TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100050009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: December 6, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/07: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100050009-8
Talking Points for the DCI
The war in Afghanistan this year was more intense than in
previous years and the casualties on both sides were almost
certainly higher. The Soviets launched major operations in Konar
and Panjsher Valleys, Paktia Province and around Herat.
-- We believe that two of these operations--the Panjsher
Valley and Paktia Province efforts were launched primarily
to prevent the insurgents from scoring major victories
against Afghan regime forces.
-- The other operations yielded little gain for the Soviets;
insurgents continue to control large parts of Herat and
important infiltration routes in Konar remain open.
-- The poor performance of the Afghan Army and particularly
its high desertion rate continue to cause problems for the
The insurgents have in our view fared well against the
25X1
25X1
Soviets this year. they inflicted ~ 25X1
substantial casualties on the Soviets while avoiding taking
crippling casualties themselves. They also:
-- Carried the war into new areas of Afghanistan. For the
first time since the Soviet invasion, this year there was
significant fighting in Helmand, Ghowr, and Oruzugan
Provinces.
-- Renewed attacks on Kabul and continue to contest regime
and Soviet forces for control of Herat, Qandahar, and
Mazar-e Sharif.
Supply
Insurgent supply lines remain open des ite Sovi
regime efforts to block infiltration. 25X1
supplies are moving regularly tb al parts of the 25X1
country and are getting to the West and North more regularly than
in past years.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/07: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100050009-8
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-- Three thousand horse loads of supplies were delivered into
the Panjsher Valley alone during the summer of 1985,
Panjsher leader Masood's 25X1
con i ence in the security of his supply lines has allowed
him to launch several attacks on Soviet and regime posts
this month.
-- Insurgent use of trucks to move supplies has also
increased, and has facilitated the movement of su lies to
the Northern provinces 25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/07: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100050009-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/07: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100050009-8
SECRET
Talking Points for the DCI's Meetin with Ambassador Abramowitz
We believe several factors enter into recent pessimistic
assessments by senior Pakistani military commanders of the
Afghanistan situation.
-- In our view,, the pessimism from front-line officials is
aimed at underlining for the visiting Consultative Group
(CG) members not only the constancy of Pakistan's military
threat from Moscow but the added threat from increasing
success at subversion by the DRA. We do not rule out the
possibility that Zia may have given more or less explicit
instructions to dramatize this threat. Our evidence to
date suggests that DRA attempts to subvert the border
tribes is, in fact, meeting with some success.
-- Our recollection is that NWFP Governor Fazle Haq has
tended to blame the approximately 2.5 million Afghan
refugees for the historically volatile province's law and
order problems. His recent discussion with members of the
CG was more extreme in its pessimism but not in its
general theme.
In our view the current forceful crackdown on the tribal
areas in the North West Frontier's Khyber Agency could also be
intended, at least in part, to demonstrate the extent of DRA
mischiefmaking.
-- We believe, however, that the operation's primary intent
may be to signal the intention of the civilian government
to address key nation-building problems; bringing the
tribal areas into the mainstream of Pakistan's
administrative life would be an important step in this
regard.
-- We believe Islamabad also sees utility in demonstrating to
the US its resolve in reducing narcotics trafficking in
the tribal areas while at the same time illustrating the
difficulty in doing so. _
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/09/07: CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100050009-8