THE PHILIPPINES: SNAP ELECTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100030004-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/29: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100030004-5
The Philippines: Snap Elections
President Marcos's announcement on US television Sunday that
he intends to hold a snap presidential election on 17 January--
the fifth anniversary of lifting martial law--accelerates
elections scheduled for June 1987. The mechanics for the
proposed elections are still unclear--the US Embassy reports that
revisions to the election code may permit an election,
referendum, or plebicite. Furthermore, Marcos apparently plans
to proceed without first resigning from office as required by the
constitution.
In our judgment Marcos has selected this strategy--and
announced it to a US audience--primarily to~ outflank his critics
in the US. We believe that he has been angered by mounting
criticism of his administration in the US press and disturbed by
the recent series of high-level US visitors. Marcos is
apparently confident that he can win an election and thereby
silence many of his critics.
-- Recent polls indicate that he is the most likely
winner.
-- The opposition is badly fragmented and will be hard
pressed to mount a strong campaign on short notice.
NAMFREL, the private poll monitoring group, will have
little time to organize effectively in rural areas where
Marcos's party exercises considerable control.
-- If he waits until 1987, the Communist insurgency will
only worsen and may prevent his party from manipulating
elections in the countryside.
-- In our judgment, Marcos expects that his election or
referendum victory--unless blantly fraudulent even by
Philippine standards--will divide and confuse US
policymakers, regain some of his Congressional
supporters, and give him a temporary reprieve from
pressures to reform political, military, and economic
institutions.
Sunday's announcement apparently caught members of the ruling
and opposition parties by surprise.
-- The opposition may be faced with the "no-win"
prospect of participating in elections controlled by
Marcos or boycotting the process--thereby supporting 0f0
'
Marcos
s contention that the opposition is afraid to
test its popular support because it has none.
J)
25X1
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-- Some of the moderate opposition believe that the
election is unconstitutional, but front-runner Salvador
"Doy" Laurel says that he welcomes the chance to face
Marcos. Cory Aquino is, for the moment, uncommitted.
-- Independent-minded ruling party member Arturo
Tolentino told the press that the elections are
unconstitutional and Marcos is bluffing. However,
Marcos's key political advisor, Deputy Prime Minister
Rono, said Sunday that Marcos's announcement was "the
real thing".
-- Many important legal questions remain unresolved,
however, including whether Marcos will run with a vice
president--he prefers not to--and whether the January
election will usher in a new six-year term or only serve
as a temporary bridge to the June 1987 presidential
elections.
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Imelda Marcos Vast financial and political re-
sources accrued through positions
as Minister of Human Settlements
and Governor of Metropolitan
Manila ... tight control of access
to Marcos's powerful allies-
Romualdez, Cojuangco, and Ver.
Juan Ponce Enrile Has amassed considerable financial
and political resources in his years
as Defense Minister ... longstand-
ing relationship with Eduardo Co-
juangco who reportedly would back
his bid ... has been mending fences
in the ruling party ... small group
of officers in the military loyal to
him.
Eduardo Cojuangco Wields tremedous political and fi-
nancial clout, including well-oiled
political machine nationwide
... one of Marcos's principal cron-
ies ... business interests include
control over the coconut industry
and the Philippines' largest food
processing company ... US Em-
bassy estimates he may be a
billionaire.
Arturo Tolentino Highly independent KBL member
... well respected by party mem-
bers as well as among opposition
and foreign observers ... former
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Jose Rono Shrewd politician ... one of Mar-
cos's closest political advisers
... effective moderator between
opposition and ruling party assem-
blymen ... Deputy Prime Minister,
Minister of Local Government,
Secretary General of the ruling
party.
Salvador Laurel President of UNIDO, largest oppo-
sition coalition ... has attempted to
fill void left by Aquino's death
... former Senator ... has national
recognition.
Corazon Aquino Wife of slain leader Benigno
Aquino ... has taken highy visible
political stand since the assassina-
tion ... widely recognized and is
popular at the grassroots level.
Ramon Mitra Member of opposition group PDP-
Laban and National Assembly-
man ... charismatic speaker with
national standing ... could proba-
bly depend on financial support of
Jovito Salonga Recently returned to Philippines
after four-year exile in US ...
president of Liberal Party, well re-
spected in opposition ranks ... se-
verely wounded in attack in
1971 ... nationally known.
Lost standing in party when she
failed to deliver Manila in National
Assembly election ... many senior
officers in military think she is
incapable of running the govern-
ment ... reportedly lacks Marcos's
political astuteness.
Closely associated with martial
law ... power has eroded as Ver's
influence has risen ... many see
him as political "has been" ... has
been viewed as arrogant by many
in ruling party.
Recent activities suggest desire to
succeed Marcos remains ... does
not recognize her unpopularity
... could move to seize power if she
determines she cannot secure the
ruling party's nomination, which
she probably expects ... requires
husband's support to succeed.
Has declared himself a candi-
date ... attempting to identify with
General Ramos's untarnished
image ... would probably seek to
build alliances with opposition to
gain support for his bid ... many in
both ruling party and opposition
believe he carries too much politi-
cal baggage to win ... has a rea-
sonably good chance.
Appears to want to influence the
succession without becoming a con- 25X1
tender... will be a key behind-the- 2bAi
scenes player ... will back whom-
ever he believes capable of winning
and protecting his interests.
Advanced age ... longtime asso- Wants to oversee the transition
ciate of Marcos ... lacks national from Marcos to new leader and
political machine. would like to be a candidate
.. could be a compromise candi-
date for opposition and ruling par-
ty members.
Viewed by many as a Marcos Reportedly is being considered as a
sychophant. good vice-presidential candidate
... his political expertise and lead-
ership skills in the party would
make him a valuable ally.
Epitomizes old style politician
... not charismatic ... family asso-
ciated with Marcos ... served in
the interim National As-
sembly ... was once member of
ruling party ... unable to galvanize
opposition following Aquino's
assassination.
Is clearly a candidate, but would
not be a popular choice among
opposition ... at a minimum will
figure prominently in opposition se-
lection ... probably will not
succeed.
Had no political experience before Many in opposition believe she
the assassination ... is first cousin could win on popular appeal alone
to Eduardo Cojuangco. ... is likely to face resistance from
opposition members who do not feel
she has paid her dues ... we believe
her support would be essential for
any opposition candidate.
Association with Cojuangco has
tarnished his credentials in opposi-
tion circles ... longstanding associ-
ation could damage his chances for
securing support for his candidacy.
Years in exile have isolated him
from opposition mainstream ... di-
visions in party may be exacerbated
by his return.
Has been mentioned by many ob-
servers as a possible candidate
... or as a vice-presidential candi-
date on a KBL-opposition coalition
ticket ... likely to be an opposition
contender.
Commands substantial influence -
within the opposition and is often
mentioned as a serious opposition
contender ... his candidacy would
probably cause dissension within
opposition, especially among those
who believe that his years of exile
should preclude his getting involved
... faces an uphill battle for the
opposition nomination.
Aquilino Pimentel Leading opposition assemblyman Still has ibversion charges pend- Often mentioned by many observ-
with national recognition ... estab- ing again:: him ... Supreme Court ers as key opposition contender
lished his credentials by becoming has barrec him from taking seat in .. strong stand against US bases
active in rallies after the Aquino National Assembly. will hurt his chances with moderate
assassination ... Chairman of opposition members ... natinnalis-
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