MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR AUGUST 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300070026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 6, 2013
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: September 16, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
16 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: John J. Bird
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for August 1987
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
USSR
The Soviets reportedly are preparing for a Gorbachev visit to New York for
the UN General Assembly session this month. We doubt that Gorbachev believes
that a hastily arranged Reykjavik-style summit would be an effective way to
close remaining gaps on INF issues. Such a visit probably would be used
instead for propaganda purposes, perhaps to pressure Washington for more rapid
movement or to float new arms control initiatives. NIO/USSR believes that
such a Soviet manuever would indicate that Moscow is no longer interested in
an agreement with this Administration and intends to try to saddle Washington
with the blame for the collapse of the talks.
USSR/Third World
It is already clear that, in the Gorbachev era, the US will have to deal
with a much more effective Soviet political challenge in the Third World than
heretofore. There was general Community agreement that Soviet policy includes
a determination to resist the challenge of the Reagan Doctrine and that it is
a much smarter effort to compete with the US. Although the USSR cannot give
This review reflects consideration of inputs generated at warning meetings
conducted by the National Intelligence Officers with Community representatives
from all areas. As such, it represents a Community-wide review, but it is not
a formally coordinated Community product.
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most Third World countries the technology and economic assistance they want,
most analysts thought that Moscow will not pass up opportunities to try to
move important Third World states into the Soviet camp, regardless of the
impact on US-Soviet relations.
Chad/Libya
We continue to believe that Chadian President Habre will succeed in taking
Aozou airbase, but again caution that his margin for error is small and his
forces could sustain serious losses if they miscalculate. Even if the airbase
is disabled, Chadian forces still will be vulnerable to airstrikes launched
from southern Libya.
South Africa/Angola
With the Angolan offensive continuing against UNITA--Savimbi's guerrilla
army--the likelihood of South African intervention is rising. Pretoria can
commit significant force on short notice. The most likely target is Cuito
Cuanavale, especially if Mavinga seems threatened.
South, Africa/International Atomic Energy Agency
South Africa stands a good chance of suspension from the International
Atomic Energy Agency for its racial policies at that Agency's conference later
this month. Suspension would be a damaging precedent for international
nuclear safeguards efforts.
2. Trend Commentary
USSR
The economic reform blueprint approved at the June Communist Party plenum
should be seen as a beginning step away from the Stalinist command economy,
although it does not alone constitute a decisive break with the old system.
As described, the reform would not go as far as Hungary's or China's efforts;
the government would retain broad powers. The blueprint has not been
finalized, however, and comments by Gorbachev suggest that the debate is not
over. Analysts are divided over the prognosis for Soviet economic reform.
Most see the reform as a protracted process and expect Gorbachev to build
incrementally on his success at the plenum. A minority see little sign that
Gorbachev has yet achieved much, and doubt that he will be more successful in
the future. NIO/USSR believes that we should not expect to see the reform
program fully operational until the 14th five-year plan (1996-2000).
Mozambique
RENAMO, the anti-Marxist guerrilla group, has intensified its efforts in
recent months. Mozambican and Zimbabwean casualties are rising and attacks on
facilities in the Beira Corridor are increasing. RENAMO seems ready to launch
its regular seasonal offensive almost anywhere in the country as soon as the
rains begin.
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3, Nb/Warning notes these additional areas of warning concern:
Greece/Turkey
A new crisis may be brewing. Greece,
will move a division from northern Greece to the Turkish border
Decause of fears that Turkey may attack in October. Whether or not this is
truly believed in Greek military and government circles, there is likely to be
a marked escalation in tension over Cyprus. The Greek Cypriots have announced
they will seek a UN resolution this fall on their desire to hold an
international conference to settle the dispute--a plan the Turkish Cypriots
reject. If the Greek Cypriots go forward with this plan, Turkish Cypriots
will at least take symbolic action to consolidate their pseudostate in the
northern part of the island. It will almost certainly draw Athens and Ankara
into a confrontation that both sides may find hard to back away from,
particularly with a Turkish national election scheduled for early November.
Philippines
President Aquino is weakened--perhaps mortally. Unless one of her
supporters can reunite the military, she will be unable to reestablish her own
political prestige and leadership. Rebel leader Colonel Honasan remains at
large with several hundred troops. The military is now split between
supporters of Honasan, Defense Minister Ramos, and former President Marcos;
each group could turn on the Aquino government. Because much of the military
and populace is sympathetic to Honasan's grievances and blames Mrs. Aquino,
another military uprising or coup attempt is likely.
South Korea/North Korea
Agreement by the major parties on a new draft constitution sets the stage
for a presidential election late this year, but hardliners on both sides
continue to oppose the pact. The radicals are likely to instigate street
demonstrations. Additional, perhaps greater, unrest could result from labor
strife. There appears to be general popular belief that a major breakdown in
order could occur before December. A looming collapse of public order could
yet result in the imposition of martial law. Disorder would encourage North
Korea to consider mounting destabilization operations and fomenting
anti-government riots and sabotage.
India/Sri Lanka
India's continuing deployment of troops to Sri Lanka is emerging as a
possibly predatory move against a smaller neighbor, belying earlier assurances
of nonintervention. It is not yet clear how far Prime Minister Gandhi intends
to go in seizing power in Sri Lanka, but his commitment to the effort
continues to grow. Should President Jayewardene be assassinated, Gandhi
almost certainly would move in force on Colombo.
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Brazil
Increased economic problems could lead to broad based protests, providing
a pretext for military intervention. The next few months will be critical as
Congress debates the constitution and considers reinstatement of cashiered
leftist officers -- a sore point with the military. Military support to
depose President Sarney may be growing, but key senior players have not yet
evinced their support to it.
Tunisia
President Bourguiba's campaign to suppress all political opposition is
escalating with crackdowns on Islamic fundamentalists. Far from ensuring
smooth succession, however, the regime's efforts are drastically increasing
discontent and ensuring chaos, uncertainty and confusion when the succession
crisis comes. The Libyan threat almost certainly will increase in the
post-Bourguiba period, and Algeria too seems poised to influence the
succession struggle.
Colombia/Venezuela
Colombia and Venezuela again are squabbling over control of the oil rich
Golfo de Venezuela. Although the situation is stabilizing and a military
clash appears unlikely, both Colombian President Barco and Venezuelan
President Lusinchi have asked the US to speed delivery of missile shipments.
The dispute is complicating cooperation in counterinsurgency and antinarcotics
operations.
Panama
Anti-government protests are tapering off but the opposition could yet
unify and force General Noriega's resignation. Noriega under siege will
continue his demagogic campaign against the US, crack down roughly on the
opposition, and if necessary, install a military junta. As the crisis
evolves, even in fits and starts, there will be an ever increasing risk that
Noriega will target more sensitive US interests in Panama for subversion.
Chile
Pinochet appears more determined than ever to maneuver to remain in power
beyond 1989. Having prepared plans for carrying out a major reshuffle of the
army to force his critics into early retirement, Pinochet now seems determined
to run as a civilian with junta backing. Pinochet's actions to maintain
control may precipitate a new crisis of confidence over his leadership within
the rank-and-file armed forces and middle class, fueling momentum for decisive
change before 1989.
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Iran! Iraq
Political stakes in the war are high. The potential for sudden collapse
of either government is out of proportion to actual or likely military
results. Military and civilian opposition to Iraqi President Husayn
continues. Meanwhile, in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini seems to have lost some
control over the power struggle among his successors, and his death could lead
to major instability within the post-Khomeini government.
Iran/Lebanon/Mediterranean
Iranian Revolutionary Guard naval forces in Lebanon apparently are
increasing and soon may present a new kind of threat to US and allied maritime
interests in the Mediterranean Sea. Israeli targets probably have highest
priority, but the Iranians might choose to retaliate for US or allied actions
in the Persian Gulf with attacks or mine laying in the eastern Mediterranean.
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