BI-WEEKLY WARNING SUPPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300030010-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 18, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
-
Washington. D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 04757-87
18 November 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Bi-Weekly Warning Support
1. Attached is my bi-weekly warning review list which is intended to
keep true warning issues in sight during periods when current events do not
necessarily require continual reporting. The effort is a joint one, taking
into account the views of other NIOs as well as Intelligence Community
perceptions developed during regular warning meetings.
2. I would be pleased to provide you with amplification of any item.
Attachment
Bi-Weekly Warning Review
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lit John J. Bird
CL BY SIGNER
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NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA
NIO/W
18 November 1987
IRAN/GULF ARAB STATES/US: Collision Course
Iranian attacks against US naval vessels in the Gulf or eastern
Mediterranean and on American personnel elsewhere are likely. President
Khameini has declared that Iran will take "decisive retaliatory action." An
Iranian Revolutionary Guard commander has called for an attack on a US Navy
frigate
The Iranians continue to plan attacks on oil
and harbor facilities of Gulf Cooperation Council states and on tankers by
fighter aircraft. They also are strengthening air defenses in the southern
Gulf and reinforcing their Gulf islands with tanks--suggesting that the
Iranians expect to do something that will provoke a US military response.
Iran's political strategy evidently aims to influence US congressional and
public opinion in a way that will oblige the Administration--on the Lebanon
precedent--to withdraw US forces from the Gulf. Prime Minister Mousavi
summarized the strategy when he warned on 6 September that the US should
withdraw "rather than go any farther down into the quagmire it has created for
itself." Mousavi prgdicted that, "However long the US may linger in the Gulf,
it will eventually pull out and let the (Gulf) states bear the consequences of
their hostility toward Iran." New Saudi assertiveness is likely to accelerate
escalation following any Iranian attacks against the Saudis. As hostilities
in the Gulf escalate, the Gulf Arabs will become more demanding of US support.
IRAN/LIBYA: More Naval Threats
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon may present a special
kind of threat to US and allied maritime interests in the Mediterranean Sea
The
three others;
encountered a mine Ott southern Lebanon alieged
ecently in the Persian Gulf while Lebanese found
claimed at about the same time
that his contingent already had 'WI near Tyre. In addition, Libya
may try to lay mines off the Suez Canal. In all cases, the minelaying is
likely to be covert. It may be difficult to prove responsibility, because we
cannot count on catching those minelayers red-handed.
SYRIA/USSR: New Military Cooperation
Syria's apparent agreement to allow construction of a Soviet-controlled
naval base at Tartus will give the Soviets their only actual base in the
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Mediterranean, reducing the need to transit the Bosporus for repairs and
replenishment, and potentially increasing the Soviet challenge to NATO's
southern flank. Syria's decision, in return for $500 million in debt
forgiveness, a submarine, and coastal defense vessels, reflects the severity
of Damascus' economic woes and could be a harbinger of new Soviet bases in
Syria of greater military significance. The Syrians have resisted requests
for bases in the past, but are behind in payments for arms and may have felt
they have little choice now if they wish to continue to receive advanced
Soviet military hardware. Chronic Syrian economic troubles and the oil
price-related financial problems of their key Arab benefactors like Saudi
Arabia may give Moscow still more leverage in the future.
INDIA/PAKISTAN: Continued Uncertainty and Nuclear Weapons
few days to a ew wee s o a secision o o so.
enjoys widespread domestic support, and external pressures against the nuclear
program are not likely to dissuade Pakistan from maintenance of the nuclear
option. This has triggered problems with US aid for Pakistan and could lead
the Pakistanis to a more independent course. It also has prompted Indian
reassessment of its nuclear weapons options that will further fuel tensions in
the subcontinent.
INDIA/SRI LANKA: Indian Imperialism?
India's intervention in Sri Lanka seems to reflect Rajiv Gandhi's adoption
of a doctrine--formulated by his mother and reaffirmed recently in
writing--asserting an Indian right and responsibility to protect ethnic
Indians anywhere, even when they resist protection. India committed most of
an infantry division pluspolice forces to northern and eastern Sri Lanka to
help enforce a peace agreement concerning the Tamil (ethnic Indian) insurgency
before the outbreak of fighting with Tamil militants. New Delhi continues to
increaseits troop strength, which now numbers over 22,000. In addition to
introducing a force that could dominate the whole Sri Lankan Army, the Indians
have obtained Colombo's agreement to restructure the Sri Lankan state and to a
virtual Indian veto of national security policy in Sri Lanka. It is not yet
clear how far Gandhi intends to go in establishing dominance over Sri Lanka,
but Tamil resistance to the Indian invasion, over 235 combat fatalities, and
active guerrilla warfare by Tamil fighters against the Indians will complicate
plans to withdraw and make a long stay more likely.
IRAN/IRAQ: Developments on the Ground
A high level of activity in Iranian rear areas and the massing of troops
and supplies suggest that Iran is preparing for a large-scale offensive
against Iraq in the near future. The Iraqi military recall of reservists born
in 1945--and placing reservists born in 1943 and 1944 on standby
status--indicate Iraq is becoming increasingly hard-pressed to replace
casualties. Extensive Iranian use of chemical weapons would exacerbate Iraq's
problem. No matter the military outcome of a new offensive, the potential for
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sudden collapse of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely
military results. Iraqi President Husayn still faces latent domestic military
and civilian opposition and is vulnerable to assassination. Meanwhile in
Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini's death could lead to major instability within any
successor government.
LIBYA/CHAD: Chemical Warfare
Colonel Qadhafi is embarked on a program to acquire an offensive chemical
warfare capability and has had some success. Libya probably has received
limited quantities of chemical bombs and artillery shells from Iran and will
We should be
prepared for additional use of chemical agents already in stockpile in Libya
against Chad.
IRAN: Chemical Weapons.
Iranian chemical warfare capabilities are growing and Tehran recently has
demonstrated a willingness to use chemical munitions on the battlefield.
Although Iraq is the most likely target, Iran may also decide to attack US
interests ashore or afloat. US Naval vessels would be hard to attack but
could quickly be contaminated by CW agents traveling through ship ventilation
systems and cause a devastating effect.
KURDS/TURKEY/IRAQ/IRAN: Kurdish Rebellion
Kurdish separatist activity is continuing in southeastern Turkey, drawing
Ankara closer to bor4er conflict. In May, Iran conducted a raid inside Turkey
following two Turkish raids against Kurdish targets in Iran.
Kurdish camps located in Iran and states that
Iranian irregulars capturea while infiltrating intended to attack Iraq's
pipeline through Turkey. Tehran's continued support of the Kurds is seriously
straining Turkish-Iranian relations. A recent Kurdish attack in Istanbul--the
first in a major city since 1980--could boost pressures on Prime Minister Ozal
to launch more preemptive strikes against Kurdish camps in Iran.
SYRIA: Internal Struggle
President Assad's poor health could leave him incapacitated at any time.
In the absence of a named successor, with new pressures in Lebanon, and with
an ever-deteriorating economic situation, any successor could become
overwhelmed with key issues, leading to governmental instability and sudden
change.
SOVIET UNION/EASTERN EUROPE
YUGOSLAVIA: More Financial Troubles
Belgrade has worsening payments problems and little prospect that it can
solve them any time soon. After failing to make scheduled payments twice
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since June, the Yugoslays face new rounds of rescheduling negotiations with
both banks and Western governments this month. The banks, especially, are
likely to be cool to requests for new lending in light of other debtors'
problems and the Yugoslays' insistence earlier this year that they had no
financial troubles. With export prospects poor, Yugoslavia probably will have
financing gaps of $1 billion or more annually for the rest of the decade.
YUGOSLAVIA: Other Troubles
Endemic Yugoslav problems are deepening. The likelihood of widespread
violence in Kosovo is greater now than at any time since the 1981 riots as
Serbs and Montenegrins have mounted frequent demonstrations against the
Albanian majority in Kosovo. Yugoslav Army troops already have been harassed;
Such
incidents may spark an escalating cycle of reprisal and reaction tnat could
overwhelm local security forces. As a precaution, federal authorities have
sent federal police and troop reinforcements to Kosovo. Problems are
exacerbated by the fragmented Serbian leadership in Belgrade, which has become
blatantly Serbian chauvinist--a trend that could accelerate centrifugal forces
throughout the federation. Meanwhile, the federal government is weakening and
regional economic disparities are growing.
POLAND: Long-term Problems
Poland faces long-term economic and political problems that defy
resolution and probably will keep political tensions high for the foreseeable
future. The economy and debt troubles are unlikely to turn around for years
and could trigger a new round of popular unrest. Senior Solidarity officials
believe continuing austerity, possibly exacerbated by the "reforms" to be
mandated by the 29 November referendum, could spark another marked upsurge in
wildcat strikes within two years. Sharp price hikes for basic goods and
services are likely after the referendum and hoarding already has begun. New,
more radical groups, well connected to Western politicians and the Western
press, are calling for confrontation with the regime and expulsion of the
Soviets. Church/state negotiatiations still are stalemated over long
contentious issues. Meanwhile, the populace remains sullen and skeptical of
the government, reform, and the Polish version of Soviet glasnost, hampering
regime efforts to reach national reconciliation.
EASTERN EUROPE: Under Pressure
To various degrees, the regimes are under increasing pressures:
Growing economic and political problems, coupled with Gorbachev's
glasnost campaign and Soviet trade demands, have had unsettling
effects on the aging East European leaderships. Prospective
succession dilemmas, particularly in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are
adding to the potential for instability.
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Pressures are especially great in Romania, where continuing debt
problems and economic mismanagement have exacerbated already abject
living conditions. Poor nutrition and worsening sanitary conditions
have contributed to new outbreaks of disease and the regime last week
cut energy rations below last year's low levels. Popular discontent
may reach its peak in late winter, when consumer goods supplies are
lowest. Even elements in the security services are disaffected.
Factions already are maneuvering to control the succession.
A wild card is popular reaction to Gorbachev's political reforms. He appeals
both to younger party functionaries and apolitical persons seeking greater
personal freedoms. Over the long haul, the unintended erosion of party unity
and greater popular demands are destabilizing and could lead to system-shaking
unrest.
WESTERN EUROPE
GREECE/TURKEY/CYPRUS: More Tension
Another crisis may be brewing. Allegedly with Greek government
encouragement, the Greek Cypriots have bought French AMX-30 main battle tanks
for their National Guard. It almost certainly is a red flag goading the Turks
to strong reactions. The NIO/Warning believes that, given the background of
contentious issues between the Greek and Turkish governments such as rights to
the Aegean seabed and militarization of the islands, direct confrontation is
likely. Rumors of future joint Greek-Bulgarian military exercises will
heighten tensions further.
EAST ASIA
PHILIPPINES: Attacks on Americans
The recent killings of three US servicemen--apparently by Communists--have
serious implications for the United States. In a climate of increasing
anti-US sentiment, the assassinations have raised the level of political
violence. The shootings apparently were designed to create greater
instability by demonstrating the inability of the government to respond
effectively to internal disorder and by driving a wedge between the US and the
Aquino government. The killings may have been intended to test the nature and
extent of both govenments' responses to attacks on Americans. If there is no
effective response, those who could profit from killings could conclude that
the benefits of more American deaths are greater than the risks. There is a
great danger, therefore, that more Americans will be targeted; there is no
practical means of protecting the some 120,000 Americans scattered throughout
the Philippines.
PHILIPPINES: What's Next?
President Aquino's support continues to weaken. Meanwhile, the communist
New People's Army is stepping up attacks on bridges, possibly signaling a
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shift in tactics toward sustained attacks on economic targets. Continued
guerrilla successes, aided by splits within the military, will accelerate
political polarization and encourage opponents of Aquino to increase their
efforts to organize a broad coalition that can force her from office, possibly
by the end of the year. Communist and non-Communist politicians have become
involved in a competition of criticizing US policy and alleged American
violations of Philippine sovereignty. It would be difficult to exaggerate the
potential damage to both Philippine and US interests of a continuation of the
politicians' anti-Americanism. At present, the most likely beneficiaries are
the Communist New People's Army and other insurgent movements.
LATIN AMERICA
CHILE: Intransigence
General Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain
in power beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major
reshuffle of the army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet now
seems determined to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's actions
to maintain control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over his
leadership within the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class, fueling
momentum for decisive change before 1989.
HAITI: Grim Prospects
The transition to civilian rule remains tenuously on track, but the 29
November national election itself is likely to be inconclusive. The decision
by the electoral commission early this month to ban former Duvalierists is
likely to lead to more rightist violence, possibly including efforts to
disrupt the election'. Assaults on leftist candidates probably will provoke
retaliation by leftists. Military and Duvalieristylotting will persist and
intensify as the election approaches. The winner of the 20 December run-off
will face massive economic, social, and political problems. Street violence
and acts of anti-Americanism will continue to endanger the safety of US
citizens--officials and tourists alike.
PANAMA: Noriega Strikes Back
As anti-government protests taper off and he consolidates his position,
General Noriega is increasing his demagogic campaign against the US and is
cracking down roughly on the opposition. As the crisis evolves, there is an
increasing risk that Noriega will target more sensitive US interests in Panama
or aid opponents of US interests elsewhere in Latin America. Deliberate
harassment of US citizens, including Embassy officers, is increasing; Noriega
may expel Embassy personnel.
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