WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300090007-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: December 22, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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National Intelligence Council
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC #05136-87
22 December 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Walter L. Barrows
National Intelligence Officer for Africa
SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
1. Intelligence community representatives discussed the following
topics at the monthly warning meeting on 15 December.
2. Warning Notes
President Habre of Chad probably will delay any attack on Libyan
forces in the Aozou Strip until after the OAU Summit meeting
scheduled for January 1987. Nonetheless, Chadian forces are
capable of attacking without further warning. Libya is likely to
strike first if Habre delays several more months.
More than just rotating troops as it normally does at this time
of year, Cuba may be increasing its forces in Angola. South
Africa is not yet withdrawing all its forces from Angola.
UNITA--with or without South African help--may try to cut off
approximately eight demoralized Angolan brigades now concentrated
at Cuito Cuanavale.
More ANC attacks in South Africa are likely, but not a
spectacular escalation. South Africa may strike perceived ANC
targets--particularly in Botswana--but probably with a
small-scale covert operation rather than a large, undeniable raid.
Zimbabwe is reducing its forces in Mozambique in order to protect
its eastern border against RENAMO guerrilla raids. Harare will
not give up protecting the road, rail, and pipeline to Beira
port, and the road to Malawi through Mozambique's Tete Province,
but it probably will send only a few hundred troops and some
militia to help guard the Limpopo rail line to Maputo.
SE/
CL BY SIGNER
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CIA cautioned that the government of Mauritania could fall at any
time, although other analysts give it a slightly better chance of
weathering more Toucouleur demonstrations, avoiding involvement
in Polisario's War, and coping with intractable economic problems.
Sudan has lost two eastern border garrisons to SPLA insurgents
with artillery support from Ethiopia, and new Libyan military aid
to Khartoum may increase Qadhafi's leveraae there.
a Sudanese coup is
increasingly likely by military officers who are dissatisfied
with Prime Minister Sadiq's Libyan ties and his inability to end
the insurgency in southern Sudan.
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DISCUSSION
-- In Zaire, Mobutu's rumored poor health and
well-known dissatisfaction with falling US aid levels. Copper
prices probably won't hold, and infrastructure is in poor shape.
-- Cameroon's economy is probably in worse shape than most
realize. It has been hurt by the falling dollar and
oil prices
President Biya's wish
to devolve more authority to the cabinet is still only a wish.
Chad's economic potential, however,
seems slight. In particular, its poor roads raise transportation
costs exorbitantly.
5. Chad/Libya. The NIO asked DIA to lead the discussion on Chad.
Indications of Chadian readiness to attack have been visible for
several months, yet Habre has allowed the momentum to be lost.
He probably is using the delay to establish a logistic base at
Miski, mass more forces in the north, and continually revise his
tactical plans as Libya improves defenses at Aozou airbase. If
the OAU meeting slips to February or March and Habre continues to
delay, his military capabilities may erode.
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INR suggested that the Chadians will attack before April.
Otherwise, Habre probably anticipates, the Libyans will attack
then during the election period in Paris when French officials
would be reluctant to get involved in more fighting on Habre's
behalf. A Libyan attack most likely would come in the east along
the Kufra-Ounianga Kebir axis. Libyan commanders are nervous and
might be spooked into launching such an operation.
INR also suggested that there is a chance of Chadian-Sudanese
conflict. Although Habre is unlikely to supply the Sudanese SPLA
insurgents with arms, he probably will let them use Chadian
territory. The NIO
that they probably would not arm the SPLA.
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6. South Africa/Angola. CIA led the discussion.
Major fighting probably has ended for the rainy season. Angolan
government forces in the southeast have retreated to positions in
and around Cuito Cuanavale
UNITA's guerrilla operations and limited South African operations
against the SWAPO insurgents in southern Angola probably will
continue. South Africa's 61st Mechanized Battalion is still in
the field. Moreover, General Geldenhuys' public statement only
guarantees South African conscripts to be home for Christmas, not
necessarily the Buffalo Battalion or territorial units.
We believe
that Cuba may be increasing its forces in Angola. Several Cuban
generals have arrived in Angola, perhaps to command the augmented
contingent or simply to carry out a fact-finding mission. Claims
that Cuban units in Angola are moving south to engage the South
Africans have originated in Luanda and may be untrue.
CIA suggested that UNITA is likely to end its siege of Cuito
Cuanavale and that perhaps half of the seven or eight government
brigades there will withdraw, leaving only the usual three or so
during the rainy season. DIA, on the other hand, said it expects
UNITA, with or without South African artillery support, to keep
shelling the airfield and Angolan units, perhaps forcing an
evacuation of the town. Resupply, always difficult during the
rains, would constrain the attackers as well as the defenders.
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BEE
7. South Africa. CIA again led the discussion.
Pretoria is taking the ANC threat seriously, but it still has not
retaliated for the bombing in Johannesburg this summer. The
South Africans believe that the ANC is infiltrating mainly
through Botswana, so retaliation there could come at any time.
The five recent grenade attacks in Gaborone could have been
carried out by the South Africans, although it is unclear if all
the targets were ANC-related. The war of words between Pretoria
and Gaborone continues.
Little came of the recent ANC meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. Few
prominent figures attended, and there was little news in reports
of what was discussed. Only the press has claimed that the ANC
decided to press for international recognition as the "sole
legitimate representative" of the South African people.
8. Zimbabwe. DIA took the lead.
RENAMO's strategy of attacking into Zimbabwe to force Harare to
recall forces from Mozambique appears to be working. There are
only about two Zimbabwean battalions--less than 1,000 combat
troops--in the Beira corridor now, and only one mechanized
battalion of nearly 500 combat troops along the Tete road. Other
forces sometimes reported as being in Mozambique actually are
guarding Zimbabwe's border. Harare also is not coping well with
the armed dissidence in Matabeleland, and--other than a few
militia--there is no indication yet of increased military
recruiting.
9. Mauritania. DIA led the discussion.
In sentencing 49 Toucouleur military officers recently for coup
plotting, the regime steared a middle course between being so
lenient that it would not deter new plots or being so harsh as to
provoke more Toucouleur opposition to the Maur-dominated
government. Only three low-ranking, non-prominent officers were
executed. The opposition Front for the Liberation of Africans in
Mauritania had threatened violence if there were any executions,
but it has not responded so far. We expect some demonstrations,
possibly even assassinations, and anti-Maur tracts are likely to
be printed in neighboring Senegal.
Analysts differed on the extent of their pessimism about
prospects for President Taya's.regime. The regime continues to
be squeezed by the war in the north and economic pressures.
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Polisario's crossing of Mauritanian territory to carry out
attacks in Western Sahara threatens to drag Mauritania into that
conflict, although Taya's neutrality policy seems to be working
better than his predecessors' pro-Moroccan or pro-Polisario
positions. And inflation continues to erode consumers'
purchasing power.
10. Sudan. At DIA's request, Sudan was added to the agenda. DIA
led the discussion.
Sudanese SPLA insurgents are showing surprising military strength
during the dry season when they normally do not, and they have
recently seized two garrisons--Kurmuk and Qaysan--above the
traditional north-south line where they historically have not
operated. Sudanese government forces attempting to retake Kurmuk
believe that they are out-gunned by Ethiopian artillery support
for the insurgents. They are delaying their advance until more
Sudanese guns arrive.
As a result of these SPLA gains since November, Sudanese-
Ethiopian tensions, and foreign involvement in Sudan, have
increased. Ethiopia began escalating its support to the SPLA
when the insurgents overran Jokau in May 1987, and Addis Ababa
currently provides the SPLA with artillery, logistic assistance,
and possibly air support. Libya has provided Sudan recently with
some artillery and ammunition, and it has modified Sudan's
Libyan-provided MIG-23s so that they can be used to bomb the
insurgents. Egypt is reluctant to jeopardize its effort to
broker peace talks between Sadiq and Mengistu by antagonizing
Ethiopia, but it reportedly sent an air defense unit to protect
Roseires dam in Sudan.
Mengistu's goals are to topple Sadiq and force Sudan to cease
aiding insurgents in Ethiopia. Ethiopia is unlikely to send its
artillery units into Sudan to support SPLA operations, but it
will continue to fire across the border and may provide artillery
pieces to the insurgents. Analysts doubt that Mengistu would
suspend Ethiopian involvement in the Sudanese insurgency even if
the West threatened to cease its famine relief in Ethiopia.
Analysts do not credit recent reports of Cuban support to the
SPLA attacks.
The discussion also seemed to dispel initial skepticism about the
unconfirmed Egyptian deployment in Sudan. Analysts questioned
why Egypt would be concerned because a dam is a particularly
difficult target to destroy from the air. Nonetheless, there was
consensus that Cairo's paramount interest is the Nile River flow.
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-- DIA
said that Sudan's SPLA and border
problems are increasing Libyan leverage in Sudan, and warned that
Qadhafi probably seeks military base rights in Sudan in return
for his military aid. Egyptian-brokered negotiations are
unlikely to end the Sudanese insurgency, and some officials in
Khartoum view Egyptian support as inadequate. This strengthens
the hand of pro-Libyan Sudanese officials. One analyst who saw
nothing new in this argued that Sadiq is simply playing the
Libyans--and others--for more military aid without giving them
anything in return.
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Walter L. Barrows
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SUBJECT: Warning and Forecast Report: Sub-Saharan Africa
The following components were represented at the Sub-Saharan Africa
warning meeting:
EXTERNAL:
Office of the Vice President
DIA/DIO
DIA/JSI-5B
DIA/DB-8D
Army
Air Force
State/INR
NSA
National Warning Staff
INTERNAL:
DDI/ALA/AF
DDI/ALA/MCD
DDI/OIR
DDI/LDA
DDI/NESA
FBIS
NPIC
DDO/AF
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