LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT AUGUST 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120009-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: August 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120009-6
Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120009-6
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120009-6
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, RC 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM:
25 August 1988
Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Report August 1988
1. The Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting was held on 23 August
1988. The following three countries were discussed and major judgments of the
Intelligence Community were that:
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In Nicaragua, the Sandinista buildup in the north continues as
regime troops work to push the insurgents into Honduras and
dismantle the Resistance infrastructure. Meanwhile, the
insurgents' position inside Nicaragua continues to erode and the
exodus to Honduras has increased. 25X1
In Panama, the death of titular political opposition leader
Arnulfo Arias offers new possibilities for the divided
opposition to rally around emerging leaders, but dissidents are
unlikely to be able to do so.
In Chile, General Pinochet is almost certain to be named the
Junta's presidential candidate next week, and a either narrow
win or loss by the regime is likely to increase prospects for
political instability in the weeks following the election,
tentatively set for early October.
2. Nicaragua
The Sandinista buildup in north central Nicaragua continues. At least
three counterinsurgency battalions plus Interior Ministry and border force
troops comprise the largest troop concentrations in over a year. The
Intelligence Community believes that rather than conducting search and
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destroy operations, the mission of the BLIs and border forces is to
locate and channel insurgent units back into Honduras. Interior Ministry
units then fill the vacumn left by the Resistance forces and destroy the
remnants of their local support networks. Sandinista troops are engaging
insurgent units only to prevent reinfiltration and to push the units
northward, a posture reflected in reduced levels of fighting.
Despite the increasing concentration of Resistance combatants in
Honduras, analysts see little likelihood of a cross-border incursion in
the near-term. The Sandinistas are achieving their objectives without an
incursion and there are no important military targets, such as supply
depots, within easy reach of the border. Moreover, they do not want to
refocus Washington's attention on the war during the election campaign.
Even the passage of a lethal assistance package for the Resistance would
be unlikely to prompt an incursion, at least until after the election.
For their part, the position of the Resistance continues to erode
both inside Nicaragua and in Honduras. Most units incountry are without
experienced commanders, there is little coordination between headquarters
and field units, and critical food and ammunition shortages have
diminished combat effectiveness sharply. As a result, the exodus of
Resistance forces into Honduras continues. The Intelligence Community
estimates that as of mid-August: 2,000 to 3,000 ERN/North, 1,000
ERN/South; and 200 to 400 Yatama Indian combatants remained inside
Nicaragua, including part-time personnel and full-time personnel short of
supplies. Inside Honduras, the availability of food will help maintain
force cohesion in the near-term, but military capabilities will continue
to decline. Indeed, even if lethal aid were restored, most analysts
believe that restoring the Resistance to former strength would be
difficult, given the success of the Sandinistas in destroying local
support networks. Analysts saw little likelihood that the current
Resistance leadership would resume ceasefire talks from such a weakened
position. although a dissident group might reengage Managua.
Warning Issue: The Sandinistas will continue to push the insurgents
into Honduras and consolidate their control over the countryside while
continued food shortages in Honduras will complicate the efforts of the
rebel leadership to hold their force together even in the near-term.
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3. Panama
The death of Arnulfo Arias offers new possibilities for the ,
opposition to rally around emerging leaders, but Intelligence Community
analysts do not believe dissidents are capable of doing so. Indeed, most
of their energy is focused on internal maneuvering to gain control over
Arias' followers rather than on building on the momentum of the large
turnout for Arias' funeral--estimated at 100,000 by
observers--to form a united front and revive opposition activity.
Analysts believe that the struggle to succeed Arias as the titular head
of the opposition reflects growing support within of the political
opposition to participate in the May 1989 elections under any
conditions.
For his part, the position of PDF commander Noriega remains firm. He
does not appear inclined to reach a settlement of the crisis and the
regime's recent approach to the Uruguayans is probably nothing more than
another Noriega gambit. Economic pressures are almost certain to
intensify in coming months, but they are unlikely to increase levels of
worker unrest. The current labor dispute with the electrical workers,
for example, is small and isolated and the regime's decision to place a
military officer in control of the electric company underscores Noriega's
determination to head-off labor unrest.
Warning Issue: A decision by the opposition to participate in the
elections will lend considerable legitimacy to the regime, and undercut
efforts by dissidents to broaden their support.
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4. Chile
Pinochet is almost certain to receive the Junta's nomination when it
meets on 30 August, marking the start of the campaign season that will
end with national elections in early October. The Intelligence Community
believes that prospects for instability in the post-election period will
hinge on the margin of victory or defeat for the regime. The probability
would be highest if the regime either wins or loses by a narrow margin.
A narrow victory for the government would almost certainly generate
accusations of fraud and embolden the far left to launch terrorist acts
in an effort to unseat Pinochet. More moderate parties, frustrated by
their defeat, may privately sympathsize with the extremists or at least
remain neutral toward them.
The great majority of analysts believe that a narrow regime defeat
would prompt an auto-golpe by Pinochet, who would then void the results
of the balloting. Such a move probably would be supported by the Army,
whose strength and influence would counter those in the Junta who would
oppose such a move. Open splits in the military in the wake of a coup
would be unlikely in the near-term/although elements--such as the
police--might remain in their barracks rather than fulfill their
functions in the event of public unrest. In addition, some commanders
could resign in protest. A minority of analysts opined that rather than
stage a coup, Pinochet--pressured by military officers--would adhere to
the constitution, which calls for direct elections within a year.
Analysts see little likelihood of widespread and significant
electoral fraud. Most of the regime's efforts at manipulation will
likely occur during the pre-election period, when Pinochet will work to
limit the opposition's access to the media and continue intimidating
voters in the rural areas. The overwhelming number of voters--nearly 90
percent of those eligible have registered--and expected close monitoring
of polling places will keep election-day fraud to a minimum. There could
be some manipulation of the results as they are transmitted from small
towns to Santiago, but it would be unlikely to amount to more than one to
three percent of the total vote.
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Warning Issue: A narrow victory by either side will increase the
likelihood of post-election violence.
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120009-6
SUBJECT: Latin America
Warning Report August 1988
25Aug88)
NIC/ANIO/LA/
DISTRIBUTION:
Cy 1 - DCI
Cy 2 - DDCI
Cy 3 - EXDIR
Cy 4 - ER
Cy 5 - D/OPS/WHSSS/NSC
Cy 6 - C/EPDS/DO
Cy 7 - C/PCS/DO
Cy 8 - National Warning
Cy 9 - NIO/W
10 - C/NIC
11 - VC/NIC
12,- NIO/AF
13 - NIO/AL (CBW)
14 - NIO/EA
15 - NIO/GPF
16 - NIO/NESA
17- NIO/USSR
18- NIO/ECON
19- NIO/S&T
20- NIO/SP
21- NIO/Europe
22- NIO/CT
23- NIO/FDIA
24- NIO/NARC
25- NIC/AG (7807)
26- SRP
27- IPC/DDI, Room 5S06 25X1
28- OHC/ICS 25X1
29- OLL/DDI Rep (7824 Hqs)
30- D/CPAS (Room 7F17, Hqs)
31- D/LDA (Room 1H19 Hqs)
32- LDA/LA (Room 1H39 Hqs)
33- LDA/PPC Room 5G03 Hqs) 25X1
34- D/SOVA (4E58 Hqs)
35- SOVA/RPD/LA (4E28 Hqs)
36- D/OIA (3N100, Bldg 213)
37- OIA (3N100, Bldg 213) 25X1
38- D/NESA (Room 6G00 Hqs)
39- D/OEA (Room 4F18 Hqs)
40- D/OSWR (Room 5F46 Hqs)
41- D/OIR (Room 2E60 Hqs)
42- OIR/Market Group 1E41 Hqs) SI-AT
43- OIR/DSD/RASB 1H0003 Hqs) STAT
44- C/OIR/PPB GE47 Hqs) SI-AT
Staff (Room 1C921 Pentagon)
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Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/18: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400120009-6
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