COUNTERTERRORISM WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300060011-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: June 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060011-1
National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 02308-87
1 June 1987
M01ORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism
SUBJECT: Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Report
1. The monthly Counterterrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting was held at
CIA Headquarters on 22 May 1987. The following warning issues were
discussed: Philippines, Threat to Western Interests; Japan, the Japanese Red
Army and Chukaku-Ha; Greece, the Terrorist Situation, and Status of Syrian-Abu
Nidal Relations.
2. Philippines: DIA led the discussion on the threat to American
interests in the Philippines, assessing the danger to the 180,000 US citizens
there as medium. Despite recent statements by Communist NPA leaders
indicating that they might be contemplating attacks against Americans, DIA
sees no evidence that the NPA is prepared to attack US personnel, unless the
US becomes more involved directly or indirectly in assisting the Philippine
Government to combat the Communist insurgency. American retired General
Singlaub, for example, has been mentioned as a potential target of the NPA
because of his involvement in private efforts to assist counterinsurgency
efforts against the Communists. NPA "sparrow teams" are active in the greater
metropolitan Manila area and the NPA has claimed responsibility for a number
of recent assassinations. Thus, US personnel could be the inadvertent victims
of terrorist attacks directed against the Aquino government. The NPA
certainly has the capability to conduct terrorist actions against the US and
was involved in several incidents against Americans during the Marcos regime.
Americans are also the occasional victims of criminal attacks in the
Philippines.
3. A number of factors could change the level of threat against the US:
(a) deeper US involvement in combatting the insurgency; (b) base
renegotiations; (c) greater involvement in the Philippines by third countries
such as Iran and Libya; and (d) a conscious decision by the NPA to seek
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outside assistance for its insurgency. Both Libya and Iran have limited
capabilities to influence the situation. Libya continues to fund modestly the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) which has engaged the government in
low-level insurgency in the southern Philippines for many years. There have
been reports of Iran encouraging Islamic elements in the Philippines to oppose
the central government and the Americ
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there may be
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ro-Iranian cells on Cebu and Luzon, but these reports have not been
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confirmed.
4. In sum, the NPA has not lifted its ban on anti-US attacks but greater
involvement by the US in anti-insurgent efforts could trigger a decision to do
so. It may, in fact, be deliberately sending threat signals without a serious
intent to conduct anti-American operations. The NPA, however, is a large
organization and has significant capability to strike throughout the islands.
Meanwhile, it will continue to target selectively Philippine citizens and will
endeavor "to legitimize" such targeting through political action.
6. Japan: CIA briefed on the status of the radical Chukaku-Ha (Middle
Core Faction) group, assessing the threat from this group is low. The group
has remained resilent, however, despite suffering setbacks in 1986. The group
has not targeted US interests but does engage in anti-US rhetoric. In
conducting terrorist attacks, it attempts to avoid or minimize human
casualties.
7. Chukaku-Ha is now focusing on Okinawa where national games will be
held this fall. The likelihood that the Chukaku-Ha will engage in some form
of political actions during the games has increased because of plans for the
Emperor to attend the games (in September or October). It reportedly is
planning to stage rallies and perhaps to fire rockets or incendiary devices in
order to "make a political statement." The warheads on the rockets, while not
powerful, may contain gunpowder and shrapnel. Chukaku-Ha first used
explosives on its rockets in early 1985 when it attacked the US Consulate in
Kobe. Because of the large number of Americans on Okinawa, it almost certain
that they will come in contact with Chukaku-Ha members.
8. The Japanese National Police Agency (NPA) is concerned about the
potential for political violence on Okinawa not only with the Chukaku-Ha but
other radical groups planning to converge on the island during the national
games. Competition among these radical groups enhances the potential for
violence. The NPA intends to increase security at US facilities, even though
it judges the likelihood of radical Japanese groups engaging in violence
against US personnel as low.
9. Japanese security has made inroads against the Chukaku-Ha and has
arrested a number of the group's leaders since September 1986. The arrests
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have hurt Chukaku-Ha's covert arm, although it can continue to conduct some
operations. CIA estimates that Chukaku-Ha still has 120-200 members in its
covert wing which in turn is supported by several thousand overt members. The
group, in CIA's view, has the potential of becoming more of a political force
in the future because it is essentially a blue collar movement and not a true
terrorist group. If it does become a more viable political force, some of the
more militant elements may break way.
10. CIA also briefed on the current status of the Japanese Red Army
(JRA). The JRA apparently is now split into two factions
One group is
centered in Lebanon's Biqa' Valley. It consists at most of 40 members,
although it more likely numbers only 20-25 people. In the Biqa', this JRA
faction is engaged in training fighters for the Palestinian Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The leader of this faction is a female named
Saiko.
11. The second faction of the JRA is believed to consist of only about 12
members, some of whom may be non-Japanese. The faction, for example, is
thought to have a German member and perhaps an American one. It has been
linked to the bombings of the US and Canadian embassies in Jakarta in 1986.
It operates under the name of "Anti-Imperialist International Brigade."
Neither its leader nor its exact location is known.
12. The Japanese NPA sees the JRA faction in the Biqa' Valley as isolated
and essentially without a place to relocate. Some members, however, are
reported to have traveled to Libya. The overall threat posed by the JRA is
small, although unconfirmed reports continue to surface that the JRA plans
terrorist actions to win the release of four convicted JRA terrorists in
Japan, two of whom have received the death penalty. However, some of these
individuals have been in prison for ten years, and the JRA has yet to stage an
attack in an attempt to free them.
14. Greece: CIA's Counterterrorist Center led the discussion on
terrorism in Greece. The CIA officer noted that Greek terrorists have
recently intensified their activities. Since late April, seven bombings have
occurred in Greece. Five of the attacks were directed against the Greek
Government; two were aimed at the United States (the bombing of the bus
carrying US servicemen on 24 April and an attack against Union Carbide offices
in Athens). The attack against the bus resulted in injuries to 16 US
servicemen.
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15. The Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), a loosely organized
umbrella group under which Greek terrorist organizations operate, is believed
responsible for most of these attacks. DLA, for example, claimed
responsibility for the attack on Union Carbide. The group tends to
concentrate on arson and explosive-type attacks. The deadly 17 November
Group, which is linked to the ELA, has taken responsibility for the attack on
the bus--its first attack in three years. Still another group called the
Anti-Authority Struggle has been formed under the !LA's banner.
16. This recent spate of violent attacks in Greece may have been
precipitated by the Prime Minister's recent pronouncements in negotiations
concerning US bases. The Prime Minister's leftist rhetoric versus his more
moderate policies have irritated radical groups and may have prompted them to
conduct the attacks.
17.
tightly knit group
the 17 November Organization. A small,
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oreign terrorist groups are a so
active in Greece, an severs are believed to have developed support
infrastructures there. These groups may include Hizballah, the Abu Nidal
Organization, and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
(ASALA). The Greek Government has not moved to restrict the activities of
these groups and there is a "hands off" attitude toward them. For example, if
Libyan and Palestinian groups there focus on non-Greek targets, there is a
tendency on the part of the government to look the other way. The Armenian
Popular Movement, the political arm of ASALA, has an office in Athens, and
there are reports that ASALA itself has a covert presence there.
19. Status of Syrian-Abu Nidal Relations: State/INR presented a draft
cable on this subject which it intended to send to Damascus, but which it
first wished to vet with Community specialists.
INR stated that it agrees that serious
tensions have arisen between the Syrian Government and the ANO and that
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President Assad is unhappy with ANO's involvement in the Palestinian Camp
Wars. Syria, moreover, is attempting to lower its profile in regard to the
use of terrorism and to decouple itself from ANO terrorism generally.
21. Nevertheless, INR remains convinced that the strains with ANO and the
organization's largely self-initiated drawndown of assets in Syria do not mean
that Damascus has ended its support for terrorism. Syria instead is keeping
its options open on the use of terrorism. The ANO drawdown, moreover, appears
to be a precautionary move in anticipation of a possible crackdown by Syria.
It does not want a complete break with Damascus and remains active in the
Biqa' Valley.
22. Syria, for its part, also does not want to force a complete break
with the ANO. Damascus also has maintained its ties to the Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK) and recently has offered haven to two organizations with a history
of terrorist activity in the Persian Gulf region. In sum, Syria's moves are
tactical and temporary; Damascus will especially continue to use terrorism in
a regional context. Syria's ability to prevent some of the terrorist groups
it supports from conducting attacks outside the region is questionable.
23. CIA/NE-SA observed that we should not understate what is occurring in
Syria. Assad is attempting to curb terrorist attacks in Europe by groups its
supports, but it would be unrealistic to expect that he will not support
radical Islamic groups in the region. Nor is it Assad's style to expel the
ANO or to close the camps in the Biqa'. Instead, he will endeavor to make
life uncomfortable for the time being for the ANO and other terrorist groups.
24. CIA/CTC supported INR's view that ANO does not wish to break totally
with Syria because the organization recognizes that Syria and eastern Lebanon
provide an excellent location for its operations. The ANO, while resisting
Syrian pressures, is not only developing stronger capabilities in Lebanon but
is moving closer to Libya. CTC expects the ANO to become more active in south
Lebanon against the Israeli-backed Southern Lebanese Army and against Israel
itself. In addition, the ANO is also working to develop a broader political
agenda to compliment its terrorist strategy.
25. Community analysts raised the key question of whether a sea-change
was in the offing for the ANO and whether it was taking on a broader political
agenda would lead to a splintering of the organization. INR did not see such
a development. Instead, it thought the ANO would continue to pursue a
two-track strategy: conducting terrorism while resisting pressures from state
sponsors to curb its activities and the development of a broader political
agenda so it could lay claim to becoming the legitimate organization of the
Palestinian people.
26. Community analysts agreed that the ANO was not all that restricted to
date, that the organization is a highly survivable and capable group, and that
it was not all that isolated.
Charles E. Allen
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Charles E. Allen
Charles E. Sparks
Philip Kosnett
Henry Eide
Morgan Langston
Michael Morse
Pamela Dobson
Suzanne Pond
Linnea Raine
Charles L. A len
John Hemry
Lee Carrigan
Mark Ran o
Cecilia Capestany
Dan Tompkins
Margery Benson
George Ryan
Michael Patenaude
NI O/CT
State DS/TAD
State INR/TNA.
DEA/OIDO
Customs/Intelligence
FAA
AFOSI
NSA/Gl1
INR/TNA
DOE/DASI
NSA
Army INSCOM
NRC/NMSS
NSA/G1l
Coast Guard
NSIC/ATAC
ATOIC/Army
USAITAC
USSS/FIB/TS
USSS/FIB/FE
USSS/FIB/EU
HQDA
Army ITAC
Army ITAC
State-Diplomatic Security
Air Force OSI
Air Force OSI
CTC/TAB
CTC/TAB
OEA/NEA/J
CIA/NESA
CTC/TAB
CIA/CRES
CIA/NESA
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