TALKING POINTS FOR THE ADDI AND ADDO AFGHANISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIME CHANGES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00874R000100160008-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/26 :CIA-RDP91 B00874R000100160008-7
Talking Points for the ?1DDI and ADDO
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Afghanistan: Implications of Regime ~hanges
Najibullah's assumption of power probably portends a more
aggressive regime approach to the war and a heightened
emphasis on subversion of Pakistan but is not likely to lead
to any fundamental policy shifts.
-- Najibullah is extremely close to Moscow and was
probably installed because of Soviet unhappiness with
9abrak's prosecution of the war and his inability to
build an effective, durable regime.
-- ~iajibullah's long background in intelligence -- where
he earned a reputation as a ruthless and efficient
manager -- coupled with his leading role in organizing
tribal opposition in Pakistan suggest he will stress
subversion an3 penetration of insurgent groups.
Although the Soviets apparently hoped that 3abrak's departure
would dampen factional fighting in the ruJ.ing party, we
believe Najibullah's ascension may well aggravate factional
tensions in Afghanistan.
-- :ie is a long time member of the dominant ?archam
faction and is reported to have engaged in fierce
struggles with rival :{halgi faction members in the
past.
-- Najibullah's relative youth -- at 39, he is at least a
decade younger than most other Politburo members -- may
also lead to some resentment against him in the party.
-- For now, however, the regime is trying to present a
facade of unity. Last week, 3abrak, *1aj ibullah and all
leading members of the pgtitburo were shown on TV
greeting Soviet soldiers. 3abrak will apparently
retain :iis post as president of the Revotutionary
council and stay on the politburo.
The timing of 3a'arak's ouster--on the eve of the resumption of
peace~tal'.cs in Geneva--suggests that Moscow intended the
change to remove any symbolic grounds for Islamabad's
continuing refusal to negotiate directly with the 3abrak
government because of its association with the Soviet
invasion. ~nle doubt it will encourage Islamabad to recognize
FCa'~ul before a comprehensive agreement is finalized, however.
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-- Resistance leader Gailani told US officials that ':ia
had given the resistance an ultimatum: either agree on
a resistance leader before a settlement is reached, or
be prepared to fight with the Communists later.
-- The Pakistanis, have since told US officials that they
view Najibullah's ascension as a hardening of Soviet
resolve and do not expect the move to have any effect
on the Geneva process. Islamabad almost certainly
finds Najibullah--the mastermind of Kabul's
destabilization program in Pakistan's tribal areas--
unacceptable.
UN-Sponsored Proximity Talks on Afghanistan
The current and seventh round of talks that began on 5 May,
almost certainly will not result in resolution of the
outstanding issues, and likely will be prolonge3.
-- The Pakistanis believe six months is an adequate
timeframe for Soviet troop withdrawal
-- Islamaba3 wants simultaneous implementation of all
parts of the agreement--cessation of outside
interference, international guarantees, the return of
refugees, and troop withdrawal--while Kabul wants
outside interference to stop before Soviet troops begin
to withdraw.
-- Islamabad rejects the concept of a joint Pakistani-
Afg'aan commission to monitor implementation of the
settlement and prefers that a *JN or other neutral party
assume responsibility for monitoring. The Soviets
support UN negotiator Cordovez's proposal that a joint
Pakistani-Afg'zan commission monitor implementation of
the agreement, probably because they believe it would
give at least t'~e appearance of normalized relations.
Islamabad rejects the idea and want a tJV or other
n~ral party to monitor the agreement.
Despite t:~eir bouts of optimism, we believe the Pakistanis
share our skepticism about Soviet intentions regarding the
peace talcs.
'~ FX'I
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The Pakistanis almost certainly would not cut bac:: on existing
arms programs as a confidence-building measure to
encourage Moscow to negotiate, but because of Prime Minister
Junejo's political caution--endorsed, we believe, by Zia--
Islamabad will continue to stonewall on new highly visible
cross-border humanitarian aid programs.
Pakistan: Internal Developments
Benazir 3hutto's nonviolent campaign to remove Zia as army
Chief and force new elections by this fall has been
interrupted by Ramadan and the hot summer months. Neither
Junejo nor ;ia appears shaken by her rhetoric, and they have
not restricted tier activities.
-- The two still believe that, given time, 3hutto and her
People's Party will discredit themselves. pinion
polls suggest that 30-40 percent of '?akistanis are
fence-sitters--indiEE~rent to 3ia and Junejo but
suspicious of 3hutto.
although 3ia recently hinted at new elections shortly before
the current term ends in 1997, the government almost certainly
will not meet 3hutto's Fall 1986 deadline.
Tie P?P re uses on princip e to open its books for
inspection by the election Commission in order to
register.
-- ;fie believe radicals in the People's Party are likely to
pressure 3hutto into a confrontational approach in the
fall, but we doubt a call for civil diso'~edience would
meet with widespread popular approval.
-- If large-scale rioting were to develop, we believe the
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army would move forcefutl with ,Tunejo's approval, to
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