OCTOBER WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000400140023-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 27, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/06/14: CIA-RDP91B00776R000400140023-8
The Director of Central Inte ce
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-03225/88
27 October 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: October Warning and Forecast Report
1. Autonomy in the Baltic? The Soviet Nationalities Policy Experiment
in the Baltic
A. Discussion: There was substantial agreement with CIA/SOVA ' s view
that Soviet nationality policy in the Baltic is a risky experiment
with potentially far reaching implications for the Soviet Union, the
region, and Gorbachev.
Soviet Objectives. Moscow's radical approach toward dealing with
increasing pressures for change from within the Baltic appears
designed to gain legitimacy for Soviet rule and serve perhaps as a
test bed for perestroika in the formulation of a coherent nationality
policy.
-- To this end, Moscow has so far sanctioned creation of Popular
Fronts encompassing a broad spectrum of political opinion and
even encouraged the challenge to the old order by replacing
Brezhnev era elites with officials much more willing to address
local grievances (recognition of native languages, local economic
autonomy, and Russian immigration) and lead the reform effort.
-- Gorbachev clearly hopes that this increased latitude for local
elites will encourage an aggressive implementation of economic
reforms in the Baltic where the social and economic conditions
are most favorable to such reforms and will demonstrate the
advantages of this course for the state and Soviet people.
Disruption Inevitable. While Gorbachev and his associates apparently
calculate that they can maintain order in the Baltic republics, these
policies have encouraged forces in the regi on that will be difficult
for the regime locally or in Moscow to manage and that could easily
get out of hand. Among others:
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there is substantial risk that local authorities will be unable
to control the Popular Fronts much as the Polish regime failed to
manage Solidarity and that separatist elements will use them to
legitimize their politically unacceptable demands.
by accommodating minority grievences, Moscow is courting
increased tensions between native populations and Russian
immigrants that could potentially spark communal violence with
much broader ramifications than the simmering conflict between
Armenians and Azerbaijanis.
permitting greater autonomy for Baltic peoples will encourage
larger and politically more important minorities such as the
Ukrainians to press Moscow for similar rights, something Moscow
does not appear willing to tolerate.
Implications. As in other areas of Soviet domestic life, Gorbachev is
pursuing policies that we never expected to see and that we believe
could pose serious dangers to him and perhaps the Soviet system. By
searching for new models for nationality and center/periphery
relations, he is headed into unchartered water. Neither he nor we can
now predict how developments will unfold, ?whether they will
permanently affect the operation of the Soviet system, or if the
turmoil will lead to retrenchment and reimposition of order.
If nothing else, the Baltic experience has already demonstrated
how far things can go when Moscow loosens its hold on the leash;
it is doubtful that it can be halted there or ultimately
elsewhere in the USSR without a strong grip from Moscow.
Considerable social, economic, and political turmoil is
inevitable if they stay on the present course. Gorbachev is
running the risk that positive results will tide him over the
rough spots and that expectations of nationality groups can be
kept within realistic bounds.
Of all his gambles, this seems to be the greatest. However
successful he is in packing the leadership, it is doubtful that
he could ride out the storm if perestroika becomes identified
with disorder and instability.
B. Warning: Soviet nationality policy has not been firmly set. The
failure to hold a Central Committee plenum on the subject indicates that
the leadership has yet to work out an acceptable approach, in part due to
internal disagreements. Substantial adjustments/alterations are possible,
especially as the impact in the Baltic becomes more apparent. Different
policies are likely to be evident in different areas with the regime using
both concessions and repression as the situation warrants. For now
Gorbachev probably has the will and political muscle to manage the fallout
as it comes. Down the road, however, this issue, perhaps more than any
other, has the potential to create political conditions for his removal.
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2. Soviet Policy in the Third World and East-West Relations
A. Discussion: An exchange of views led off by DIA suggests that the
extent of change in Soviet policy in the Third World remains a matter of
debate within the intelligence community. While some analysts emphasize
what has changed, and others emphasize what hasn't, there appears to be
substantial agreement on the following conclusions:
The Third World ranks relatively low in Gorbachev's priorities.
Relations with the United States, West Europe (essential to the
success of Gorbachev's domestic reform program) and Japan take first
priority with China running a close second. Moscow acknowledges that
its aggressiveness in the Third World harmed its broader interests
with the West in the late 70s and wants to avoid such a problem now.
Soviet policy in the region under Gorbachev is more pragmatic and
less encumbered by ideological blinders. Practical considerations
(who can offer the trade and technology they need for domestic
modernization) will play a larger role. They will place more emphasis
on newly industrializing countries (such as South Korea and Taiwan)
and other pro-Western states (such as Israel, Saudi Arabia and
Egypt), and less on potentially unstable and bankrupt leftist regimes.
The Soviets are not abandoning existing clients (except Afghanistan);
the flow of assistance remains at high levels and Moscow will
continue to provide what it believes is necessary to keep existing
clients afloat.
Moscow will be more judicious, however, with its economic and
military assistance and more willing to exert pressure on its clients
to change their domestic and foreign policies if doing so is seen as
serving larger Soviet interests.
The USSR will be more cautious than in the past about supporting
military solutions to regional conflicts and more willing to back
negoti ated arrangements.
The Soviets are not abandoning the Third World to the West. On the
contrary they are more active than ever. They continue to see it as
a region of varying degrees of rivalry and competition with the
United States. A more pragmatic approach could mean increased
willingness to participate in cooperative approaches to resolve
regional conflicts and to more carefully take Western interests into
account as they formulate their strategies.
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Robert Blackwell
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SUBJECT: October Warning and Forecast Report
Outside Attendees
Paul Goble
Evan Press
Ints Sums
Priscilla Cl a
e er . osman
William Stearman
Scott Salmon
Joseph Abramson
STATE
State
State
State
NSA
NSA
NSA
NSA
NSA
NSA
DIA
DIA
DIA
NSC
NSC
ARMY
ARMY
Inside Attendees
Bob Blackwell
SECRET
NIO/USSR
A/NIO/USSR
A/NIO/USSR
A/NIO/USSR
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
SOVA
LDA
LDA
SOVA
SOVA
OGI
SOVA
FBIS
FBIS
DO/SE
DO/SE
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