PROBLEM-ORIENTED PLANNING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400100008-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: July 20, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776ROO0400100008-9
20 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM: Charles E. Allen .
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Problem-Oriented Planning
REFERENCE: Your memo dated 29 June 1988, same subject
1. Projected international situations which likely will have security
policy implications for the US fall principally into two categories:
a. Those situations which have a direct bearing on US interests.
b. Situations which are primarily internal to a nation or region,
but which have potential to significantly affect US interests.
2.. Issues likely to have a direct bearing on US interests, by region, are
as follows:
a. Latin America. In Panama, anti-Americanism could continue to
grow over the next few months as Noriega consolidates his hold on Panama
and blames the US for his nation's continuing economic difficulties. Over
the longer term, our concerns include establishment of a revolutionary
infrastructure (wittingly) by the Cubans and (unwittingly) by Noriega;
this involves the organizing and arming of civilian groups to ostensibly
support the regime. US policy concerns include continued control of the
Panama Canal and access to strategic locations for US forces in the
country.
b. Europe. Tensions over US bases probably will increase over the
short term only marginally, except in Greece. The Greek Government's
attempt to influence the negotiation process through manipulation of the
media seems to have gotten out of hand and threatens to carry the
government along in a tide of anti-base sentiment. Over the long term,
increasing nationalism, Soviet force reduction initiatives, trade
friction, and continued US budgetary constraints will increase pressure
both here and on the continent for a reduced US military presence. Policy
implications will center over our ability to counter trade and nationalism
pressures, our capability to seize and direct arms control initiatives,
and our willingness (or need) to find alternate. methods to support either
continued US military presence or a rapid.insertion capability.
I
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c. Middle East. Over the long term, a conclusion of the Iran-Iraq
war on terms favor le to Iraq will significantly increase the threat to
Israel. A Threat to US interests is implicit in our support to Israel and
the US could become embroiled in a future Middle-East war. In addition,
world oil markets are likely to be at least temporarily disrupted by an
end to the war as traders sort out conflicting trends of increased
production versus possibly greater OPEC discipline.
d. USSR. Warsaw Pact arms control initiatives could place the US in
an untenable strategic position. The disproportionate effects of proposed
symmetrical force reductions--or cheating--will test NATO political will
and bargaining skills. The Soviets will continue to seek to increase West
European public pressure for US and NATO arms reductions.
e. Asia. The primary threat to stability and US interests in Asia,
in the near term, is the volatile situation on the Korean peninsula. The
period following the Olympic'games-to the time shortly after the
Pyongyang Youth Festival (fall 1988 to fall 1989) will be critical as the
following activities occur: South Korea likely will announce the stepped
withdrawal of US forces; democratization in the South will have progressed
or digressed; succession issues in the North will be clarified; the
economic situation in the North probably will begin to stabilize; South
Korea's armed forces will be close to achieving parity with the North.
The challenge for US policy-makers will be to stage periodic
demonstrations of resolve to preclude North Korean adventurism.
3. Numerous other issues/situations have the potential to threaten US
security and interests, world-wide. The most significant of these include:
a. CBW/Ballistic Missile/Nuclear Proliferation. Proliferation of
long-range weapons and weapons of mass des rucion--particularly chemical
and nuclear munitions--will pose a significant and growing threat to US
forces and US allies for the foreseeable future, especially in the Middle
East and South Asia. The possession of such weapons in the hands of
terrorists could directly threaten US territory.' Barring containment of
the threat, which seems highly unlikely, accurate threat assessment and
development of effective countermeasures must be a number one national
priority.
b. Latin America. Over the next few years, some Latin American
democracies probably will either fall or undergo such profound change as
to resemble democracy in name only. Increasing nationalism and growing
resentment over a perception of US interference in internal affairs will
foster anti-Americanism throughout the region. In Honduras, the continued
presence of an organized, armed groups of Nicaraguan insurgent refugees
(Contras) will threaten internal stability, especially if they are
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SUBJECT: Problem-Oriented Planning
effectively locked out of Nicaragua. In El Salvador, the terminal illness
of President Duarte and the continual slide of his ruling Democratic
Socialist Party will pave the way for a political turn to the right; this
will result in a stronger leftist insurgency. Guatemala may undergo a
military coup as the senior officers' disaffection with the civilian
government grows. Mexico probably will lean further to the left as the
power of the ruling PRI.wanes. The recent presidential election may well
have marked the beg inning of a new era of Mexican political history--with
major accompanying implications for the US.
c. Europe. Growing mutual interests will forge closer economic and
political cooperation within the European Community, to the exclusion of
some US interests. Growing trade and energy links with the USSR--and
strengthening popular perceptions of a benign Soviet leadership--are
likely to influence European policy to the detriment of US and NATO
interests.
d. USSR. Continued and heightened ethnic tensions and dissent will
cause increased difficulty for Gorbachev, especially within a framework of
glasnost and perestroika. A continuing inability to resolve nationality
and economic problems could presage his downfall and a return to a more
conservative leadership. Gorbachev's difficulties should be examined in a
context of possible US opportunities.
e. Middle East. US restrictions on arms sales and the end of the
Iran-Iraq war will cause a steep decline in US influence in the area,
opening the way for a corresponding rise in the influence of West European
nations and the USSR. Traditional US Arab allies who
have long resented favoritism of Israel, are turning increasingly to arms
suppliers who are more cooperative and who are not perceived as meddling
in Arab internal affairs.
f. Southwest Asia. In Afghanistan, key questions include the
ultimate extent and timing of the Soviet withdrawal and what kind of
association will the two nations establish. The effect of an independent
Afghanistan on the regional balance is a big unknown. Such an Afghanistan
under the mujahedin probably will have close ties to Pakistan and Iran,
possibly to the detriment of India. Over the long term, India will
increase its control over the Indian Ocean, through political maneuvering
and military muscle.
g. Southeast Asia. China will increase its influence in such
nations as Thailand, Malaysia, and possibly the Philippines, as-it.
presents an ever more benign face to the region's inhabitants. Vietnam
will moderate its position in the region and seek closer ties to the West.
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5. Forward thinking assessments of the sort you have asked for are very
much in the strategic warning arena, while most of the. Intelligence Community
remains in blinders, focused on I&W and tactical warning. Continued and
expanded assessments in this genre will be increasingly useful to the
policy-maker, but will require a re-orientation and re-education of the
Intelligence Community. I would be pleased to present my views and
recommendations in this matter.
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NIO/.W/CEA1.1en:amb/2OJul.y88
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1 - NIO/AF
1 - NIO/AL
1 - NIO/CN
1 - NIO/CT
1 - NIO/EA
1 - NIO/ECON
1 - NIO/EUR
1 - NIO/GPF
1 - NIO/LA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NIO/S&T
1 - NIO/SP
1 - NIO/USSR
1 - D/AG
1 - SRP
2 - NIO/W files
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000400100008-9