensions in
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Imperialism?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's adoption
of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
an infantry division plus police forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian) insurgency
before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi continues to
increase its troop strength, which now numbers nearly 32,000. In addition to
introducing a force that could dominate the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians
have obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri Lankan state and to a
virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka. It is not yet
clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing dominance over Sri Lanka,
but Tamil resistance to the Indian invasion, over 260 combat fatalities, and
active guerrilla warfare by Tamil fighters against the Indians will complicate
plans to withdraw and make a long stay more likely.
IRAN/IRAQ: Developments on the Ground
the massing of troops
and supplies suggest that Iran is preparing for a large-scale offensive
against Iraq in the near future. The Iraqi military recall of reservists born
in 1945--and placing reservists born in 1943 and 1944 on standby
status--indicate Iraq is becoming increasingly hard-pressed to replace
casualties. Extensive Iranian use of chemical weapons would exacerbate Iraq's
problem. No matter the mi1it6ry outcome of a new offensive, the potential for
sudden collapse of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely
military results. Latent civilian and military opposition to Iraqi President
Husayn, combined with lack of success on the battlefield, popular weariness
with heavy casualties, and no end to the war in sight, could with the right
catalyst produce a sudden governmental change. Meanwhile, in Iran, the death
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of the popular Ayatollah Khomeini could lead to major instability within any
successor government given massive, continuing battle casualties and the
deprivation of the populace.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya probably has received
limited quantities of chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran and will
We should be
prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile in Libya
against Chad.
IRAN: Chemical Weapons
Iranian chemical warfare capabilities are growing and Tehran recently has
demonstrated a willingness to use chemical munitions on the battlefield.
Although Iraq is the most likely target, Iran may also decide to attack US
interests ashore or afloat. US Naval vessels would be hard to attack but
could quickly be contaminated by CW agents traveling through ship ventilation
systems and cause a devastating effect.
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KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is continuing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to border conflict. In May, Iran conducted a raid inside Turkey
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Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that
Iranian irregulars captured while infiltrating intended to attack Iraq's
pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is seriously
straining Turkish-Iranian relations. A recent Kurdish attack in Istanbul--the
first in a major city since 1980--could boost pressures on Prime Minister Ozal
to launch more preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps in Iran.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
President Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time.
In the absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with
an ever-deteriorating economic situation, any successor could become
overwhelmed with key issues, leading to governmental instability and sudden
change.
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
ROMANIA: Impending Crisis
President Ceausescu's personality cult, managerial incompetence,
repression, and yet more severe living conditions point to a major crisis,
possibly by late winter when consumer supplies are lowest. The regime
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recently stiffened austerity measures that in recent years have lead to
thousands of malnutrition and exposure-related deaths, and laid off still more
workers whose entire livelihoods--including housing and meals--are linked to
their jobs. The measures have sparked new unrest. In the worst incident, in
Brasov on 15 November, up to 100,000 workers and sympathizers sacked the local
Party headquarters and city hall, and called for Ceausescu's ouster. This
time, security forces' responses were muted and the crowd dispersed on its
own. The regime may be able to defuse individual troubles, but major endemic
problems and hatred of Ceausescu make more, possibly violent unrest all but
inevitable; it could be comparable to the bloody 1956 Hungarian uprising.
Imminent upheaval also could embolden disaffected government, security, and
party officials to overthrow the ailing, 73-year old Ceausescu. We are likely
to have little warning of governmental collapse. Depending on the scale and
type of crisis, Moscow may find opportunity or need for military intervention.
YUGOSLAVIA: More Financial Troubles
Belgrade has worsening payments problems and little prospect that it can
solve them any time soon. After failing to make scheduled payments twice
since June, the Yugoslays face new rounds of rescheduling negotiations with
both banks and Western governments this month. The banks, especially, are
likely to be cool to requests for new lending in light of other debtors'
problems and the Yugoslays' insistence earlier this year that they had no
financial troubles. With export prospects poor, Yugoslavia probably will have
financing gaps of $1 billion or more annually for the rest of the decade.
YUGOSLAVIA: Other Troubles
Endemic Yugoslav problems are deepening. The likelihood of widespread
violence in Kosovo is greater now than at any time since the 1981 riots as
Serbs and Montenegrins have mounted frequent demonstrations against the
Albanian majority in Kosovo. Yugoslav Army troops already have been harassed;
Such
incidents may spark an escalating cycle of reprisal and reaction that could
overwhelm local security forces. As a precaution, federal authorities have
sent federal police and troop reinforcements to Kosovo. Problems are
exacerbated by the fragmented Serbian leadership in Belgrade, which has become
blatantly Serbian chauvinist--a trend that could accelerate centrifugal forces
throughout the federation. Meanwhile, the federal government is weakening and
regional economic disparities are growing.
POLAND: Long-term Problems
Poland faces long-term economic and political problems--exacerbated by the
regime's humiliating defeat in the 29 November "reform" referendum--that defy
resolution and probably will keep political tensions high for the foreseeable
future. The economy and debt troubles are unlikely to turn around for years
and could trigger a new round of popular unrest. The government announced
sharp price hikes for basic goods and services before the referendum, and
hoarding already had begun. Government determination to proceed with the
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price increases could spark another marked upsurge in wildcat strikes. New,
more radical groups, well connected to Western politicians and the Western
press, are calling for confrontation with the regime and expulsion of the
Soviets. Church/state negotiations still are stalemated over longstanding
contentious issues. Meanwhile, as the referendum vote dramatically
demonstrates, the populace remains sullen and skeptical of the government,
reform, and the Polish version of Soviet glasnost. Regime efforts to reach
national reconciliation have been badly damaged.
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures. Growing
economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's glasnost campaign
and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling effects on the aging East
European leaderships. Prospective succession dilemmas, particularly in
Hungaryand Czechoslovakia, are adding to the potential for instability. A
wild card is popular reaction to Gorbachevhs political reforms. He appeals
both to younger party functionaries and apolitical persons seeking greater
personal freedoms. Over the long haul, the unintended erosion of party unity
and greater popular demands are destabilizing and could lead to system-shaking
unrest.
WESTERN EUROPE
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: More Tension
Another crisis may be brewing. Allegedly with Greek government
encouragement, the Greek Cypriots have received 30 French AMX-30 main battle
tanks for their National Guard and may soon buy 30 more. The buildup in
offensive weapons could become a red flag goading the Turks to strong
reactions. The Nb/Warning believes that, given the background of contentious
issues between the Greek and Turkish governments such as rights to the Aegean
seabed and militarization of the islands, direct confrontation is likely.
Rumors of future joint Greek-Bulgarian military exercises will heighten
tensions further.
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
NIGER: Government in Transition
New President Ali Saibou's position is insecure and he probably will ?be a
transitional leader. The Nigerien armed forces are divided and many officers
believe that Saibou lacks ability; senior officers are jockeying for position
while younger ones want someone from junior ranks. Popular support also
appears thin. Protracted instability could make the country especially
vulnerable to Libyan meddling and territorial predation.
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