MONTHLY WARNING REPORTS FOR OCTOBER 1988

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400140019-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: November 14, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Reports for October 1988
1. Summary of Key Warning Issues:
USSR-Nationalities Policy
The Intelligence Community views the Soviet nationality policy in the
Baltic as a risky experiment with potentially far-reaching implications for
the Soviet Union, the region, and Gorbachev. Moscow's radical approach toward
dealing with increasing pressures for change from within the Baltic appears
designed to gain legitimacy for Soviet rule and serve as a test for
perestroyka in the formulation of a coherent nationality policy. To this end
Moscow has:
o Sanctioned creation of Popular Fronts encompassing a broad spectrum of
political opinion.
o Replaced Brezhnev era elites with officials much more willing to
address local grievances and lead the reform effort.
Gorbachev clearly hopes that this increased latitude for local elites will
encourage aggressive economic reforms in the Baltic, where the social and
economic conditions are most favorable for such change, and will demonstrate
the advantages of this course for the state and the Soviet people.
This report reflects consideration of inputs generated at warning meetings
conducted by the National Intelligence Officers with Community representatives
from all areas. As such, it represents a Community-wide review, but it is not
a formally coordinated Community product.
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Nonetheless, these policies have encouraged forces in the region that will
be difficult for the regime to manage locally or in Moscow, and that could
easily get out of hand:
o There is substantial risk that local authorities will be unable to
control the Popular Fronts and that separatist elements will use them
to legitimize their politically unacceptable demands.
o Moscow is courting increased tensions between native populations and
Russian immigrants that could potentially spark communal violence with
much broader ramifications than the simmering conflict between
Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
o Permitting greater autonomy for Baltic peoples will encourage larger
and politically more important minorities, such as the Ukrainians, to
press Moscow for similar rights, something Moscow does not appear
willing to tolerate.
The Baltic experience has already demonstrated how far things can go when
Moscow loosens its hold on the leash; it is doubtful that the reforms can be
halted in the Baltics or elsewhere in the USSR without a strong grip from
Moscow. Considerable social, economic, and political turmoil is inevitable if
Moscow stays on the present course. Gorbachev is gambling that positive
results will tide him over the rough spots and that expectations of
nationality groups can be kept within realistic bounds. Of all Gorbachev's
gambles, this seems to be the greatest. However successful he is in packing
the leadership, it is doubtful that he could ride out the storm if Derestroyka
becomes identified with disorder and instability.
Soviet nationality policy has not been firmly set. The failure to hold a
Central Committee plenum on the subject indicates that the leadership has yet
to work out an acceptable approach, in part due to internal disagreements.
Substantial changes are possible, especially as the impact in the Baltic
becomes more apparent. Different policies are likely to be evident in
different areas, with the regime using both concessions and repression as the
situation warrants. For now, Gorbachev probably has the will and political
muscle to manage the fallout as it comes. Down the road, however, this issue,
perhaps more than any other. has the Dotential to create political conditions
USSR/Third World and East-West Relations
The extent of change in Soviet policy in the Third World remains a matter
of debate within the Intelligence Community, but there is substantial
agreement on the following:
o The Third World ranks relatively low in Gorbacnev's priorities. Moscow
acknowledges that its aggressiveness in the Third World harmed its
broader interests with the West in the late 1970s and wants to avoid
such a problem now.
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o Under Gorbachev, Soviet Third. World policy is more pragmatic and less
encumbered by ideological blinders. Moscow will place more emphasis on
newly industrializing countries (such as South Korea and Taiwan) and
pro-Western states (such as Israel and Saudi Arabia), and less on
potentially unstable and bankrupt leftist regimes.
o The Soviets are not abandoning existing clients; the flow of assistance
remains at high levels and Moscow will continue to provide what it
believes is necessary to keep existing clients afloat.
o Moscow will be more cautious than in the past about supporting military
solutions to regional conflicts and more willing to back negotiated
settlements.
o Soviets will be more willing to exert pressure on their clients to
change their domestic and foreign Dolicies if doing so seems to serve
larger Soviet interests.
The Soviets are not abandoning the Third World to the West. On the
contrary they are more active than ever. They continue to see it as a region
of varying degrees of rivalry and competition with the United States. A more
pragmatic approach could mean increased willingness to participate in
cooperative approaches to resolve regional conflicts and to more careful
take Western interests into account as they formulate their strategies.
Yugoslavia
The general consensus of the Intelligence Community is that Yugoslavia
faces its greatest threat to stability since the 1940s. The federal system
itself is being challenged by Serbian party leader Milosevic, who has mounted
an aggressive campaign designed to assert Serbian dominance in the
federation. Despite recent setbacks--and increasing opposition from other
regional and federal leaders--Serbian nationalism remains a potentially
explosive challenge to Yugoslav cohesion. While the Yugoslav federation will
probably stagger through in weakened form, there is also a risk that
heightened ethnic tensions will provoke widespread violence or increased
separatist tendencies. stibility of the country's
dismemberment.
Milosevic aims at reasserting Serbian control over Serbia's multi-ethnic
"autonomous provinces" of Kosovo and the Vojvodina. He also wants to increase
Serbia's weight within Yugoslavia as a whole--by changing the balance of power
within existing institutions, assuming power himself, or even altering the
make-up of the federal system. Milosevic's methods are unconventional, not to
say unconstitutional. Operating from a power base among local and county
bosses in Serbia, he has seized control of the Serbian media and organized
nationalist demonstrations directed against Albanians and other ethnic
groups. Milosevic draws support mainly from within Serbia-but also among
Serbs in neighboring republics, where he is projecting himself as an
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alternative to the weak federal government and a way out of the deep economic
crisis. Escalating labor unrest fuels the process by further undermining the
federal government's authority.
Intelligence Community analysts generally agree that the year ahead could
hold three scenarios, listed below from most to least likely:
o The Federation Staggers Through. Under this scenario, Serbia would
consolidate power within the Serbian Republic but not beyond. Other
republics would continue largely to go their separate ways, albeit with
wary eyes focused on Milosevic; jointly agreed reform programs would
prove insufficient to reinvigorate the federal system.
o Toward a more Genuine Federalism. There is now a small window of
opportunity for this more hopeful scenario. Leaders in the key
republics, shocked out of complacency by the Milosevic challenge, could-.
take their federal responsibilities more seriously and work toward a
more viable federation on the basis of decentralization and market
reforms. The effort would require an accommodation of some Serbian
demands but would not necessarily entail institutional change.
o A Centralized, Serb-dominated Federation. This scenario would have
Milosevic rebounding to force his will on the Kosovo and then the
Montenegrin leaderships, and ultimately on the federation as a whole.
Though not an inconceivable scenario, it is hard to see it evolving
without major violence or toward anything but an authoritarian
regime.
Some analysts also believe a fourth, alternative scenario is
likely--widespread violence. Milosevic's active encouragement of Serbian
nationalism has increased the danger of violent confrontation. Given
Yugoslavia's volatile past, it is surprising that greater violence, or the
emergence of domestic terrorism, has not occurred already. Although ethnic
tensions seem to have abated for now, a spark could touch off a cycle of
violence and repression that could overwhelm security forces, paving the way
for widespread bloodshed and breakdowns in public order.
Algeria
Recent riots in Algeria were the most serious unrest since independence.
At least 176 people were killed and police made 3,700 arrests. Continuing
economic problems and recent water and food shortages sparked the riots.
Islamic fundamentalist groups tried but failed to gain control of the riots.
The Algerians believe the French and Soviets may have helped instigate the
unrest. Algerian President Bendjedid's October 10 speech, promising election
and other reforms, offered a "quick fix" that helped end the unrest. Such
measures, however, will only gain the President a temporary respite. The
unrest is likely to return in a few months if the fails to make significant
improvements. Intelligence Community analysts question Bendjedid's ability
and willingness to go through with reforms needed to reduce ethnic and social
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pressure. They believe that the riots have weakened Bendjedid and that he
will not make changes or decisions quickly enough. Low oil revenues and a
lack of foreign aid will hamper his ability to improve the economic
situation.
2. Trend Commentary
Pakistan
Community analysts believe that Pakistan will not be interested in any
diplomatic attempt by Vorontsov, the new Soviet Ambassador to Kabul, to alter
the pattern of Pakistani support to the Afghan mujahedin. Islamabad and the
Afghan insurgents judge they have already won the war and do not need to make
a deal. Analysts believe that even if Islamabad had the desire, it could not
force a deal on the insurgents.
Concerning the elections, analysts believe that the pro-government
Pakistani Muslim League (PML) will get a plurality of seats in the election on
November 16 and will form a new government. Former Prime Minister Junejo
believes he should lead the PML and become the new Prime Minister. President
Ghulam Ishaq, however, is unlikely to agree to this and probably will look for
a compromise candidate in the PML. Violence has declined in Sind Province,
but natred between local people and Pakistanis who were born in India runs
deep. Further violence is likely, especially after the elections. We have no
evidence that India was involved in fomenting unrest in Sind.
With regard to Pakistani nuclear weapons development, Community analysts
agree that nuclear weapons are a.key goal for Islamabad. Pakistani leaders
will not halt or slow down their development programs in response to US
threats to cut off aid. The Pakistanis, however, will not do anything
deliberate--such as test a weapon--to cause US sanctions. They will continue
to try to acquire delivery systems for nuclear weapons.
Iraq
President Husayn appears to have more power now than ever before. The
power of the Ba'th party has declined and a military coup is unlikely because
of the effectiveness of Saddam's security services. Iraq will not violate the
ceasefire unless Iran does or unless the peace talks fail. Iraq wants an end
to the war, but on its terms. The threat of renewed conflict with Iran will
limit Iraq's willingness to threaten neighboring countries militarily.
Husayn, however, will seek revenge against Syria by supporting anti-Syrian
elements in Lebanon. He also will give low-level support to pro-Iraqi
Ba'thist parties in the region. Community analysts do not believe Iraq will
go to war with either Syria or Israel in the near or medium term. Iraq,
however, probably has enough personnel and opportunities to foment subversion
and terrorism in Syria. Baghdad will avoid becoming too involved with Syria
until after settling the war with Iran.
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wants access to US technology.
If the US Congress were to enact sanctions against Iraq for using chemical
weapons, analysts believe Iraq Drobablv would react in a low-key way. Iraq
Lebanon
Change or improvement is very unlikely in Lebanon over the next three
months. The trends in the country are still toward partition, especially with
the continuing failure to elect a new president and with the establishment of
rival Moslem and Christian governments. The Lebanese, moreover, believe that
others, especially the United States, should solve Lebanon's problems; they
are slow to understand the limits of US effectiveness in the area. Christian
warlord Ja Ja is opposed to any president, unless personally selected by him;
ne will, moreover, block any candidate proposed by Syria. Ja Ja does not want
a united Lebanon but hopes to set up a Christian dominated "mini-state." He
is likely to absorb the Christian Phalange Party and is in a strong position
to consolidate control over a large area.
Nicaragua
Damage wrought by Hurricane Joan will probably force a delay in
large-scale Sandinista counterinsurgency operations in south-central Nicaragua
for at least 30 days. The hurricane will also complicate efforts of the
insurgents still inside Nicaragua--now estimated at a total of no more than
2,500, including 1,500 Resistance Army of the North combatants--to live off
enhancements of Nicaragua's military capabilities.
up in 1991, when a new round of deliveries will be aimed at significant
plan, deliveries will level off during a period of consolidation and then pick
some decline in Soviet military deliveries to Nicaragua is likely. Under e
in the near term.
Financial pressures on Panama's government mount as the regime continues
to build substantial monthly deficits and delays payments to creditors.
Should such practices as running arrearages with suppliers and issuing
government checks falter, a quick economic collapse would result. There is
little likelihood, however, that the downturn will prompt large-scale unrest
The political opposition still seems inclined to participate in the May
1989 elections, should they take place. Analysts agree, however, that the
opposition would have to win by a margin of at least 30,000 votes to overcome
electoral fraud by the regime. In terms of managing the elections issue,
Noriega has several options. He could:
o Decide to hold elections, putting himself or a surrogate forward as the
government's candidate and using the time before the vote to undermine
the opposition and develop mechanisms for manipulating the outcome.
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o Opt for a plebiscite that could take a variety of forms ranging from
whether the term of Acting President Solis Palma should be extended
until 1992 or whether to postpone the elections, capitalizing on
sentiments among several factions that perrPiyP the rapidly approaching
May date working against their interests.
Haiti
Community analysts believe that without economic assistance, President
Avril's chances of holding power are substantially diminished. His lack of
economic resources continues to limit his maneuvering room within the
military, where he faces continued pressure. Some leftist sentimen
the military,
Nonetheless, the left is likely to make
only slow progress, especially if foreign aid is restored. Indeed, the
leftists are so internally divided, they have attracted virtually no attention
from either the Cubans or Nicaraguans. The far right is still reeling from
the co oes not have the support necessary to remove
Avril.
The National Intelligence Officer for Warning adds the following analysis
on Haiti: The reduction of Western aid in the wake of last November's aborted
election and two military coups this year has worsened Haiti's already gloomy
prospects. Haiti, the poorest nation in the Western Hemisphere, is in a
vicious no-win cycle. The weak Avril regime cannot address the country's
fundamental problems without external assistance, which donors from Europe and
North America have cut significantly because of the lack of movement toward
democracy. The donors at the same time say they want on progress toward
constitutional government--itself dependent on social and economic
stability--before resuming aid deliveries.
Haiti's intractable problems have some negative implications for the
United States. Chronic poverty will encourage more illegal emigration to the
United States; US officials monthly turn away several hundred Haitians
attempting to enter the United States illegally. Haiti's cash shortage will
encourage yet more corruption and may drive the government to look for support
from narcotraffickers, who already use Haitian airspace as one avenue for
deliveries to the United States. The extreme poverty also may, over time,
provide fertile ground for leftist insurgents. In addition, periodically
savage outbursts of violence--likely as conditions continue to
deteriorate--will remain a threat to Americans in the country.
Chile
The Chilean political landscape remains fluid in the wake of the
government defeat in the 5 October plebiscite as both sides assess the results
and map out longer-term strategies. The moderate political parties will
probably lose ground to the far left--prompting an increase in violence--if
President Pinochet refuses to show flexibility on political reform. The
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Intelligence Community agrees that if the opposition can remain unified, no
regime candidate will be able to win the December 1989 presidential election.
Community analysts are divided, however, over whether Pinochet will be able to
hold firm to his position not to enter into a dialogue with the opposition on
constitutional reforms, such as holding the presidential election sooner than
December 1989. Pinochet is still considering running as the government
candidate, although there is growing sentiment against him within the ruling
military Junta. Nevertheless, the Junta will probably not ask Pinochet to
resign either the presidency or his command of the Army, at least until after
the December 1989 election.
Chad/Libya
There is little likelihood of renewed fighting between Chad and Libya in
the Aozou region of northern Chad during the next 90 days. An increase in
Chadian military readiness by late December, however, may increase slightly
the chances that Chad would initiate fighting then. Chadian President Habre
does not appear to face any significant domestic opposition or insurmountable
discontent within the military.
Uganda
The security situation in northern Uganda remains problematic. Although
rebels have the upper hand in much of the countryside, they do not threaten
the regime of Ugandan President Museveni, which appears committed to a
military rather than political solution to the country's serious ethnic
tensions.
Angola
Operations by the Angolan army against rebels of the pro-Western Union for
the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) may become larger in the central
region of the country and will not necessarily be inhibited by the onset of
the rainy season. The intentions of President Dos Santos regarding
reconciliation with the rebels remain unclear. Regional leaders plan to hold
talks in an effort to encourage the government and the rebels to reconcile,
and this initiative may help move forward the currently stalled negotiations
between Angola and South Africa.
The National Intelligence Officer for Warning adds the following
assessment of Angola: UNITA is prepared to continue to fight if diplomatic
efforts fail to achieve a ceasefire and a dialogue on power sharing. UNITA
leader Savimbi is seeking direct talks with the Luanda regime while
international attention is focused on the US-mediated negotiations among
Angola, Cuba, and South Africa. UNITA has distanced itself from those
negotiations because of diminishing confidence that the United States will
support its interests, concern about the lack of progress toward national
reconciliation, and fear that a deal will be cut at its expense.
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To focus attention on the need for a political settlement within Angola,
Savimbi, with US support, is trying to get African national leaders to
pressure Dos Santos into direct talks with UNITA. While some 15 leaders
reportedly are supportive, there has been little coordinated effort to press
Luanda. To show good faith, Savimbi says he is willing to recognize the
Luanda regime and go into exile temporarily to facilitate talks. Dos Santos,
however, appears confident that he'is gaining the upper hand as South Africa
disengages from Angola and--if a regional settlement is reached--from Namibia;
he has refused tone otiate with UNITA althou h he has acknowledged the need
to talk eventually.
If UNITA fails to win a political settlement, it will continue its
military struggle. Savimbi recognizes that his military position is weakened
at least temporarily by South Africa's withdrawal. He anticipates less
support from South Africa, is unsure of US aid, and expects Cuban-backed
Angolan forces to try to crush UNITA militarily. If necessary, UNITA will
revert from semi-conventional warfare to guerrilla tactics but retain its
political objectives. We expect UNITA to survive even a determined assault
and to continue to battle Luanda.
Counterterrorism--Europe, Algeria, Lebanon
Two forthcoming events in 1989 may provoke the pro-Iranian, Lebanese Shia
Hizballah group to renew terrorism in Europe. These events are the end of the
trial in West Germany of two brothers in the Hizballah organization for
possessing explosives, and the trials of a group that carried out the Paris
bombings in 1986.
Support provided by Algeria facilitates the operations of international
terrorist groups. Largely because of its traditional leftist orientation and
sympathy for national liberation movements, Algeria maintains relations with
several radical groups. Such activity also provides the regime some influence
over these groups. Algeria provides almost unrestricted safehaven to a number
of Palestinian groups, almost certainly including the Palestinian Front for
the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command, the Palestine Liberation Front,
and Fatah's Force 17. Algeria also allows Abu Nidal to headquarter his
organization in the country, and recent developments suggest that this
contingent is deeply involved in operational activities worldwide. In the
.wake of renewed terrorist activity by Abu Nidal and international publicity
about the group's use of Algeria to facilitate its operations, Algiers may
reduce its support for the group..
The release of Mithileshawr Singh from captivity does not necessarily
portend the early release of the remaining western hostages in Lebanon. CIA
analysts believe Singh was released because he is not an American citizen, and
that the release was probably encouraged by Iran.
Counternarcotics--The Caribbean, Europe, Worldwide Heroin
The Panamanian crisis has prompted narcotraffickers to find alternate
locations for money laundering operations. For the present they appear to be
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focusing on The Caymans and the Bahamas. Their basic approach, however, may
be to-wait out the Panamanian difficulty until the political and economic
climate is more favorable to their interests, at which time they will return
to Panama.
The National Intelligence Officer for Counternarcotics made the following
observations after attending the conference of European Narcotics
Coordinators, sponsored by the Department of State's Bureau for International
Narcotics Matters:
o Europe is ill-prepared philosophically, socially, and institutionally
to deal with what is bound to become a major cocaine explosion over the
next few years.
o The European drug enforcement infrastructure has been and is currently
aimed at confronting a heroin trafficking problem. In the cocaine
trade, the players and the trafficking networks are all different.
o Watching the United States develop its drug policies, Europe is not
sure that our current approach is very effective, and is quick at this
point to question critically US drug enforcement and prevention
methods.
o With national customs barriers ending by 1992, Europe will face a
significant challenge to the enforcement process.
The worldwide heroin trade is growing increasingly complex and difficult
to police despite numerous drug control initiatives over the past two
decades. The effectiveness of opium production control strategies is
increasingly limited by the growing sophistication of current trafficking
networks and the expansion of markets. Crop eradication efforts are
fragmenting the trade by causing traffickers to turn to alternate source
areas, such as Afghanistan and Laos. Qeneratin4 an increasingly complex web of
routes, methods, and networks.
3. The NIO/Warning notes these additional areas of warning concern:
Although the agreement by the Warsaw regime and Solidarity leader Walesa
to discuss long contentious issues is a positive sign, major differences
remain: The parties postponed the beginning of "roundtable" talks in
mid-October. Poland may have entered a highly uncertain period that could
harden the regime's impasse with Solidarity and the Church, thereby sharply
increasing the chances of a new wave of strikes and breakdowns in public order
in the next six months. Such events could have a major impact on Soviet
politics and policies, as well as on the balance of forces in other East
European countries. Soviet leader Gorbachev has identified himself so closely
with General Jaruzelski that any conspicuous failures by the Polish leader in
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handling the explosive contest with Solidarity could damage the Soviet
leader's authority at home and abroad.
The Warsaw regime has been shaken by the strikes in ports, shipyards,
steel mills, and coal mines in April, May, and August which inflicted heavy
losses on the already chaotic economy. Jaruzelski, however, cannot satisfy
Solidarity and Church demands for genuine political and trade union pluralism
without risking the loss of the Communist party's monopoly of power. The
party, moreover, is deeply divided; hardliners oppose meaningful reforms and
concessions,_particularly the reinstitution of Solidarity as an independent
This unyielding stance will collide with Walesa's insistence that the key
issue is legalization of the union, with Solidarity's warning that
legalization "is not negotiable," and with more radical workers' demands for
democratization. The outlook. therefore. is for a lengthly impasse over this
potentially explosive issue.
The regime's reluctant agreement merely to open talks with Solidarity
leaders carries high risks of stimulating growing public expectations of
genuine political and economic reforms. If expectations are frustrated again,
there could be a powerful backlash against the regime. This--along with
worsening living standards--would end the apathy and passivity that has
characterized the Polish population since 1981; Poland would face a l 9m
winter of strikes, confrontations, and accelerated economic decline.
Middle East
Many of the Middle East countries that have chemical weapons programs are
also developing biological weapons'(BW). They apparently perceive that
biological weapons/agents have military advantages and are working on
traditional types of BW agents such as anthrax, botulism, and ricin.
The decisions of these countries to develop BW capabilities--despite an
international agreement banning BW--indicate that perceived military
advantages of such weapons have won out over political drawbacks. BW agents
can be produced cheaply, secretly, and on relatively short notice; they can,
moreover, threaten civilian populations as well as military forces
We are concerned about the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining these
agents in sufficient amounts to permit limited, surreptitious use. US
interests in the Middle East and elsewhere are at risk to BW agents; we
currently have no detection capability and are likely to have little warning
of an attack.
Somalia
President Siad's inability to quell the rebel offensive in northern
Somalia has resulted in an increased threat to US facilities at Berbera.
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Meanwhile, worsening tribal rivalries and public opposition to the regime's
war mobilization effort have increased the likelihood of a coup attempt or a
decision by Siad to step down.
Siad's insistence on a military solution to the insurgency has thwarted
Western efforts to encourage him to negotiate. In his search for military
support, Siad has even sought rapprochement with Libya. Disappointed with the-.
levels of military assistance from the US and the West, Siad has accepted
small arms ammunition, howitzers, and other materiel from Tripoli since late
August.
The Siad regime appears particularly vulnerable to military coup plotting,
principally because acts of favoritism by Siad for his family and clan over
the past year have narrowed the political base of his regime. Adding to
Siad's problems, the Somali people are increasingly distressed by the
government's drastic war mobilization efforts such as impressment of youth
from the streets for military service. Urban disturbances in the south have
added to the military's burdens. Frequent rumors in Mogadishu also point to a
possible military takeover.
Argentina
Argentina's staggering foreign debt of $52 billion, of which $8.6 billion
is owed to US banks, has become a major focus in the campaign of Peronist
party candidate Carlos Menem, who is likely to win the May 1989 presidential
election. If elected, the populist, charismatic Menem plans to call for a
negotiated five-year moratorium on interest payments, which could prompt other
countries to adopt confrontational stances on debt service payments and
endanger major US banks.
Menem's stance on the debt issue is largely an appeal for domestic
support. In order to broaden his power base beyond his traditional popularity
with the working class, Menem has played on deep middle class discontent with
President Alfonsin's failure to stem inflation--currently heading toward 500
per cent annually--and a corresponding decline in real wages. Menem has also
attempted to assuage military suspicions of his populist policies with
promises to raise officer and enlisted salaries and to increase the military
budget.
If Argentina declares a moratorium, the US Federal Reserve could force US
banks to write off the credits. Such an event would have serious implications
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 T(1P CF('RFT
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for the US banking industry, already weakened by billions of dollars worth of
bad foreign loans. 25
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SUBJECT: Distribution for Monthly Warning Reports
Cy 1 - NIO/W Subject File
7E47 HQ
Cy 2 - NIO/W Chrono File
7E47 HQ
Cy 3 - * Executive Director
7D55 HQ
Cy 4 - * Executive Registry
7E12 HQ
Cy 5 - DDI 7E44 HQ
Cy 6 - Senior Review Panel
7842 HQ
Cy 7 - NIC/AG 7807 HQ
Cy 8 - NI0/AF 7E48 HQ
cy 9 - NI0/AL (MGen Einsel)
7B42 HQ
Cy 10 -
NI0/CT 7B07 HQ
Cy 11 -
NI0/EA 7E62 HQ
Cy 12 -
NI0/E 7E48 HQ
Cy 13 -
NI0/EUR 7E62 HQ
Cy 14 -
NI0/FDIA
7B27 HQ
Cy 15 -
NI0/GPF 2E49 HQ
Cy 16 -
NI0/LA 7E62 HQ
Cy 17 -
NIO/N 7E62 HQ
Cy 18 -
NI0/NESA
7E48 HQ
Cy 19 -
NI0/S&T 7B42 HQ
Cy 20 -
NIO/SP 2E49 HQ
Cy 21 -
NI0/USSR
7E62 HQ
Cy 22 -
D/CPAS 7F16 HQ
Cy 23 -
D/OIR 2E60 HQ
Cy 24 -
D/LDA 1H19 HQ
Cy 25 -
D/SOVA 4E58 HQ
Cy 26 -
D/EURA 6G42 HQ
Cy 27 -
D/ALA 3F45 HQ
Cy 28 -
D/OIA 3N200-12
- Bldg 213
Cy 29 -
D/NESA 2G11 HQ
Cy 30 -
D/OEA 4F18 HQ
Cy 31 -
D/OGI 3G00 HQ
Cy 32 -
D/OSWR 5F46 HQ
* w/att
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