LETTER TO LEE H. HAMILTON FROM JOHN L. HELGERSON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100140001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 19, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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~~z~r-
Central Intelligence Agency
Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
Chairman
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
Attached is our analysis of the recent
Soviet Party Congress. I believe it answers
the questions that you and the other members
raised on this subject.
We have already responded by telephone to
the questions on Lebanon, Angola, and the US
naval exercise in the Black Sea.
As always, we stand ready to respond to
any other questions you may have.
Associate Deputy Director for
Intelligence
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ILLEGIB
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The 27th CPSU Congress: Gorbachev's Unfinished Business
Key Judgments
Gorbachev's first congress was a fitting cap to a successful
first year in office. He got most of what he wanted--an
endorsement for his domestic policy agenda, a new Central
Committee to carry out his policies, and a strengthened Qrio on
the pinnacle of power, the top Kremlin leadership.
The congress saw the greatest turnover in the Politburo and
Secretariat since Khrushchev's last congress in 1961, allowing
Gorbachev to build further on his unprecedented successes in
reshaping the top leadership. The placement of supporters at the
candidate Politburo and junior secretariat rank--the stepping
stone to full Politburo membership--positions him to further
_ consolidate his power over the next year or two. Gorbachev also
had considerable success at the Central Committee level, where
the largest increment of new members ince 1961 should give him a
more compliant body.
Gorbachev received a strong endorsement of his domestic
policy agenda which unfolded in his first year. The congress
repudiated the Brezhnev era stagnation and inertia, displayed a
new self-critical style of leadership, and set~down more
demanding standards for party and state bureaucrats. It blessed
Gorbachev's modernization strategy, which relies heavily on
heightened discipline in the short-term and increased investment
in machine-building and new technology over the longer term, to
reverse the stagnation of economic growth.
The congress probably opened the door to a wider discussion
of economic reform. Gorbachev advanced the concept of "radical
reform" as a legitimate topic for discussion, argued that prices,
credits, and supply and demand should play a more important role
in the economy, and quietly unveiled a change in agricultural
policies which if implemented could shift some farm production
onto cooperative or collective farm markets--where prices are
largely set by supply and demand. One of Gorbachev's proteges
justified such reliance on the "socialist market," by arguing
that state ownership of industry would prevent such a step from
evolving in the direction of capitalism.
The congress also gave a boost to Gorbachev's foreign policy
approach, underscoring the degree to which it is closely tied to
his domestic agenda. The focus on US-Soviet relations at the
expense of traditional revolutionary and internationalist themes,
and his low profile on regional issues, probably reflect his
concern that an arms race with the United States could jeopardize
his plans for economic modernization. While Soviet support for
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made some Third World leaders anxious.
key Third World clients is apparently not about to change, the
stress on arms control at the expense of rhetoric supporting
revolutionary movements and internationalist themes apparently
change.
Personnel changes at the congress reinforced the notion of
the centrality of the US-Soviet relationship. Ambassador
Dobrynin was brought back from Washington and assigned to the
Secretariat and Gorbachev protege and propaganda specialist
Aleksandr Yakovlev--who also has a strong background in US
affairs--received a similar promotion, giving Gorbachev an
unusually strong team of US specialists directly under his
control. Gorbachev probably is building a strong core of
advisors to help him pursue a more sophisticated strategy to
~~influence American and West E is opinion against SDI
and the US military buildup.
Despite these successes, there is good reason to believe
_ that Gorbachev did not get all he wanted. Despite rumors that he
wanted to oust several Brezhnev old guardists from the
Politburo--particularly Kazakh boss Kunayev and Ukrainian First
Secretary Shcherbitskiy--Gorbachev failed to accomplish this task
or to advance some of his personal proteges in the Politburo.
Pervasive resistance to change within the bureaucracy was also
mentioned by Gorbachev and other congress speakers. A
sufficiently larg^ contingent of Brezhnevite appointees remain on
the new Central Committees to act as a brake on the, pace of
party.
While endorsing Gorbachev's new more exacting standards for
personnel, the congress did not produce the bolder measures that
some Soviets had anticipated. Gorbachev did not launch a direct
attack on Brezhnev, despite reports that he would give his own
"secret speech"--a reference to Khrushchev's tumultuous
denounciation of Stalin thirty years before. He went out of his
way, in fact, to reassure the delegates that no purge was
planned. The congress also failed to enact any method for
systematically turning over leading officials, a provision which
some Soviets had suggested Gorbachev wanted in order to avert a
loss of political dynamism. Finally, second secretary Ligachev
seemed to call a halt to media discussion of sensitive issues
like bureaucratic privileges and greater democratization of the
On the economic front, Gorbachev also moved cautiously.
While opening the door to discussion of further changes, he did
not translate rhetoric into action. The five-year plan reflected
his underlying caution and confidence that a focus on better
performance of everyone from minister to worker would contribute
to a turnabou Homy without any major changes in the
short-term.
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desired modernization of the Soviet state and economy.
reorganization, neither of which succeeded in affecting the
The incompleteness of Gorbachev's victory suggests that he
still faces a predicament of how to activate the system without
throwing the bureaucracy into a panic. He has raised
expectations by his earlier anti-Brezhnevian rhetoric and calls
for change, but he still faces an ossified system and a resistant
bureaucracy, and must somehow maneuver between the extremes of
Brezhnev's immobilism and Khrushchev's penchant for sweeping
The cong~~ss sends ambigous signals about how Gorbachev
intends to surmount this obstacle. Was his caution an indication
that he had been checked by political resistance or did he
purposefully choose a low profile strategy of pressing change in
order t.o avoid providing his opponents with a clear rallying
point? Developments over the next year should provide an
opportunity to test these hypotheses and assess the degree of
Gorbachev's commitment to change:
o Will Gorbachev move more of the old guard out of the
Politburo and Central Committee and promote proteges and
allies more open to change, such as Moscow boss Yel'tsin
or First Deputy Premier Murakhovskiy?
o Will he maintain public pressure on the leadership
shortcomings of the Brezhnev era, or authorize further
public exposes on the privileges and failings of the
bureaucratic elite?
o Will he press ahead with the rumored restructuring of the
party apparatus, moving it away from day-to-day economic
issues toward a focus on strategic issues?
o Will Gorbachev give substance to his call for "radical
reform?"
o Will Gorbachev succeed in carrying through changes in
agricultural procurement policy despite likely resistance
on ideological grounds?
o Will Gorbachev's rhetoric on the increased role of prices,
credit and supply and demand translate into a significant
dilution of central control over the allocation of
economic resources?
Gorbachev needs to make headway in the areas where the
congress broke little new ground, such as cultural policy.
Gorbachev must also consolidate his hold on foreign policy
decisionmaking and should follow through on his rumored plans to
create a strong national security making policy structure in the
Secretariat, squarely under his control. It may be that
Gorbachev takes a lay-term view, content to move deliberately in
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too slowly.
that he has a long tenure ahead of him in which to turn the
country around. But he risks becoming mixed in political
frictions at ,the top and bureaucratic lethargy below if he moves
consolidating his own power.
If Gorbachev can make significant headway against this
ambitious list of undertakings, he may yet emerge as the
strongest leader since'Stalin and a genuine reformer of the
Soviet system, rather than just another party boss interested in
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SOVIET LEADERSHIP RANKINGS
Depending upon the occasion there are slight differences in the protocol
order in which the members of the Politburo appear. Since Ryzhkov's elevation
to the premiership in September 1985, Gorbachev, Gromyko, Ryzhkov, and
Ligachev have consistently stood ahead of other members of the Politburo. In
keeping with the normal protocol status accorded to their ,jobs, on most
occasions, President Gromyko and Premier Ryzhkov occupy the positions
immediately after Gorbachev. At some party functions, such as the 27th
Congress, the "second" secretary (Ligachev) has appeared in the number two
spot, next to the party leader. At another ceremony during the Congress,
however, Ligachev stood in his normal fourth-ranking position.
Below the top level leadership rankings are less predictable.
Nevertheless, there were several interesting developments in the rankings
evident at the Congress:
--Aliyev has dropped in status, for the first time ranking below all other
Moscow-based Politburo members.
--Over the past year Vorotnikov has been passed in the rankings by Chebrikov
and Shevardnadze.
--After promotion to the Politburo, Zaykov immediatel umped ahead of Aliyev
and the two regional leaders on the Politburo.
The current protocol rankings of the Politburo are presented in the
following chart. The rankings are based upon appearances at the Congress and
other recent events.
25X1
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SOVIET LEADERSHIP RANKINGS
1. General Secretary Gorbachev
2. President Gromyko
3. Premier Ryzhkov
~. Secretary Ligachev
5. Party Control Committee Chairman Solomentsev
6. KGB Chief Chebrikov
7. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze
8. Russian Premier Vorotnikov
9. Secretary Zaykov
10. First Deputy Premier Aliyev
11. Ukrainian First Secretary Shcherbitskiy
12. Kazakh First Secretary Kunayev
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O~arkov's Status
Former Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy Minister of
Defense, Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, remains in the shadows to which he
was relegated by his transfer in September 1984 to the militarily
important, but less politically sensitive, post of Chief of the
Western Theater of Militar 0 erations headquartered in Poland. At
the time, he had run afoul of the political 25X1
leadership, a t ough the precise reasons for his demotion are still
unclear. Since that time, his status has remained essentially
unchanged. 25X1
o Ogarkov retained his seat on the party's elite body, the
Central Committee, at the recent party congress and was seen on
Soviet television during the proceedings, but has not yet made
the political comeback that has been rumored to be on the way
since last July. 25X1
o that Ogarkov would return had him as a replacement 25X1
or arsaw act Commander Kulikov and Defense Minister Sokolov,
but both of the latter remain at their posts and were re-
elected to the Central Committee. ok 1 v also retained his
Politburo candidate membership. 25X1
Since his demotion he is apparently still highly regarded by many
of the younger members of the officer corps as a first-class military
strategist and thinker. Ogarkov's writings have periodically
appeared, includinsJ an article in late 1984 and a short book
reiterating some of his controversial views on defense policy in
1985. Gorbachev re ortedly read his book last year and found it
interesting. 25X1
While Ogarkov may still make a political comeback, the rumors of
his comeback have recently subsided. Although there is a general
agreement that he is very talented, his reputation as an assertive and
often overbearing advocate in pressing the military's case for
resources and modernization may continue to cloud his prospects.
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